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.Foreword
This assessment responds to a request to the Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) from the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation for an
evaluation of the present state and possible future directions of space applications
technologies in the civilian sector. Four technologies are examined in detail: satellite
communications, land remote sensing, materials processing in space, and space
transportation. In addition, the assessment investigates the national policy that has
guided the development of these and other applications technologies.
For the past quarter century, the United States has been the acknowledged world
leader in the exploration of space and the use of technologies developed to operate in
the space environment. Now, however, the United States faces increasing foreign
competition in many areas of the space program, particularly in applications with
commercial promise. Civilian Space Policy and Applications examines several means
for addressing this competitive challenge. In particular, it investigates the options
available for the future deployment of U.S. land remote-sensing systems, and explores
the status of advanced satellite communications research within the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. Further, the report assesses the potential for
manufacturing useful products in space and for commercializing space transportation
systems.
OTA was greatly aided by the advice of the project advisory panel, as well as by
participants in several specialized workshops. The contributions of contractors, who
provided important analyses, and of numerous individuals and organizations that gave
generously of their time and knowledge, are gratefully appreciated.
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Chapter 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
OVERVIEW
The United States orbited its first satellite in
1958, nearly a quarter century ago. In the in-
tervening years, the United States has made great
strides in developing peaceful and practical uses
of space technology. However, in spite of the
dramatic successes of the space program, among
which are the recent flights of the Columbia shut-
tle orbiter, many informed observers express con-
siderable unease about the future of our civilian
efforts in space, particularly in light of increased
foreign competition and stringent fiscal restraints.
Because of these uncertainties and also be-
cause of emerging new prospects for using the
space environment, this assessment was re-
quested by the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, and endorsed by the
House Committee on Science and Technology.
It investigates America’s civilian space policy from
the point of view of its effects on the primary areas
of space applications technology, including space
transportation. It does not address military/in-
telligence applications projects, activities in space
science, or space exploration except insofar as
Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The successful launching (11-12-81) and return (11-14-81) of the second flight of space shuttle Columbia.
The first reuse of a manned spacecraft with Astronauts Joe H. Engle and Richard H. Truly aboard
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4 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications
these affect civilian applications. Its aim is to in-
vestigate Federal policies, public and private in-
stitutions, and the external circumstances that
shape space applications today. In keeping with
this emphasis, the assessment explores the ques-
tion of Federal involvement in space research
and development (R&D), the issues that arise
in the transition from R&D to full-fledged opera-
SPACE
Current Status
In 1958, the basic institutions and policy prin-
ciples for civilian space activities were established
in the National Aeronautics and Space (NAS) Act.
This supporting structure, though amended and
extended by legislation and presidential direc-
tives, remains essentially unchanged to this day.
During this time much has happened–not only
with regard to the space program, but also with
regard to the commercial, national, and interna-
tional context within which the program
functions.
One of the most striking changes since 1958
is that space applications are now common and
pervasive parts of day-to-day life. We rely increas-
ingly on space for vital private and public func-
tions (commercial communications and military
reconnaissance) and for useful services (land
remote sensing, navigation, and weather forecast-
ing). In the near future, we can foresee commer-
cial possibilities for processing materials in space.
All of these applications of space technology re-
quire the support of a space transportation sys-
tem, including launch vehicles, spaceports, and
tracking networks.
In spite of these advances, however, there is
no overall agreement about the direction or
scope the civilian space program should assume
in the future. For the most part, our increasing
reliance on space systems has not been appreci-
ated by the general public, which responds most
readily to spectacular manned and scientific mis-
sions.
For space applications in particular, lack of
agreement on appropriate goals has made it dif-
tional status, when and under what circum-
stances commercial involvement is appropriate,
and how to respond to commercial competition
from overseas. It also addresses questions of
space policy suggested by the Nation’s ex-
perience with applications of technology in
space.
POLICY
ficult for the executive agencies to set specific
timetables for developing space systems that meet
user needs, to encourage private sector invest-
ment, and to initiate new and/or implement man-
dated programs. In addition, there is no clear and
predictable policy or process to define at what
rate and by what criteria the transfer of technol-
ogy from Government research, development,
and demonstration programs to the private sec-
tor should take place.
The lack of consensus is of concern because
many desirable space activities require continued
Federal support. The Government continues to
play a crucial role in at least four areas that are
essential to the Nation’s future in space but have
little potential for immediate commercial return:
contribution to advanced R&D, continuation of
space science, provision of public goods and
services, and regulation/coordination of na-
tional efforts, particularly with respect to inter-
national agreements.
The failure to agree about the aims of the U.S.
space program has occurred as other nations
have been expanding their own programs. When
the U.S. space program began, the Soviet Union
was our only competitor in space. The Soviets
have never challenged our leadership in space
applications. Now, however, international com-
petition in space applications is a reality. The
Europeans and the Japanese have targeted spe-
cific space technologies for development, and
they will soon be providing stiff competition for
services heretofore offered only by the United
States. Their increased activities threaten the loss
of significant revenue opportunities for the United
States as well as a potential loss of prestige and
— — - —
Ch. I—Executive Summary l 5
influence. Japanese and European technologies
now capture a small but growing portion of the
world market in satellite communications tech-
nology. Their position is likely to strengthen in
time. In the near future they are also likely to be
in a similar position with respect to launch serv-
ices and remote-sensing systems.
Unless the United States is prepared to com-
mit more of its public and private resources to
space than it now does, it will lose its preemi-
nence in space applications during the 1980’s.
Both technological and commercial leadership
are at stake. The U.S. leadership position will
depend not only or even primarily on spending
more money, but on effectively allocating our
technical, financial, and institutional resources
to meet international competition. Given the
likely constraints on the Federal budget, it will
be important to decide in what areas the United
States wishes to compete, because attempts to
maintain a comprehensive program without addi-
tional capital and manpower may lead to sec-
ond-best technology and systems and/or inade-
quate institutional support.
Although the Federal Government must con-
tinue to play an important part in space, it can-
not do the job by itself. The twin factors of
diminishing Federal resources for civilian space
activities and the dynamic qualities of the pri-
vate sector make it important that the private
sector participate more actively in U.S. space
efforts. A great part of the success of the Euro-
pean and Japanese programs results from their
institutional arrangements within which private
and public sectors can work well together.
Specific Issues
Amending the National Aeronautics and
Space Act
The NAS Act allows for a very broad range of
activities; in itself it is not a constraint on en-
acting or implementing U.S. programs. How-
ever, it may need to be amended to allow the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) to operate space systems after the R&D
phase is complete, or explicitly to encourage
commercialization of space applications tech-
nology developed under Federal sponsorship.
In addition, certain provisions of the act, such
as the commitment to leadership in space, and
the civilian/military separation, may have to be
reinterpreted in light of current needs. Possible
changes or reinterpretations are raised as ap-
propriate in the following discussion.
Civilian/Military Relationships
The separation of the military from the civilian
space program has served this country well. It has
allowed both programs to develop along paths
that reflect their different roles and missions. The
civilian program has been conducted openly and
has provided spectacular technological achieve-
ments, many useful applications, and solid scien-
tific research results; the military and national in-
telligence activities, while providing critical
security services, have contributed significantly
to our understanding of space. Cooperation and
technology transfer between the two programs
have involved launch vehicles, launch and recov-
ery facilities, tracking and communications, and
an array of spacecraft technologies, to the mutual
benefit of both programs.
In certain cases, the sensitive and highly clas-
sified nature of military and intelligence space sys-
tems has made it difficult to transfer technology
from these programs to the civilian sector. As the
military program has grown in the past decade,
such difficulties have become more common.
The joint military and civilian roles in NASA’s cen-
tral program, development of the space shuttle,
have raised serious questions of how to divide
financial and operational responsibilities. In addi-
tion, the rise in military activities may occasion
doubt in many foreign countries about the
peaceful and civilian character of the civilian
space program. The current climate of domestic
fiscal restraint and competition with other coun-
tries argues for: 1) more timely transfer of mili-
tary technological capacity to the civilian sec-
tor; 2) assurance that past restraints on permissi-
ble civilian applications activities be reexam-
ined; 3) appropriate assignment of lead respon-
sibility where classified and unclassified space
programs have similar technical requirements;
and 4) increased joint management of programs
common to both.
— — .—. ———
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Emphasis of the Program
The current institutional structure of the
civilian space program is well-suited to major
programs of technology development such as
Apollo or shuttle. It is probably too large and
too tehnologically ambitious in an environment
of level or decreasing budgets for programs hav-
ing few major new projects. NASA’s organization
would constitute an effective base for embark-
ing on a substantial new project, but it is not well-
-suited to undertake broad responsibilities for
operations.
Embarking on any ambitious development proj-
ect involving advanced technology carries with
it the inherent risk of fiscal and institutional com-
mitment which, unless carefully planned, could
overwhelm other important parts of the space
program. The experience with the shuttle is il-
lustrative of this danger. Because of insufficient
allowance for unforeseen (but not unexpected)
development problems, it has been significantly
more expensive and difficult to bring to full opera-
tional status than originally estimated. The un-
intended (and unfortunate) result is that, during
a period of constrained Federal budgets, impor-
tant space science and space applications proj-
ects have been slighted.
Future Programs
In considering programs in space applications,
one must take into account the overall context
within which such an effort would take place. The
future of the U.S. space program as a whole will
depend on three key factors: 1) the desire to de-
velop space technology to meet national needs,
2) the degree and kind of foreign competition,
and 3) the amount of Federal and private re-
sources available,
OTA has selected alternatives that bracket a
range of possible future space programs, with em-
phasis on the implications for the four applica-
tions technologies addressed in the report. In the
following, three possible levels of U.S. response
to foreign competition are used to order options
for space applications. Foreign competition was
chosen as a basis for comparison because it leads
to the clearest distinctions between options.
Strong Response to Competition
This response would require a strong political
commitment and a consequent increase in the
Federal budget for space. A strong response to
competition could lead to two different space
programs, depending on the nature of the com-
petitive threat. it would follow from the evalua-
tion that energetic development of U.S. space
technology would lead to a strong competitive
position for the United States in other high tech-
nology areas as well.
l
l
Apollo-1ike, Government-run program. The
structure of the U.S. civilian space program
was decisively shaped in the early 1960’s by
the high-risk, manned Apollo program and
its associated projects. As in the Apollo era,
commitment to a new large centerpiece
project such as a permanent manned space
station, or a manned exploration of Mars
could be prompted by major new civilian
and military initiatives from the Soviet Union,
coupled with a desire to build on the tech-
nical and institutional resources developed
over the past two decades. A strong U.S. re-
sponse could also include a focus on applica-
tions projects as part of an effort to empha-
size certain capabilities such as communi-
cations or remote sensing in conjunction
with a central program. In either case, such
efforts would be Government dominated,
with commercial activities probably taking
a secondary place to the goal of increasing
U.S. prestige.
Competitive, applications-oriented program.
A strong reaction to European, Japanese, and
possible Soviet economic competition in ap-
plications systems could lead to an aggressive
Federal effort to maintain U.S. technological
and commercial preeminence across-the-
board. It would be based on the estimation
that foreign government support and subsidy
for their own programs could be met only
by similar support in the United States. Such
a program might well be dominated by the
Federal Government, but because one of its
primary aims would be to develop commer-
cial applications, strong efforts would be
made to enlist private industry as a major
partner.I
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Summary of Operational Landsat Applications in the Statesa
A.
B.
c.
D.
Water Resources Management
SOURCE: National Governors Conference.
Moderate Response to Competition
This response would follow from an evaluation
that foreign competition in space constitutes a
significant, but not overriding commercial or l
political challenge. There are two variations:
l Single emphasis program (majority of
resources devoted to a single project, e.g.,
the shuttle). This option describes the cur-
rent situation, where NASA’s other applica-
tions and science efforts have been steadily
reduced as shuttle development has taken
a dominant share of a constrained overall
budget. Private sector involvement in appli-
cations would be strongly encouraged. Par-
ticular “targets of opportunity” would have
to be selected to take best advantage of fi-
nancial resources.
Program with several emphases. This con-
figuration could occur when the shuttle
becomes fully operational, or if it were taken
out of NASA and operated by a private firm,
a separate Government agency, or the mil-
itary. Though NASA’s overall budget would
be reduced, nontransportation applications
might then have a larger and protected share
of NASA’S lower budget; their portion could
not be reduced as a result of increased
budgeting demands from the transportation
8 l Civilian Space Policy and Applications
activities. Private sector participation in ex-
tended, cooperative generic R&D would be
solicited to reduce costs and increase the
prospects for commercialization. For simi- l
Iar reasons, NASA’s space science programs
could also be expanded.
Low Level of Response to Competition
This response would result from a view of for-
eign competition as either not threatening or
unimportant, and a low estimate of the intrinsic
value of the public benefits of space applications,
coupled with severe constraints on the Federal
civilian space budget.
Severe/y constrained. Additional large cuts
in the civilian space budget would leave very
little room for new applications projects; the
amount available for them would depend in
part on the resources devoted to the shut-
tle. Major programs and perhaps entire
categories of activities in science and applica-
tions would have to be eliminated and some
field centers would have to be restructured
or closed. Private sector efforts would be en-
couraged, but significant Federal funding for
joint projects would not be available.
Transfer of all of NASA’s applications re-
sponsibilities. A possible response to civilian
budget cuts and a weak competitive re-
sponse by the United States would be to
transfer any remaining Government applica-
tions programs, particularly the shuttle, to
the Department of Defense (DOD) and
other Government agencies. Appropriate
NASA laboratories and facilities would be
transferred to DOD, Interior, Commerce,
and universities or private firms. NASA
would retain responsibility only for basic
research in space science and aeronautics,
with little or no applications R&D or opera-
tional role, Such a scenario would require
a radical restructuring of the civilian space
program. It should be recognized that a
transfer of some NASA activities to DOD
may be desirable even without major budget
cuts, as suggested above in the section en-
titled “Program with several emphases. ”
1959 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 T.Q,a 77 78 79 80 81 1982
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SOURCE: Off Ice of Management and Budget,
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POLICY FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS
What are the appropriate roles of the U.S.
Government in funding or otherwise encourag-
ing civilian space applications research, develop-
ment, and demonstration? Who should operate
space systems once they are developed and
demonstrated? Discussion of these two fun-
damental questions forms the basis of much of
this assessment.
Federal Operation of Space Systems
At present, NASA is the civilian agency desig-
nated to conduct R&D of space systems and to
operate launchers. The National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA) operates the
weather satellites and is scheduled to assume
operation of the Landsat system until the latter
is transferred to private hands. Decisions on when
a technically successful space system changes
from R&D to operational status, and where opera-
tional responsibility lies (whether in NASA, a
separate agency, a mission agency, or a private
firm), have been made ad hoc. Insofar as the cur-
rent procedure maintains flexibility, it has worked
well; nonetheless, the absence of guidelines for
the transition from R&D to operations leads to
uncertainty and inefficiency in the various
programs.
In particular, NASA’s role in operating, as op-
posed to developing, applications systems needs
to be clarified. The NAS Act itself gives NASA only
limited operational responsibilities, and suc-
ceeding executive and congressional interpreta-
tions of the act make it clear that NASA is not
to be primarily an operations agency, with the
exception of providing launch services. Never-
theless, one approach to circumventing poten-
tial conflict between NASA and the Federal agen-
cies which manage space systems and to easing
the transition of applications systems from R&D
to operational status would be to restructure
NASA’s charter in the NAS Act and to allow it
to operate selected Federal civilian space sys-
tems. Such a broadening of NASA’s role would
require the agency to restructure itself internally
so that it couId gain expertise in specific mission
areas.
Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
ERTS-1 satellite counting down, July 1972. The ERTS program
was the first step in merging space and remote-sensing
technologies into a system devoted to managing the Earth’s
resources more efficiently
. — — .  -
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On the other hand, insofar as the mission agen-
cies already have the necessary knowledge and
supportive institutional structures, there are good
reasons to place mission-related space systems
in their care. It must be noted, though, that space
systems often support the activities of several mis-
sion agencies. If mission agencies are to operate
space systems, the lead agency with respect to
each application should be designated early in
the R&D phase in order that it may be involved
in designing specifications and planning for the
demonstration phase, with a view to the services
they are to provide to other agencies and the
private sector.
Whether space systems are operated by NASA
or by other Federal agencies, adequate planning
for the use of space technology requires that the
needs of ultimate users of the new technology
be considered in the development stages. poten-
tial users must also be involved in planning and
evaluating the demonstration experiments.
Commercial Ownership of
Space Systems
One important way to strengthen the Nation’s
space program is to enlist a greater share of pri-
vate resources and responsibility in space tech-
nology. To do so will require the development
of innovative institutional mechanisms and incen-
tives, examples of which are discussed later in
this chapter. One way to focus attention on this
aspect of the space program would be to amend
the NAS Act to include commericalization as an
explicit goal for appropriate space systems.
There is no single best model for commercial-
izing space applications technologies. The par-
ticular series of steps that led to the COMSAT
Corp., for example, though effective in promoting
satellite communications, will not necessarily
serve as a paradigm for other technologies. Com-
mercialization of other space technologies re-
quires that the special circumstances and different
requirements of each be considered in determin-
ing whether and to what extent any system
should be privately owned. At a minimum, re-
gardless of the means considered appropriate for
transfer of federally developed technology into
the private sector, at a minimum interested in-
dustrial participants should be involved in plan-
ning for the demonstration phase (i.e., the phase
prior to commercialization) in financing, in set-
ting technical specifications, and in articulating
the goals of potential customers.
The effectiveness of tax and other incentives
(e.g., patent policy and antitrust policy) for en-
couraging stronger industry participation in space
technology R&D varies according to the technol-
ogy and the industry. Though general policies
such as changes in depreciation allowances or
tax credits for R&D can have major effects on
private investments, OTA has not evaluated the
implications for space of such approaches. The
“Joint Endeavor Agreement (JEA),” recently in-
troduced by NASA, is a promising and innova-
tive initiative to encourage private sector interest
by allowing individual treatment of industry
needs in the context of NASA’s overall goals.
Through JEA, NASA agrees to provide free shut-
tle launches and limited on-board services for
private sector experiments or technology demon-
stration programs that meet certain criteria—such
as technical merit, contribution to innovation,
and acceptable business arrangements. Though
originally designed to encourage private sector
participation in NASA’s materials processing pro-
gram, JEA, along with similar arrangements al-
lowing for different degrees of participation,
may also be useful in encouraging new advances
in satellite communications and remote sensing.
In addition, NASA could also encourage in-
dustrial development of space R&D by offering
to launch experimental private sector devices or
satellites in return for some portion of their ac-
tivity being devoted to public service. Another
possibility is to allow NASA to collect a royalty
fee on future profits from satellites in return for
a free launch.
If the move to commercialize space applica-
tions technologies is to develop successfully, Gov-
ernment and industry must show an increased
willingness to work together to share the risks and
benefits of new technology. In particular, private
firms must not expect publicly financed technol-
ogies to be transferred gratis, and Government
agencies must be willing to relinquish control
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over their projects and to plan ahead for even-
tual commercialization.
Commercializing space technology raises a
number of complicated regulatory issues. Domes-
tic and international problems concerning direct
broadcasting technologies, remote sensing of for-
eign territories without prior consent, and the
development of private launch vehicles have
already arisen. As the technology to support
materials processing in space improves, new
chemicals, alloys, and pharmaceuticals may be
produced, some of which may require Govern-
ment oversight to assure their content, quality,
and safety. Because the technologies and the
regulatory issues each raises are so different,
regulation of each is best handled by agencies
that specialize in each technology. In some cases,
such as developing new drugs, regulatory policies
(e.g., those of the Food and Drug Administration)
are already in place; in others, such as private
operation of launch vehicles, new policies or in-
stitutions are likely to be required.
Technologies
Of the many technologies that can be applied
in space, OTA chose advanced satellite commu-
nications, land remote sensing, materials process-
ing, and space transportation to study because:
1 ) these technologies raise issues that are of cur-
rent interest, 2) they illustrate a range of issues
faced by space applications, and 3) they have
commercial potential.
Advanced Satellite Communications
The private sector has operated communica-
tions satellite systems since 1964. Today, largely
because of original research conducted by NASA
and several private laboratories, the industry is
flourishing. It is the most profitable area of space
technology to date. In 1973, because of strong
industry pressure, NASA began to phase out its
advanced satellite communications research pro-
gram. By 1977, however, the communications in-
dustry had decided that NASA had a role to play
and urged it to begin advanced communications
research again. Although NASA reinstituted a
small program in 1978 ($26.7 million in 1981 and
$15.9 million in 1982), it may need to be ex-
panded. Consequently, in order to strengthen
NASA’s role in supporting advances in satellite
communications technology, it may be desirable
for Congress to direct NASA to pursue a vigor-
ous program in advanced satellite communica-
tions R&D.
Projections of increasing demands for commu-
nications services, especially television distribu-
tion, indicate that technology for exploiting the
Ka-band (30/20 GHz) of the radio spectrum can
be developed into profitable operational systems
well before 2000. Development and demonstra-
tion of this technology require at least some
generic research of the sot-t not customarily done
by the private sector. Already the Europeans and
the Japanese are developing 30/20 GHz systems
heavily subsidized by their governments. The vir-
tual certainty that foreign systems will come on-
line sometime in this decade has occasioned
debate about whether NASA should undertake
a large 30/20 technology R&D program, including
flight-testing of 30/20 hardware. Proponents of
a NASA program argue that the private sector
alone cannot afford to develop 30/20 systems, but
that if they are not developed, the United States
will lose an important market and its strong lead
in communications technology. An important
consideration is that several companies are
already doing some Ka-band work near 30/20
GHz for the military. It appears that 30/20 de-
velopment is an area in which creative new
mechanisms for Government/private sector co-
operation could be tried. A joint public/private
demonstration project, with substantial finan-
cial participation from several corporations,
might be possible and desirable. However, in
order to encourage the private sector to enter
into such an arrangement, appropriate incen-
tives would have to be devised.
On the other hand, perhaps the salient issue
for commercial 30/20 systems, especially in the
United States, is not whether NASA should lead
the way, but when the private sector judges it
appropriate to bring such systems into the mar-
ket. Systems currently in use, both satellite and
ground based, can still be substantially improved,
and the private sector is working to do so. Until
most of these improvements are made, private
firms, acting alone, may not find it advantageous
——
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The Communications Problem
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
to jump to 30/20, even if firms of other nations
do. However, there is no doubt that eventually
the United States will need to develop 30/20. The
question is when. An important consideration is
that crowding of the geosynchronous orbit and
the radio spectrum has led to international po-
litical problems that the private sector cannot
resolve on its own. Accelerating the availability
of 30/20 technology could render these problems
more tractable.
The case of 30/20 demonstrates that in satellite
communications, as with other space applications
technology=, the United States lacks a consistent
policy to assure coordination of military, civilian,
and industry efforts. This absence of clear vision
will again become a problem as a new configura-
tion for communications satellites, large com-
munication space platforms, becomes possible
in the 1990’s. Large communications platforms
could support large multibeam antennas and the
associated switching electronics needed for vastly
expanded point-to-point services. The major
question to be answered by a possible develop-
ment and demonstration project is whether the
alleviation of congestion in the geostationary orbit
and reduced costs outweigh the problems of as-
sembling them in orbit. A further important ques-
tion is whether the risk of development is low
enough so that the private sector will be able to
develop large communications platforms on its
own, or whether a NASA program is necessary
or desirable, perhaps in cooperation with
INTELSAT or other interested international
parties.
Many of the pressing issues in satellite com-
munications are not related directly to the use
of space but concern regulation or involve ques-
tions of national sovereignty. Direct broadcast
television and geostationary orbit allocation are
examples of such important issues (see the recent
OTA repot-t, Radio frequency Use and Manage-
ment: Impacts From the World Administrative
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Radio Conference of 1979). Although these issues
are not fully addressed in this report, it is impor-
tant to note that because the Federal Government
and relevant international organizations have not
decided how direct broadcast television is to be
regulated, industry’s investment in this technol-
ogy is laden with extra risks. Designing appro-
priate regulations requires considerable technical
knowledge and some research. In order to aid
the regulatory bodies, it may be desirable to mod-
ify NASA’s legislative charter to direct the agen-
cy to support the research needs of their prospec-
tive regulatory actions.
Satellite Land Remote Sensing
The future of U.S. civilian satellite land
remote sensing is in considerable doubt. The
question of what to do with the U.S. system is
a critical one for the future of the management
and development of U.S. natural resources.
Whatever is decided, the question should be
resolved with dispatch. The needs of the data
users make it essential that continuity of data
flow be maintained and that price increases be
predictable and incremental. However, at the
present time, it is unclear whether the United
States will have a civilian remote-sensing capa-
bility after the flight of Landsat D, and what
prices will be charged for data. Landsat D is
scheduled to be launched in the third quarter of
fiscal year 1982 and has a mission goal of approx-
imately 3 years.
NASA has managed the Landsat program as a
quasi-operational system for several years. Under
its leadership, the value of Landsat data for pro-
viding synoptic views of the Earth has been
proved. The launch of Landsat D will bring this
technology nearer to operational status under the
management of NOAA. However, there are sev-
eral general concerns about the viability of the
Landsat program. First, because Landsat D will
carry new and untried sensors as well as proved
ones, one cannot be certain that it will provide
full operational service. In addition, budget
restrictions might make it difficult for NASA to
complete and launch Landsat D’, an identical sat-
ellite that is now in production. Finally, the deter-
mination of the French, the Japanese, and the
European Space Agency to build their own sat-
Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Landsat-D, an experimental satellite used primarily for
monitoring and management of food and fiber resources,
water resources, mineral and petroleum explorations, land
cover, and land use mapping
ellite remote-sensing systems makes it certain that
the United States will no longer have a monopoly
in providing these services; the French have
already begun to market their SPOT system,
scheduled for operation in 1984. In addition, the
Soviet Union has recently flown a new advanced
land remote-sensing satellite. Although it is
unclear what use they plan to make of their new
capability, the Soviets could also compete with
the United States in this important technology.
CURRENT POLICY: PRIVATE SECTOR OWNERSHIP
Both the previous and the current administra-
tions have been committed in principle to com-
mercializing a satellite remote-sensing system,
but, no specific guidelines have been provided
to specify the terms and speed of transition to
the private sector. More than 3 years of experi-
ence in exploring the possible institutional ar-
rangements have already demonstrated that the
transition is likely to be very difficult to ac-
complish. Several general proposals have been
made for the means of transfer to the private
sector.
. — .
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Designating a single entity (either an existing
corporation, or one created by legislation) to
own and operate the entire existing system
(space and ground segments).
Establishing a laissez-faire policy that would
leave to the marketplace the decision to launch
and operate the entire system, with the Federal
Government committed to leaving the field at
a specific time.
Commercializing the space and terrestrial
segments independently of one another, either
through designation or laissez-faire.
Each possibility has potential benefits and draw-
backs. One promising means of effecting transfer
to the private sector would be to commercialize
the space and the ground segments at different
rates. The ground segment already has a strong
private component; the small, but important
value-added industry, which processes and en-
hances satellite data to meet particular user
needs, is certainly growing, if not yet flourishing.
The remainder of the ground segment, the receiv-
ing and processing centers, could be operated
by the private sector, provided continuity of data-
flow from the space segment were assured. In
the next 5 to 10 years, the market is not likely
to sustain commercial operation of the entire
satellite land remote-sensing system without
substantial direct or indirect Government fund-
ings. A multilevel pricing structure, in which
some users pay more than others, or an explicit
subsidy to the operating entity could be used. No
matter how Government funding is provided,
however, commercialization of the ground seg-
ment for land remote sensing will require a Fed-
eral commitment to the long-term, user-oriented
operation of the satellite portion of the system.
Placing the satellite land remote-sensing sys-
tem in private hands creates an inherent con-
flict of interest for the firms that control the
distribution of primary data. This might create
significant problems for foreign users, particular-
ly those less developed countries whose main
economic and social potential lies in exploiting
indigenous raw materials or agricultural products.
Some less developed countries fear that a com-
mercial operation may give private corporations
or industrialized countries access to vital resource
information before the sensed country is able to
obtain it. Even if controls deemed adequate by
the United States are instituted to prevent un-
scrupulous use of the data, other nations may still
judge private control of the data to be unaccept-
able, and might try to promote international over-
sight and control in various international forums.
MULTILATERAL ALTERNATIVE TO CURRENT POLICY
The concerns of other nations might be
alleviated and a much stronger market for land
remote-sensing data developed if, instead of
continuing a domestic system, the United States
offered to share the ownership and operation
of Landsat with other nations. A single
multilateral management authority could assume
responsibility for global operation of a land
remote-sensing system; its responsibility would
include establishing technical specifications, pro-
curing and operating satellites, and receiving and
preprocessing satellite data. Such an approach
would spread the investment risk, as well as en-
courage member nations to be more aggressive
in developing their own internal markets for
satellite data. It could also contribute to the
development of a strong market for U.S. data-
processing hardware and software, and broad
data-processing services. In addition, a multi-
lateral system might make it easier to use the
power of Landsat data in combination with
weather satellite data to tackle some of the press-
ing global problems that face the world, such as
the buildup of carbon dioxide, or deforestation.
If the United States is to pursue the initiative of
a multilateral system, it must do so soon. The
French SPOT system is well along in the planning
phase and the Japanese system will follow a few
years after SPOT is in place. India, Brazil, and
China are planning to develop their own systems
in the 1990’s.
However, if the system were internationalized,
the United States could no longer determine its
characteristics unilaterally. The United States
could not guarantee that the resulting system
would continue to serve U.S. needs to the same
extent as the current Landsat system. To retain
control, the United States would need to develop
and market its next generation of Landsats in a
much more aggressive manner.
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CONTINUED FEDERAL OWNERSHIP
An alternative to either a privately held or an
internationally owned satellite remote-sensing
system is a thoroughgoing commitment to a sys-
tem owned and managed by the Federal Gov-
ernment. Meteorological satellites, which, like
Landsat, provide data of benefit to the general
public, have always been owned and managed
by the Government. Unlike satellite communica-
tions technology, which is already fully commer-
cialized, and materials processing in space,
which, if successful at all, seems particularly ap-
propriate for private sector operation, satellite
remote sensing could certainly be retained as a
Government system on the grounds that the good
it provides is primarily public. At the present time,
100 percent of the costs are borne by the Govern-
ment through the budgets of NASA and the De-
partment of the Interior, and about so percent
of the data soId are “purchased” by various Gov-
ernment agencies. The Government, in effect,
makes the market.
Materials Processing in Space
The prospects for manufacturing commercial
products in space are unclear, based on data
obtained to date from limited in-space and ter-
restrial studies. Additional fundamental science
and technology research such as will be con-
ducted in Spacelab is required before the private
sector can be expected to initiate large-scale, ex-
pensive manufacturing of goods in space. How-
ever experiments that have been conducted so
far do suggest that the pursuit of space process-
ing techniques might yield unique high-value,
low-volume products for the pharmaceutical,
electronics, chemical, “specialty” glass, and ad-
vanced alloy industries. Much of this research will
also lead to greater understanding of the effects
of gravity on chemical and physical processes.
At Ieast two commercial ventures to produce
commercial products or services in space are
underway through joint endeavor agreements
with NASA. Other firms have also begun to ex-
press interest in similar projects.
In addition to the lack of adequate knowledge,
other factors that will affect the willingness of
some companies to invest in space R&D are:
1 ) the cost of experimentation in space, 2) the
Ieadtime needed to design experiments and
schedule shuttle flights at optimal times, 3) need
for multiple-flight opportunities in many cases,
4) uncertainty of return on investment, 5) industry
distrust of long-term arrangements with Govern-
ment, and 6) unfamiliarity with space systems and
the benefits they may offer.
The United States can expect significant com-
petition in the long term from Germany, France,
Japan, and the Soviet Union, all of which are con-
ducting a wide range of experiments in materials
processing. [n the near term, according to their
published plans, their efforts will concentrate on
the basic science end of the R&D spectrum. Al-
though at present it is sharply curtailed by budget
reductions, the U.S. effort is directed toward
commercializing this technology as well as pur-
suing R&D. At present it is unclear which pro-
grams will produce the greater near-term results.
Space Transportation
Civilian space transportation, by means of
both the reusable shuttle and expendable launch
vehicles, is likely to remain a function of the
Federal Government throughout this decade.
The aerospace industry is reluctant to assume
ownership of the presently operating space
launching systems because: 1) the majority user
is the Government, 2) the Federal Government
owns and controls the existing facilities, 3) the
initial investments are very high compared to ex-
pected revenues, and 4) indemnification in case
of disasters (e.g., an explosion on the launch pad,
or misguidance) could be very expensive.
The aerospace industry has been willing, how-
ever, to operate any and all space transportation
services under contract to the Government.
There has also been some limited commercializa-
tion of space transportation hardware. Upper
launch stages are routinely sold directly to the
user, rather than through the Government. All
lower stages of expendable launch vehicles
(Scout, Delta, Atlas, and Titan), however, are still
purchased and launched under the control of the
Federal Government.
If the Space Transportation System (the shut-
tle and its related components) is to be commer-
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SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
cialized, the Federal Government will have to of-
fer realistic incentives to the private sector.
These might include: 1) committed purchase of
an attractive number of flights, 2) provision of an
accelerated schedule of investment credits, 3) low
rental costs for Federal launch facilities, and
4) decision by the Government not to recoup in-
vested costs,
NASA had planned to phase out most expend-
able launch vehicles in the mid 1980’s as the
space shuttle becomes fully operational, How-
ever, it appears that the growing future need for
launch services will exceed the shuttle’s availabil-
ity, If demand outpaces availability, and if the
United States has no expendable vehicles ready
to launch commercial satellites at affordable
prices, then the private sector will be forced to
continue to purchase launch services from the
French. NASA is now reconsidering its policy, As
experience is gained with the shuttle, the launch
needs for the future will be clearer than they are
today, and decisions regarding the phaseout
could be made in light of more realistic demand
projections. It may even be appropriate to con-
tinue R&D of expendable launchers, particular-
ly to develop a low-cost reliable launcher for
boosting small payloads to geosynchronous orbit.
U.S. dominance of free world space transpor-
tation faces strong competition. The Ariane Ex-
pendable Launcher, developed by the European
Space Agency, is being marketed by a private,
French-incorporated company. Several U.S. com-
panies have already changed their plans to
launch on the shuttle, in favor of launching on
Ariane. The Japanese now launch their own satel-
lites by means of Delta-class launchers, which
they construct under agreements with the U.S.
firms that developed the technology. The Soviets
and the Chinese also launch their own satellites,
but with locally developed technology. The Sovi-
ets are willing to place satellites of certain other
countries in orbit. Thus, although the foreign mar-
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ket for satellite launches is growing, foreign capa-
bility is also growing rapidly.
in addition to launch vehicles developed by the
Government, at least one private U.S. company
plans to build and launch its own commercial ex-
pendable launchers. This fact has caused the
Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal
Communications Commission, the State Depart-
ment, and NASA to begin to analyze the regula-
tory problems that may result from private
launches from the United States and other na-
tions. At this writing, it is unclear what agency(ies)
will have the responsibility for such issues as:
launch authorization, aerial and maritime clear-
ance, the development of new commercial
launch sites, the need for a system of indemnifica-
tion, and payload authorization. These issues are
more likely to be resolved if a lead agency is des-
ignated to coordinate launch regulations.
International Issues
NASA has had marked success in arranging co-
operative ventures in space with other countries.
However, as has been noted previously, foreign
competition is almost certain to increase. One
result is some kinds of cooperative international
ventures will become more difficult to initiate or
sustain. In particular, projects having potential
commercial payoff, such as future activities in
materials processing that may prove of interest
to chemical or pharmaceutical companies will be
problematic. On the other hand, there may be
more scope for joint ventures, or subcontracting,
between companies from different countries,
notably in selling equipment and services to the
third world.
Proliferation of direct broadcast satellite
systems and improvements in the resolution of
civilian remote sensing data raise issues of na-
tional sovereignty and open data policy. Many
countries fear that unregulated translational radio
and (especially) TV broadcasts direct to home
receivers will undermine their sovereignty and
their cultural values. Direct transmissions would
also provide unwelcome competition for national
broadcast monopolies. Issues surrounding the ap-
propriate use of direct broadcasting systems are
likely to be raised in the context of recent inter-
national proposals to regulate the free flow of
information. Similarly, many countries fear that
unrestricted dissemination of high-resolution re-
mote-sensing data would threaten their sover-
eignty and national security. The question of re-
quiring the prior consent of a country before sell-
ing or otherwise distributing high-resolution sat-
ellite data has been debated frequently at the
United Nations and other international bodies.
Policy for Science
U.S. leadership in developing innovative tech-
nology results from the strength of its scientific,
engineering, and educational institutions. innova-
tions in space applications require that these in-
stitutions maintain their interest in the oppor-
tunities for science and engineering made possi-
ble by continued operations in space. If the vitali-
ty of the U.S. space program is to be preserved,
the United States must also be willing to com-
mit sufficient resources and attention to basic
science research and advanced engineering in
all areas related to space, including space sci-
ences. A healthy program includes: support of
educational programs in science and engineer-
ing, innovation in laboratory equipment, and
basic research in science and engineering. It
would maintain a strong space science effort: new
missions to gather data in and from space, a cor-
responding set of projects to guarantee adequate
analysis of these data, and a stable infrastructure
of facilities and support technologies.
Charting the Policy Future
The discussion in the first section of this sum-
mary describes current problems that reach all
segments of the civilian space program. A per-
vasive element is the lack of consistent long-term
goals and clear policy initiatives, from either the
executive or the legislative branches of the Gov-
ernment. This situation derives in part from the
fact that since the Apollo decision was made in
1961, the number of major actors in civilian space
activities has increased from one agency (NASA)
to include six Federal agencies and numerous pri-
vate firms. Not surprisingly, the many groups with
direct and indirect interests in space agree neither
about the overall importance of the civilian space
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program nor about specific applications projects.
In the absence of broad consensus and a means
for deciding between opposing views, the scope
of individual projects is determined by the an-
nual budget deliberations among the executive
agencies, the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), and Congress. Over time, the sum of
these decisions determines the overall course of
the space program. However, the annual budget
cycle bears little relationship to the long-term,
evolutionary cycle of space systems. In addition,
OMB has not chosen to view investment in space
activities from a long-range perspective. Until
such time as a broad consensus is formed, it is
left to the President or Congress to set forth a
coherent, strategic framework for civilian space
policy. In the absence of such direction, the cur-
rent drift will continue and worsen.
Periodic, open, high-level discussion of the
space program is needed to focus attention and
sharpen debate on our national objectives in
space. Reviews of space policy such as those be-
ing conducted by the President’s Office of Sci-
ence and Technology Policy, and by Congress,
including this assessment, serve part of this pur-
pose. Nevertheless, such one-time efforts cannot
substitute for a sustained forum for debate about
the program. In order to plan for the future of
the space program in the context of other na-
tional needs, the United States needs a multi-
representative forum to discuss and recommend
comprehensive, long-term goals. Such a forum
could coordinate the interests of all the major
actors in order to allow equitable and stable
decisions to be made about the overall direc-
tion of the civilian space program. Though such
a body would not itself direct the course of the
space program, because this responsibility lies
with the President and Congress, it could focus
the debate and provide timely advice.
Several different institutional options are dis-
cussed in this report. They range from establishing
a new Department of R&D, of which NASA
would be a part, to establishing a commission to
advise the President and Congress on space. One
attractive option in the executive branch would
be a reconstituted and broadened National Aero-
nautics and Space Council, with representatives
from civilian agencies, DOD, and the private
sector.
Because Congress is the Government’s major
forum for the representation of differing views,
it is there that one would expect to see the in-
terests of different parties debated. However,
space issues have not always received the coor-
dinated attention from the committees that they
probably deserve. In addition, the space activities
of the Federal Government are carried out by a
variety of mission agencies, most of which are
not concerned primarily with space. As space
technologies have developed and begun to af-
fect so many aspects of our society, space issues
have come to be dealt with in several different
committees and subcommittees. If the different
views are to be synthesized into a consistent
space policy, coordination of responsibility is
necessary. Congress would then be in position
to formulate a comprehensive space policy that
would set long-term goals for the U.S. space pro-
gram, military and civilian.
If the congressional committees wish the issues
to be raised and debated in a noncongressional
environment, an option for bringing together the
major interests in space would be a Presidential
commission with a limited lifetime, established
under concurrent resolution by Congress. To be
most effective, it should also include represen-
tation from Congress. After the commission’s
business was completed, congressional hearings
on its report could be held, followed by a new
or revised charter for the space program and a
clear statement of goals. This option would not
remove the need for further governmental action.
A temporary commission, though highly useful
for initiating a new focus for the space program,
cannot substitute for longer term policymaking
and coordinating bodies in the executive or the
legislative branches.
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Chapter 2
INTRODUCTION
The space age is 25 years old. Yet in this short
time period, one-third of an average citizen’s life-
span, the United States has landed men on the
Moon, explored portions of the two nearest plan-
ets, Mars and Venus, and flown near Jupiter and
Saturn. A thriving satellite communications and
data transfer industry has also been established,
and a highly successful satellite weather observa-
tion system has been developed. The United
States is on the threshold of an operational land
remote-sensing system and will soon be experi-
menting with new industrial processes in space.
In just a quarter of a century, this country has
come to rely in a significant way on the unique
vantage point and special properties of space.
The stunning success of the first flight of the
space shuttle raised anew U.S. aspirations for a
vital, useful space program, reflective of the re-
cently developed technical capabilities. Yet in
spite of substantial technical progress and a new
capability to place men and objects in orbit, this
country’s civilian space policy lacks a coherent
strategic framework. Though lack of clear direc-
tion affects the entire space program, public and
private, it has had a particularly detrimental ef-
fect on the applications of space technology. In
spite of the increasing dependence on space
technologies, there is some uncertainty about the
future direction and what questions should be
asked.
Requested by the Senate Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, ’ and en-
dorsed by the House Science and Technology
Committee2 this assessment attempts to lay the
foundation for a broad review of national space
policy, particularly as such policy may relate to
civilian applications of space technology, includ-
ing space transportation but not including track-
ing, data, and relay or navigation systems. Be-
cause the “changing nature of this country’s ac-
tivities in space raises a number of economic,
1 Letter from the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation requesting the OTA Space Policy and Applica-
tions Assessment, September 1978.
2Le~er from the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Science and Technology, June 1981.
social, legal and political questions,” OTA was
asked to develop “criteria and analyses to assist
Congress in deciding the many complicated pub-
lic policy issues that are likely to arise in chart-
ing the Nation’s future in space. ”
Although this report analyses the effects of pol-
icy decisions on applications of space technology,
it also takes a broader view. In examining deci-
sions made in an applications context, certain is-
sues surfaced that affect the entire space program.
The course of shuttle development, the emphasis
on cost-benefit analysis, and the absence of broad
consensus and consistent support for the overall
space program goals have had their effects on
programs outside of space applications. As far as
is possible, this assessment addresses these wider
policy areas and suggests policy options for mak-
ing the civilian space program a more robust part
of the Nation’s future. It does not explore the na-
tional security space program except insofar as
it affects the civilian space program.
Applications of space technology involve rather
different assumptions than do scientific missions
such as planetary exploration or the deployment
of telescopes in space. They therefore necessitate
a different policy treatment. The National Aero-
nautics and Space (NAS) Act of 1958 established
the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA) as a research and development
(R&D) agency for space technology. In that role,
it has served the Nation well. Yet development
implies that a point will be reached when a new
device or technical system is ready for use in an
operational mode. It is at this juncture, in the
transfer of developed technology to the realm of
routine operation, that many of the most impor-
tant issues in applications of space technology
surface. Technology developed with NASA funds
is technology paid for by the U.S. taxpayer. Will
another agency or a private firm receive the tech-
nology? If so, how will the transfer be made? The
history of the space program provides us with sev-
eral examples of how that transfer can be ef-
jL@@r  from the LJ. !j. Senate Committee on Commerce, science,
and Transportation, op. cit.
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fected. Communications satellites were “spun
off” to the private sector very early, weather sat-
ellites to the National Oceanographic and Atmos-
pheric Administration (NOAA). Navigation satel-
lites have remained under Department of De-
fense control; terminal equipment for civilian use
is available commercially. Land remote-sensing
satellites are at a historic juncture in their
development as they pass from R&D to opera-
tional status, This assessment examines different
possibilities for their future operations.
In addition to the issues raised in considering
the transition from Government-supported R&D
to operational status, there is a prior concern:
when, where, and for how long should the Gov-
ernment involve itself in funding space R&D ef-
forts? By its nature, space R&D is expensive, large-
ly because the costs of raising people and mate-
rials beyond the atmosphere and supporting life
in orbit are very high. The risks of R&D in space
are also high, not only because traveling to space
is inherently risky to humans and equipment, but
also because so little is yet known about the ef-
fects of extended microgravity and high vacuum
on physical and chemical processes. Even with
more than two decades of experience the United
States still has little more than 8 hours of experi-
mental results on space-based processing of ma-
terials. These risks also bear an economic cost
that must be taken into account when consider-
ing R&D in space. What is the proper balance
between Government and private funding for
R&D? What incentives are needed to encourage
the private sector to assume a major role in inno-
vation of space technology? What are the effects
of emerging foreign competition on the U.S.
space program?
These and other issues in the space program
exist in the context of similar issues relating to
Government-supported R&D in other Federal
programs. Accordingly, a considerable body of
analysis on this broader subject is already avail-
able. For space, however, many of the issues are
too current to have been discussed in detail.
Hence, a major part of OTA’s task was to deter-
mine just what are the important issues for space
applications. In order to identify and refine the
issues that are amenable to policy treatment, OTA
convened a series of workshops that drew togeth-
er experts from the major space technologies
OTA selected to study. They treated:
Remote sensing: Government user concerns.
Though still an R&D system, the Landsat pro-
gram has provided data to users of remote-
sensing data since 1972. This workshop was
an effort to learn what problems some of the
major users of the data had faced in the past
and what concerns they have for the future
as the Landsat program moves into opera-
tional status. It included Federal, State, and
local users of the data, as well as representa-
tives of two private corporations that process
Landsat data, and the international banking
community.
Commercialization of remote land sensing.
Several proposals have been made to trans-
fer part or all of the current Landsat system
to the private sector. This workshop con-
vened to: 1) assess the strength of the mar-
ket for remotely sensed data from space and
to identify the factors that affect this market,
and 2) explore appropriate models for com-
mercializing remote sensing. Since space
communications technology is already high-
ly commercialized, OTA invited several par-
ticipants who have had considerable expe-
rience with the communications satellite in-
dustry as well.
Space transportation issues. For the present,
NASA will be operating the space transporta-
tion system. What interest does private in-
dustry have in owning and/or operating a
reusable shuttle-like transportation system?
Is industry interested in marketing and
launching expendable launch vehicles? This
workshop asked these questions and, in ad-
dition, explored the nature of the incentives
that the aerospace industry sees as necessary
to help it do further space transportation and
space construction research, development,
and demonstration.
Materials processing in space. The shuttle
has raised expectations for using the special
properties of space to manufacture low-
mass, high-value products that cannot be
made on Earth. This workshop explored the
state of national and international programs
in materials processing and the prospects for
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manufacturing products in space. It dis-
cussed the NASA/industry Joint Endeavor
Program, which brings NASA into working
partnerships with other firms, and suggested
other incentives that could attract industry
to invest in R&D in space.
l International issues in commercial space sys-
tems. Other industrialized countries of the
world also have a strong presence in space,
some components of which will compete di-
rectly with U.S. systems. This workshop ex-
plored the complicated relationship between
cooperation and competition in space in the
free world and compared commercialization
policies in the United States, Europe, and
Japan. Among other topics, it discussed the
private French corporations Spotimage and
Arianespace, and the competitive challenge
that they present to comparable U.S. sys-
tems, as well as the prospects for future mul-
tinational applications organizations like
INTELSAT.
Following the development of the issues in
these five workshops, OTA convened a Work-
shop on Policy Alternatives to consider a variety
of options for addressing the major concerns
identified. The workshop identified as crucial the
need to develop a high-level Federal forum for
reaching consensus on the direction of the space
program and devoted substantial discussion to
policy options addressing this need.
In addition to the workshops, several contrac-
tors contributed to this report, as well as a num-
ber of individuals conversant with the issues dis-
cussed herein. A large body of literature now ex-
ists on the space program, but we as a society
are just beginning to understand the depth and
breadth of its effects on our economic, social, and
political fabric. Policy analysts are now able to
perceive long-term effects of past decisions and
can assess with more boldness the possible future
effects of our efforts in space.
ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
Space technology, whether we are aware of it
or not, is pervasive in our lives. After the presen-
tation of the report’s chief issues and findings in
chapter 3 the main body of the report begins in
chapter 4. Conceived out of concern over Soviet
achievements in space in 1957, the NAS Act re-
mains a basic foundation for national space pol-
icy. Chapter 4 discusses the policy history of the
U.S. space program and outlines the changes that
have been made since 1958 in space policy.
Based on an analysis of past history, it also sug-
gests areas for review today.
Chapter 5 begins with a discussion illustrating
our dependence on space technology, followed
by a summary of the current status of the U.S.
space program and a short section on U.S. public
attitudes and perceptions about space.
After summarizing the major features of the mil-
itarv space program and how it interacts with the
civilian program, chapter 6 discusses the ques-
tion of the separation between the two programs
that is built into the 1958 NAS Act. It also explores
the important question of transfer of technology
developed for the military space programs to civil-
ian uses, and how the pace of that transfer might
be increased for the ultimate benefit of the civilian
program.
Chapter 7 presents the current status of foreign
space achievements and future prospects for con-
tinued cooperation and competition between the
United States and other states in space science.
Of major concern is the competition in space ap-
plications that foreign entities pose for U.S. ef-
forts. This chapter also outlines some of the gen-
eral foreign policy questions raised by different
space policies, along with the outstanding inter-
national legal problems that could affect U.S. ap-
plications programs.
Chapter 8 summarizes the prospects for trans-
ferring the results of space R&D to the private
realm for commercial exploitation, it also de-
scribes the process that American industry follows
in deciding to do R&D. In a more specific way,
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it further develops the kinds of incentives and bar-
riers to entering upon a program for space R&D.
Institutional effectiveness is critical to policy
success. The institutional questions that have to
be solved in transferring an R&D system to opera-
tional status, whether it be operated for the public
good or for private profit, are complex. Because
Government policy strongly conditions the frame-
work within which private sector activities exist,
chapter 9 builds on the issues concerning com-
mercialization of R&D that are developed in
chapter 7, as they relate to institutions. It also
reviews the institutional frameworks that have
been set up in the public good.
Whereas each of the preceding chapters raises
several policy issues, chapter 10 summarizes the
policy foundation of U.S. space activities. Further,
it suggests new policies and integrates them with
the policy framework that now exists. It analyzes
a range of major policy options that could form
the foundation for the U.S. future in space.
The appendixes contain material that was con-
sidered germane to the assessment, but too de-
tailed for inclusion in the body of the report.
Among these are summaries of case studies pre-
pared for this assessment by the Bureau of Land
Management and the Foreign Agricultural Serv-
ices of the Department of the Interior and the Na-
tional Climate Program in NOAA of the Depart-
ment of Commerce. Three contributed reports
on materials processing in space from the TRW
Corp., McDonnell Douglas Corp., and from
NASA, plus material gathered by an OTA con-
tractor make up the case study on materials proc-
essing.
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Chapter 3
ISSUES AND FINDINGS
OVERVIEW
As its title indicates, the scope of this assess-
ment has been determined by two axes: space
policy as it pertains to applications and space
policy in general. Although the major considera-
tion has been to explore the issues surrounding
space applications technologies, it has been im-
portant to frame that exploration by a considera-
tion of issues germane to the entire civilian space
program.
This chapter gathers the principal issues and
findings of the entire assessment. Some of these
are treated in greater detail elsewhere in the
assessment; others, particularly those which con-
cern the technologies themselves, are discussed
in full here. The chapter has, therefore, been
divided into two major sections: “General Policy
Issues” and “Applications Policy Issues.”
SECTION 1: GENERAL POLICY ISSUES
Introduction: The Inadequacy of
Current Policy
From the beginning of the space age nearly 25
years ago, there has been general public agree-
ment that the United States should play a major
role in the utilization of space. Although there
continue to be questions about appropriate fund-
ing levels and the relative priority of specific proj-
ects, the United States as a nation has been and
remains committed to the development of space
activities.
The National Aeronautics and Space (NAS) Act
of 1958 articulated the policy principles for
overall guidance of the U.S. civilian space pro-
gram, but the act alone has not provided (and
cannot be expected to provide) the particular
goals for civilian space activities. Lacking such
guidance, the space program has instead been
directed by political and budgetary pressures not
always relevant to a logically ordered exploration
and use of space. At the same time, none of the
policymaking bodies successively established in
the executive branch nor any of the congressional
committees have been able to ensure that a long-
range plan of particular policies and programs
would be pursued.
Furthermore, it may be important to recast the
NAS Act to reflect the development over the past
25 years of significant U.S. capability to conduct
space operations. The act was designed to de-
velop these capabilities rather than to give
guidance on how to make use of them once de-
veloped. In particular, very important services are
or soon can be provided by space applications
technologies, but specific policies to ensure that
their potential is fully realized are not in place.
The goal of this assessment, therefore, is to ex-
amine the interrelation of space policy and space
applications technologies, four of which—satellite
communications, land remote sensing, materials
processing in space (MPS), and space transpor-
tation—are treated in detail. Weather observa-
tions and navigation are not covered except by
reference. It should be noted that space transpor-
tation is not usually considered an applications
technology. OTA’s reason for so classifying it is
that it, like the other applications, is a means to
further ends, and also has a strong potential for
commercialization.
Six policy principles form the core of the NAS
Act. These six, which are discussed in detail later
in this chapter, have provided the framework and
goals in accordance with which the civilian space
program has evolved to the present day. These
principles may be stated as follows:
that U.S. preeminence in space science and
applications be maintained;
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that economic and social benefits be de-
rived;
that knowledge be increased;
that civilian and military activities be sep-
arated (though they are to be coordinated
and are not to duplicate one another unnec-
essarily);
that the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration (NASA), the civilian agency, be
limited largely to research and development
(R&D); and
that international cooperation be fostered.
Issue 1: What Are the Key Factors of the
Current Situation?
Reliance on Space
We depend increasingly on space for vital pub-
lic and private services (national security and
commercial communications); we rely on it for
useful services (remote sensing of land, naviga-
tion, and weather reporting); we can foresee
commercial possibilities for MPS in the near term.
All of these space applications require an ade-
quate space transportation system, including
launch vehicles, spaceports, and tracking net-
works. Because of our significant reliance on
space, we will certainly retain some sort of space
program. However, broad agreement about the
direction or scope the program should assume
in the future has not been achieved. Furthermore,
there is no set of procedures in place whereby
a national consensus about the future program
can be generated.
Need for Continued Federal Activities
Lack of basic agreement is of concern for the
whole U.S. space program, not only for applica-
tions technologies. But it is of particular concern
for the latter because the range of desirable
civilian space applications, on account of their
economic risk and high expense, cannot be un-
dertaken by the private sector alone, in accord-
ance with ordinary market forces. On the other
hand, it is inappropriate and unnecessary for the
Federal Government to undertake all of the space
activities in the United States. For the foreseeable
future, we will continue to be in a period of
mixed public and private responsibilities. In order
to ensure the success of our space ventures, a
determination of the appropriate Federal role
should be made and, once made, pursued con-
sistently. In this assessment, at least four areas in
which the Federal Government should continue
to be involved are identified: contribution to ad-
vanced R&D, provision of public goods and serv-
ices, continuation of space science, and coor-
dination of national efforts, particularly with
respect to international agreements.
International Competition
The United States no longer has a monopoly
on free world space activities. The Europeans and
the Japanese have targeted specific space
technologies for development and are already
providing stiff competition for a number of serv-
ices and facilities heretofore offered only by the
United States (e.g., launch facilities and commu-
nications ground stations). in particular, the
French will soon be marketing an expendable
launch vehicle, the Ariane, to compete with the
shuttle, and they plan to begin operating, in 1984,
the Systeme Probatoire d’Observation Terrestrial
(SPOT) remote-sensing system to compete with
the land remote-sensing satellite system (Land-
sat). Making good use of available U.S. technol-
ogy, the Japanese are developing their own
launchers, as well as communications and remote
sensing satellites, particularly for ocean surveil-
lance. The Europeans and the Japanese have also
developed excellent space science programs.
The Europeans are not only technologically
competitive, but have founded new semiprivate
institutions, e.g., Arianespace and Spotimage, to
operate and market their new systems. These in-
stitutions are subsidized by their sponsoring
governments and are, therefore, able to price
their services significantly lower or offer more at-
tractive financial terms than could unsubsidized
firms. In addition, their profitmaking character en-
courages them to seek efficiencies that a program
managed by government agencies might not.
Through the European Space Agency (ESA),
member countries cooperate in developing ad-
vanced systems for which no one country has all
the resources required (expertise as well as
capital).
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Need for Greater Private Sector Participation
A great part of the promise of the European and
Japanese programs results from the structure of
their institutions, under which private and public
sectors can work well together. Their plans, how-
ever, should not necessarily cause the United
States to imitate their institutional arrangements,
but to discover equally effective arrangements
compatible with our political and economic tradi-
tions. The twin factors of the diminution of Fed-
eral resources for civilian space activities, and the
dynamism of the private sector, make it impor-
tant that private corporations participate more ac-
tively in U.S. space efforts whenever commer-
cial success is possible. if we are to develop space
applications that have the most social value,
signals from users must guide our efforts; it is the
private sector that responds to and uses such
guidance most effectively in the marketplace.
Above all, we must remain flexible in determin-
ing whether one sector or the other, or some
novel combination of the two, should assume the
responsibility for particular activities. As respon-
sibilities are divided, it is essential to consider
both the stage of development–basic research,
development, demonstration, or operations–and
the kind of application—communications, remote
sensing, materials processing, or transportation,
To help meet foreign commercial competition
as well as to foster the more efficient use of our
national resources, the United States should con-
tinue to seek further innovative relationships, like
the Joint Endeavor Agreements (JEAs) sponsored
by NASA, which bring public and private sectors
into effective partnership in planning for and car-
rying out space activities. Because we have been
less than effective in discovering such arrange-
ments, many of our space applications systems
have not evolved smoothly from research to op-
erational status.
Present Government Institutions Ill-Suited
to Current Conditions
By charter and by subsequent legislation, NASA
is primarily responsible for the R&D of civilian
space systems, not their operation. The excep-
tion to this rule is NASA’s operation of space
transportation systems, including launch vehicles,
spaceports, and tracking systems. Responsibility
for operating other federally owned civilian
systems rests with the National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA); it operates
U.S. weather satellites and is scheduled to
manage the Landsat system as well.
NASA’s emphasis on developing new technol-
ogies makes sense in the context of a highly visi-
ble project on which national prestige is staked.
In the current political and economic context
(i.e., diminishing Federal resources allocated to
space, increasing competition from abroad, and
growing need to involve the U.S. private sector
more substantially), NASA and other Federal in-
stitutions which make extensive use of space-
derived data may require reorientation, first, to
ensure that a balance of diverse space activities
emerges, and second, to be more responsive to
user needs. Some specific suggestions for possi-
ble reorientation appear in chapter 10; chapter
9 explores the principles upon which such re-
orientation could be based.
Issue 2: How Are We to Manage
Our Future in Space?
Future Options for the Civilian Space Program
This section considers a range of legislative ap-
proaches the Congress could take concerning ap-
plications of space technology. Although these
options are derived from considering the specific
technologies we have addressed in this report
(i.e., satellite communications, land remote sens-
ing, materials processing and space transport-
ation), they generally reflect the needs of the en-
tire spectrum of space applications. At one end
of the range, Federal involvement dominates, and
public goals drive the development of all space
applications. At the other, Federal involvement
is very low, and the pursuit of space applications
is a function almost solely of private sector
activity.
The U.S. space program is an investment for
the Nation. Consideration of options for the U.S.
space program must take into account what we
can do, what we can afford to do, and what we
must do, to meet external competition and in-
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ternal demands. What we can do is determined
by our technical and institutional capabilities;
what we can afford to do is bounded by overall
Federal resources and judged by ranking the
value of space activities against other Federal pro-
grams; what we must do is driven by external
challenge and domestic requirements. The rel-
ative importance to be granted these various
determinants is, finally, a political decision. The
shape of the resulting program can vary widely,
but it is important that Congress recognize the
cost of inconsistent Federal support of planned
programs. The time stretching from initial con-
cept, through research, development, and dem-
onstration (RD&D), to final operations may in-
clude major political changes. if these changes
occasion major financial perturbations, both
money and talent are lost.
Our technical and institutional capabilities pro-
vide, perhaps, the least constraint. The success
of Apollo proves that we can undertake and com-
plete challenging new projects. We have a wide
range of future possibilities to choose from, and
we have much of the experience and expertise
necessary to carry them out. The availability of
Federal resources, on the other hand, is less
predictable, depending, as it does, on the overall
state of the economy. It is expensive to develop
space technology, and for the next 3 or 4 years,
at least, many Federal programs are likely to be
under severe financial constraint. In addition, the
relative priority of space activities in the national
economy depends on an evaluation of their con-
tribution to overall national goals. Though the
need for some civilian space program is clear, its
appropriate level is not. Finally, as international
competition increases, serious thought must be
given to planning an effective response.
Space applications exist in the context of an
overall Federal commitment to the exploration
and use of space for civilian and military pur-
poses. Accordingly, the following discussion out-
lines the legislative choices OTA has selected for
discussion and relates them to the sorts of overall
programs within which they might exist. The
three levels of overall commitment presented
below are determined by different evaluations of
foreign competition.
HIGHLY COMPETITIVE APPLICATIONS PROGRAM
As other parts of this report have stressed, the
competitive challenge from other nations is strong
and growing. With the exceptions of materials
processing, in which competition has not yet
developed because it is too new, and of naviga-
tion satellites, all space applications originally
developed in the United States now face com-
petition from other countries. For both economic
and political reasons, foreign activities must be
taken seriously by U.S. policymakers. Strong Fed-
eral intervention might be warranted if failure to
pursue new technologies would result in signifi-
cant loss of revenue or U.S. prestige, or if the
threat was much greater than could be met by
current Federal and private programs. A highly
competitive applications program would fit most
appropriately into an overall space program that
seeks to achieve ambitious goals. Two different
approaches bear consideration.
Ž Apollo-like program. Such a space program
would likely arise only in response to a per-
ceived threat from the Soviets. If they were to
initiate an ambitious and highly publicized
project such as a manned planetary mission,
or a large, advanced orbital base, space might
again become an area of superpower competi-
tion in which we tried to best Soviet efforts.
New applications and enhanced capabilities
for existing ones could result as byproducts of
a singly focused space effort. The institutional
structure and large budget required to com-
plete the R&D for a single large project could
lend itself, for example, to development of a
new generation of communications or land re-
mote-sensing satellites. If competition were to
focus on a single dramatic project, it could spill
over into a broad range of areas if the United
States attempted to emphasize its across-the-
board capabilities, as it did during the Apollo
program. The development of the shuttle,
however, argues the reverse: a single
showpiece program might drain all others of
much-needed funds.
Because this program would be politically
motivated, it would be aimed primarily at in-
creasing U.S. prestige in a short period of time,
and therefore would inevitably be dominated
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by the Government. The private sector would
be seen as the source of expertise and contract-
ing capability, but would not, at least imme-
diately, be a prime beneficiary of U.S. pro-
grams. Encouragement of commercial activi-
ties other than those directly supportive of the
major project would depend on the overall re-
sources available: unless these resources were
substantial, large crash programs could absorb
funding and expertise to such a degree that
other interests would receive little attention.
l Applications-dominated program. If competi-
tion from European and Japanese and, possi-
bly, Soviet applications systems were seen as
especially threatening, it might be appropriate
to concentrate an aggressive Federal effort on
maintaining U.S. preeminence across-the-
board. This course of action would place a high
value on civilian space technology as an instru-
ment for maintaining U.S. technical capabilities
and general economic strength. It would be
based on the estimation that the support and
subsidy of foreign governments for their own
programs could be met only by similar support
in the United States.
This program would emphasize the applica-
tions segment of NASA’s activities, including
space transportation, and could be carried out
even without a commitment to a very large
single project. It would require a significant
redirection away from NASA’s present orien-
tation toward spectacular missions. Except for
use of the shuttle, manned programs would be
reemphasized and made a part of specific ap-
plications projects, where pertinent. Space
science research that contributed directly to
applications efforts would receive priority;
basic research that used shuttle capabilities in
near Earth orbit would be favored over expen-
sive planetary probes and long-term experi-
ments. Like the politically motivated Apollo-
type program, this highly competitive course
of action would be dominated by the Govern-
ment, but insofar as its aim would be leader-
ship in commercial applications, private in-
dustry would be encouraged to become a full
partner. various joint-ventures and other
cooperative agreements might be encouraged.
The high costs of Government subsidy in such
a program could be justified as leading to even-
tual commercial payoff, as well as considerable
public sector benefits.
MODERATELY COMPETITIVE
APPLICATIONS PROGRAM
Such a response to foreign commercial com-
petition would arise from the judgment that the
United States retains significant strength in many
sectors and should target “areas of opportunity”
for Federal attention. Private-sector involvement
in development projects and in planning for even-
tual takeover of potential commercial systems
would be encouraged. In the near term, 30/20
GHz communications technology, land remote
sensing, and space transportation are the most
likely areas to receive Federal attention under this
scenario. Materials processing projects would be
aided, largely through use of JEAs. Federal in-
volvement would be initiated on the grounds that
the private sector cannot afford the high risks of
entering a given area without help. Industry
groups would be encouraged to expand their in-
volvement by entering into joint ventures with
each other and with the Government where ap-
propriate (see ch. 8 for a full discussion of some
of these possibilities). Technology transfer from
military to civilian use would be increased wher-
ever possible.
This applications program could fit the follow-
ing general scenarios:
Budget-constrained, with most resources
devoted to a single large project (e.g., the
shuttle). This reflects the current situation
where more than 50 percent of the NASA
budget is devoted to the shuttle. Although
the effort to develop less expensive transpor-
tation to space will eventually benefit the en-
tire space program, at present it has led to
foreclosing or deferring many opportunities
in space science and in applications. Under
such conditions, if the applications program
(exclusive of space transportation) is to pros-
per, the private sector must be involved to
a much greater extent. If that involvement
is not forthcoming, the U.S. competitive po-
sition will necessarily suffer. Of particular
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concern is the future of 30/20 GHz commu-
nications technology (see “Communications
Technology,” below) and land remote sens-
ing by satellite (see “Land Remote Sensing,”
below).
Budget-constrained– “balanced spending. ”
This is not the current situation, but one that
might prevail when the shuttle is fully opera-
tional and its costs are borne by the users—
provided NASA’s budgets stay relatively
level. Under “balanced spending” condi-
tions, an applications program (including ad-
vances in space transportation) would con-
sume a significant portion of the budget.
Space science would receive a comparable
share. NASA would play a strong role in de-
veloping new communications and remote-
sensing systems, in conducting experiments
in materials processing, and in planning and
constructing space platforms and large struc-
tures. The private sector would be solicited
to participate in many of these activities.
NONCOMPETITIVE APPLICATIONS PROGRAMS
If the competition from other states is not con-
sidered especially threatening to the U.S.
economy, and to our general position of leader-
ship, and if space applications are not viewed as
worth developing for the public benefits that
might be derived, a greatly reduced Federal ef-
fort in space applications would be a potential
policy option. Such a stance would force depend-
ence on private investments to develop and op-
erate space systems, but would not provide ap-
preciable Federal funding to do so.
Although this option could apply to any of the
civilian space programs considered above, it is
more likely to be part of a highly constrained
civilian space program:
l Severely constrained. Such a program, some
30 to 50 percent smaller than the current
one, would allow little room for a civilian
Federal applications effort, especially given
the large percentage required for continued
development of the shuttle. Major programs
and perhaps entire categories of activities
would be eliminated. Depending on the size
of the cuts it might be necessary virtually to
eliminate space science and/or defer produc-
tion of parts of the space transportation sys-
tem. It could not allow for a major Federal
role in developing the next generation of
communications satellites or remote-sensing
technologies. In this situation, private at-
tempts to develop or operate space systems
would be encouraged, but significant Federal
funding for joint projects would not be avail-
able. Transfer of technology developed by
the military to the civilian realm could pro-
vide incentives for private involvement, es-
pecially if military spending on space were
relatively unconstrained. This might allow
the private sector to concentrate on modi-
fying military-derived technologies to civilian
uses and on developing areas, such as ma-
terials processing in space, where the military
is not heavily involved.
DISPERSAL OF NASA’S RESPONSIBILITIES
This would result if, because of budget con-
straints and a desire to consolidate all Govern-
ment space programs, the shuttle and other ap-
plications developments were to be transferred
to the Department of Defense (DOD) and other
Government agencies. Under such a scenario,
advanced communications, atmospheric (weath-
er and climate) sensing, and land and ocean
remote sensing would be developed first for the
military, and spun off to the private sector or
civilian agencies later, if ever. Desensitized data
could be made available for civilian consump-
tion and sale to other nations through public en-
tities or through specially licensed private cor-
porations. However, a much more relaxed view
of security would have to prevail if the data were
to be as valuable as data derived from com-
petitive international systems. Launches would
be conducted by the military, with appropriate
arrangements for private sector and foreign users.
NASA would retain responsibility only for basic
research in space science. NASA’s centers now
working on applications and operations would
be turned over to DOD, Interior, Commerce, or
universities and private firms. Such a scenario
would contravene a major premise of the NAS
Act, that civilian and military space activities are
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to be conducted separately, and hence might re-
quire explicit legislation. It would certainly raise
questions about the act’s premise that “activities
in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes
for the benefit of all mankind.”~
Toward a Coherent Federal Space Policy
partly because most civilian space technologies
arise within NASA, which is primarily an agent
of technology push, commercial interests and in-
itiatives have not developed to the extent that
they ordinarily do in industry. Other contributing
factors include: lack of consistent congressional
or executive policy direction facilitating the
development of a stable market, the complexity
of the technologies themselves, and the high costs
and economic risks the private sector would have
to bear. Aside from the general public, whose in-
terest is periodically sparked by space spec-
taculars, the communities NASA serves have up
to now been users rather than partners. Lacking
on the one hand effective guidance from the Con-
gress or the President, and on the other an ade-
quate forum in which user needs may be ex-
pressed, civilian space policy is often made de
facto by NASA and the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB). Essentially, there are two
problems. First, the United States currently lacks
the appropriate means to bring the scientific,
commercial, and political communities into con-
sensus about the broad goals for civilian space
activities. Second, the Federal Government has
given insufficient attention to establishing ar-
rangements whereby the private sector can be
brought into effective partnership in the develop-
ment and operation of civilian space systems.
Lack of foresight and, especially, lack of coor-
dination have characterized much of the recent
U.S. space effort. Increasingly, the direction and
scope of our space program are determined by
the annual budget deliberations among the ex-
ecutive agencies, OMB, and the Congress. This
approach presents several problems, one of
which is that annual budget cycles bear little rela-
tion to the long-term evolutionary cycle of space
systems. Another is that by its nature, OMB is not
‘National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended (Public
Law 85-568, 85th Cong., H.R. 12575, July 29, 1958, 72 Stat. 426.)
sec. 102 (a).
well suited to view investment in space activities
in long-range perspective, Finally, insofar as the
civilian space program remains essentially
NASA’s to direct, it suffers from inattention to the
concerns of users, those in the public sector, as
represented by Government agencies, as well as
those in the private sector. In order to focus the
U.S. civilian space program and to introduce
more consistency into all U.S. space activities,
the President or the Congress must set forth new
goals. In the absence of such direction the cur-
rent drift will continue and worsen.
In order to focus attention on the country’s ob-
jectives in space, periodic high-level review and
discussion are needed. The Carter administration
undertook several reviews of space policy under
the aegis of the National Security Council which
resulted in Administration Policy Directives
PD-37, 42, and 54 (see ch. 10). In the Reagan ad-
ministration, the Office of Science and Tech-
nology Policy (OSTP) is conducting a major policy
review for a Cabinet Council chaired by the
Secretary of Commerce. It is scheduled for com-
pletion sometime in 1982. Such reviews are
useful for focusing attention on the needs of the
space program. However, these short-term,
highly focused reviews cannot substitute for sus-
tained examination of our long-term goals in
space and high-level attention to policy setting.
The many authorization and appropriations
hearings on space within the Congress, as well
as reports from its support agencies, keep the
Congress informed on pressing space policy
issues. However, because of the press of other
items on the national agenda, the relatively small
weight that space matters receive in most con-
gressional districts, and the fact that space issues
are dealt with in several different committees,
space policy has not received sustained and
broad-based attention. It would be helpful to
establish a high-level, multirepresentative body
to recommend goals and objectives for the over-
all U.S. space effort. Such a body should be able
to articulate, and gain support for, the broad goals
of our civilian space program, and to suggest
major programs to implement these goals, though
it should not be expected to achieve consensus
on all the details of our future space effotts.
Indeed, consensus on specific activities, e.g., the
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level of effort devoted to space science, may
never be reached, for at that level, the political
process of balancing competing interests (with in-
put from the scientific establishment) properly
takes precedence.
Several alternatives for this proposed body,
varying in potential effectiveness and feasibility
are as follows:
l
l
l
Establish a new version of the National
Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC). As
it operated in the past, the NASC consisted
of a permanent White House group, chaired
by the Vice President and composed of rep-
resentatives from the major Federal agencies.
It was charged with recommending policy
and programs directly to the president. If a
future council is to be effective, its chairman
would have to take a significant personal in-
terest in space activities. A membership re-
stricted to Federal agencies, however, would
not include all of the potentially interested
parties. To represent the broader perspec-
tive characteristic of the maturity of the U.S.
presence in space, a reconstituted NASC
should also include several members from
the private sector in addition to those of the
Federal agencies.
Activate the Policy Review Committee
(Space) in the National Security Council
(NSC), the body charged in the Carter ad-
ministration with advising and recommend-
ing on space matters. If chaired by a civilian
Cabinet-level officer, it would have visibil-
ity. However, such a course of action might
have the drawback of overemphasizing na-
tional security interests at the expense of the
scientific, Government-user, and commer-
cial representatives.
Establish a Presidential or national commis-
sion composed of representatives from all
the major communities interested in space.
The terms of the commissioners should be
long enough to outlive any particular ad-
ministration. The influence of such a com-
mission would depend on the personalities
and talents of its members and the receptivity
of various administrations rather than on a
solid political/institutional base. Key Mem-
bers of Congress should be included as
members of the commission.
Raise the importance of OSTP. Within the
executive branch, civilian and military space
policy is studied and formulated in OSTP and
NSC. Currently, OSTP is conducting a policy
review. Although this arrangement may
serve as a focus for developing space policy,
access to the President may not be direct
enough to insure his attention to the needs
of the civilian space program.
Institute joint congressional hearings. At
present, civilian space activities are reviewed
by separate subcommittees of the House and
Senate. For many years, both Houses had
full committees responsible for space. One
way to put space more prominently on the
congressional agenda might be to reestab-
lish full committees whose staff and mem-
bers would have a strong interest in estab-
lishing goals and supervising their implemen-
tation. Periodic joint hearings between com-
mittees responsible for various aspects of the
civilian and military space programs would
help to provide coordination of national
policy.
Though each option has attractive features,
none appears to resolve completely the twin
issues of representing all major participants fair-
ly and adequately, and of influencing key deci-
sionmakers. Without a commitment from the leg-
islative and the executive branches to pursue a
long-term course, none of these alternatives can
be effective. However, their activities could at
least define the major problems over time and
ensure that regular reports are sent to the Presi-
dent or Congress.
Overall Prospects for Space
Applications Technologies
Whereas the military and political threat of the
Soviet Union sparked the initial drive toward U.S.
preeminence in space, the challenge to U.S. lead-
ership in applications programs now and for the
forseeable future will come from commercial
competition from our allies. The Japanese and
the Europeans have heavily involved their private
sectors with government programs. These gov-
ernment/industry partnerships have made for
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vigorous space programs; government con-
tributes various kinds of subsidies and technical
resources as well as a sense of national interest,
the private sector contributes a whole range of
commercial and technical expertise along with
risk capital. Although the United States still re-
tains its lead in technology in most space applica-
tions, foreign technical and managerial capabil-
ities are growing rapidly.
Of the four space applications technologies
here under review, U.S. success with satellite
communications is in many respects exemplary.
To begin with, it is flourishing. The rate of growth
in this industry has been and probably will con-
tinue to be over 20 percent per year. It provides
an increasingly greater range of services on which
users worldwide have come to rely. The keys to
its success seem to have been the early and major
involvement of the private sector and a firm
understanding of the potential market.
There is, however, no single model for com-
mercializing space applications technologies.
Markets for each are in different states of develop-
ment; the proportion of activities aimed at public
(rather than private) good varies from one tech-
nology to the next; and the maturity of the tech-
nologies themselves is not the same. Further-
more, there may be some portions of these tech-
nologies that are not at all suited for commer-
cialization. The special needs and effects of each
technology should therefore be considered in
commercializing technology developed by the
Government.
Issue 3: What
Guided the U.S
Policy Principles Have
Civilian Space Program?
Before the issues specific to each of the tech-
nologies are addressed, it is useful to consider the
foundation upon which the space program now
rests, the 1958 NAS Act. The discussion in this
section considers six of the major policy prin-
ciples articulated in the act and in subsequent ex-
ecutive and legislative directives. Although the
act contains other principles (e.g., that peaceful
uses of space are to be developed, and that
benefits to all mankind are to be sought), the prin-
ciples selected for discussion in this assessment
suffice to allow reasoned consideration of civilian
space policy. Indeed, these six principles form
the core of U.S. civilian space policy, and they
have helped to shape the programs and institu-
tions for implementing that policy.
The six policy principles may be stated as
follows:
that U.S. preeminence in space science and
applications be maintained;
that economic and social benefits be
derived;
that knowledge be increased;
that civilian and military activities be sep-
arated (though they are to be coordinated
and are not to duplicate one another unnec-
essarily);
that NASA, the civilian agency, be limited
largely to R&D; and
that international cooperation be fostered.
Thus, the issues and findings organized by these
six policy principles include those that are generic
to all four technologies under review, and those
that extend beyond space applications to the con-
duct of the entire civilian space program.
To Maintain National Preeminence
[n what sense has the United States been
a leader in space applications? Is it still so
today? For how long can we expect to main-
tain our leadership?
Especially since World War II the United States
has seen itself as preeminent in science and tech-
nology and as having a special expertise in both
the military and civilian applications thereof.
Maintaining a technological edge has been con-
sidered crucial for several reasons. First, national
security has become increasingly dependent on
rapid and sustained technical advances in elec-
tronics, aerospace, and nuclear energy. Second,
high technology has increasingly become a stra-
tegic sector of the economy; that is, high tech-
nology so thoroughly pervades other sectors of
the economy that the United States cannot af-
ford to be dependent on foreign countries to pro-
vide it. Other advanced nations behave similar-
ly. Third, economic competitiveness in global
markets, as well as continued domestic prosperi-
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ty, stems in large part from a broad R&D base
in high-technology industries. Particularly in
highly developed countries such as the United
States, where the costs of labor and raw materials
are high, advanced technology products are a
major export item. For the preceding reasons,
and also because scientific and technical progress
gives a general impression of vitality and strength,
scientific and political decisionmakers often
believe our political influence abroad to be direct-
ly dependent on national programs in the
sciences and on advancements in high-technol-
ogy sectors of the economy.
Attention to national preeminence has been the
major formative influence on the conduct of the
U.S. civilian space program. The 1958 NAS Act
states as one of its aims “the preservation of the
role of the United States as a leader in aero-
nautical and space science and technology and
in the application thereof . . . “2 At its inception,
the space program had to meet the perceived
threat to U.S. national security from the launch
of Sputnik and subsequent Soviet space initia-
tives. The design of our manned programs of the
1960’s and the shape of NASA’s institutional
structure were driven primarily by considerations
of national security and political prominence, and
only secondarily by regard for potential economic
and scientific benefits. If the Soviets had been
allowed to achieve clear superiority in any major
category of space activity, they would, in the
judgment of U.S. political leaders, have been like-
ly to gain increased political support from neutral
countries. As a nation, we refused to accept sec-
ond place. Therefore, the United States em-
barked on a comprehensive and accelerated pro-
gram that included the development of a variety
of expendable launch vehicles, communications
satellites, manned vehicles, and several orbital
and planetary scientific probes. By the end of the
1960’s, we succeeded in matching or bettering
achievements of the Soviets in virtually every
area: in addition to our celebrated victory in the
race to the Moon, U.S. communications satellites
were providing operational global service in the
International Telecommunication Satellite Orga-
nization (I NTELSAT) system; U.S. meteorological
Zlbid., Sec. 102 (C) (5).
satellites were making local weather coverage
available to many parts of the world; U.S. launch-
ers were available to other countries for scien-
tific and applications projects; an ambitious pro-
gram of unmanned planetary missions to explore
Mars and the other planets was underway; and
a promising remote-sensing technology was
under development, the data from which were
to be made available at low cost to all countries.
As a result, the United States was able to reap
the political and economic gains of unchallenged
superiority in space applications.
In the following years, however, this picture
began to change. Defeated in the race to man
the Moon, the Soviet Union concentrated on de-
veloping a permanent manned Earth orbital
laboratory, the Salyut. From 1975 to 1981, while
the United States flew no manned missions, the
Soviets flew 20, some of up to 6 months in dura-
tion. The Soviets conducted extensive experi-
ments in materials processing, remote sensing,
and the biological sciences, and they gained ad-
ditional experience in remote-controlled rendez-
vous and docking, and operation of manned sys-
tems. The U. S. S.R. ’S investment in planetary ex-
ploration and space science and applications has
also been extensive, in some cases more than that
of the United States, but for the most part has
yielded fewer results. Though less spectacular
than the U.S. flights of a decade ago, the steady
program of the Soviets has produced valuable ex-
perience largely unavailable in the West. Coop-
erative ventures with other Communist countries,
as well as with India and France, have provided
them significant political gains, too. Future Soviet
plans are unclear, but are likely to include de-
velopment of larger permanent orbital stations,
an operational land remote-sensing system, high-
performance boosters, and, eventually, manned
planetary missions.
More important to the present situation is that
Japan and several European countries have re-
cently developed a number of advanced space
technologies, many of which are comparable and
in some cases superior to those of the United
States and the Soviet Union. In addition, they
have established a number of innovative institu-
tional arrangements that allow significant private-
sector/government cooperation. Beginning in the
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early 1960’s, Europe and Japan saw the impor-
tance of developing competitive space capabil-
ities to avoid political and economic dependence
on the superpowers. Though their space budgets
have only been a fraction of those of the United
States and the Soviet Union, their programs have
achieved success by eschewing development of
expensive manned capabilities, borrowing tech-
nology from the United States, and concentrating
on a few key applications. Their motivations have
varied, from France’s highly political desire for
independence and a domestic technology base
to support military programs, to Japan’s percep-
tion of the space market as an arena in which
advanced technology is likely to yield high long-
term profits. Especially significant has been the
devleopment of an independent launch capabili-
ty in the form of ESA’S Ariane and Japan’s N-1
and N-2 vehicles.
Because of the U.S. space program’s historical
emphasis on very large, expensive manned pro-
grams, and because of institutional and political
difficulties in transferring technology from the
public to the private sector and in coordinating
private sector activities, commercial competition
from heavily subsidized foreign space systems
may prove difficult to meet, Though the United
States will retain its lead in state-of-the-art
technologies and especially in manned flight, its
institutional and financial capacity to support
operational systems and to meet user needs is
very much in question.
To Derive Economic and Social Benefits
The civilian space program has been the source
of an important flow of economic and social ben-
efits. Some of these benefits have been derived
indirectly through the spinoffs from technology
developed for NASA, while others have resulted
from direct technology transfers to the private
sector and to Government agencies. Insofar as
commercialization of space applications technol-
ogies is a natural and accepted process in a
capitalist society, the problems inherent in in-
dustry’s attempts to commercialize technology
orginally developed by or for NASA are of par-
ticular importance for this assessment.
Does the commercialization of space-based
technology differ from the commercializa-
tion of Earth-based technology?
The commercialization of new technology is
the last state of a complex process of innovation.
Generally, this process begins with a period of
basic scientific research, proceeds through a stage
where practical applications are sought, and ter-
minates in the identification of potentially mar-
ketable products. The time required for such a
project, the number of participants, and the cost
will all vary, depending on the nature of the re-
search and the existing store of knowledge.
In the private sector, the decision to invest in
innovation is generally motivated by desire to sus-
tain profits. Investments in innovation, like other
investments, are required to meet criteria of
return on investment. Profitmaking enterprises
tend to invest in projects which are designed to
satisfy a recognized market or management need.
Expensive, long-term, and high-risk endeavors
have to be justified by a reasonable expectation
of high payoff and future profit. This basic rule
applies, whether the proposed innovation is in
Earth- or space-based technology.
Innovation in space-based technology is in-
herently expensive and highly dependent on
Government interest and cooperation; it involves
untried technology and is often not driven by
clearly defined markets. As a result, such activities
cannot easily attract corporate capital. Given this
generalization, it is important to review the pat-
tern of past and current private sector investments
in space technology.
The most obvious example of the successful
commercialization of a space technology is the
communications satellite. Early private sector in-
terest in satellite communications was motivated
by the realization that satellites provided a more
efficient and less expensive alternative to the
then-existing means of long-distance communica-
tion. Substantial private sector investment was
later required to utilize this technology; however,
the investment was made with the knowledge
that the technology was well-understood and the
market large and well-defined. Other space-based
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technologies, such as remote sensing and mate-
rials processing, do not share these advantages.
Much of the present dialog about the commer-
cialization of new space systems concerns untried
technologies directed toward undefined markets.
As a result, the private sector’s aversion to ex-
pensive, high-risk endeavors and undefined mar-
kets has prevented and will continue to militate
against major private investment in these areas.
Though reluctant to undertake the commercial-
ization of specific space-based technologies, the
private sector has been actively involved in space-
related support services, providing such neces-
sities as flight hardware, project financing, in-
surance, and tracking and control facilities. This
limitation of private sector involvement is under-
standable, for these suppont services require only
limited risk, and rely on preexisting and/or Gov-
ernment-funded technology or contracts.
To date, the major industrial participant in
space activities has been the aerospace industry.
This fact may be attributed to that industry’s
familiarity with space technology, to its close
working relationship with Government, and to
its willingness to take a long view of product
development. Other industries have been reluc-
tant to engage in research projects which require
knowledge, personnel, and support facilities
which they do not already have.
Without substantial budget support from the
Government, private investment in new space
technologies, such as materials processing,
remote sensing, and space transportation sys-
tems, can be expected to proceed at a pace and
in a manner consistent with normal investment
practices in the private sector. There is some
cause to believe, however, that the amount of
private sector resources devoted to space may
increase in the near future. This inference is large-
ly the result of what might be termed a disag-
gregation of space investment opportunities. In
other words, as the opportunities for relatively
small investments in space technology multiply,
different industries are likely to pursue individual
profitmaking activities. Instead of one firm at-
tempting to undertake a major space project, nu-
merous firms, pursuing their own interests in par-
ticular segments of a space system, may indirectly
accomplish the same result. Examples of such a
situation now exist in land remote sensing and
materials processing.
In land remote sensing, it is very unlikely that
the private sector could finance and operate the
presently structured Earth observation system.
(See Issue 5.) However, it is possible that if the
space and ground segments were separated, one
or more private firms could profitably operate the
ground segment of such a system. Similarly, in
materials processing, the investment required for
a single firm to identify a product, to design and
launch the necessary experiments, and then to
manufacture the product in space, is too great
to attract industry’s interest. However, recent ac-
tivities in the aerospace industry indicate a will-
ingness to design multiuser instrumentation to be
used in conjunction with the shuttle for a wide
va’riety of in-space research. After its develop-
ment, this instrumentation would be rented to
other private sector organizations for specific
research projects. As the cost of in-space research
is gradually spread among a number of partici-
pants, the risk to any single firm will be reduced,
and the industry’s investment in space should in-
crease. (See Issue 6.)
To Increase Knowledge
The goal of increasing knowledge is more char-
acteristic of the space sciences than of the de-
velopment of applications technologies. None-
theless, the goal of achieving a balanced and
sound space policy requires that it be fostered.
In addition, space science, especially studies of
the near-Earth environment, plays a key role in
the design and implementation of successful ap-
plications projects. An important aspect of this
goal is that it mediates between maintaining na-
tional preeminence and promoting international
cooperation.
NASA, the National Science Foundation (NSF),
and the universities set the agenda and direction
of basic space science research. The National
Academy of Sciences, through its Space Science
Board, also plays an important role in this proc-
ess, The yearly budget process determines the
level of funding for space science among the
many other competitors for portions of the Fed-
eral budget.
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Although this study did not assess the adequacy
of the U.S. space science effort, nor the institu-
tions and procedures used to determine its goals,
it is clear that a thriving space applications
technology program depends on maintaining a
strong U.S. base in many key areas of science and
tech nology.3
What problems are associated with as-
suming a continual growth of the knowl-
edge base?
Conducting research in space is becoming
more expensive, primarily because the easiest
studies have already been done. Furthermore,
justifying basic science research is difficult
because direct tangible benefits from a quest for
knowledge cannot be immediately shown. Thus,
it is somewhat more difficult to generate public
support outside of spectaculars such as the Mars
Viking landing or the Voyager missions to the
outer planets.
As missions have become more complex and
expensive, and therefore more infrequent, it is
becoming increasingly difficult for Government
and universities to maintain their science teams.4
As a result, there may soon be a narrowing of the
base from which new ideas can come.
Finally, there is a tendency within NASA to
focus on development and launch of new space-
craft or payloads. Anaiysis of data and interpreta-
tion of existing information or of material from
past missions tend to be given lower priority and
funding. In addition, the planning for data
analysis prior to missions has often been inade-
quate. Space science has suffered from budget
reductions caused by the growing costs of the
shuttle program in an era of fiscal constraint. For
a long time, there has been inadequate integra-
tion of space-based and ground-based science
priorities, as well. Here, as in space applications,
the appropriate allocation of financial resources
could be assisted by an effective forum in which
comprehensive and long-term national civilian
space policy goals could be established.
‘James A. Van Allen, “U.S. Space Science and Technology, ” 5ci-
ence,  Oct. 30, 1981, vol. 214, No. 4520.
4“Space Science Research in the United States, OTA Workshop,”
May 5, 1982,
To Keep Civilian and Military
Space Activities Separate
A cornerstone of U.S. space policy has been
that civilian and military programs are to be con-
ducted separately. Up to the era of the shuttle,
this separation has served the Nation well: in-
dependence of the civilian space program has re-
duced concerns of other nations that the United
States might impose a Pax Americana in space
or that space might become just another arena
for military competition; good relations between
NASA and DOD have reduced unnecessary du-
plication and promoted technology transfer; and
the civilian space program has served as a high-
technology analog of the Peace Corps—a point
of focus for peaceful and scientific national aspira-
tions and international cooperation.
Recent developments have led to serious con-
cerns that the separation of the two programs
may be diminished, that NASA funding and tech-
nical resources may be preempted by military
uses, or even that much of the civilian program
may be subsumed under the military. The shut-
tle in particular, which will be operated by NASA,
though used by both NASA and DOD, is a com-
promise between the requirements of both. Be-
cause of this joint usage, there have been sug-
gestions that DOD assume all responsibilities for
space transportation.
Within certain boundaries, technology transfer
from DOD to NASA has generally worked well
enough in the past, but the current climate of
fiscal restraint argues for a more effective, more
timely transfer of military technology to the
civilian sector. The United States finds itself fac-
ing considerable competition from Japan and
Europe. Two different technologies illustrate the
problems we face:
l Development of 30/20 GHz technology. In
order to meet this competition, the United
States is being pressed to begin a program
to develop and demonstrate a civilian 30/20
GHz communications system. At the same
time, however, military contractors are
working on systems related to such a civilian
system. Many believe that the technology
developed for the military can be transferred
to the civilian sector at a cost saving that
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would permit a commercial system to reach
operational status rapidly.
Development of multilinear array (MLA)
technology for a civilian land remote-sens-
ing system. The French are already working
on MLA technology for their SPOT remote-
sensing system. Although this technology is
well known to military engineers, independ-
ent development of a U.S. civilian system
would entail an expensive R&D program
and, subsequently, an expensive demonstra-
tion project.
How can technology transfer from the mil-
itary to the civilian sector be facilitated and
increased?
There has been, and continues to be, a recog-
nized need for military use of various space plat-
forms to accomplish national defense missions.
Though the civilian program is separate from
DOD’s program, they interact at both the man-
agement and technical levels. The 1958 NAS Act
specified the establishment of a civilian agency,
called for technology transfer between the civilian
and military programs, and established an exter-
nal coordinating mechanism, NASC, to mediate
any interagency conflicts. In the intervening
years, NASA’s program has been subject to ex-
tensive public scrutiny, and it has developed an
applications component which, because of our
political philosophy and tradition, is oriented
primarily toward developing systems that will
eventually be operated by the private sector. The
programs of DOD (and the intelligence com-
munity) have been highly classified, subject to
no extensive public debate or scrutiny, and have
been highly focused on mission applications.
These differing objectives (and others mentioned
elsewhere in this report) have led to the develop-
ment of separate systems in many areas, but have
not precluded common usage of certain systems.
The primary example of a common system is,
of course, the shuttle. This system, the major
elements of which are funded by NASA, was in-
tended from its very beginning to satisfy the mis-
sion needs of both NASA and DOD. DOD
funded the development of an interim upper
stage, the shuttle launch complex at Vandenberg
AFB, and extensive missions applications studies.
In addition, DOD will bear the costs of produc-
ing its own shuttle-compatible payloads. Overall,
the two agencies have worked well together on
the shuttle program, their cooperation ensured
by commitments at the highest policy levels.
At the same time, the payload programs of the
two agencies (focusing on applications only) have
developed along parallel, but generally separate
paths. in some areas, though, DOD’s technology
has not been unique and, in fact, has benefited
from work done by NASA and the private sec-
tor. For example, first generation military sea
communications services were supplied by trans-
ponders Ieased from civilian maritime satellites;
the FLTSATCOM system became operational
later. Similarly, DOD has learned from, as well
as contributed to, the technologies of geosyn-
chronous satellite emplacement, of orbit control
and station-keeping, and of satellite housekeeping
(i.e., thermal control, power supplies, signal proc-
essing, etc.). In addition, the two sectors have
shared information on satellite structures, altitude
and attitude control, sensors, and a miscellany
of such items as composition of the upper at-
mosphere and transmission/reflection character-
istics of the Earth and its atmosphere.
There remains a significant concern about the
store of military technology, largely unknown to
the public, that lies behind the curtain of securi-
ty classification blanketing most of DOD’s ac-
tivities and interests in space. It is important to
recognize the nature of the barriers that exist with
respect to accessibility of DOD’s technology—for
use either in the private sector or in the civilian
public sector (by NASA or NOAA). The technol-
ogy may be:
Unique to a given DOD mission. To reveal
that DOD possesses a given technology
would be to reveal that a specific classified
mission was being pursued.
Not suitable for civilian use, Missions unique
to DOD may require the development of sys-
tems with characteristics (and associated
costs) unnecessary in the civilian sector. For
example, the security and survivability cri-
teria driving the design of many DOD sys-
tems result in a degree of redundancy and
circuit hardening unneeded in civilian sat-
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ellites. If, in addition, a satellite with such
characteristics were introduced into civilian
use, the measures employed to ensure the
survivability and security of its military twin
might be compromised.
l More advanced than needed for civilian ap-
plications. In Earth observations, for exam-
ple, military intelligence requires that data
of very high resolution be collected-a stand-
ard of performance well beyond that re-
quired (or even desired) for most civilian pur-
poses. Adoption of specific military systems
or specific technology may be restricted for
several reasons: it may reveal how capable
U.S. systems are, and it may reveal that a par-
ticular technology, generally considered to
be well understood, achieves higher per-
formance through special modifications.
These barriers apply to a greater or lesser
degree to specific Earth-sensing and com-
munications capabilities, and they derive
from concerns for national security, con-
cerns that cannot be ignored in assessing the
question of technology transfer from DOD
to NASA.
However, there are cases in which the ex-
istence of a DOD technological capability
(though not necessarily the latest development)
has been shielded unnecessarily. In such a case,
NASA has had to develop a demonstration system
incorporating the same technology before it can
be transferred to the public domain. Such meas-
ures are wasteful of public resources and should
be given careful review in the light of current
resource constraints.
To Limit NASA to R&D
With the exception of launch facilities and
space transportation in general, NASA’s work has
been confined to R&D–largely because when the
1958 act was written, the question of Govern-
ment operation of, as yet nonexistent, space ap-
plications technologies was not of great concern
to the framers of the act. In addition to its many
contributions to aeronautics technology, NASA
has developed communications and Earth obser-
vations systems, and has studied the potential for
manufacturing products in space. The experience
of the past quarter century with respect to NASA’s
limitation to R&D has been mixed. A primary
benefit of NASA’s emphasis is that it has been
able to make rapid technological progress be-
cause it has not had to develop expertise either
in operation of service systems or in commercial
development. Drawbacks include pursuit of some
projects that may be impractical because they are
developed with insufficient appreciation of user
requirements and constraints, and inefficient
transfer of technology and services to potential
operators.
Prior to 1958, the National Advisory Council
for Aeronautics (NACA) operated according to
a general policy, set in 1946, that directed R&D
to cease prior to development of specific designs
of commercial aircraft equipment. This specific
development was viewed as the proper role of
industry. Government research was oriented
toward proving a concept and generating suffi-
cient data to permit an industrial designing proc-
ess to start with a good chance of successful com-
pletion from both the technical and economic
point of view. This mission is simpler for the case
of aeronautical research than for space applica-
tions efforts, however, because the civil aviation
market has been well defined for decades. Un-
fortunately, this same high degree of market ar-
ticulation is not the case for all space applications
technologies. The market for international com-
munications services was rather well understood
in the early 1960’s. Consequently, commer-
cialization could proceed from NASA generic
R&D much as aeronautic technology did in the
past. For materials processing in space, however,
the market is embryonic, and simple proof of
concept will not move MPS into commercializa-
tion. Thus, the precedents of how and when to
shift development into the private sector fit less
well for MPS.
Primarily because the NAS Act is silent on the
question of who is to operate space applications
(except for transportation), decisions about when
a system is ready for operation, and who should
be given responsibility for operating it, are made
ad hoc. For satellite communications, Congress
decided after much debate that responsibility for
operations should reside in the private sector, but
because of fears that open entry would result in
a virtual communications monopoly by one firm,
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namely, the American Telephone and Telegraph
Co. (AT&T), it created the Communications Sat-
ellite Corporation (COMSAT) in 1962. The polar
orbiting TIROS weather satellite system was given
to the Weather Bureau, within the Department
of Commerce, to operate in 1961. When NOAA
was formed in 1970, operation of the weather
satellites was given to that agency. It now
operates the geostationary operational environ-
mental satellite system as well.
Land remote sensing from space, after consid-
erable infighting among the mission agencies, was
finally assigned to NOAA in 1978, principally be-
cause of its expertise in operating satellites,
though it had no prior experience in the special
issues surrounding land remote sensing. Accord-
ing to that policy decision, NOAA was also to in-
vestigate and develop mechanisms for eventually
transferring Landsat to the private sector. Mean-
while, the Government committed itself to assur-
ing continuity of the data flow from Landsat. Cur-
rent policy calls for transfer of Landsat to the
private sector “as soon as possible” and provides
for no follow-on to the program if private oper-
ators do not assume operational responsibility.
NOAA was also to operate the now-cancelled
National Ocean Satellite System.
In materials processing, NASA is pursuing a
vigorous basic research program. As the commer-
cial viability of this technology becomes clearer,
it seems likely that private industry, with NASA’s
help, will pursue specific opportunities for devel-
oping manufactured items in space. As with aero-
nautics or communications satellites, the Govern-
ment’s role in materials processing R&D will
change as the technology matures.
The rationale for maintaining a separation be-
tween R&D and operations is that better, more
innovative research may be done by an agency
in which finding new and better ways to accom-
plish a task is the agency’s primary concern. On
the other hand, leaving an agency free from the
ofien pedestrian tasks of operating a complicated
technology for the public good may result in a
configuration of technology that will not serve the
eventual user well, either technically or eco-
nomically, Also, without a closely involved client
intending to assume responsibility for operations,
an R&D agency may not be motivated to make
appropriate tradeoffs between cost and perform-
ance; there may be unnecessary “gold plating.”
Furthermore, the user agency can concentrate
on operations and avoid unproductive conflict
between engineers and users. Users tend to be
conservative: they would rather stay with a work-
ing system that they know and trust than risk their
time and resources on an untried system even
if it promises a vast improvement in capability.
Clearly, a proper balance must be struck.
The primary issues of concern in Government-
operated applications systems are when and how
the transition is to be made from R&D to opera-
tional status and who has control over the course
of R&D. Though different systems should be
treated with flexibility as this transition is planned,
the lack of clear and consistent principles for
transfer introduces uncertainty and inefficiency.
Perhaps the most important consideration is that
potential users of a new system must be identified
as soon as possible and brought into the process
of planning its eventual operation. The cases of
Landsat and the weather satellites have shown
how difficult this transition can be to carry out.
With all good will on both sides, the perceived
needs of the users and the far-seeing vision of the
engineers and scientists were not always compati-
ble. One of the reasons for the user communi-
ty’s current dissatisfaction with certain aspects of
Landsat is that it has remained an R&D system
too long.
If the Government is going to be the operator
of an applications system, one way to avoid in-
teragency transition problems is to assign opera-
tional responsibility to the development agency.
For space applications, NASA would assume this
role, which has worked well for space transpor-
tation. In such a case, NASA would then have
to develop competence in a variety of new fields
in order to plan effectively for the operational
phase and to carry out the plan when it is im-
plemented. If NASA were assigned an operational
role in areas other than space transportation, the
transition from development to operations could
be made smoother and would be more likely to
lead to early returns from investment in space ap-
plications R&D. Where the period of governmen-
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tal operations is likely to be of limited duration
(e.g., for remote sensing), making NASA the
operational agency seems appropriate.
When the private sector is to operate the ap-
plications technology once Government R&D is
complete, the issues are somewhat different and
involve the vital question of whether Government
should be doing the R&D at all. The primary
reason for the Government to sponsor R&D, as
well as demonstration, in technologies intended
for eventual commercial exploitation is to reduce
uncertainties about the technical and economic
risks associated with space applications systems.
The key issue in making the transition from a
Federal R&D program to a commercial operation
is what additional Federal actions, if any, are
needed once the technology has proved its
viability, The Government has a generally weak
record in understanding the marketplace, al-
though the aeronautical program in NASA has
had a long history of moving technology suc-
cessfully to the private sector. As a further com-
plication, nonaerospace industry has had little ex-
perience in working with Government on space
activities.
The Federal agencies are learning how to col-
laborate effectively with business in the develop-
ment of commercial opportunities based on Gov-
ernment-developed technology. Effective col-
laboration has been most effective in certain
specific areas such as aeronautics, where the
sometimes adversarial relationship between the
public and private sectors has not developed.
Eventually, however, the Government is likely to
become more sensitive to commercial considera-
tions in its dealings with new technology. As this
kind of learning continues, Government can be-
come a more effective partner with the Nation’s
investment firms and industries in maintaining
U.S. economic leadership based on technological
supremacy. However, there are probably in-
herent limitations in Government’s ability to ac-
commodate all private sector priorities.
To Foster International Cooperation
What benefits has the United States re-
ceived from its cooperative programs? How
is the desire for cooperation reconciled with
maintaining U.S. preeminence?
The 1958 act encourages “Cooperation by the
United States with other nations and groups of
nations in work done pursuant to this act and the
peaceful application of the results thereof.”5
Though in some ways opposed to the goal of
maintaining national leadership, U.S. cooperative
efforts have made useful contributions to overall
political and foreign policy aims. By entering into
a variety of formal and informal agreements with
foreign governments (ranging from provision of
scientific and technical data and participation in
NASA science experiments to direct access to
U.S. applications technology), the United States
has encouraged potential partners to look fav-
orably on the U.S. space effort.
In return, the United States has gained a variety
of tangible and intangible benefits. At first, in the
context of competition with the Soviet Union, the
United States enlisted the support of allies and
potential allies by offering them a stake in the new
and adventurous space program. In addition, we
gained access to a large number of foreign sites
to provide tracking and relay stations for manned
missions. Scientific data as well as general infor-
mation were widely disseminated, in accordance
with our basic decision—diametrically opposed
to that of the Soviets—to provide the world with
open coverage of U.S. successes and failures. Our
civilian space program has provided a concrete
demonstration of what we mean by an open
society.
The United States took a leading role in estab-
lishing INTELSAT in 1964 and in arranging for
broad international participation in the system.
The United States profited through its initial
SNatiOnal Aeronautics  and Space Act of 1958, Op. cit., Sec. 102.
(c) (7).
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dominance of INTELSAT and its position as the
main supplier of INTELSAT hardware. Because
of the position of the United States, the Soviet
Union did not join INTELSAT, leaving the United
States as the central figure in international satellite
communications.
The United States has attempted in a number
of ways to involve third-world countries in its
space program. The direct-broadcast experiments
conducted by NASA’s applications technology
satellites in 1976 enabled India and Brazil to eval-
uate the feasibility of transmitting educational
programing to remote rural areas. The Landsat
remote-sensing system was made accessible to
all countries through the sale of global data at low
prices, the establishment of foreign ground sta-
tions, and technical/economic assistance to less
developed countries provided by the Agency for
International Development. In addition to foster-
ing goodwill, U.S. openness has helped forestall
criticism directed at direct-broadcast and remote-
sensing systems that operate across national
boundaries.
The United States has long had a policy of sell-
ing launches—vehicles and tracking facilities—
to foreign users for peaceful purposes. In one
major instance of direct technology transfer,
Japan has been allowed to produce Thor-Delta
expendable vehicles under license. Many scien-
tific and R&D missions have been carried out for
developed and less-developed countries, in ad-
dition to cooperative ventures between NASA
and outside agencies.
More recently, the rise of competitive European
and Japanese capabilities, along with increasing
antagonism toward the United States on the part
of third-world countries, has strained our coop-
erative posture. European participation in the
space transportation system has been extensive;
the European Space Agency is building Spacelab
(at its own expense), in return for free flights on
the shuttle. European and Japanese payload spe-
cialists will participate in upcoming Spacelab mis-
sions. Though, overall, the Spacelab/shuttle ar-
rangement appears to be satisfactory to both
sides, differences have arisen over timing of
delivery, costs, and participation in operational
decisions. More generally, there are unresolved
issues concerning the proper extent of coopera-
tive ventures and of information sharing about
potentially competitive commercial products,
particularly in materials processing. Cancellation
of the U.S. portion of the international solar polar
mission (ISPM) has made the Europeans wary of
entering other cooperative ventures with the
United States.
In international organizations, especially the
UN’s Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, the U.S. position on several important
legal and regulatory issues has increasingly come
under attack. The United States was instrumen-
tal in drafting the major treaties dealing with outer
space and in establishing the principle that broad-
casting and data collection from satellites could
be carried out without interference based on
claims of national sovereignty. However, many
third-world and Communist countries are resist-
ing possible transmission of radio and, especial-
ly, television programing across their borders, as
well as the collection and dissemination of high-
resolution imagery of their territories without
prior permission. Cooperation with the United
States may be disrupted by disagreements over
these issues, especially as Japan and Europe are
rapidly becoming alternative sources of com-
parable services and products and may make
concessions to third-world and Communist coun-
tries as a means for gaining commercial advan-
tage over the United States.
SECTION 2: APPLICATIONS POLICY ISSUES
Introduction: Generic and Specific space technologies—e.g., the appropriate rate of
Technology Issues transfer from military to civilian uses, or the ap-
propriate role of the Government in supporting
Each of the major space applications technol- R&D. In addition, each technology also creates
ogies raises certain issues that are generic to all several issues that are specific to it alone—e.g.,
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the resolution limit of civilian land remote sens- issues by technology and the policy principle
ing by satellites. under which they fit most appropriately. The
Through a series of workshops, OTA estab-
generic issues were discussed in the previous sec-
Iished a set of generic and specific issues that
tion. The following section discusses the most im-
underlie this assessment. Table 1 groups these portant specific issues, technology by technology.
Table 1 .—Summary Matrix of Primary Policy Principles Across Four Major Space Application Technologies
Policy principle Communications Land remote sensing
Civilian/military split
International cooperation
Leadership in science and
technology and application
thereof
NASA focus on R&D
Expansion of scientific
knowledge (basic science
research)
Development and operation
of space vehicles
(spacecraft)
Promote commercialization
of civilian applications
1.
2.
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
1.
1.
2.
1,
2.
Is the transfer of technology from the military to
the civilian sector adequate?
Common/shared systems: a) What problems may
the civilian sector face if the military can
preempt civilian use? b) How should costs be
shared?
How should the United States respond to foreign
competition in ground and space hardware?
What are the impacts of Third World re-
quirements for spectrum frequency allocation?
What policy focus should the United States
develop toward foreign cooperation in satellite
communications R&D?
What are the implications of U.S. application of
its antitrust policies in foreign countries?
What improvements need to be made in policy
implementation?
How should United States respond to foreign
competition?
What national goals or programs should the
United States pursue?
What is NASA’s role vis-a-vis the private sector?
How should program discontinuities be handled?
What is NASA’S role?
What should NASA’s role be regarding
demonstrating publicly useful systems?
Do civilian agencies have a role to play in
operating satellite communications systems?
How should regulatory problems (delays) be
handled?
How should the Government regulate DBS na-
tionality and internationally?
1.`
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
1.
1.
2.
3.
1.
1.
2.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6,
7.
8.
Is the transfer of technology from the military to the
civilian sector adequate?
What limits of resolution are appropriate to civilian
systems?
What impact would declassifying existing military
data have on prospects for transferring satellite
remote sensing to the civilian sector?
How will the problems of sovereignty and/or fairness
be addressed?
What are the benefits/drawbacks of an international
system for remote-sensing system? (a la INTELSAT or
some other model).
What problems arise in our relations with other
countries regarding private v. U.S. Government
ownership of remote-sensing system?
What should U.S. policy be regarding U.S. agency
use of data collected by foreign systems?
What is the impact of the U.S.S.R. as a competitor
in remote sensing?
What are the effects on the foreign user of an inter-
ruption of the data flow from Landsat?
Are we losing our leadership in land remote
sensing?
Is the policy regarding flights of opportunity
adequate?
What steps might be taken to improve user inputs to
the R&D process?
What continuing roles do NASA and NOAA have?
What is NASA’s role?
Why hasn’t the system been made operational?
What mechanism(s) is (are) needed to decide on the
operational readiness of a technology?
How can the market for data be aggregated and ex-
panded?
How should the technology be transferred to the
private sector?
What should policy be regarding data availability
from R&D systems?
What incentives does industry require to commer-
cialize remote sensing?
What institutional models might be appropriate?
How do we determine that a technology is ready for
commercialization?
Should system continuity be assured?
Who should decide what sensors are required for an
operational system?
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Table I.—Summary Matrix of Primary Policy Principles Across Four Major
Space Application Technologies (continued)
Materials processing (MPS)
Space transportation structures and manufacturing in space Common issues
1.
3.
1.
2.
1.
1.
2.
3.
1.
1.
1.
2.
3.
4.
What should be DOD’s role and share? 1!
What problems arise from the military’s
right of preemption of a launch
opportunity? 2.
What problems occur from military in-
fluence on space transportation system
design? How would this affect cost and
pricing?
What problems arise with the perception 1.
of shuttle as a military system?
How should we respond to competition
from foreign transportation systems?
What should the policy be regarding main-
taining national facilities?
What role can industry play as potential
operator/owner of space transportation?
Who decides what continuing R&D is
needed?
Should the operational system(s) pay for
further R&D?
What is NASA’s role?
Who will operate the space transportation
system in the near term? The far term?
How can the market for space transporta-
tion services be aggregated?
How can shuttle pricing policies be made
more certain?
What regulatory/political constraints are
needed for privately run systems?
What incentives might be needed to en-
courage private investment In owning and
operating space transportation com-
ponents or systems?
1.
2.
1.
2.
1.
1.
Is there adequate coordination of ef- 1. Is there adequate transfer of technology from
forts between military and civilian
sectors? 2.
On what basis can a potential space-
based materials lab be shared?
To what extent is the prospect of 1.
commercial competition detrimental
to scientific cooperation? 2.
How should the United States
respond to potential foreign
competition?
Is Spacelab an adequate base for
future MPS experiments?
Who should pay for basic ground-
based research?
Who decides what space-based
research to do? Who pays?
How should costs of space-based
materials lab be allocated? a) How is
the lab shared between Government,
industry, and academia?
What new facilities may be needed
to promote space-based materials
processing?
3.
4.
5.
1.
2.
1.
2.
3.
1.
1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.
4.
military to civilian?
How should systems be shared?
What should our policies be regarding inter-
national competition?
What institutions may be needed to address
international competition?
Is the United States a reliable partner for
cooperative programs?
Is it possible or desirable for the United
States to institute Government-indust~
cooperative ventures similar to those of other
nations?
How should the United States protect
technology developed by Government R&D?
Given that portions of U.S. policy are sound, how
can policy implementation be improved?
Is the lack of program goals the problem with
the space program or is it lack of implemen-
tation of existing policy?
What different role should Government and
industry play?
Who should perform oversight?
What is NASA’s role in continuing R&D after
commercialization of a system?
What is NASA’s role?
Who decides when a technology is ready for
the operational mode?
What criteria should be used to determine the
operational readiness of a technology?
What role should NASA have in operating
proven space systems?
What steps should be taken to reduce risk to
the private sector?
What incentives are needed to encourage
private investment in space technology?
What should be the policy regarding opera-
tion of expendable launch vehicles?
What Iegal agreements/restraints are needed
to transfer technology developed with public
funding to the private sector?
SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment.
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COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES
Issue 4: What Are the R&D Needs for
Optimal Advances in
Satellite Communications?
Because the satellite communications industry
has already achieved the status of big business,
R&D is a significant part of its competitive stance.
Nonetheless, there is a point, based on industry’s
own view of return on investment, beyond which
it is unwilling to commit funds for advanced
R&D–where the risks are great, the payoffs
uncertain, the technology unproved, and the
time-scale of needs unclear. For this reason, the
pioneers in advanced R&D are likely to be the
Federal Government, industry/Government joint
ventures, or, if antitrust laws permit, private con-
sortia formed ad hoc. It is widely believed that
individual firms cannot afford to finance the front-
end costs of performing truly advanced develop-
ment or substantial basic research,
Up to now, U.S. leadership in this field has not
been threatened. But recently, Japan and several
European countries have entered this field deter-
mined to compete successfully.6 Supported by
government-sponsored R&D as well as contracts
awarded by INTELSAT, European and Japanese
firms have developed competitive satellite sub-
systems and are now capable of designing, build-
ing, and operating complete telecommunications
systems. In several areas, foreign development
programs are more advanced than those in the
United States. More concerned to maintain their
competitive position with respect to one another
than worried about possible antitrust violations,
U.S. firms seem unwilling to coordinate an in-
dustrywide response to this potential threat to
their markets.
NASA took an early lead in the development
of communications satellites, and even after com-
mercial success had been achieved, the agency
continued to conduct R&D for advanced tech-
nologies. These included advanced stabilization
techniques, the control of satellite position in syn-
bAnthony  J. Calio, statement before the Subcommittee on Space
Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Tech-
nology, U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st sess.,  July
8, 1981, p. 13.
chronous orbit, and, in the last of the series, a
demonstration of broadcast technology from the
satellite to small, low-cost ground stations.
In 1973, OMB, acting on recommendations
from the Office of Telecommunications Policy,
greatly restricted funding for NASA’s R&D in
advanced communications. The assumption un-
derlying this decision was that the U.S. private
sector could conduct its own advanced R&D,
making NASA’s further participation mostly un-
necessary. In the event, however, the private sec-
tor has, for the most part, been content to ex-
ploit proved technologies already available and
to package them in even larger satellites; it has
done little R&D of advanced systems. As a result,
many of the new developments in satellite com-
munication have come from the Europeans and
the Japanese; in some areas they seem to have
leapfrogged U.S. technology.
In this situation it is appropriate to ask what role
NASA should play in responding to current needs
for advanced R&D. One possibility is for NASA
to proceed with plans to complete a demonstra-
tion flight of a 30/20 GHz satellite system. Other
possibilities include demonstration projects for
a large communications platform, and, at a much
lower level of expenditure, a large deployable
antenna. In addition, NASA could continue to
support a number of smaller projects for 30/20
GHz subsystem work.
Increasing Use of the Geostationary Orbit
By far the most useful communications satellites
are those stationed in geosynchronous orbit
(GSO) in which they rotate about the Earth, in
the plane of the Equator, at an angular velocity
equal to that of the Earth itself. Stationed at a
point above the Earth’s Equator, a communica-
tions satellite in GSO can provide continuous
coverage of nearly a third of the Earth’s surface
with a broad beam antenna.
Because many satellite systems must share rel-
atively small numbers of orbit slots in space and
frequency bands in the spectrum, there is a limit
to the number of spacecraft that can be stationed
in a given arc of GSO. Satellites must be sufficient-
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Iy separated to avoid radio interference, the sep-
aration required for a given level of technological
maturity being subject to several physical con-
straints. In general, satellites along the geosta-
tionary arc can use the same frequencies only if
they are far enough apart so that ground stations
can point at one and not receive an interfering
signal from its neighbor on either side.
To guarantee noninterference, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and interna-
tional regulatory agencies have established
minimum orbital separations and have assigned
satellites to specific locations called orbital slots.
Each slot can accommodate one or more satel-
lites that, between them, utilize the full range of
suitable frequencies. All the slots in view of the
United States are filled with existing or author-
ized satellites, and FCC has had to choose from
several competing carriers for allocating the last
few slots. When the capacity of these satellites,
operating at either C or Ku band, is fully utilized
(projected to occur in the last half of this decade),
the growth of this industry will come to a halt–
unless a solution is found and implemented.7 Two
possible solutions that will be examined here are
Ka band technology and large communication
platforms.
NASA’S Past and Future Roles
Through the middle 1960’s and 1970’s, NASA
played a leading role in R&D for communications
satellite technology. Beginning in 1973, however,
NASA’s program was phased down considerably,
on the assumption that the private sector would
continue necessary R&D. The industry did indeed
make noteworthy progress in a number of areas,
but only because these areas offered: 1) a modest
risk for the cost, 2) a relatively immediate market
payoff, and 3) affordable development costs. As
it has turned out, however, the private sector has
not funded long-term, high-risk, and high-cost
satellite communications research.
While the U.S. satellite communication R&D
program slowed between 1973 and 1979, the
Japanese and European efforts accelerated. The
z~enera[ Dynamics, Convair Division, and Comsat Corporation,
“Geostationary Platform Systems Concepts Definition Follow-On
Study,” final review, July 28, 1981, pp. 8-38; see also, Calio, op.
cit. p. 14.
japanese  have already launched a direct broad-
cast satellite for tests and preliminary operations
in the Ku band. Although the first two satellites
in this program were bought from U.S. industry,
all subsequent models will be made in Japan. It
is also noteworthy that the Japanese have be-
come the leading supplier of INTELSAT Earth sta-
tions and, because of very advanced technology
and established production lines, are likely to take
the world market lead in the sale of TV receive-
only (TVRO) Earth stations designed specifically
for direct-broadcast reception. Some see these
efforts by the Japanese and similar activities in
Europe as serious threats to the U.S. lead in
satellite technology, systems, and market share.
Opportunity at 30/20  GHz
There are three frequency bands allocated for
the use of civilian communications satellites: the
C bands (6 GHz uplink, 4 GHz downlink), the
Ku bands (14 GHz,  12 GHz),  and the Ka bands
(30 GHz,  20 GHz).  The technology for transmis-
sion and reception in the C bands was developed
first; almost all commercial satellites now operate
in the C band.
Crowding at 6/4 GHz
While it is true that satellite communications
systems operating in the C band (6/4 GHz)  are
successful and cost effective, two major problems
are becoming increasingly apparent. First, the
number of useful locations in GSO has been used
up. With current technology, a 4° orbital separa-
tion between satellites operating in the C band
is required. Not long ago, a 50 separation was
required, and, as transmitting and receiving tech-
nology improves, a 3” separation may soon
become standard.a  Although it is theoretically
possible to reduce the separation between sat-
ellites further, each reduction increases the costs
of controlling the satellites’ susceptibility to in-
terference. Despite the introduction of new
beam-shaping technology that will further reduce
interference, the point at which it becomes im-
practical to squeeze additional satellites operating
at 6/4 GHz  into desirable parking spaces in GSO
is nevertheless rapidly approaching. Therefore,
Scalio, op. cit., p. 14.
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we are indeed running out of GSO locations with
good “look angles” for 6/4 systems.
The second problem is coordination with
ground microwave systems operating in the 6/4
GHz bands. These ground-based systems are
radio relay systems, used primarily for telex,
telegraph, and voice traffic. The problems are that
the satellite ground transmitters cause 6 GHz in-
terference at the radio relay system receivers, and
that the radio relay system transmitters cause 4
GHz interference at the ground receivers of the
satellite system. As these ground-based systems
proliferate, it has become too costly to protect
colocated two-way satellite ground terminals near
metropolitan areas against interference. This
problem is especially acute in heavily populated
areas such as Japan, Western Europe, and the
Northeast United States.
FUTURE NEEDS
As demand rapidly outpaces capacity of C band
satellite systems, the United States has to make
some difficult decisions as to what step to take
next. Should we fully develop the Ku band?
Should we jump to the Ka band? Should we at-
tempt to deploy fibre optics more rapidly? Should
we buy facilities and technology for service in the
Ku and Ka bands from the Japanese and the Euro-
peans?
There are two main advantages of going direct-
ly to Ka: first, the enormous spectrum spread be-
tween 20 and 30 GHz allows for transmissions
of much greater bandwidth and, hence, much
greater versatility; and second, there are many
more orbital parking slots if the Ka band is used.
Projections of demand for transponders in the
1990’s differ on the question of the ability of the
Ku band to handle the traffic. If projections are
limited to increases in voice and data traffic,
technical improvements will probably allow the
Ku band to suffice up to approximately 199s-
2000. On the other hand, if there is a large in-
crease in video traffic, particularly for teleconfer-
encing, the Ku band will be exhausted by about
1992. It follows that while the Ku band represents
a near-term solution to the problem of crowding
in the C band—e.g., the decision of Satellite
Business Systems (SBS) to operate at 14/12
GHz–projected long-term requirements can be
met only by moving to the Ka band. On the other
hand, there are several unresolved technical and
economic questions that prevent immediate es-
tablishment of an operational Ka system.
The main advantage of developing Ku systems
is that the technology is already fully tested. The
disadvantage is that the Ku band will not be able
to meet the needs of a greatly expanded video
market. In particular, with Ku only, full action,
large screen video teleconferencing will almost
certainly not be possible; only the expanded
capacity of 30/20 can handle the large data flow
of such a high-quality system. Ku band is, how-
ever, an important interim solution; whereas C
band allocations total about 700 MHz, Ku pro-
vides 1500 MHz. As a ready technology, Ku can
meet a service market having three times the
capacity of the already crowded C band. Ka tech-
nology on the other hand is not ready for com-
mercial use, and experiences three to five times
the transmission losses experienced at Ku.
A potential competitor to satellite systems is
transmission by fibre optics. By the 1990’s, fiber
optics will have come into its own as a major
ground-based supplier of communications needs,
However, no matter how well this technology
performs, or how extensive its network be-
comes, it will not be on-line widely enough to
fulfill the requirements of the expanding markets
of the 1980’s. Furthermore, unlike satellite beams,
fibre optics is line-switched, not area-covering;
therefore, it is not so likely to be competitive for
broadcast or distribution services.
COMPETITION ABROAD
The Japanese and the Europeans have already
begun to develop 30/20 Ka systems. One reason
that they have moved to 30/20 is that they already
use the 14/1 2 Ku band for commercial radio.
Therefore, if they paid exclusive attention to
developing satellite systems in the Ku band, they
would face the same kinds of interference prob-
lems there that plague the United States in the
C band. Similarly, the United States already has
INTELSAT-V and an SBS satellite and will soon
have TDRSS/AW–all operating in Ku band. Five
new Ku systems, to be launched in 1983-85, are
under development.
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More important, however, the Japanese and
the Europeans have concluded that the future of
satellite communications systems lies in develop-
ing systems to exploit the Ka band, though they
are deploying Ku systems as well. Precisely be-
cause the Ku band represents only an interim
solution, they have decided to attempt long-range
domination of the satellite communications mar-
ket. The Italian firm, Telespazio, for example,
hopes to be in the forefront of 30/20 develop-
ment, and plans to introduce a system to handle
domestic telephone service and data traffic. In
congressional testimony, some U.S. companies
in effect agree with the foreign evaluation, albeit
in hindsight, for they argue that without the con-
tinuation of a strong U.S. Government program,
foreign countries will almost surely dominate the
multibillion-dollar international communications
satellite markets of the 1990’s.9 A strong U.S. pro-
gram is, however, not synonymous with 30/20
exclusively; aggressive deployment of Ku is im-
portant also. But a renewed effort by NASA
would concentrate on development and demon-
stration of Ka technology because the agency has
already completed these tasks for Ku with the CTS
experimental satellite, from 1971 to 1977. At this
point, the industry has the knowledge and tech-
nology to proceed at Ku, without further need
for NASA to do product improvement.
One course of action made possible by the de-
velopment of 30/20 systems abroad is that U.S.
firms could buy the facilities and services
developed elsewhere. But to allow ourselves to
fall into second place in an important area of
space applications would be to ignore a basic
tenet of U.S. space policy -i.e., that the United
States will maintain a position of leadership. Once
the United States allows itself to take a back seat
in the development and deployment of this (or
any) technology, it becomes ever more difficult
to regain the lead. The United States cannot light-
ly abandon any area of technological leadership
(especially in a strategic sector such as com-
munications), given the economic importance of
maintaining a favorable trade balance in high-
technology products.
gDavid McElroy, MaRin Newman, and Johan  Benson, statements
before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of
the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, 97th Cong., 1st sess., July 9, 1981, p. 149.
POTENTIAL MILITARY INTERFACE
U.S. aerospace companies are developing sig-
nificant new satellite technology for the military,
some of it designed for use at 30/20 GHz.1°  Those
firms do not (and could not afford to) maintain
separate working groups for military and civilian
applications of a given technology. Rather, it is
standard procedure for the same group to work
on both. As important work has been done for
the military at 30/20 and higher bands, the ex-
pertise exists to initiate a civilian program in short
order (see ch. 6 for the broader context of this
discussion).
By 1980, NASA and the Air Force had decided
on joint funding of traveling wave tube develop-
ment, in which the Air Force Space Division
would provide 30 percent of the total funding.
The Air Force, on the other hand, would handle
the IMPAIT transmitter development, with NASA
funding only a portion of that. For antijamming
purposes, DOD is interested in a 44 GHz uplink
band, but NASA is not. Thus, it seems clear that
with the military interest in 30/20 (and 40), the
research will continue with or without NASA.11
Although there would be some problems with
transferring the technology because of military
emphases on security and survivability, such
problems have been solved before and, in prin-
ciple, could be in the present case.
RESPONSE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
In congressional testimony, private industry
representatives have provided an unequivocal
answer: no individual firm can finance the R&D
costs of 30/20 technology.lz On the other hand,
though the industry as a whole, acting as a con-
sortium, might be able to provide the financing,
the structure of such an arrangement would have
to be carefully drawn so as to conflict neither with
‘Whomas F. Rogers, Edward C. Aldredge, Jr., and Elizabeth Young,
in separate statements before the Subcommittee on Space Science
and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d sess.,  Mar. 2, 1982.
I ljohn H, McE[roy, statement  before the subcommittee on Tran$
portation, Aviation, and Communications and the Subcommittee
on Science, Research, and Technology of the Committee on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 2d
sess., May 21, 1980.
IZDonald B. Nowakoski,  statement before the Subcommittee on
Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st sess.,
jliy 8, 1981, pp. 56-57.
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present antitrust laws nor with the competitive
positions of the corporations.
This is not to say that private industry has not
in the past and will not in the future engage in
significant R&D. It is, rather, to say that industrial
R&D is generally conducted in support of primary
business goals. Unlike NASA’s R&D, it is product-
or service-oriented. Furthermore, an acceptable
percentage of industrial R&D must result in profit-
able business applications.
Furthermore, firms in the industry see them-
selves as spending to the corporate limit in fulfill-
ing needs for short-term R&D. There are not
enough funds to be applied to a long-term pro-
gram like civilian 30/20. NASA estimates, and in-
dustry concurs, that the agency’s flight program
to test 30/20 technology will cost $250 million
to $400 million over 3 to 5 years. A commercial
R&D program in satellite communications hard-
ware (which a carrier conducts in a lab) is, by
contrast, on the order of $10 million per year.
SOME CONCERNS
One reason for concern is that the costs of flight
testing 30/20 technology are estimated on the as-
sumption that NASA would do the tests. It is often
the case (and industry makes it frequently in other
contexts) that industry can do certain kinds of
tasks more economically than government can.
Presumably, therefore, if one of the large
aerospace companies conducted flight tests of
30/20 technology for civilian use, the costs would
be substantially lower. Whether industry would
argue that they still could not undertake the
necessary R&D, even if the Government fur-
nished launch, data acquisition, and tracking
services free, is an open question. The compli-
cating factor, however, is that no appropriate
spacecraft bus exists. It is not certain that a Ku-
band bus will suit Ka-band technology. if a new
spacecraft is required, it will cost over $100 mil-
lion, excluding the costs of the new communica-
tions hardware to be tested. Nevertheless, if, for
example, a consortium of the major satellite firms,
builders and carriers, received contributions of
$10 million dollars per year from each, over a
5-year period, a demonstration project could be
privately funded.
A second reason for skepticism is that the risks
seem somewhat overestimated. The technology
has already been bench-tested; the launch sys-
tems are not problematic. Thus, besides the com-
plex but manageable business of developing a
suitable spacecraft, there remains only the task
of mating proved technology and reliable launch
facilities. Additionally, market studies of the com-
mercial potential of Ka-band  technology have
been made and have been uniformly encourag-
ing. ’ 3 In short, the technical risks do not seem
great, while the prospects of return are high.
A final area of concern, one which verges on
questions of policy, is that insufficient considera-
tion seems to have been given to the possibility
of establishing a joint management structure for
development of 30/20 technology. The Govern-
ment might be a guarantor or a partner in such
an arrangement, One potentially attractive Gov-
ernment-industry relationship for 30/20 tech-
nology, as well as for the large communications
platform, might be a variation on the JEA current-
ly instituted to promote materials processing in
space. In such an agreement, the Government
could offer to bear the cost of launching a com-
munications satellite in return for a guarantee of
a specified amount of public service communica-
tions from the satellite. If successful, both par-
ties would benefit, If not, the losses would be
shared.
Large Communications Platforms
TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS
As one important means of meeting the prob-
lem of crowding in GSO, large communications
platforms (LCPS), on which several transmission
facilities are mounted together, are a promising
new configuration of technology. In addition to
fixed and mobile communications an LCP may
provide direct broadcast, navigational, meteor-
ological, and Earth observation services, and sup-
port for scientific payloads, thus becoming a mul-
timission platform. The large capital expenditures
and the number of technological advances re-
— . —
1 JEliZab@h  L. Young,  statement before the Subcommittee on
Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st sess.,
Jllly 10, 1981, pp. 122-123.
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quired make LCPS a much more speculative pros-
pect than are 30/20 GHz satellite systems.
In general, an LCP is distinguished from con-
ventional communications satellites by greater
capacity, connectivity, and switching capability.
The LCP would provide high capacity by means
of multiple spot beams and multiple bands. It
would provide good connectivity for a wide range
of communications users, and it would offer very
substantial in-orbit switching capability, far
beyond that attainable by conventional sat-
ellites.1 4
The use of LCPS would bring several substan-
tial changes:
l
l
l
The high power of the platform would dras-
tically lower the power needs and therefore
the cost of the ground segment, resulting in
a proliferation of Earth stations. Space seg-
ment costs per channel would drop, despite
the larger initial investment required.
The large capacity of the platforms would
result in a requirement for fewer slots in the
geostationary orbit. This would relieve the
congestion that would result from the use of
conventional satellites.
The switching capability of the large plat-
forms would eliminate the need for complex
switching at the Earth stations. Earth stations
would no longer be required to access more
than one spacecraft.ls
The cost savings for LCPS, estimated to be sub-
stantial,16 would result from three areas in which
economies of scale could be achieved. These
economies result from:17
reduced mass in orbit:
–lower bus mass per pound of payload, and
—much lower payload mass to perform the
same mission,
slightly lower production cost per pound of
hardware, and
14Future  Systems Inc., Large Communications P/atforms Versus
Sma/ler Sate//ites,  prepared for NASA Headquarters, February 1979,
p. ii.
‘sIbid., p. 203.
IGlbid., pp. 203-204.
1 zGeneral Dynamics, Op. cit., Pp. 8-15.
. much lower transportation cost per pound
—more efficient utilization of shuttle
capacity.
The critical need of the satellite communica-
tions industry of the 1990’s will be a spacecraft
capable of supporting the large multi beam anten-
nas and switches needed to provide large-scale
frequency reuse for point-to-point services. A
large platform in GSO is ideally suited for this task.
All other services provided by the platform must
be compatible with this primary mission–i.e.,
they must not interfere with or compete for band-
width with the point-to-point payloads.18 The
primary and secondary services of LCPs in geosta-
tionary orbit may be broken out as follows:19
Primary use:
l Fixed point-to-point services:
–direct-to-user (DTU) or customer premise
services (CPS) network, and
–high-volume trunking (HVT), domestic,
regional, and international.
Compatible services:
mobile services:
—air mobile,
—sea mobile, and
–land mobile,
Broadcast and relay services:
–TV distribution (separate Ku-band alloca-
tion,
—educational TV,
–direct-to-home TV,
—tracking and data relay, and
–data collection.
DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS
The development of large space platforms
would require a significant number of technical
accomplishments, though what has to be done
to make them successful is, as theory, well-
understood. Thus, they represent significantly
more than a relatively larger step in the evolu-
tionary pattern that satellites have always fol-
lowed–from smaller to larger, from less to more
reliable.
‘* Ibid., pp. 8-44.
lqlbid., pp. 8-45.
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There are definite prerequisites that can, for the
forseeable future, be provided only by the United
States. First of all, the shuttle itself must be
brought to operational status. Second, a vehicle
capable of transferring a platform from low Earth-
orbit (LEO), where its components would be
brought up on several shuttle flights and then
assembled, to its destination in GSO must be
developed and proved. Third, satellite servicing
and construction techniques (including extensive
life-support and extra-vehicular activity (EVA), will
have to be developed and demonstrated by
NASA in LEO before the private sector will con-
sider deploying LCPS in GSO. Next, certain im-
provements in the technology for the platform
itself are needed. Of these, one is the design of
antenna beams capable of very accurate point-
ing; this project, however, is an extension of pres-
ent technology. Another is the development of
a high-speed, low-power switch to interconnect
the several antenna beams. Finally, the general
requirements of long life and high reliability must
be assured to compensate for the much greater
expense of an LCP.
The requirements of long life and high reliability
could be met in two ways. Either the hardware
might be constructed to maximize these charac-
teristics, or it might be deemed more feasible to
rely on in-orbit maintenance of the platform.
Maintenance, in turn, might be accomplished
robotically by, for example, NASA’s projected
teleoperator, a remotely controlled device that
would replace certain modules aboard the plat-
form. Alternately, a manned orbital station in
LEO, which might be deployed in 1990-2000,
could be assigned maintenance duties; person-
nel would be dispatched to a platform on a trans-
fer vehicle, not only to replace modules, but, if
necessary, to make more extensive repairs. All
of this must be accomplished at GSO and will
require substantial development for an upper
stage and for the shuttle itself.
LAND REMOTE SENSING BY SATELLITE
Issue 5: What Role Should the
Federal Government Play in
Developing or Operating a Satellite
Remote-Sensing System?
Characteristics of Satellite Remote Sensing
Satellite remote sensing is one component of
a broad range of technologies and techniques
that are used to acquire data about the Earth’s
resources. They range from simple direct human
observation and measurement, to high-altitude
aircraft photography, to sensing by satellite. Thus,
satellite remote sensing exists as one element of
an activity that has been part of the human scene
since it first became desirable to survey the ex-
tent and kind of resources available for human
use.
Satellite sensing has unique properties that
separate it from earlier methods: ease of opera-
tion, once established; the ability to see other
lands without intruding in the country or its
airspace; the ability to sample very large areas
in a single “scene”; and the ability to produce
an enormous data flow in digital form suitable
for direct computer processing. Unlike other
methods, its development and present operation
rest solely with the Government.
Each of these characteristics, as well as others
that will become apparent in the ensuing discus-
sion, present new opportunities to the traditional
users of remotely sensed data, but they also raise
issues that must be resolved before satellite re-
mote sensing can become a large and thriving
component of resource observation and devel-
opment.
Current Status of the U.S. Land Remote-Sensing
Satellite Program
The world’s first civilian land remote-sensing
satellite was launched by NASA in 1972. Original-
ly named the Earth Resources Technology Satel-
lite (ERTS), the name was later changed to Land-
sat 1. The Landsat 1 and Landsat 2 satellites no
longer provide data to users. Landsat 3 functions
—— ——— .——-—
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only partially. The present sensors are a multi-
spectral scanner (MSS) that can sense the surface
of the Earth in four different spectral bands, each
with 80 m resolution, and two television-like
cameras called return beam vidicons (RBV). Used
together, the two sensor systems can produce
data products that achieve 30 m resolution. The
data from Landsat are transmitted to Earth by
radio link and received at some 12 stations
located in various countries around the world (fig.
6). The MSS sensors aboard Landsat 3 are return-
ing only partial data, though the RBV sensors are
functioning normally. A new satellite, having a
broad resolution, high spectral coverage sensor
called a thematic mapper (sensitive to emissions
in seven spectral bands) is scheduled for deploy-
ment in late summer 1982. This satellite is
designated Landsat D. A second satellite with
similar sensors, Landsat D’, has been scheduled
for launch in 1985.
Although the system has been an R&D system
designed to verify the potential of satellite remote
sensing, through the efforts of NASA, the data
from Landsats 1, 2, and 3 have attracted a wide
variety of users (resource managers) in this coun-
try and abroad. These users consider Landsat data
to be an invaluable component of the larger
realm of resource inventory data from all sources
(see apps. B and C for details). For some, data
from Landsat have become a baseline require-
ment of their daily routine. For others, these data
serve the secondary, but important role of a com-
parison data base. Generally, the users treat Land-
sat as if it were an operational system, even
though it is still officially an R&D system managed
by NASA.20
Although the system has found a variety of
users, it has yet to demonstrate that it can attract
a large enough market for satellite data to sup-
port even the management and operations of the
system without large Federal outlays. Part of the
problem is simply one of technological maturi-
ty. Very few technical improvements have been
made in the characteristics of the data available
from Landsat since 1972.21 Many applications will
ZO’’Planning  for a Civil Operational Land Remote Sensing Satellite
System: A Discussion of Issues and Options,” Department of Com-
merce, June 1980.
ZI ~, Depa~ment  of the Interior  Position paper on the private SeC-
tor Transfer of Civil Land Observing Satellite Activities, ” Depart-
ment of the Interior, October 1981.
require a satellite system of greater capability:
higher spatial resolution, stereo imagery, and
broader spectral coverage. A more important
reason Landsat has not attracted a larger number
of customers, however, is the uncertainty about
whether the Landsat system will continue.
Many users of remote-sensing data from civilian
satellites express considerable frustration with the
current U.S. program. Though it is at a relatively
primitive stage, the technology is far ahead of the
institutional arrangements necessary to collect
and distribute the data in a timely and predictable
manner. From the users’ viewpoint, the program
is in disarray, and is characterized by a lack of
clear direction and by organizational am biva-
Ience.22 According to U.S. policy, as articulated
in the Carter administration’s Presidential Direc-
tive 54,23 NOAA will be responsible for manag-
ing civilian operational land remote-sensing ac-
tivities after the multispectral scanner aboard
Landsat D becomes operational in January 1983.
NASA will remain in charge of R&D of satellite
remote sensing for the civilian sector. This ad-
ministration, as well as the previous one, is com-
mitted to transferring land remote sensing by
satellite to the private sector. The current policy
is to make this transfer “as soon as possible.”24
Criteria for a Satellite Remote-Sensing System
Regardless of who operates a civilian satellite
land remote-sensing system, the Federal Govern-
ment or the private sector, the major users of
satellite data have basic general needs for the
conduct of an operational system, needs which
they have expressed clearly.25 26 Because each
user has specific data needs (e.g., resolution,
spectral ranges) closely related to his applications,
each will have a different view of the specific
technology most suitable for his purposes. How-
ever, given an operational system for acquiring
remote-sensing data by satellite, most users agree
on the following minimal criteria:
22
’’ Remote Sensing Government User Concerns, ” OTA Work-
shop, May 1981.
zJPresidental Directive 54, White House Press Release, Nov. 20,
1979.
24J.  wright,  ~pa~ment  of commerce  statement, U.S. Senak and
House of Representatives hearing on Civil Land Remote Sensing
Systems, July 22, 1981.
250TA W o r k s h o p ,  o p .  c i t .
X4J.S. Senate and House of Representatives hearing on Civil Land
Remote Sensing Systems, July 22 and 23, 1981.
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Ž Continuity of data flow. Reliable, continuous
flow of data is regarded by operational users
as mandatory. For each user, the term “con-
tinuous data flow” has a slightly different
meaning. However, it generally means be-
ing able to acquire the data that a satellite
could have taken, or did take, in a timely
manner appropriate to a given application.
In the past, the data flow has been inter-
rupted or slowed by failure of the tape re-
corders on the satellites, a natural enough
occurrence in an R&D system but unac-
ceptable in an operational one. Therefore, in
order to ensure continuity, the users need
the most reliable possible system, consistent
with obtaining the necessary data. A backup
satellite for deployment should the first
satellite fail in a major way is also an impor-
tant requirement.
Delivery of data to the user has also been
interrupted or slowed by the inability of the
data center at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight
Center to process Landsat data fast enough .27
Domestic users have experienced delays of
up to 6 months in the delivery of Landsat
data. Certain time-dependent data needs,
such as those of agriculture or pollution con-
trol programs, cannot be served if the data
cannot be processed within a few days (see
table 2). The work of other programs is also
slowed considerably by such delays.
Continuity of data also means retaining
data acquired in previous years. Landsat
satellites have provided data since 1972,
when the first remote-sensing satellite was
launched. The data are stored on magnetic
tapes that deteriorate over time. Thus, the
tapes must be rerecorded in order to save
the data. Because of the storage problems
involved with saving everything, the EROS
Data Center has selected standard scenes of
cloud-free data over the world. The NASA
Goddard Data Center is transferring these
scenes from the early tapes to the computer
compatible tapes (CCT), that will be stored
at the EROS Data Center and available upon
request to users. In the course of identify-
ing the scenes to be saved, the EROS Data
ZY~TA Workshop, op. cit.
Table 2.—Data Needs of Foreign and Domestic Users
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Agriculture (Federal, State, and private): specific sampl-
ing areas chosen according to the crop; time-dependent
data related to crop calendars and the weather patterns
Forestry (Federal, State, and private): specific sampling
areas; twice per year at preselected dates
Geology and nonrenewable resources (Federal, State,
and private): wide variety of areas; seasonal data in ad-
dition to one-time sampling
Civil engineering and land use (State and private):
populated areas; repeat data required over scale of
months or years to determine trends of land use
Cartography (Federal, State, and private): all areas; repeat
data as needed to update maps
Coasta/zone management (Federal and State): monitor-
ing of all coastlands at selected dates depending on
local seasons
pollution monitoring (Federal and State): broad, selected
areas; highly time-dependent needs both for routine
monitoring and in response to emergencies
SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment.
l
Center notified users of Goddard’s intentions
and asked them to suggest which scenes to
save. Some early data, which are currently
being stored at Goddard, are scheduled for
destruction. However, for many users, these
early observations represent a valuable and
irreplaceable baseline for comparison with
later observations. In addition, much of the
only cloud-free global coverage dates from
this early period in space remote sensing.
Users agree that it is important to retain these
early data and make them available upon re-
quest. They represent a large investment and
a valuable global resource for the future.
Looking toward the future, the users of
Landsat data are concerned that data will not
have begun flowing from Landsat D before
the flow from Landsats 2 and 3 ceases. Will
Landsat D be available soon enough to
assure continuity of the data flow? There are
presently no plans for backup should D fail
to operate as planned.
Quality and integrity of data. It is important
that data acquired in different time periods
be comparable and of uniform quality.
Landsat data are initially “preprocessed”
at Goddard; the results are in the form of
high-density digital Tapes (H DDTs). These
HDDTS are then sent to the EROS Data Cen-
ter for processing. EROS in turn supplies data
to users either in the form of film imagery
or as CCTS. Some additional special process-
94-91!3 O - 82 - 5
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ing of data to meet particular user needs is
done at EROS; other similar processing is
done by various value-added companies.
Four problems have surfaced in the data
stream from satellite to user. First, the quality
of data tapes is not always maintained at a
high level. Users complain that errors in-
troduced in the HDDTs from Goddard are
passed through and appear in the CCTS from
EROS. Second, abrupt changes over time in
the format of CCTS, again a function of the
R&D nature of the system, have seriously in-
convenienced users. These changes have
made it impossible to process older CCTS
with the techniques for processing current
CCTS. Users must therefore go to unantici-
pated and sometimes extraordinary lengths
to process the earlier tapes. These format
changes were made without sufficiently con-
sulting the needs of the user community.
Thirdly, not all users want to purchase pre-
processed data because preprocessing nec-
essarily causes some degradation of quality
or loss of information. For some applications,
it is better to have raw data as they come
off the spacecraft. Finally, maintenance and
management of the data base have been in-
adequate.
l Adequate collection of primary data. For a
truly global satellite remote-sensing system,
all data must be collected.
As the example of Costa Rica illustrates
(see below under “Foreign Uses of Landsat
Data”), the United States lost an important
opportunity to sell Landsat data because
Costa Rica is just out of range of receiving
stations and because Landsat 3’s tape re-
corders are unreliable. The tracking and data
relay satellite system (TDRSS), when it is
completed, will serve to gather and relay
data from Landsat D and D’. Until then we
will be dependent on foreign ground stations
for MSS data received by D and D’, because
these spacecraft will carry no tape recorders.
Although the U.S. agreements require the
foreign ground stations to make their data
available to others in accordance with our
open data practices, it is not clear that the
foreign ground stations will respond to re-
quests for data in a timely and efficient man-
ner. Users in some countries, including the
United States, have experienced difficulties
in the past in obtaining needed data quick-
ly from foreign ground stations.
l Adequate consultation with the user com-
mun;ty. This is an essential element of an op-
erational space remote-sensing system,
whether run by the Federal Government or
by the private sector.
Although NASA has consulted other Fed-
eral agency users, neither users in the private
sector nor those in State and local govern-
ment have been included in any way in the
key decisionmaking processes. A successful
operational system depends on the full par-
ticipation of all elements involved on an
ongoing basis.
In an effort to build interest in the capa-
bilities of Landsat, NASA has sought the ad-
vice of the user community about its needs
with respect to sensors and resolution limits.
However, as maybe appropriate in an R&D
system, NASA has approached the problems
of the future orbital height, orbital planes,
and orbital path of the Landsat D satellite
from the point of view of optimizing space-
craft design, rather than the data product.
This approach will result in abrupt changes
in data format and further disruption of the
data base, to the discomfort of the potential
purchasers of the data from Landsat D. Con-
sequently, the user community displays con-
siderable skepticism about the Federal com-
mitment to operate a complete land remote-
sensing system via civilian satellite, tailored
to providing standard and predictable data
products for the public and private organiza-
tions that are attempting to integrate Land-
sat data into an ongoing operation,
Continuation of remote-sensing R&D. The
current Landsat capabilities, though they
satisfy the basic needs of a large portion of
the potential users, are also limited.
Users such as those represented by the
Geosat Committee28 are very interested in
using stereo images of the Earth for explora-
tion of mineral and energy resources. Geosat
has suggested development of the so-called
2a
’’ Satellite Remote Sensing Data–An Unrealized Potential for
the Earth Science Community, the Geosat Committee Inc., 1977.”
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“stereosat” remote-sensing satellite.29 Car-
tographers would benefit from stereo imag-
ing and from higher resolution. Many other
users agree that an automated mapping sat-
ellite system based on multilineal array tech-
nology (MLA), a so-called “MAPSAT,” would
serve their needs for high-resolution (20 m)30
stereo imagery as well as their multispectral
and spatial requirements and be far cheaper
than Landsat D or D’,31
Even the heavy users of current Landsat
data will find their needs expanding as they
gain experience with the data and under-
stand their potential. They are likely to find
needs for data from new sensors and ad-
vanced data relay subsystems.
l Price of data. The major concern of the users
with regard to price of data is that inevitable
price increases be reasonably predictable
and incremental.
Current data prices are much lower than
the marginal costs of generating the data.
Users recognize that future data prices will
be higher as the prices are increased to
reflect marginal costs. However, users would
not purchase the same volume of data if the
prices were doubled or tripled suddenly.
Some State and local government users also
face the difficulty of a 2-year budget cycle .32
If data prices are raised precipitously, these
users cannot adjust to the increase for up to
2 years, and will be forced to purchase fewer
data products than their needs would actual-
ly dictate. At a minimum, there should be
a declining Federal price subsidy to bridge
the gap in budget adjustment.
On the whole, these are not hardware or tech-
nology problems, but rather derive from the
management and structure of the system. The
larger problem, at least in part, seems to be that
NASA, in an effort to test a broad spectrum of
applications and to interest potential users around
291 bid.
30A. P. Colvocoresses, “Proposed Parameters for Mapsat: Pho-
togrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing, ” vol. 45, No. 4,
pp. 501-506, April 1979.
31 Itek Corp., final report, “Conceptual Design of an Automated
Mapping Satellite (Mapsat), ” January 1981.
32B.  f&jo,  statement  to U.S. Senate and House of Representatives,
hearing on Civil Land Remote Sensing Systems, July 22, 1981.
the world in using remote-sensing data, created
a de facto operational system .33 Its effort was
driven, in part, by a desire to justify the R&D pro-
gram to OMB. However, being by established
policy an R&D, not an operations agency, NASA
has not been able to manage or fund an opera-
tional system, and has therefore been unable to
guarantee its continuity. Nor was NASA directed
to assume operational responsibilities by the
President or the Congress. NOAA, in turn, is not
scheduled to assume the management of the sys-
tem until 1983 (after Landsat D is launched). Cir-
cumstances such as these have made the users
extremely wary of investing in the manpower,
hardware, and software to process Landsat data,
Further, these uncertainties have limited the size
and vitality of the market for Landsat data as well
as that of the private data-processing (value-
-added) industry.
In short, the future direction of satellite land
remote sensing has reached an impasse: the users
refuse to invest further in Landsat data because
the system is not operational, but many of them
also oppose changes because they have become
dependent on the system as it is currently con-
figured. On the other hand, no existing institu-
tion, Federal or private, seems appropriate to
undertake operations: first, because there are not
enough users, and second, because the present
system is not advanced enough to generate a
large market. Among other things, this has led
to a situation in which the French, using tech-
nology originally developed in this country, will
shortly provide very strong commercial competi-
tion in land remote sensing. They have designed
their SPOT system from the first to be an opera-
tional system and have included user needs in
the system specifications.
Foreign Users of Landsat Data
One of the basic tenets of the 1958 NAS Act
is that “activities in space should be devoted to
peaceful purposes for the benefit of all man-
kind.” 34 Our Landsat system, with receiving sta-
tions distributed around the world and a prac-
JJp. Mack, “space Science for Applications: The History of Land-
sat. ’ in Space Science Comes of Age, P. A. Hanle  and V. D.
Chamberlain (cd.), Smithsonian Institution Press, 1981.
JQNational  Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, op. cit.
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tice of open data sales, certainly satisfies the in-
junction of the NAS Act. It also satisfies section
102c (7) of the act, directing “cooperation by the
United States with other nations and groups of
nations in work done pursuant to this act and in
the peaceful application of the results thereof.”
In fact, from a pure cost-benefit approach, remote
sensing by satellite only makes sense as a global
system. For the continental United States alone,
the investment in Landsat far exceeds the cost
of obtaining equivalent data by other means.
However, U.S. corporations and Government
agencies also need foreign data in order to pur-
sue their operations abroad. More importantly,
Landsat, by providing low-cost images of the
world to all purchasers, has enhanced our status
in the world. Our willingness to join others in
solving problems of regional or global import can-
not but strengthen our overall position in the
world as a leader concerned for the good of all.35
Importance of Landsat Data:
Three Asian Countries
Foreign users of Landsat data have found them
very helpful for problems of resource manage-
ment and control. The experiences of several
Asian countries illustrate the potential of Land-
sat for these uses. Asia serves as an excellent ex-
ample because it is the location of five of the
original 10 countries selected by the U.S. Agen-
cy for International Development (USAID)S6 in
1975 for initial testing of the applicability of using
Landsat data for resource management problems
in developing nations. Two criteria have to be
met for this technology to be successful in
resource management applications: a practical
means of transferring it to the country must be
found, and the data flow should be maintained
over an extended time. A brief historical review
of three of the original Asian programs and their
present day applications provide insight into the
ability of Landsat to meet these criteria.
Bangladesh began its use of Landsat data with
the help of USAID. This Asian country was in-
35c. K. Pau[, and A. C. Mascarenhas,  “Remote Sensing in ~velop
ment,” Science, vol. 214, No. 4517, 1981.
MT. W. Wagner, and D. S. Lowe, AID’s Remote Sensing Grant
Program (Ann Arbor: Environmental Research Institute of Michigan,
1978, pp. 11-22).
terested in testing the use of Landsat data for
deriving information on agricultural production
and land use in order to promote optimal devel-
opment of a section of northeastern Bangladesh.
The initial project was quite successful and
regional information on rice and other crop pro-
duction was obtained during the 1975 winter sea-
son. Interpretation of Landsat data during this
project also provided detailed information con-
cerning changing pond, stream, and flood pat-
terns, data that are invaluable for planning at both
regional and village levels.37 After this initial in-
troduction of Landsat technology, its use in Bang-
ladesh has rapidly expanded with diverse govern-
ment programs in agriculture, forestry, ocean-
ography, fisheries, and disaster prevention. In
1980, in an effort to enhance the return from this
effective and developing technology, Bangladesh
established the Space Research and Remote Sens-
ing Organization (SPARRSO), a lead government
agency for R&D and operational activities.38
Sri Lanka is an island nation whose economy
is highly dependent upon agricultural production.
Because of such constraints as the rugged topog-
raphy and its effect on transportation, as well as
a paucity of trained field personnel, continual ef-
fective ground survey of agricultural production
is not feasible on a continuing basis. In 1975, the
Ministry of Agriculture and Lands requested
USAID assistance for establishing local capabil-
ity to use remote-sensing technology for accurate
agricultural inventories.  Specifically, the
Ministry requested assistance in digitally process-
ing Landsat data. This project resulted in the
development of an operations manual and digital
analysis capability in that country. Although the
accuracy was less than would be desired in a
mature program for estimating agricultural acre-
age, Landsat was recognized as a valuable re-
source management tool, and in 1978 a national
remote-sensing center was established.~ USAID
37M. A. H. Pramanik, and A. K. M. Alam, “Space and Remote
Sensing Activities in Bangladesh,” proceedings of the Second Asian
Conference on Remote Sensing, Beijing, China, 1981, 1-2-l.
MJT. W. Wagner, op. cit., pp. 69-81.
Jgchristopher  Nanayakkara, “The Sri Lankan Experience in Re-
mote Sensing, ” proceedings of the Second Asian Conference on
Remote Sensing, Beijing, China, 1981, 1-7-l,
q. Geiser, M. Sommer,  and E. Nanayakkara,  The Sri Lanka/Swiss
Satellite Imagery Interpretation Project: Repott on Test Phase (Col-
ombo: Center for Remote Sensing, 1981).
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provided a followup grant in response to a Center
request for the development of a simplified low-
cost Landsat data-processing system to address
specific resource needs. This system will be
delivered to the Center in 1982. A unique pro-
gram also currently under way in Sri Lanka re-
flects the value that another industrial nation
places on the application of U.S. space-derived
data for development assistance. The Swiss are
training Sri Lanka resource managers in tech-
niques for using U.S. Landsat data for monitor-
ing rice production. Sri Lanka is also using
remote-sensing data for monitoring land use and
for mapping its forest cover. Sri Lanka views Land-
sat as a successful technology that can be em-
ployed without heavy capital investment if the
project is well planned, and is optimistic about
the possibilities for using future satellites.41
Thailand began its leadership role among the
developing nations of Asia by establishing a na-
tional remote-sensing program in 1971. The ma-
jor goal of Thailand’s program was to develop the
means to use remote-sensing technologies effec-
tively for natural resource management. As a
result of its early initiatives, Thailand’s Royal
Forestry Department was one of the first depart-
ments of any country to develop an operational
Landsat-based system for monitoring deforesta-
tion. Today, information derived from Landsat
data is a major component of the forestry policy
decisions of this Asian nation.42 USAID’S 1975
joint project with the Thai agricultural department
that sought to obtain acreage information as
part of the annual rice, corn, and sugar cane
survey was of limited value. Two major constrain-
ing factors affected this project: 1 ) continuous
cloud cover during scheduled sampling periods
and prior to harvest prevented data acquisition
by Landsat; and 2) the available Thai computers
had not been programmed for Landsat data anal-
ysis prior to terminating this project.43 However,
the USAID project was beneficial in providing ex-
Alchrlstopher  Nanayakkara, “The Sri Lankan Experience in Re-
mote Sensing, ” proceedings of the Second Asian Conference on
Remote Sensing, Beijing, China, 1981, 1-7-6.
AZSanga  Sabhasri, pradisth Cheosakul, Boon Indrambarya and
Suvit Vibulsresth.  “National Remote Sensing Activities in Thailand,”
unpublished report to the Second Asian Conference on Remote
Sensing, Beijing, China, 1981.
43T.  W.  Wagner, op. cit., P P. 77-BI.
perience with Landsat sampling and data analysis
techniques. This experience contributed to later
successes such as the national rubber plantation
survey and a continuing soil erosion study by the
agricultural department. Landsat data are being
widely used by other government agencies, in-
cluding the Department of Mineral Resources and
the Royal Irrigation Department. Thailand is com-
pleting a major Landsat/Metsat ground receiving
station that should provide timely data to the Thai
user service center beginning in late 1982. Thai-
land has not only committed itself to using data
from Landsat, but it has also shown its determina-
tion to assist other Asian countries. Data from this
ground station will be made available to these
nations.
These selected Asian cases demonstrate the
utility of Landsat technology for peaceful uses and
its applications to the resource management
problems of developing nations. Landsat tech-
nology has not only been successfully introduced,
but has been shown to be effective in monitor-
ing resources over time, These factors make it an
effective tool in global resource development.
One must remain cognizant that Landsat tech-
nology, although transferable to developing
countries, is not a simple technology. It therefore
demands complex man/computer interaction and
timely current data for the analysis of most
renewable resource problems.
However, though foreign users of Landsat data
have made good use of them, they often face
problems very similar to those troubling domestic
users. The experiences of an Italian land planning
firm are not atypical of user experience in the
United States and abroad44. This firm attempted
to integrate Landsat data into its normal data
stream from aircraft and ground survey. After first
learning how to make the best use of the data,
it then experienced difficulties in obtaining timely
data and data that were of high quality. As a
result, it has made much less use of Landsat data
then originally planned. Instead of being a major
component of the firm’s land planning efforts,
these data serve only a secondary role in its total
scheme.
44G. C. Bernardino, “European Industrial Space Projects, ” Ameri-
can Astronautical Society, 19th Goddard Memorial Symposium,
March 1981,
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A short case history of one country’s attempt
to use Landsat data will illustrate other problems
foreign users have faced. It also provides another
illustration of the usefulness and cost effectiveness
of Landsat data for attacking important renewable
resource problems.
Importance of Landsat Data: Case of Costa Rica
Deforestation and subsequent desertification
have become problems of great concern in many
countries throughout the world. The case of
Costa Rica demonstrates the importance of Land-
sat data for dealing with these problems and the
potential tragedy of unavailability of these data
through discontinuity in Landsat service.
The Government of Costa Rica (GOCR) Minis-
try of Agriculture was aware in the early 1970’s
that loss of forest cover and watersheds had
become a major problem. Personnel in the min-
istry knew that a complete forest inventory would
be necessary in order to assess the extent of the
problem, but that if contemporary ground truth
and survey methods alone were used, 25 years
would be needed to complete the inventory. By
that time, there might be no forests to save.
Recognizing that the problem was beyond the
capabilities of his staff, the Minister of Agriculture
requested assistance from the USAID to deter-
mine whether Landsat technology could be ap-
plied effectively to map the resources of Costa
Rica. USAID commissioned a study that was com-
pleted in March 1977.45 This initial study con-
cluded that the deforestation problem was even
more severe than GOCR had thought, and that
a combined aircraft and satellite remote-sensing
program might be the most cost-effective way to
determine the full extent of the problem. Data
from Landsat could not alone do the entire job
because some areas (the watersheds most at risk)
required detailed mapping and analysis at scales
and resolution beyond the capability of the cur-
rent Landsat series.
As a second step in determining the feasibility
of relying on Landsat data, USAID contracted for
a test and demonstration project, which was com-
qS”An Assessment of Resource Inventory and Environmental prob-
lems in Costa Rica,” Report to USAID,  Office of Development Re-
sources, LA/DR, contract No. AI D/afr-c-l  135-8, March 1977.
pleted in March 1978.* The principal conclusions
for the forest sector were the digital-processed
Landsat data would be the most cost-effective al-
ternative for “Level l“ forest cover maps at a scale
of 1 :200,000, and that color infrared (CIR) pho-
tography would be the best choice for “Level 11”
and Level Ill” mapping. Landsat data could also
be used effectively for urban mapping and anal-
ysis, but would be cost effective only if coupled
with a project to maintain the forests that would
absorb the primary costs.
The major problem confronted in the second
phase of the project was that of obtaining “cur-
rent” Landsat data. After an initial request to
NASA was ignored, it was necessary for the Presi-
dent of Costa Rica to make a direct personal re-
quest to the White House in order to have the
tape recorder aboard Landsat 3 activated, so that
data on Costa Rica could be collected, stored,
and relayed in a timely fashion.
The third phase of the Costa Rican study was
the pilot project (conducted between January
1978, and June 1979).47 Here the objective was
to develop in Costa Rica an operational system
for resource management. The system was to be
tested and established on a cross-sectional area
representing more than 20 percent of the entire
country and running from the Caribbean to the
Pacific. This project demonstrated that a nation-
wide program based on CIR photography and
Landsat data was both possible and practical.
Such a program would be remarkably cost effec-
tive: the entire forest survey task could be ac-
complished in less than 3 years for about $1
million (compared with the earlier GOCR esti-
mate of 25 years and $20 million, using only
ground and aircraft surveys.)
Despite the clear need for such a nationwide
program in Costa Rica, despite its cost effec-
tiveness, and despite significant investments both
by GOCR and by the United States, today–3
years later—no system to use Landsat data is yet
a“The Utility, Cost, and Effectiveness of Remote Sensing for Forest
and Urban Sector Assessment in Costa Rica, report to USAID/ROD/
LA/US and USAID/Costa  Rica, contract No. AID/afr-C-l  135-9-10,
March 1978.
47
’’ Design of a Natural Resources lnvento~  and Information Sys-
tem for Costa Rica: The Pilot Project Report, ” report for USAID,
contract No. Al D/la-C-l 253, June, 1979.
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in place in Costa Rica because of the unreliabil-
ity of the present Land sat system. The system for
deforestation analysis does not exist because
sparse data were supplied and because the
United States made no credible assurance that
continuity of data would be maintained in the
future. During the entire period of the pilot proj-
ect (January 1978 through June 1979), only six
images were obtained over the western half of
the area and only two over the eastern half. Wet-
season data were never obtained, and no CCT
was ever available for the one usable image over
the eastern section. On the basis of this ex-
perience, GOCR decided not to fund a nation-
wide operational program.
Many of these user problems are due to the
R&D nature of the current system, but they point
up the care that will be needed in planning for
a future operational system, whether operated by
the government, the private sector, or a mix of
both.
Market for Satellite Remote-Sensing Data
Whatever entity (ies) operates a U.S. satellite
land remote-sensing system, the size and breadth
of the market for the data it supplies is of major
concern. in either case, recovery of the costs of
investment and upkeep (particularly those of the
space segment) is necessary. In a publicly owned
system, political benefits, such as its use as a tool
of foreign policy or its value in enhancing U.S.
technological superiority, may justify a reasonable
shortfall in cost recovery. But in a privately owned
system operating with no taxpayer subsidy, the
market alone must bear the entire burden of re-
covering these costs.
The market for remote sensing data from space
divides naturally into two categories: The market
for primary data provided directly from the space
segment, and the much more lucrative market
for value-added data, which represents the largest
part of the ground segment. Based on its review
of the size and nature of the market,QB OTA can
make the following observations:
l Size of the market. The true extent of the
market for primary satellite remote-sensing
—
a“Commercialization  of Remote Sensing, ” OTA Workshop, May
1981.
l
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data is unknown. The domestic market con-
sists of two kinds of users, the government
(local, State, and Federal), and the private
sector. Federal Government users generate
the largest demand in this category today.
Although the records of the EROS Data Cen-
ter and the NASA Goddard Distribution Cen-
ter indicate a relatively small primary market
(approximately $5.7 million per year sold by
the United States directly )49 this estimate
reflects only a portion of the true market,
which could be at least as much as 50 per-
cent greater. Some users obtain data directly
from other users at a portion of the original
cost, or gratis (i.e., a certain amount of data
sharing occurs). so
Even if the exact distribution of original
satellite data were known, however, it would
represent only a fraction of the value of data
after they are computer-processed to provide
particular information. For example, the cost
of a CCT is currently $200 to $300. To proc-
ess the data contained on a specific CCT and
to present it in usable form to the ultimate
user of the data can cost between $1,000 and
$20,000, depending on how much informa-
tion is extracted from it or merged with it,
and the number of steps taken to enhance
the original information. Processing satellite
remote-sensing data thus represents a signifi-
cant investment opportunity for a firm, es-
pecially one that is already capable of digital-
ly processing remote-sensing data from air-
craft. Currently, some 60 firms are known
to be capable of processing Landsat digital
data. Another 35 firms (28 United States, 7
foreign) sell computer-processing equipment
for Landsat, which range in price from
$50,000 to $500,000. Firms providing digital
processing of photographic data might also
be interested, because the basic techniques
for enhancing image data by computer are
similar for all applications, though most film
processors would lack the analytical exper-
tise in land resources.
Nature of the market. One of the major dif-
ficulties in defining the full extent of the
———
49
’’ Status of NASA’s Landsat–D,”  GAO briefing, July 1981.
‘“’’ Commercialization of Remote Sensing, ” OTA Workshop, May
1981.
.
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market is its extremely diffuse and dispersed
condition. Each major category of user, both
foreign and domestic, has different spectral
and resolution requirements, is interested in
different geographical areas, or needs data
on a different time schedule. Table 1 sum-
marizes the categories of major users and
their general needs for Landsat data.
In order to understand fully the data needs of
each user group, it would be necessary to analyze
in detail the records of the EROS Data Center,
the NASA Goddard Data Processing Center, and
the foreign ground stations to determine:
l Who uses the data (specific users identified
by discipline)?
Ž What regions are requested? With what fre-
quency? Under what time constraints?
From this information and a projection of user
requirements, future market potential might be
determined. Predictions about new markets,
foreign and domestic, would have to be added
to this information to reach an estimate of the
total size of the market for Landsat data. To OTA’s
knowledge, no analysis has reached the level of
detail required for making reasoned decisions
about the potential for commercialization of the
technology,
Commercialization of Remote Sensing:
Domestic and Foreign Concerns
If commercialization of civil land remote-sens-
ing satellite activities is to occur, the major ques-
tions before the country at this time are how and
at what speed the transition to the private sector
should be accomplished. Conversion from public
to private ownership and operation of the civilian
land remote-sensing system would affect the user
community in a variety of ways. Users perceive
that both advantages and disadvantages will result
from the change. In addition to the concerns of
users previously expressed in relation to an opera-
tional system, they have raised the following con-
cerns specific to a commercial enterprise:
l Open data. The U.S. current [y supports and
follows the practice that any party, regardless
of nationality, may purchase Landsat data,
regardless of the country from which they
l
l
are derived. This conforms to long-standing
U.S. policy on the sale of maps prepared by
the U.S. Geological Survey. Users fear that
this practice may be discontinued. The ques-
tion of whether unrestricted dissemination
of remotely sensed data violates the sover-
eignty of a sensed nation has occasioned vig-
orous debate in the U.N. and other forums
for many years; no agreement has yet been
reached. Many countries have objected on
the grounds that they do not wish important
information about indigenous mineral re-
sources, crop conditions, or military activities
to be made public. Private operation may
heighten suspicion that such data will be
used to enable interests outside the coun-
try to gain a competitive advantage, or that
data may be sold secretly to political adver-
saries. These concerns will increase sharply
as new sensors improve upon the current
resolution of 80 m for the MSS aboard Land-
sats 2 and 3.
Resolution limits. What regulations will be
imposed concerning the limit of resolution
of the sensors? The thematic mapper on
Landsat D and D’ will be capable of 30-m
resolution. The SPOT sensors will reach res-
olutions down to 20 and 10 m. Will there
be restrictions on dissemination of high-res-
olution data from some areas? For some ap-
plications (e.g., forestry), resolutions of 1 to
5 m over small areas would be useful. Fur-
ther, as other users become more accus-
tomed to the capabilities of remote sensing,
and as their ability to handle massive
amounts of data improves and costs de-
crease, they are likely to find need for data
of higher resolution. As in other aspects of
satellite remote sensing, users want to be in-
volved in the decision making process for
determining the limits to resolution. Resolu-
tion limits will also be of major international
concern.
Competition from governments. Both the
potential operators of remote-sensing sys-
tems and the value-added firms are con-
cerned about potential competition from
governments, either the United States or
foreign entities. For example, NASA may
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now compete with private industry when it
institutes an R&D project in a university or
government facility to process Landsat data.
These projects often result in computer soft-
ware that competes directly with software
packages developed by private value-added
data processors.
l Price of data. The user community is quite
concerned about the price of primary data
from a privately owned satellite system. It
fears a dramatic increase in price if total costs
are to be recovered. 51 This is especially true
for users who require repeat data on a time
scale of weeks or months. For users whose
needs are largely for one-time data from a
particular region, the cost of a single CCT is
not as critical. It is doubtful that the price
elasticity is sufficient to allow prices to be
raised to a full cost recovery level in the next
few years,
l Continuing Federal R&D. users recognize
that neither they nor the actual operators of
land remote sensing are willing to provide
the resources to fund continuing R&D in the
private sector. Yet there are a number of
technological improvements that could be
made to the system even after Landsat D and
D’ are operational (e.g., stereo imagery,
higher resolution, greater spectral coverage).
Users therefore see the need for continued
research by the Federal Government, and for
substantial involvement by the user com-
munity in the decisions about the directions
such research should take.
• Archived data. What wiII happen to the ar-
chived data that have already been provided
by Landsats 2 and 3, the shuttle, Skylab, and
other means if the private sector assumes re-
sponsibility for U.S. satellite remote-sensing
activities? As mentioned earlier, users are
very concerned that the previous data be re-
tained. But retaining them is very costly be-
cause the high-density digital tapes have a
limited lifetime and, therefore, must be re-
copied at regular intervals.
Sljoint hearings, July 1981, oP. cit.
Foreign Policy Concerns
W/hat commitments does the United States
have to foreign purchasers of Landsat data if the
entire system is in private hands? Other countries,
particularly LDCS, are well aware that the posses-
sion of remote-sensing data carries with it the
concomitant power to affect resource develop-
ment. In considering transfer of Landsat or other
satellite information systems to private hands,
U.S. policy makers must consider the effects on
our relationships with other countries. In addi-
tion, there is an added foreign and domestic
problem of conflict of interest if a private cor-
porate operator or its subsidiaries are allowed to
offer value-added services. Advance knowledge
of certain time-dependent data such as crop con-
dition or water availability has the potential for
exploitation by the firm before others could ob-
tain the data.
The largest market for satellite land remote-
sensing data might eventually be the totality of
foreign users. if foreign governments are to de-
pend primarily on U.S. satellite data, they will,
in most cases, have to restructure any systems
they presently use for monitoring and managing
their resources. If the space and primary delivery
system were publicly held, and if a country ex-
perienced problems with the pace of data deliv-
ery, or with the continuity or quality of data, it
could then petition for redress directly through
diplomatic channels. If the space and/or recep-
tion component were in private hands, such
recourse could be only indirect. Competition
from other satellite systems could mitigate this dif-
ficulty somewhat, if the data were totally com-
patible. Private operators would then have con-
siderable incentive to meet contractual agree-
ments. However, data from other systems
(French, Japanese, or Soviet) will not be exactly
compatible with those from the Landsat MSS. Will
the U.S Government therefore regulate the sale
of remote-sensing data to other states? If so,
guidelines will have to be drawn up by an agen-
cy designated for the purpose.
Foreign users of Landsat data have purchased
ground stations and data on the understanding
that the system would be subject to possible data
gaps, change of data format, and other deficien-
64 l Civilian Space Policy and Applications
cies peculiar to a system in development. Accord-
ing to the policy of the previous administration,
however, they could look forward to data con-
tinuity through the 1980’s. In light of the resolve
to transfer Landsat technology quickly to the
private sector, foreign users who have invested
in Landsat receiving stations and data-processing
equipment are questioning the value of our com-
mitments. Total foreign investment in ground sta-
tions is about $60 million. Additional investments
in data-processing equipment have also been
made, as well as systems to integrate Landsat data
with other necessary data. How will these ground
stations and associated processing capabilities be
integrated with a private system?
As sensors improve, the civilian capabilities for
land remote sensing will grow uncomfortably
close to military/intelligence standards. The
satellites owned by the private sector will there-
fore require close supervision and oversight by
the Government to: 1) monitor their technical ca-
pabilities, and 2) prevent use of the data derived
from them inimical to the security of the United
States.
Foreign Competition
Direct commercial competition to the U.S
Landsat system will come from France’s SPOT sat-
ellites starting in 1985, at about the time Landsat
D’ is now scheduled to be launched. The SPOT
sensors will provide multispectral spatial resolu-
tion of 20 m, and panchromatic resolution of
10 m (compared with Landsat D’s TM resolution
of 30 m); in addition, SPOT will be able to
“point” its sensors to the side, allowing it to ac-
quire stereoscopic data. Unlike the more expen-
sive and fragile optical-mechanical sensors on
Landsat, SPOT will use relatively simple solid-state
MLA. The establishment of a semiprivate com-
pany, Spotimage, to market SPOT data and serv-
ices greatly enhances its competitiveness, espe-
cially in the absence of similar organizational cer-
tainty for Landsat; pricing for the two systems is
not yet firm. Spotimage is heavily subsidized: the
French Government has funded purchase and
launch of the first satellite as well as all
preliminary R&D, and owns the overwhelming
majority of stock in the company. The first SPOT
satellite will be launched in 1984 on the French
launcher Ariane, and Spotimage is committed to
maintaining an operational system for 10 years.
In the area of ocean surveillance, the Japanese
Marine Observation Satellite (MOS) system is
scheduled to begin operations in 1985. The sat-
ellite’s sensors will be capable of observing land
masses as well; this satellite is likely to be the
precursor to an operational land remote-sensing
system (for further details, see ch. 7).
Potential Policy Initiatives for a Land Remote-
Sensing Satellite System
If the United States is to continue to play a role
in the operation of a satellite land remote-sens-
ing system, what mode of operation would be
most desirable? OTA has explored a number of
options for continued operation of a Landsat-type
system (see ch. 10 for further details). Before a
decision is made to proceed with any one of
them, each option would require much more de-
tailed study than it was possible to provide in this
assessment.
Ž Designated private entity. The Government
could ensure that its data needs were met by
private operators by licensing a single U.S. en-
tity to operate the satellite system. This could
be done fairly quickly if a sufficient subsidy
were provided, either through direct support
for the difference between income and ex-
penditures or through a Government guaran-
teed market.
This option might suffer the objection from
some foreign countries, particularly less
developed countries (LDCS), that leaving the
data distribution function in private hands
might allow corporations from developed
countries to use the resource information in
remote-sensing data unfairly for their own
profit. This objection could be circumvented
if the licensed corporation were a separately
incorporated firm prohibited from entering
other fields; it would be, essentially, a reg-
ulated monopoly.
l Continued Federal operation of the space seg-
ment only. In this scenario, the Federal
Government would continue to operate the
space segment while turning over the distribu-
tion of preprocessed data to private sector
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operators. The rationale for such an approach
is that the private sector cannot make a profit
by operating the entire land remote-sensing
system, but the Federal Government does not
have the expertise to market satellite data ef-
fectively and promote their expanded use.
Even if the relevant market experience could
be obtained in the Government, Federal op-
eration of an enterprise that the private sec-
tor might operate more efficiently would be
inappropriate.
This option might meet with the same ob-
jection that private ownership of the entire
system would, viz., that it gives too much
power over resources to a private corporation.
l Laissez-faire private ownership and operation.
The Government could declare that after
Landsat D & D’ reach the end of their useful
life, it will terminate operation of land remote
sensing from space (present administration
policy) and leave the field open to all par-
ticipants. The data needs of the U.S. civilian
agencies would be filled by any supplier of
satellite data, including foreign companies,
and U.S. ground stations and related equip-
ment would be sold to the highest qualified
bidder or converted to other uses. The Gov-
ernment might be able to protect its future
data needs by aggressive marketing of Land-
sat D & D’ data in the expectation that a strong
market would encourage active private sec-
tor participation in land remote sensing, or by
using suitably degraded data obtained from
reconnaissance satellites. As for the designated
private entity option, the Government could
provide the incentive for this option by
guaranteeing a market.
For the near term, however, a number of
factors make this option the least likely to re-
sult in an operational satellite remote-sensing
system :52 1) the market is likely to remain small
enough that private ventures would sustain
very high risk; 2) other, less suitable, but less
expensive data alternatives are available (if full
recovery of Landsat operating and mainte-
nance costs is assumed); and 3) the largest
benefits to accrue are likely to be public good
‘
z
’’Commercialization of Remote Sensing,” OTA Workshop, May
1981.
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benefits (i.e., the Government will remain the
largest purchaser of data). Therefore, this op-
tion carries with it the danger that the U.S. data
source will simply disappear if the private sec-
tor fails to find customers to cover the cost.
If U.S. companies chose not to launch a sat-
ellite, or if the data taken by U.S. satellites
were not of the sort or quality to meet the
needs of mission agencies, the Government
might be in the position of having to purchase
data from the French or the Japanese.
Broad-based cooperative arrangement. The
United States could follow a policy that would
include other nations in the ownership and
operation of satellite remote sensing by set-
ting up an international entity patterned after
the interim INTELSAT agreement in which this
country retained majority control for a speci-
fied period.
Under this arrangement, a single manage-
ment authority with multinational participation
would assume responsibility for global opera-
tion of a land remote-sensing system, including
establishing technical specification, procuring
and operating satellites, and receiving and pre-
processing satellite data. Such an approach
would spread the investment risk, as well as
encourage other nations to be more aggressive
in developing their own internal markets for
satellite data. It could also facilitate the even-
tual development of joint ocean remote sens-
ing systems and lead to global systems that
would join land, ocean, and weather data in
order to monitor critical environmental factors.
Perhaps the major advantages of this option
are that it might well forestall wasteful com-
petition among national entities and that it
would provide an important forum in which
international issues could be resolved within
the confines of responsibility for an operational
system.
The major disadvantage of this approach is
that the United States would no longer con-
trol its own system, still the only one in ex-
istence. U.S. users would face strong competi-
tion for their views in an organization that in-
cluded other major users of remote-sensing
data, and U.S. technology suppliers could no
longer count on assured sales. Because of sen-
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sitive issues involving national sovereignty and
resolution limits, the United States would have
no guarantee that the resulting system would
continue to serve U.S. needs as well as a U. S.-
operated system. If the Landsat system is dis-
continued, however, a multinational entity,
with its possible drawbacks, would be far bet-
ter than the alternative of having to purchase
data from Spotimage.
On the other hand, a multinational system
might alleviate fears of the less developed na-
tions that the industrialized nations will use
their superior technology to exploit the re-
sources of the LDCS. By buying shares in a
multinational system, the LDCS would have
the same access to data as any other country
in the system.
Continued Federal ownership. Although cur-
rent policy is to transfer Landsat to private
ownership, it would still be possible to reverse
that decision and make a thoroughgoing com-
mitment to a system owned and managed by
the Federal Government. Meteorological sat-
ellites, which, like Landsat, provide data of
benefit to the generaI public, have always
been owned and managed by the Govern-
ment. Unlike satellite communications, which
is already fully commercialized, and materials
processing in space, which, if successful at all,
seems particularly appropriate for private-
sector operation, satellite remote sensing
could certainly be retained as a Government
system on the grounds that the good it pro-
vides is primarily public. At the present time,
about 50 percent of the data sold is purchased
by Government agencies. The Government,
in effect, makes the market.
This comes about because most of the needs
for data are for the management of renewable
natural resources (e.g., agriculture, forestry,
range lands). Even for those resources owned
by the private sector, Federal and State govern-
ment agencies set policies, quotas, and price
supports on a regional basis that direct and
constrain the management of these resources.
Few private operators own enough land to find
the expense of using Landsat data worthwhile,
but the government agencies find the use of
Landsat data highly cost effective for their func-
tions (see the Bureau of Land Management
and Foreign Agricultural Services case studies
in apps. B and C).
As the last part of this section on land remote
sensing argues, the data needs of the developers
of nonreusable resources are large. However,
even though the extractive industry finds Land-
sat data highly useful, its data needs will remain
less than those of the managers of renewable
resources simply because the latter require re-
petitive data. Therefore, in the Unites States, the
majority user of data from a Landsat system is like-
ly to remain the Federal and State Governments.
Potential of Land Remote-Sensing Data
and the U.S. Economy
There is no doubt that satellite land remote-
sensing data are useful for inventorying and
managing the world’s renewable and nonrenew-
able natural resources. Table 1 lists the areas in
which satellite data are already being used in cost-
effective ways for these purposes. Appendixes B
and C illustrate the use two Federal agencies
make of Landsat data. As emphasized above in
the section on the data market, however, the
variety of users and their different data needs,
coupled with slow technical advancement and
considerable uncertainty about the status of the
Landsat system have acted to inhibit the market
that many users53 insist is there to be tapped.
Continuing to develop land remote sensing
thus represents a certain economic risk for the
Government or the private sector. If the market
cannot sustain the investment, the losses could
be great. However, the Government and private
industry have already committed more than $1
billion to the Landsat venture. To fail to make the
best use of these sunk costs represents a con-
siderable loss as well. As the need to manage
global resources efficiently and inexpensively
grows with the expansion of the population, the
need for a land remote sensing system increases
proportionally. The use of Landsat data by Costa
Rica is a case in point. For that country, use of
Landsat data is not only the least expensive and
—
5J’’Analysis of the Private Market for Landsat Products and Ap-
placations, ” report by OAO Corp. for NASA contract No.
NASW3358,  1981.
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the most efficient way to monitor the rate of
depletion of its forests, it seems to be the only
means for meeting the problem in time. 54
As large-scale forestry management methods
improve, the worth of satellite-derived data will
likely increase for domestic uses as well. The
same is likely to be true for the other categories
of table 1. However, perhaps the most critical
area for the U.S. economy is in nonrenewable
resources such as coal, oil, gas, and minerals.
Even at the slower rates of energy consumption
increase we have recently experienced, 55 our
dependence on foreign petroleum sources has
and will continue to be strong, primarily because
our own recovery rate for oil will continue to
decrease in the future.56 Greatly increased ex-
ploration efforts will be needed to keep pace with
the loss of U.S. reserves. Landsat data now play
an important role in energy and minerals explora-
tion, especially in regions where vast land areas
must be evaluated. However, as far as the extrac-
tive resources industry is concerned, the use of
Landsat data is still in its early development
stages. 57 In spite of this fact, it is the largest single
private purchaser of Landsat data. The extractive
industry has now bought data covering from 10
million to 15 million square miles of the Earth’s
54
’’ Design of a Natural Resources Inventory and Information
System for Costa Rica,” June  1979, op. cit.
SsWeekly  petroleum Status Report, U.S. Department of Energy,
Energy Information Administration, Mar. 5, 1982.
Sbu.!j.  Congress, office of Technology Assessment, “world pe-
troleum Availability, 1980-2000,” technical memorandum, October
1980, OTA-TM-E-5.
57
’’ Satellite Remote Sensing Data–An Unrealized Potential for
the Earth Science Community,” the Geosat  Committee, Inc., 1977.
land surface. This is in spite of the fact that the
current system lacks stereoscopic capabilities, nor
does it gather the most appropriate spectral data
for this industry’s use.sG  Though it is difficult to
assign a precise worth to the use of satellite data,
because the process of exploitation involves a
variety of techniques and often takes many years
to achieve success, those who use the data are
convinced of its usefulness and argue that if the
present capabilities were increased, their task
would be greatly simplified. 59 The support of an
operational surveillance system tailored to min-
eral resources does not appear to be outside the
financial capability of a consortium of resource
companies, though there would be problems of
competition between members of such a consor-
tium to be solved.
The French SPOT system offers the sort of sig-
nificant improvement in data capabilities that
would be most useful to the exploration industry.
However, American industry is reluctant to be
forced to rely on foreign sources for their data,
since it is unclear to what data they may or may
not have access. Similar concerns apply to min-
erals exploration in this country and abroad. The
question of what to do with the U.S. land remote-
sensing system is a critical one for the future of
the management and development of U.S. nat-
ural resources. Whatever is decided, the ques-
tion should be resolved with dispatch.
Sglbid.
‘
g
’’ Department of the Interior Position Paper on the Private Sec-
tor Transfer of Civil Land Observing Satellite Activities,” U.S. Geo-
logical Survey, 1981.
MATERIALS PROCESSING IN SPACE (MPS)
Issue 6: What Are the Technological and
Commercial Prospects for MPS?
The primary motivation for MPS research is to
use the microgravity  environment unique to
space for scientific and commercial applications.
process variables such as temperature, composi-
tion, and fluid flow may be controlled far better
in an environment of microgravity.  As a result,
some materials can be manufactured in space
with greater precision and fewer defects; others,
which cannot be made at all on Earth, may
become possible for the first time. MPS looks par-
ticularly promising for pharmaceuticals, elec-
tronic devices, optical equipment, and metal
alloysobo
60WVjA, kfaterja/S Processing in Space: Early Experiments, Wash-
ington, D. C., 1980.
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The U.S. civilian program has so far conducted
rather limited MPS experimentation in space, and
the results have been inconclusive.GO if there are
great days ahead for MPS, they must be preceded
by years of research and major improvements in
orbiting facilities.
Despite the need for further basic research,
there may well be near-term opportunities for
commercializing particular, carefully chosen
technologies. Under a Joint Endeavor Agreement
with NASA, the McDonneil Douglas Aeronautics
Co., (working with Ortho Pharmaceutical) and
the GTI Corp. are both moving vigorously ahead
on R&D projects. Several other major corpora-
tions, including John Deere, TRW, INCO, and
DuPont, have made significant commitments to
early exploratory R&D. If MPS is found to be well
suited to commercialization, several issues arise
with regard to how and when it can be taken over
by the private sector and by what means the U.S.
Government can facilitate the transition.
Requirements for the Commercialization of
MPS Technology
The space processing experiments that have
been conducted so far have focused on identi-
fying potential new processes and products.
Because the research conducted to date has been
basic, with subsequent commercial applications
uncertain, there has been little private investment
in this area. Private industry will invest its risk
capital only if it is reasonably confident that the
five conditions listed below are met.
1. There is a reasonable chance that re-
search efforts will result in a commer-
cially viable product or process.
A firm seeking investment opportunities must
be reasonably certain that a proposed product
or process innovation can be developed in a
given time, at an affordable cost, and that there
is a market capable of supporting a price that pro-
vides an adequate return on investment. The twin
factors of time and cost are extremely important
to a firm, especially during periods of economic
instability. Projects that require large initial invest-
ment and take a long time to show a return usual-
61The  National  Research council,  /vfateria/s  Processing in space,
Washington, D. C., 1978, p. 5.
Iy do not compete well for corporate capital. Proj-
ects that stimulate further corporate investment
as they begin to show promising returns are much
more attractive; however, there are currently few
such opportunities in the MPS area. In order to
make a reasonable projection as to a project’s
possible rate of return on investment, a firm must
have a clear view of the relevant market. When
dealing with a new technology without a well-
defined market, the firm’s projections become
more suspect, so that its investment in that
technology would be at greater risk. The com-
bined burden of developing new markets simul-
taneously with new technology may inhibit in-
vestment in MPS. It should be noted, however,
that some MPS technologies (e.g., electrophoretic
processing) will be directed toward well-defined
Earth markets (e.g., pharmaceuticals). In these in-
stances, the decision to invest in MPS technology
may be preceded by standard market analyses.
2 . The benefits of processing in space will
be substantially greater than those of
processing on the ground.
The MPS experimentation conducted to date
indicates that many innovative uses of the space
environment are possible. From a commercial
perspective, however, the question is not what
projects are technically possible, but rather which
are economically viable. For example, it has been
claimed that if semiconductor electronic crystals
were grown in space, they would be purer, with
fewer imperfections, and would therefore per-
form better. However, a recent study by the Na-
tional Research Council has found that the quality
of the preprocessed material is not the limiting
consideration for most devices presently manu-
factured.G t Therefore, though space-based man-
ufacture of these devices may offer certain im-
provements, it is not clear that the benefits of the
improvements outweigh the costs of producing
them.
3. The market for the product will not be
replaced by advances in Earth-based
production.
It is possible that improvements in Earth-based
technology may make certain processing tech-
Gzlbid.,  p. 38.
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niques possible that previously could only be
done in space. Evidence for this view is provided
by recent advances in the manufacture of glass
products through the use of acoustic levitation,
and by the enlargement of latex polymers by
means of new chemical tech niques.G3 To the ex-
tent that such improvements confer some of the
advantages of space-based processing without the
high costs of in-space production, there is less
incentive to’invest resources in expensive space
technology.
4 . intellectual property rights in space tech-
nology must be assured.
Though NASA has given assurance that industry
will retain the rights to patents and trade secrets
developed while working with NASA, such as-
surances are in the form of policy and regulations,
not law. The present law vests the ownership of
intellectual property developed under contract
with NASA in the Government, but allows the
Administrator to waive such rights. NASA has
been consistent in its policy of not claiming an
interest in such rights, but the specter of patent
and trade secret loss, either through a change in
policy or as a result of a legal challenge by third
parties, still remains.
There is current congressional interest in new
patent legislation that would grant greater rights
to private developers working under Government
contract.b5 Present law, however, is more liberal
with small business, universities, and nonprofit
firms than with large contractors. The status of
proprietary information and trade secrets is con-
sistently more uncertain.
5. National commitment must be certain.
Industry’s planning is hindered by the fact that
all space research depends on a Federal funding
commitment to NASA, but the level of that com-
mitment remains uncertain. Decreases in NASA’s
appropriations will cause delays in the flight
testing of space technology. Such delays are cost-
ly, and in some circumstances could mean, at the
corporate level, the difference between a suc-
bj/ndustry  Week, Mar. 3, 1980, p. 90.
MNAS Act 1958,  see 305 (a); 42 USC 2457.
bSGerald  J. Mossinghoff, “intellectual Property Right in Space
Utilization, ” address before the ALI-ABA Conference, “Doing Busi-
ness in Space,” Washington, D. C., Nov. 12-14, 1981.
cessful project and a failure (as measured by
dollar-return). Should MPS technology appear to
offer a commercially viable product, some type
of long-term, in-orbit facility may be necessary
to assure the continuing supply of specific quan-
tities of the product. At present, NASA cannot
provide credible assurance that such a facility will
be provided.
Government Incentives for MPS Research
In chapter 5, NASA’s MPS activities are de-
scribed. What follows is a discussion of the pro-
grams NASA has initiated to enlist commercial
support in moving MPS toward operational status.
The ultimate goals of NASA’s MPS program are
to:66
l
l
l
perform research to improve industrial tech-
nology or to develop new products;
prepare research quantities of space prod-
ucts for comparison with Earth-based prod-
ucts; and
encourage the production of commercially
viable materials.
In hope of commercializing MPS, NASA has es-
tablished three levels of working relationships
with the private sector. On all three levels, the
relationships are agreements between NASA and
its partners to cooperate in a defined area. Each
agrees to accomplish specific tasks and to pro-
vide its own funding. The grading of these rela-
tionships marks the degree of the signatories’
commitments.
For companies interested in the application of
microgravity technology, but not ready to com-
mit themselves to a specific space flight experi-
ment or venture, the Technical Exchange Agree-
ment (TEA) has been developed. Under a TEA,
NASA and a company agree to exchange tech-
nical information and to cooperated in the con-
duct and analysis of continuing ground-based
research programs. In this agreement, a firm can
familiarize itself, at minimal expense, with
microgravity technology and its potential ap-
plicability to a product line. Under the TEA, the
private company funds its own participation and
—  . - —
bbRobert  A. Frosch, “NASA Guidelines Regarding Early Usage of
Space for Industrial Purposes, ” NASA Internal Document, June  25,
1979.
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obtains direct access to and results from NASA’s
facilities and research; in return, NASA gains the
support and expertise of the company’s research
capability.
In an Industrial Guest Investigators Agreement
(IGIA), NASA and industry share sufficient mutual
scientific interest that a company arranges for one
of its scientists to collaborate (at company ex-
pense) with a NASA-sponsored principal inves-
tigator on a space flight MPS experiment. Once
the parties agree to the IGI’s contribution to the
objectives of the experiment, he becomes a
member of the investigating team, thus adding
industrial expertise and insight to the experiment.
The joint Endeavor Agreement (JEA) is a
cooperative arrangement in which a private sec-
tor offeror and NASA share common program ob-
jectives, program responsibilities, and financial
risk. The objective of a JEA is to encourage early
private sector investment in MPS by sharing in
the cost and risk of initial space ventures and to
determine the ability of MPS to meet needs of
the marketplace. A JEA is a legal agreement be-
tween equal partners; it does not initiate procure-
ment. Under a JEA, NASA and its partner ex-
change no funds. An offeror from the private sec-
tor selects an experiment and/or a technology
demonstration in compliance with NASA’s ob-
jectives for its MPS program, conducts the
necessary ground investigation, and develops
flight hardware at company expense.
As incentive for a JEA investment, NASA agrees
to provide transportation on the shuttle, provided
that the project meets certain basic criteria, such
as technical merit, contribution to innovation,
and acceptable business arrangements. As a fur-
ther incentive, the participant is allowed to re-
tain certain proprietary rights to the results, par-
ticularly the proprietary information that would
yield a competitive edge in marketing products
based on the MPS flight data. NASA agrees not
to enter into a JEA with a second potential source
to investigate a similar space-based process.
NASA also receives sufficient flight data to
evaluate the significance of the results, and can
require as part of the JEA that any promising
results be applied commercially on a timely basis;
if in NASA’s judgment the participant does not
commercialize the results within a reasonable
time, NASA is allowed to publish the research
findings.
By establishing legal and managerial mecha-
nisms by which the cost and risk of early com-
mercial ventures can be shared, “constructive
partnerships” have been formed between the
Government and the private sector. A number
of cooperative agreements are in various stages
of discussion. Agreements now in force, and
those that have been publicly disclosed are:hz
l
l
l
l
A TEA was signed in 1981 with Deere& Co.,
to study the effects of microgravity on solid-
ification of metals. More recently, TEAs have
been signed with INCO and DuPont.
An IGI was appointed in 1980 by TRW to
study directional solidification.
Signed in January 1980, the first JEA pairs
NASA with McDonnell Douglas. The process
to be investigated is continuous flow elec-
trophoresis (CFE), in which materials in solu-
tion are separated by subjecting them to an
electrical field as they flow continuously
through a chamber. The CFE experiment, to
be flown in the shuttle, is designed to dem-
onstrate the applicability of the process to
the production of marketable quantities of
pharmaceutical products. Ortho Pharma-
ceutical Corp. has joined McDonnell
Douglas as a partner in this MPS business
venture.
GTI Corp. signed the second NASA JEA in
January 1982. Under this agreement, NASA
will fly a multiple microexperiment flight
package (MMFP) to be developed for GTI by
a third party. The MMFP will be a furnace
with multiple subenclosures designed to per-
form and control several separate ex-
periments in solidification, GTI’s role in this
JEA is to serve as a broker between NASA
and potential investors, customers, inven-
tors, and hardware manufacturers.
How Business Sees NASA
Industry’s respect for NASA’s accomplishments
and technical talent is high. However, doing
business with NASA is complex, involving par-
67R, L. Brown, and L. K. Zoner, “Avenues and Incentives for Com-
mercial Use of a Low-G Environment, ” MPS Projects Office, Mar-
shall Space Flight Center, Alabama, undated.
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ticular NASA policies and general Government
policies. Uncertainty about NASA’s level of fund-
ing, short- or long-term, makes for an unstable en-
vironment for private investment. To date, in-
dustry has not been assured that NASA will have
enough funding to continue development of MPS
systems beyond the early research stage. If unable
to rely on NASA for continued basic development
of new technology, industry sees no long-term
future for MPS (whatever the temporary success
of McDonnell Douglas and CT!).
Additionally, industry not involved in MPS gen-
erally finds NASA’s JEAs to be in various ways
unrealistic. Some industry observers read NASA
as (in order to free itself to do little other than
basic R&D) seeking partners who can do every-
thing—marketing, financing, hardware develop-
ment, etc NASA’s agreement with GTI is a bold
step toward meeting this objection. Through the
guest investigator, technical exchange, and joint
endeavor process, individual companies, concen-
trating on discrete tasks, can more easily enter
the MPS field.
Businesses that have considered some com-
mercial activity in space have also expressed con-
cern over the potential loss of intellectual prop-
erty rights (e.g., patent, trade secret, and industrial
techniques). There are several reasons for this
concern: 1 ) should such intellectual property
become a matter of “Government record,” com-
petitors might be able to obtain this information
through the Freedom of Information Act, 2) the
1958 NAS Act provision which states that NASA
shall “provide for the widest practical and ap-
propriate dissemination of information concern-
ing its activities, “ is at odds with the industry’s
desire to maintain the secrecy of R&D directed
to potentially valuable products; and 3) section
305 of the NAS Act vests in the United States, sub-
ject to the discretion of the NASA Administrator,
the right to any invention “made in the perform-
ance of any work under any contract” with
NASA. Though NASA’s Administrators have con-
sistently waived the Government’s rights under
the act, industry’s concerns remain.
——
‘–MOTA  workshop, Materials  Processing in Space, May 1981.
‘Possible New Institutional Frameworks
Though NASA is attempting to encourage pri-
vate-sector interest in MPS through its TEAs, IGIs,
and JEAs, a different institutional framework may
eventually be needed, if the private sector is to
be brought into MPS in a major way. To date,
discussion has centered around three possible
structures: an organization like COMSAT, a space
industrialization corporation, and a possible con-
sortium of industries. No consensus on this ques-
tion has yet emerged.
The COMSAT Model. In this scenario, a private
corporation, established by legislative action, but
financed through the issuance of capital stock,
would be given a monopoly in the provision of
processing facilities in space. The Government
would retain some degree of internal control over
the organization by holding a number of posi-
tions on the board of directors, by regulating
competition in the procurement of equipment
and services and by involvement in the ratemak-
ing process.
The purpose of such a corporation would be
to supply a space platform with various facilities
and services that users could rent. The extent of
use by NASA, as a customer, and the degree of
Government R&D performed on such a platform
would be matters of policy to be decided at some
point in the future.
A structure like COMSAT’S has certain advan-
tages. First of all, even with the substantial interest
generated in MPS over the past 2 years, private
corporations might not wish individually to pro-
vide all the services needed to support separate
processing facilities. Secondly, despite the ob-
vious differences between communications and
materials processing, one can envision an impor-
tant similarity in the ways in which they might
be conducted in space. A private concern might
well operate a space platform with various facil-
ities and services that users could rent. So de-
scribed, such a platform could as well be used
for materials processing as for communications.
In neither case does the operator of the platform
concern itself with the use to which its rented
facilities are put. In both cases the operator might
be expected to put some of these facilities to its
own use.
94-915 0 - 82 - 6
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The biggest obstacle to the creation of a federal-
ly chartered structure is that the basic science on
which MPS would be founded is insufficient for
marketable quantities of products to appear in
the near term. It is the view of ESA, for example,
that at least 10 more years of basic science are
needed before serious consideration of commer-
cializing MPS can be given.69 ESA, therefore, con-
siders MPS a scientific rather than an applications
program.
Two objections to the federally chartered struc-
ture have surfaced. One is that, at its founding,
COMSAT was supported by significant expertise
already existing in corporations and Government
agencies. No such MPS expertise now exists. The
other is that COMSAT entered an established and
revenue-producing market, whereas a similar
MPS corporation would be entering an unknown
market. In any case, objections to the COMSAT
model for MPS that are founded on various in-
sufficiencies (whether of basic science, of rele-
vant expertise, or of ready markets for products)
argue for no more than a delay in the time when
such a corporation might be chartered.
Although no organizations are now processing
materials in space, to the extent that processes
to be implemented in an MPS program are ex-
tensions of current terrestrial processes, relevant
expertise exists in abundance. ’o Furthermore, to
the extent that MPS products may improve the
quality of similar terrestrial products by one or
more orders of magnitude, marketability for some
of them appears high.
The Space Industrialization Corporation (SIC)
Introduced primarily as a means to provoke
public discussion, the Space Industrialization Act
of 1979 (H. R. 2337) called for:71
Establishment of a Space Industrialization Cor-
poration to provide a means for financing the de-
velopment of new products, processes, and indus-
tries using the properties of the space environ-
ment.
bgsee  Ch. 7, p. 179.
ZOOTA  Workshop, Material Processing in Space, May 1981.
zlThe Space Industrialization Act of 1979, Hearings on H.R. 2337,
before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of
the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, 96th Cong., 1st sess.
H.R. 2337 was introduced to address the prob-
lems of the private sector in developing space
processing capabilities and to provide a thorough
and orderly examination of the means to reduce
the business venture risk of using space for com-
mercial purposes.
If SIC were established, it would function essen-
tially as an investment bank, providing capital
through direct equity investments, loans, and
loan guaranties. The problems most often cited
by those opposing SIC in its present form are that
such an organization is premature and that it may
interfere with the activities of NASA.72
Some fear that given our limited knowledge
of MPS science and engineering, SIC might en-
courage technically and economically unsound
projects, which could have a negative impact on
the evolution of space industrialization. They also
argue that if companies are not required to put
up their own money, they will take excessive risks
and give projects inadequate management atten-
tion.
A different set of concerns regarding the SIC
center around how this organization would af-
fect NASA’s continuing activities. NASA has been
given a broad mandate to serve as a research and
development center for U.S. space technology.
SIC, as described above, would function primarily
as an investment bank. Viewed in the abstract,
these two entities would appear not to interfere
mutually, but to be perfectly compatible. What
many fear, however, is that, because space in-
dustrialization technology and its commercial ap-
plications are yet unproved, SIC could do little
more than supply funds for basic R&D. If this
were the case, then instead of complementing
NASA, SIC would act as a competitor.
INDUSTRY CONSORTIUM
One way to encourage high-risk, expensive
MPS research is to allow firms jointly to fund these
activities. By allowing the sharing of key resources
such as facilities, personnel and capital funds, the
cost and the risk of space-based innovation would
be reduced. A consortium of these firms-would
also have considerable market strength because
it could share the combined expertise of its
zzlbid.,  testimony  of Robert A. Frosch, p. 78.
. ———.
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members, which normally address differing cus-
tomer communities or markets.
The structure of such a consortium would have
to be carefully drawn so as not to be in violation
of U.S. antitrust laws.73 Simply stated, these laws
are designed to prevent monopolistic market
structures and/or collusion between competitors
leading to price fixing and market or customer
allocation. It is possible that a consortium as
described above could violate both of these
tenets.
Because of the time and expense involved in
most antitrust litigation, firms tend to be cautious
when dealing with their competitors. it is unlikely
that in the absence of a well-articulated Govern-
ment policy condoning such conduct that poten-
tially interested firms would form such a consor-
tium. In 1980, however, the Justice Department
issued guidelines “clarifying” its position on
cooperative ventures: as long as these ventures
are open to all prospective participants and the
research they undertake is fundamental and long
range, the Department will probably not object.74
More than a score of the largest U.S. computer
manufacturers and their semiconductor suppliers
are forming just such a research consortium
under the Semiconductor industries Associa-
tion. 75
International Competition in MPS
The European states and the Japanese agree
that MPS has great long-term promise, and
they support extensive basic research preparatory
to possible commercial ventures. The ESA-funded
Spacelab designed to be flown on the shuttle will
provide facilities for such MPS experiments.
The Germans, who are the prime contractors
on Spacelab, are particularly interested in MPS
and plan an extensive combination of scientific
and industrial projects, with some hope of signifi-
cant near-term results.7b The French have fewer
near-term activities, but are hoping for extensive
future use of the Ariane launcher to orbit proc-
essing facilities for scientific and industrial uses.77
The Japanese program is similar to that of the
Germans.78 The Japanese plan to conduct MPS
studies aboard Spacelab, and are using an exten-
sive sounding rocket program to gain preliminary
knowledge. The Japanese expect that in the long
term at least some MPS work will result in the
development of marketable products.
Far more extensive than any MPS efforts in the
West, the Soviet MPS program has, so far as can
be ascertained, been geared to manufacturing
process research, much of which extends to
studies of terrestrial production techniques.79
Because there is no private sector to participate
in the Soviet space program, and perforce, no
concern for commercialization, any inference
from Soviet experience in MPS to Western at-
tempts to commercialize would be risky. Soviet
MPS experiments, which have been conducted
aboard the Salyut 6 manned orbital lab, appear
likely to continue at a high rate during the next
few years.
Perhaps the best lesson to be drawn from this
cursory review of the activities of other nations
is that the United States has a variety of paths it
may follow in the development of MPS technol-
ogy. If it is to establish and sustain a successful,
long-term MPS program, basic research must
surely go forward. The speed of this research and
the extent of private sector involvement are mat-
ters of policy to be decided in the context of our
overall space goals.
A key question for the near future is the extent
of international cooperation in MPS basic re-
search. U.S.-European collaboration on Space-
Iab makes it possible to conduct joint efforts at
the basic science level, provided competitive
strains are not too great.
mlj. s. Department  of justice, Antitrust Guide Concerning Re-
search joint Ventures, November 1980.
741bid.
‘sTom Alexander, “The Right Remedy for R&D Lag,” Fortune,
Jan. 25, 1982.
%See  ch, 7, pp. 192-193.
Tzsee ch. 7, pp. 190-191.
TaSee ch. 7, pp. 201-202.
Tvsee ch. 7, p, 207.
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SPACE TRANSPORTATION
Issue 7: What are the Major Barriers
to Commercialization of
Space Transportation Facilities
and Services?
Though the shuttle opens the door to relatively
inexpensive access to space, it makes the prob-
lem of transferring the U.S. civilian space trans-
portation capability to the private sector more
complex. Because the shuttle is new, its track
record is insufficient to allow corporations to
assess its long-term expenses and risks. Full com-
mercialization of expendable launch vehicles
(ELVS), however, is possible now. But whether
a private launch service using ELVS could offer
a price competitive with the technologically
superior shuttle or the ESA-subsidized Ariane re-
mains an open question. Therefore, the near-term
prospects for commercializing U.S. space trans-
portation are unclear, and the long-term pros-
pects ride with the shuttle. In any case, the single
major impediment to commercialization of U.S.
launch systems is the absence of a comprehen-
sive Government policy that favors and en-
courages the participation of the private sector.
The Background
In the United States the Federal Government
has heretofore provided launch vehicles and
launch services for all users. While DOD general-
ly launches its own spacecraft, NASA has pro-
vided these services for its own missions and, on
a reimbursable basis, for other U.S. Government
users, foreign governments, and private entities.
(NASA’s policy on reimbursement seeks, in gen-
eral, to recover incremental, out-of-pocket costs
only, not capital already invested.) Of the roughly
20 to 30 U.S. launches per year over the last 10
years, about one-third were DOD’s, one-third
were NASA’s own spacecraft, and the remain-
ing third were for other United States or foreign
government users and private entities. NASA’s
mission model80 for the space transportation
system (STS) for the next 10 years or so shows
~“Final  Flight Manifest for Space Shuttle,” Aerospace ~ai/y,  Dec.
18, 1981, pp. 253-257.
about the same ratio. A recent study by the
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astro-
nautics (AIAA), however, has projected a signifi-
cant additional need for total launches, primari-
ly for commercial communications satellites.81
Until 1981, all U.S. experience had been with
ELVS. Until recently, civilian ELVS were to be
phased out by the mid-1980s, and the sole U.S.
launch capability was to be the NASA STS, rep-
resented primarily by the shuttle and its
associated upper stage components. However,
delays and uncertainties in the shuttle program
have caused NASA to reexamine this policy. Pro-
ponents of retaining ELVS argue that the number
of launches that will be needed will exceed the
capacity of the shuttle, leaving the United States
without sufficient launch capacity if ELVS are
phased out.
Private industry has not generally marketed
launch hardware or services directly to custo-
mers. ELVS are sold to NASA, which then charges
the customer. Industry has, of course, built the
launch vehicles under Government contract and
to a degree, lesser (for NASA) or greater (for
DOD), provided contracted-for launch services
at Government launch facilities. However, NASA
has remained responsible for providing launch
facilities and support services to all users. Already,
NASA is facing its first competition. Arianespace,
a private French corporation with substantial
Government ownership, has begun selling
launches after a successful development pro-
gram. Certain private corporations, such as Space
Services, Inc., of the United States, hope to offer
launch vehicles and services within a few years.
An investment banking firm, William Sword, Inc.,
has offered to fund a fifth shuttle orbiter in return
for exclusive rights to market commercial pay-
loads. Already, small military rockets and satellite
kick stages have been commercialized, and one
of the shuttle upper stages, the SSUS-D, is being
El American institute  of Aeronautics and Astronautics, projection
of non-Federal Demand for Space Transportation Services Through
2000, Jan. 19, 1981,
s2AviatjOn week arid $pace Technology, “Firm Sets Down-Pay-
ment for Buy of Space Shuttle,” Jan. 18, 1982.
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sold by the manufacturer (McDonnell Douglas)
directly to the end user rather than to NASA.
Military and Civilian Use of the Shuttle
DOD is the only other U.S. launch agency,
handling many of its own launches. How will
DOD share the shuttle with civilian users? DOD
has the right to preempt civilian flights in case
of need. How will that right and its other special
requirements affect hardware and launch costs?
Generally speaking, OTA has not found any of
these concerns to be major impediments to ci-
vilian use of the shuttle—provided that the pro-
jected launch schedule of one flight every 2 or
3 weeks is attained. Once this planned flexibil-
ity of the shuttle system has been realized, a DOD
preemption of a shuttle flight would probably
have little adverse affect on civilian needs, most
of which are not time-sensitive over periods of
a few weeks. For now, it is essential that at least
one line of ELVS be retained, both to provide ad-
ditional capacity and to back-up the shuttle, In
addition, it may be prudent to continue develop-
ment of expendable launch vehicle technology
for certain payloads (see ch. 10).
The questions of DOD’s share and require-
ments in STS decisions are mostly settled, but re-
tain historical interest. The shuttle was planned
to be a “national” program; i.e., it would serve
all customary U.S. launch needs for payloads that
were in the shuttle range. Specifically, this im-
plied that NASA and DOD would need to define
a common, acceptable payload bay size, oper-
ating characteristics, and compatible subsystems.
The major premise was that such a substantial
investment in a new technological capability
could not reasonably be made unless it could
serve the broadest set of national needs. The in-
itial concept included the possibility that DOD
would assume some degree of responsibility to
fund development of the shuttIe. This was subse-
quently modified in view of DOD’s rather sub-
stantial budgets already in existence for other
weapons systems and space developments; the
shuttle was included in NASA’s budget, though,
of course, support for the program rested on con-
gressional recognition of its military uses. It was
agreed that DOD’s direct share of the program
development costs would be limited to two items:
a west coast launch site for the shuttle, and
development of an interim upper stage (I US) for
boosting shuttle payloads into higher orbits.
The resulting agreement gave NASA the re-
sponsibility to purchase and operate the STS for
everyone. DOD would have missions solely for
its use, but NASA would own and operate the
launch capability equitably for all users. Certain
DOD requirements did drive initial shuttle costs
higher than the estimates of NASA’s original pro-
posal, but most requirements also resulted in
greater, if more costly, capabilities. As DOD has
generated additional requirements (for its own
mission control center for example), the Depart-
ment has itself bought these capabilities. This divi-
sion of responsibility is expected to hold hence-
forth. NASA’s pricing policy for the shuttle re-
mains problematic, especially in view of the 73
percent increase in the projected average cost
of a standard mission (from $16.1 million in June
1976 to $27.9 million as of September 1980).
According to a recent General Accounting Of-
fice (GAO) study, NASA is “locked into a pric-
ing policy that encourages space transportation
system use at NASA’s expense and at the expense
of the space science, applications, and aero-
nautics programs. GAO believes DOD and other
government agencies should bear a greater share
of the shuttle’s early years operations costs . . .“133
The division of the U.S. space program into
civilian and military components has been a
valuable tool of foreign policy. DOD’s involve-
ment with and ultimate use of the shuttle have
raised the issue of the possible militarization of
the entire U.S. space program, a possibility that
is unsettling to other nations, especially the third
world and the Soviet Union. The United States
has assured other nations that the programs will
remain separate, but their concerns are likely to
remain until the passage of time and experience
with the shuttle show whether or not the civilian
program remains unmilitarized.
83 General Accounting offiCf?, “NASA Must Reconsider Opera-
tions Pricing Policy to Components for Cost Growth of the Space
Transportation Systems, ” Feb. 23, 1982, pp. ii-iii.
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Foreign Competition in Space Transportation
Currently, the United States has no policy re-
garding foreign competition in space transporta-
tion. Though the Soviet Union has had a reliable
launch capability for 25 years and has launched
satellites for several other countries, it does not
sell launches. However, commercial competition
from the ESA’S Ariane ELV is now a reality. The
Ariane (which is approximately twice the size of
the U.S. Delta) has recently completed a suc-
cessful series of test flights, and the Europeans
are now selling space on future launches. Already
several U.S. telecommunications companies have
switched from NASA launches to Ariane, and
more such decisions can be expected because
fewer shuttle opportunities are available and U.S.
ELVS have become more expensive. The Ariane’s
attractiveness is enhanced by the creation of
Arianespace to market the Ariane and provide
launch services. Arianespace, in conjunction with
European banks, is offering customers below-
market financing and other financial incentives
that compare favorably to present U.S. pricing
procedures. Arianespace plans initially for five to
six launches per year, rising to 10 per year in the
mid-l 980s.
The Japanese space agency, NASDA, is current-
ly building and operating modified Delta launch-
ers, designated N-1 and N-11, built under license
from McDonnell Douglas. At present the Japa-
nese are prohibited from selling launch services
to third parties without U.S. permission; develop-
ment of a completely Japanese launcher is
planned but is not likely to be completed before
the end of the decade.
Regulatory Needs
There is now no clarity with regard to regula-
tion of private launches from the United States,
largely because there is no single Federal authori-
ty for overseeing private space activities from
launch to flight termination. The absence of such
authority creates a number of problems. First, al-
though certain agencies (FAA, FCC) exercise lim-
ited authority over private rocket launches, the
absence of clear Government policy and proce-
dures creates confusion as to who has the author-
ity to authorize a private launch. Second, existing
Federal launch centers, because of launch con-
flicts and space limitations, may not be sufficient
to meet the future demands of private spaceflight
operations. The proper role of Government in the
construction, operation, and regulation of new
commercial launch sites has yet to be addressed.
Indeed, the issue is so recent that the Federal
agencies that have interest or jurisdiction have
just begun to address it. Finally, it may be pru-
dent to devise some type of mandatory insurance
scheme to indemnify the Government and pro-
tect the general populace from the possibility of
accidents resulting from private launches.
Once a comprehensive regulatory scheme is
adopted and a clear Government policy ar-
ticulated, the institutional risks inherent in
operating a private launch system will be
diminished, and greater private sector participa-
tion may occur.
Prospects for Commercialization
Though the complete transfer of shuttle opera-
tions to the private sector does not seem likely
in the near future, there is no reason why the
private sector could not eventually supply this
service. As technical experience is gained, the
reliability of shuttle systems proved, and infor-
mation is obtained concerning the real costs of
operating the shuttle, the commercial potential
of this system will also begin to be understood.
If the transfer of the shuttle to the private sector
is determined to be in the national interest, firm
Government policies to this effect must be ar-
ticulated and, where necessary, supported by fi-
nancial incentives.
No private sector firm has yet expressed interest
in operating the entire shuttle system (i.e., orbiters
and related launch hardware, and ground sup-
port and maintenance facilities), but there has
been some interest in the operation or owner-
ship of discrete parts of the launch service. Cur-
rently there are three areas where private sector
involvement may become important:
Tracking, telemetry and control.–ln 1979
COMSAT established the first commercial
launch control facility that offered services
previously only provided by NASA. As space
activities become more common, oppor-
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tunities for the private sector to provide these
services will increase.
Shuttle refurbishment.–currently, NASA
contracts with more than 25 private firms to
refurbish the orbiter between flights. NASA
has recently decided to find one firm to act
as a manager for the entire process.
Orbiter ownership.–As mentioned above,
a U.S. investment banking firm announced
its interest in purchasing the fifth orbiter, with
the provision that NASA would continue to
operate the vehicle but that its payload
capacity would be marketed by the private
owner. Should this venture prove to be suc-
cessful, the likelihood that other orbiters will
be privately owned will be greatly increased.
Full commercialization of ELVS, however, is
possible now. There are few if any unknowns sur-
rounding their operation. The market for
launches is steadily growing: though it is not large
enough to support all the expendable lines
(Titans, Atlas-Centaurs, Deltas, etc.), it could cer-
tainly support one of them. Because of various
uncertainties, the aerospace companies have not
shown much interest in dealing directly with any
group backing private launch services. A possibil-
ity here would be the mediation of a third-party
broker, A further possibility might be the forma-
tion of a Government-chartered private corpora-
tion to provide launch services, leasing facilities
at Kennedy Space Center. Rapid commercializa-
tion of U.S. ELVS would provide immediate ad-
vantages: competition for the Ariane, added in-
centive to NASA to bring the costs of shuttle
operations down, and a backup system for the
shuttle should it meet unexpected problems.
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Chapter 4
DEVELOPMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE U.S. SPACE PROGRAM
— —
INTRODUCTION
Nearly a quarter century after Explorer I and
the U.S. entry into the space age, the space shut-
tle now presents the Nation with new and ex-
panded opportunities for space operations. In the
coming months and years, we will learn to oper-
ate and use the new capabilities of this system.
It is indeed ironic that, at this time of brave new
beginnings, the Nation again faces important
questions about the future of the civilian space
program.
At the inception of the space program, the
United States perceived Soviet initiatives in space
as political, military, and technological threats.
Having seen space as a field in which to com-
pete, the United States directed its space program
toward the primary objective of exceeding Soviet
achievements. With the passage of time, and the
great success of Apollo, Soviet competition no
longer challenges the United States politically. But
as the Soviet challenge has vanished, so has the
motivation of beating the competition. Now the
United States is faced with the more sophisticated
challenge of devising a balanced policy frame-
work—a framework that will enable the United
States to identify new objectives and stimulate the
Nation to achieve them. Lacking such a perspec-
tive, the Nation has, instead, begun to evaluate
space more pragmatically. This evaluation sug-
gests that “activities will be pursued in space
when it appears that U.S. national objectives can
most efficiently be met through space activities.’”
It contrasts with the aggressive acceptance of the
“role of the United States as a leader in aeronau-
tical and space science and technology and in
the application thereof . . . ,“ as prescribed in the
National Aeronautics and Space (NAS) Act of
1958.2 The act itself, however, established no spe-
1“White House Fact Sheet on U.S. Civil Space Policy,” Oct. 11,
1978.
2National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, and
related legislation. Prepared at the request of Hon. Howard W.
Cannon, Chairman Committee on Commerce, Science and Trans-
portation, U.S. Senate, December 1978.
The dawn of a new age in space flight, Space shuttle
Columbia blasts off Pad 39a, April 12, 1981, with astronauts
John Young and Bob Crippen aboard
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cific manned or unmanned missions, outlined no
priorities, nor specified a funding level at which
the program was to be carried out. Instead, the
commitment to Apollo set the civilian space pro-
gram on the expansionary course that provides
the baseline for current comparisons. Likewise,
this commitment generated the momentum that
is largely responsible for sustaining the program
today. But now, with current budgetary stringen-
cy, commitments to civilian projects are few and
uncertain, though the military and national secu-
rity programs continue to grow. Consequently,
it is timely, as we embark on the next decade of
space activity, to scrutinize and to consider revis-
ing the framework of U.S. space policy.
Basic to any overall assessment of the U.S. civil-
ian space program, particularly one which seeks
to assist Congress in setting public policy for
charting the Nation’s future in space, is an inter-
pretive, retrospective review of our current pos-
ture in space, how the United States has pro-
ceeded to develop its current program and the
capabilities on which the program is based, the
role of various external factors such as interna-
tional competition, the processes that have
shaped its current posture, and other relevant
forces and environmental factors that led to, or
provided the foundation for, the current situation
facing the United States in space. This chapter
presents the results of such a retrospective review
applied to the civilian space program of the
United States, emphasizing those aspects that are
relevant to space applications. It is intended to
highlight issues and lessons learned, as well as
characteristics of previous decisions regarding the
program that may have applicability to current
and future developments.
The civilian space program of the United States
has grown from its early beginnings as part of
operations in connection with the International
Geophysical Year, to the great successes of
Apollo, Viking, and Voyager, in the short span
of one generation—a little over 20 years. Thus,
history and current practice are woven together
in a tapestry, with many threads still in place that
bind past and present: still present are many in-
dividuals in the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) who have been with the
agency since its beginning, contractors that have
played a continuing role over this period, and in-
stitutional relations that are relatively unchanged
since the earliest days of the agency. There are
both strengths and weaknesses in such a situa-
tion. To the extent that it is desirable to prevent
making the same mistakes as one’s predecessors,
such continuity and institutional memory is im-
portant. To the extent that it serves to limit the
Nation’s ability to take a fresh look at the pro-
gram, how it functions and how it should respond
to a changing external environment, the strong
links to the past may inhibit the agency from
becoming a dynamic vehicle of change and the
source of new initiatives involving the use of
space systems.
In addition, the relatively short span between
establishment of NASA and this assessment
makes it difficult to separate the objective views
of participants from a tendency to defend their
own decisions and roles. Because of this problem,
this history and analysis is primarily based on spe-
cific events, documented roles and decisions,
observed consequences, and supporting state-
ments.
Although the civilian space program is a rela-
tively recent activity of the U.S. Government, it
is unique among Government programs in its
high public visibility. It has been the subject of
many historical evaluations and popular histories.
NASA from its very beginning devoted attention
to the development of an official chronology, and
in the past there was an annual report of space
activities submitted to Congress, summarizing the
full scope of the U.S. civilian space program.
Together, these resources report the history and
evolution of the civilian space program in great
detail, and there will be no effort in this report
to duplicate such materials. The specific programs
or decisions discussed in the sections that follow
have been selected to illustrate an issue or to sup-
port a conclusion so the material selected is
not a comprehensive or exhaustive Iising of
milestones or significant events. In keeping with
this assessment’s focus on civilian activities, the
present chapter does not discuss the extensive
military space program except as it illustrates a
policy issue of significance for the civilian space
program. Its focus is primarily on NASA’s activ-
ities, though it includes some discussion of pro-
grams of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA).
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EARLY DEVELOPMENT
The early development of the U.S. space ef-
fort was primarily a specialist’s concern; that is,
the scientific research objectives associated with
the prospect of access to the upper atmosphere
and eventually to an Earth-orbiting platform were
the province of a relatively small community of
scientists and engineers. This community in-
cluded a few universities, not-for-profit institu-
tions, and several defense laboratories. There was
associated with this research-oriented community
a larger engineering-oriented group that was de-
veloping propulsion systems, radio and inertial
guidance systems, and control systems for ballistic
missiles. This second group provided much of the
basic launch vehicle technology for the civilian
program. Before Sputnik in 1957, these groups
pursued their objectives in relative obscurity.
In the wake of Sputnik, however, the public
demand for a U.S. response galvanized Congress
and the executive branch to act. Seeking to re-
vitalize technological and scientific development
across-the-board, they instituted programs to de-
velop better science and engineering education,
to increase Federal support for science, to attract
greater numbers of young people to technical ca-
reers, and to improve military systems.
One of the first measures taken was to appoint
a full-time Science Adviser to the President, Dr.
James Killian, and to establish the President’s
Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), a group of
18 respected senior scientists and engineers. They
were asked to review and comment on the meas-
ures needed to carry out the peacetime mobiliza-
Spacecraft used in the early stages of space exploration
84 l Civilian Space Policy and Applications
tion of skills in science and technology called for
by the President. Clearly, the major topics of re-
view were: 1 ) the U.S. response to Soviet space
achievements and 2) the national security pro-
grams needed to counter Soviet military devel-
opments, particularly their ability to launch
ballistic missiles and to detonate hydrogen
bombs.
One of the first tasks at hand was to explain
to the public the significance of the Soviet and
U.S. entry into space. Many people could not
understand how orbital flight around the Earth
was possible, and they found its realization threat-
ening. Thus, in its first public report, PSAC found
it necessary, in 1958, first, to expound Newton’s
laws of motion to explain “why satellites stay up,”
and second to assure the public that the Soviet
space achievements did not signal a serious, im-
minent threat to U.S. national security.3 In this
same report, PSAC outlined the future evolution
of the space program, including (under the cat-
egories of near-, mid-, and long-term possibilities)
the full range of missions that the United States,
with time, could adopt as the national space pro-
gram. The remarkable feature of the report was
the very complete characterization of future ap-
plications, including manned planetary explora-
tion and a lunar base, both listed as long-term
goals, and both still possible as targets for future
space activity.
{n those early days of civilian space activity, the
principal objectives were to acquire new knowl-
J/ntro~uctjon tO Outer  Space, report of the President’s Science
Advisory Committee, 1958.
MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS
In order to build a foundation for the analysis
of later chapters, this section will highlight a num-
ber of important characteristics of the U.S. civilian
space program which have been instrumental in
setting the stage for current issues.
Open and Public Nature of the Program
As the NAS Act separated civilian and military
space activities, the civilian space program was
edge, performing specific functions that were en-
hanced or made uniquely possible by utilizing
space platforms, and to strengthen national pres-
tige and self-confidence, badly shaken by a suc-
cession of Soviet “firsts” in space. These objec-
tives appeared prominently in the NAS Act,
which was prompted by Sputnik and very quickly
drafted and signed into law in July 1958.
As is clear from chapter 5, the essential char-
acter of the civilian space program has not
changed significantly in the succeeding years: we
still seek new knowledge about the Earth, the
Moon, the Sun, the planets, and the more dis-
tant objects in space; we remain active in exploit-
ing applications that make use of the unique van-
tage point or the unique environment (low grav-
ity, high vacuum) of space; we still attend to ex-
ploration and technological “muscleflexing” in
programs such as the space shuttle. Perhaps one
of the most remarkable aspects of the way the
space program has developed is the fact that the
opportunities and areas of activity in the space
program have not changed appreciably over a
quarter century. The developments in space ap-
plications, the mission opportunities in science,
and the manned space exploration program have
largely followed the scenario laid out by the early
advisers and space proponents—if anything, they
have failed to equal the imagination and vision
of these early projections. This suggests that we
have not yet penetrated beyond the initial learn-
ing phase of space activity to a more mature treat-
ment of and familiarity with space systems, and
how they can best serve us.
OF THE SPACE PROGRAM
open to public scrutiny from its inception. This
characteristic of the program has helped to shape
and, in a sense, to constrain the U.S. civilian pro-
gram. As the public has become more knowl-
edgeable about space capabilities and costs, the
objectives of NASA’s program have required
more detailed justification, more planning, and
even some marketing in order to build sufficient
public understanding and acceptance. The grow-
ing complexity of technology and missions in
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space applications and science requires more
sophisticated public understanding than did some
of the earlier programs, As a result, NASA’s task
of justifying its activities to the public has become
more difficult.
Contrasted with the public acceptance and sup-
port that NASA requires is the more restricted
nature of the decision process for the space pro-
gram in the military and intelligence arenas. Here,
the very large majority of the program is space
applications, that is, activities which assist in per-
forming a specific mission or missions and which
are therefore amenable to cost-benefit analysis.
It is quite often the case that any one of several
alternatives may achieve the objectives of a given
mission, and that tradeoffs may determine the op-
timal allocation of resources from among the var-
ious alternatives available, For the most part, this
decision process takes place in the closed world
of the Department of Defense (DOD) or the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency. There is, consequently,
no need to sell the program to the public, nor
do elected public officials participate in the selec-
tion, the configuration, or the operation of mis-
sions. The important element in this process is
the mechanism for generating requirements. The
requirements provide a target toward which the
technical community can work and by which the
proposed system may be evaluated. It would be
difficult to devise an analogue to this mechanism
suitable for use in the civilian program because
in the early stages of R&D, civilian users and, per-
force, their requirements cannot be identified.
Use of Industry and University Support
From its very beginning, the space program has
been a high-technology endeavor, and the aver-
age citizen has not easily understood its operative
concepts. Early failures in both launch vehicles
and satellites dramatized the problems associated
with space operations and taught invaluable les-
sons to those who were actively participating in
their development. Practices and techniques that
were adequate for most terrestrial systems had
to be modified and adapted to the demanding
requirements imposed by the space environment.
As a result, highly skilled industrial teams were
formed. These teams learned to apply specialized
manufacturing and environmental specifications
and found ways in which they could be satisfied.
They also developed a wide variety of associated
techniques that could be perfected only through
actual space missions. Such specialized knowl-
edge and specialized capability in industry and
universities represent a national resource that, if
lost, could not be easily duplicated.
An important characteristic of the U.S. program
in this regard has been the diversity of industrial,
university, and Government resources that were
drawn into active participation in all aspects of
the program. Through this diversity of resources,
there has been enough competition so that new
ideas have had an opportunity to surface, space
expertise has been acquired by many technical
teams, and the entire program has been strength-
ened. Furthermore, significant diversity has
always characterized intragovernment space ac-
tivities. NASA’s predecessor and major constitu-
ent element, the National Advisory Committee
on Aeronautics (NACA), developed a major field
laboratory structure (Langiey, Ames, and Lewis
Research Centers), and it promoted valuable
cross-fertilization through good working relations
with its principal customers—DOD and the com-
mercial aeronautical industry. When space activ-
ities began, and the level of effort was substan-
tially raised, in accordance with our commitment
to the success of Apollo, NASA elaborated
NACA’S pattern: it created new government
research centers, each playing a major role in
program management, and each having unique
facilities and a modest in-house research and
technology development capability. NASA also
enlisted the support of its counterparts in DOD,
particularly with respect to launch vehicles (Thor,
Atlas, Agena).
With a few notable exceptions, manufacturing
and detailed system development were the prov-
ince of industry, while university teams designed
the instruments and experiments, formulated the
overall science objectives, and constituted the
user community for the space science program.
For the most part, the relationships among these
contributors have been beneficial and positive.
From time to time, however, some concerns have
surfaced. For example, the university experiment-
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ers complain about the privileged position of their
competitors inside the NASA research centers,
or NASA headquarters claims it lacks adequate
control over the centers. An abiding concern of
industry is that they will lose a significant business
base from a combination of NASA’s shrinking
budgets and its desire to maintain an in-house
establishment.
Overall, the United States continues to call on
and use capabilities that were created as part of
the major expansion during the Apollo program.
However, shrinking NASA budgets, particularly
when inflation is taken into account, have
gradually eroded the contractor base support-
ing the civilian space program. Many contractors
now prefer to work on DOD’s space program.
New civilian activity has slowed overall, partic-
ularly in some of the advanced scientific areas.
Similarly, universities made significant commit-
ments to space in the early expansionist days, and
many specialized university space institutes or
laboratories were established. Several factors
threaten the ability of universities to continue
their support of the space program. These fac-
tors include: increasing time intervals between
successive launches; lack of funds to support con-
tinued data collection and processing of data
from satellites after their initial period of opera-
tion; reduced funding for exploitation of data
already gathered; and increasing complexity and
Ieadtimes between initiation of an experiment
and the actual flight opportunity. The support for
the space program from universities and industry
has enabled the United States to succeed in in-
creasingly advanced and more challenging mis-
sions. This base of suport will be the key to the
successful performance of commitments yet to
be made. Clearly, the vigor of space-related pro-
grams in industry and universities is an appropri-
ate subject for periodic evaluation.
Public Understanding
The community most immediately affected by
the awesome character of launching artificial sat-
ellites were those who operated, constructed,
and designed the various interdependent sys-
tems. The inception of manned flight brought the
wonder of space exploration home to us all. For
now our space program had become not only
a scientific investigation of a new medium, but
a human adventure into the unknown. As the first
astronauts were selected, communications media
hastened to canonize them as national heroes.
Through extensive publicity, particularly live
television coverage, people throughout the world
followed the early manned flights with great in-
terest. Familiarity with the astronauts, their space
vehicles, and the new jargon of the space age led
to some understanding of the relevant concepts:
weightlessness (or “microgravity”), how satellites
and launch vehicles operate, the difference be-
tween synchronous and low-altitude orbits, the
concept of satellite communciations relay, and
Earth observations from space for weather or
other purposes, all became topics of casual con-
versation.
In addition, even rather esoteric subjects of sci-
entific investigation, such as the structure of the
Van Allen belts around the Earth, the composi-
tion and characteristics of the Moon, and the
nature of the planets in our solar system, became
matters of general interest. The space program,
which began as the province of specialists, gen-
erated ever more publicity and discussion, so that
the general public was eager to learn of, and par-
ticipate vicariously in, the planning and flight of
new missions.
Yet, even as the public came to understand the
first steps into space, succeeding missions and
systems became more enterprising: simple instru-
ments were being supplemented by complex de-
vices and systems, plans were made to investi-
gate new objects, and the first surveys of these
objects were followed by detailed and highly spe-
cialized analyses. In Earth-orbital applications,
naive signal propagation and tracking devices
evolved into sophisticated relay stations with
multiple channel capacity and multiple spot
beam retransmission capability; simple cameras
and optical scanning devices were comple-
mented by multispectral scanners and infrared
or microwave imagers; and the tracking systems
were supplemented by laser trackers of high
spatial and range precision. The experiments to
be performed by the next generation of space
missions are even more complex.
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Thus, the open and public nature of the civilian
space program, coupled with its high technology
content, presents a special challenge to policy-
makers and the leadership in the civilian space
community, if there is to be some continued de-
velopment of public understanding of space mis-
sions, program objectives, and the possible
returns to be expected.
International Cooperation
It is impossible to discuss the overall U.S. space
program without mentioning its international
component. From its very beginning, the civilian
space program has had an international char-
acter. International cooperation in science led to
the first satellite launches as part of the multi-
national International Geophysical Year. The
1958 NAS Act explicitly recognized the objective
of fostering international cooperation, and it
charged NASA with integrating this objective into
the overall program. Yet the consideration which
dominated space policy in the early years was
competition with the Soviet Union, and policy
decisions during this period tended to protect
U.S. interests against possible foreign preemption.
Our treatment of international cooperation has
also varied considerably, depending on the type
of activity—space science, applications, or
manned flight.
The approach taken to science has favored data
exchange, large-scale cooperative experiments
where multiple measurements at geographical-
ly dispersed locations are involved, and to a very
limited extent, foreign experiments on U.S. sat-
ellites or use of data acquired by the United States
(such as lunar samples). In general, the United
States has regarded cooperative efforts in science
as less problematic than those in other areas,
although it has been assumed that the United
States would participate in each area of space sci-
ence with sufficient vigor so that we would re-
main in the forefront of current research and
would not abandon any area to foreign competi-
tion.
In applications, the most notable activity has
been the commitment to a single international
communications satellite system, INTELSAT, and
the creation of a chosen private entity, COMSAT,
to represent the United States and, initially, to
be technical manager for the system. In this area
of commercial interest, many nations had to co-
operate if links among the various communica-
tions systems were to be established. To this end,
the creation of a new international institution
seemed the most feasible means. On the other
hand, introduction of Earth remote sensing
through the experimental Landsat system has not
yet required extensive international coopera-
tion, so that no international institution to col-
lect data has been created.Q Of course, there has
been extensive international dialog regarding
Earth observations, and the sale both of the re-
ceived data and of ground stations for direct re-
ception of Landsat output are proceeding apace.
Thus the Landsat program has not been without
substantial international participation or commer-
cial interest. It has been customary for Govern-
ment to supply meteorological data as a public
service, and this practice was continued with
weather satellites. As in the case of terrestrial
weather observations, free and open exchange
of data has been the rule, where the United States
makes ground stations available for receipt of U.S.
meteorological data. Cooperation has grown in
this area, particularly as part of a series of large-
scale atmospheric ocean observation programs
that gave other nations greater experience and
an incentive to create their own meteorological
capability at geosynchronous orbit. Navigational
aid, also largely a Government service, was orig-
inally used to support military (submarine and
surface ship) operations, but was later opened
to civilian and international users merely by their
purchase of the appropriate receiver. A more ad-
vanced system of position location is under devel-
opment; it too will be available to civilian and
international users.
Manned space flight, by its nature a very cost-
ly aspect of the space program, has been carried
out only by the two space superpowers, the
United States and the U.S.S.R. With the excep-
tion of lunar exploration, the U.S.S.R. has pio-
neered this area and has flown international
4Remote Sensing of Earth Resources, Panel on Science and Tech-
nology Thirteenth Meeting, proceedings before the Committee on
Science and Aeronautics, House of Representatives, 92d Cong.,
2d sess.;  Jan. 25, 26, 27, 1972; No. 13, Washington, D.C.
94-915 0 - .9? - ‘
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crews with members from Socialist bloc coun-
tries. The U.S. program is moving toward inter-
national participation in manned flight with the
advent of shuttle operations and a manned lab-
oratory payload (Spacelab) supplied by a Euro-
pean consortium. Indeed, the shuttle system is
an international cooperative venture, and the
shuttle itself may very well be flown by multina-
tional crews. In early manned operations, includ-
ing Apollo, the need for close contact and global
monitoring of flight crews and their capsules re-
quired tracking, communications stations, and
recovery units around the world. These were part
of a large-scale cooperative international frame-
work established by NASA (and DOD) that sup-
ported the manned flight program and many un-
manned operations as well.
More recently, other nations have designed
and begun to test space systems that will com-
pete directly with U.S. projects in communica-
tions, remote sensing, and transportation (ch. 7).
Thus, cooperation and competition are both pres-
ent in the international aspects of the civilian
space program. As a result, there is a certain flex-
ibility in U.S. space policy, ensuring that analysis
and debate will continue.
MAJOR MILESTONES IN SPACE
The following milestones have been selected
to illustrate the major issues and characteristics
of the civilian space program of the United States
and to lay a foundation for a retrospective assess-
ment of our current posture in space.
The International Geophysical Year (IGY)
U.S. participation in the IGY program provided
the explicit rationale for entry into civilian space
activities. It was fundamental to this participation
that the experiments would be open and the re-
sults published, consistent with the traditions of
scientific research. There would be international
discussions and exchange of results, and the
knowledge gained would become part of the
global scientific literature. in this work, therefore,
were laid the foundations for an open and public
civilian program with a fundamental objective:
expansion of human knowledge. This contrasts
with the military and intelligence space objectives
—support of the national security of the United
States–and the high degree of secrecy associated
with most of their activities.
The search for knowledge is still an important
objective of the U.S. space program and can
serve to link people of diverse cultural and politi-
cal backgrounds. It involves its own form of com-
petition, but also enables nations to cooperate,
leaving a political deposition of value beyond the
scientific measurements that are made.
National Aeronautics and Space
Act of 1958, as Amended
The basic foundation for the civilian space pro-
gram is Public Law 85-568, the National Aero-
nautics and Space Act of 1958. This act was the
result of compromise, but represented a victory
for those who supported a space program con-
ducted principally by an independent civilian
agency. The policy guidance in the act, essen-
tially unchanged from its original form, specified
that “activities in space should be devoted to
peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind.”
It also enumerated a set of broad objectives:
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Expansion of human knowledge.
Improvement of aeronautical and space
vehicles.
Development and operation of vehicles
(spacecraft).
Study of potential benefits to be gained from
aeronautical and space activities.
Preservation of the role of the United States
as a leader in aeronautical and space science
technology and their applications.
Publication of information about discoveries.
Cooperation between the United States and
other nations.
Effective utilization of the scientific and engi-
neering resources of the United States. -
Significantly, the act is silent on responsibilities
for operational space systems beyond DOD’s role
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with regard to national defense. By implication,
since the “aeronautical and space activities” that
are the principal responsibility of NASA, are de-
fined as “research . . ., development, construc-
tion, testing, and operation for research purposes
of aeronautical and space vehicles, and such
other activities as may be required for the explor-
ation of space, ” operational roles are expected
to be carried out by other agencies. At the time
the act was written, however, its framers did not
foresee the variety of space applications that are
now possible. That the act neither specifies nor
precludes operational responsibilities for NASA
suggests a pragmatic approach to each functional
area and a flexibility in determining which agency
should take the lead in operating any given sys-
tem. (NOAA’s current assignment as the lead
agency for Earth observational satellite systems
in the civil sector may also need reexamination
and evaluation in the light of its activities since
assuming this role about a year ago.)
This report presents a more detailed summary
of the 1958 NAS Act in chapter 3. The following
observations are appropriate here, however. The
legislative mandate for NASA has had great effect
on the institutional configuration of the agency,
but has provided little guidance on the pace and
content of the program. In some areas, notably
space communications R&D and Earth resources
systems, the act was of no use in resolving policy
differences or in guiding executive branch action.
Recent congressional action, such as in the
energy area, has been much more aggressive in
spelling out the objective of technological pro-
grams and giving guidance on the level of in-
tended or expected spending, but not all such
efforts represent a good legislative model. Clearly,
a balance between a detailed congressional man-
date and a restrictive overspecification of the pro-
gram must be struck.
The Apollo Commitment
No other single event has so profoundly shaped
the U.S. space program and current issues as the
decision for man to go to the Moon and return
within the decade of the 1960’s. Much has been
written about the personalities and pressures that
led to Kennedy’s decision, and that discussion
will not be rehearsed here. The most important
aspects of Apollo for this assessment are its legacy
and the issues flowing from that legacy.
The major characteristics of the Apollo proposal
were:
l
l
l
l
l
A multiyear joint executive branch and con-
gressional commitment.
An extremely challenging technological feat,
feasible in principle, but with a great many
engineering problems, and under a signifi-
cant time constraint.
A political measure–aimed at foreign policy
goals, national prestige, and self-confidence.
Commitment to a major expansion in the
civil space program and in the institutional
base for the program.
Required contractor teams on a scale not
previously attempted.
In the process of accomplishing its goals, NASA
added significantly to its laboratory structure, cre-
ating a combined Government-contractor work
force that exceeded 400,000 people at its peaks
Though Apollo dominated the agency’s priorities,
there was also a presidential commitment to pur-
sue satellite communications and meteorology,
and programs in these areas also expanded dur-
ing the 1960’s. During this period, many were
strongly attracted to the challenge and the prom-
ise of space activity.
However, even before the first successful lunar
landing, there were signs of change. NASA budg-
et outlays, which peaked at nearly $6 billion in
1966, began decreasing by almost $500,000 a
year for the next 4 years. The total work force
dropped from 400,000 to 160,000 in the same
period, beginning a period of aerospace unem-
ployment that was to have significant impact on
future commitments to manned flight programs.
(Of the decrease in aerospace employment over
this period, over 220,000 was in direct contrac-
tor employment, while only 6,000 was in civil
service or direct support service manpower.) A
backlash developed in the scientific and engi-
neering professions when individuals found that
their opportunities for careers in aerospace were
sThe u.s. civilian  Space Program—look at options. OMB Issues
Paper, Oct. 14, 1971.
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disappearing. During the peak readjustment peri-
od, the political liability of large-scale unemploy-
ment in this work force prompted direct, Govern-
ment-supported, ameliorative measures. As a re-
sult of this expansion and rapid contraction in the
aerospace industry, political resistance to future
decisions causing major disruptions in the work
force may be anticipated. (See discussion of the
space shuttle decision below).
During the decade of the 1960’s, therefore, the
overarching commitment to Apollo focused the
space program; other space activities throve
amidst Apollonian largesse. By the beginning of
the 1970’s, however, the program had lost its
focus, and the continuing projects, all smaller in
scope, began to lose their way in the twilight of
fiscal restraint.
The large-scale commitment to the Apollo pro-
gram left a legacy that did not dissipate easily.
This legacy, while mostly positive, was also some-
what disruptive because no equivalent subse-
quent project was identified. National prestige
from such an amazing accomplishment contin-
ued long after the event, but ordinary citizens
soon lost interest in space and began to ask: if
we can put a man on the Moon, why can’t
we . . .
INTELSAT/COMSAT Commitment
Recognition of the importance of space plat-
forms for communications came early in the
space program. As the common carrier respon-
sible for long distance communications in the
United States, A.T.&T. funded a low-altitude sat-
ellite, Telstar, while Hughes Aircraft Co. con-
structed the Syncom series of satellites, which
were intended for synchronous orbit placement.
(The concept of a synchronous communications
satellite was first suggested in 1945.6) With the
beginning of the Kennedy administration and a
much more activist role for Government in space,
however, the role of the private sector was rewrit-
ten for the newly created COMSAT Corp., the
chosen vehicle for U.S. participation in a com-
mercial communications satellite system (a single,
bArthur c. clarke,  “Extraterrestrial Relays: Can Rocket StatiOns
Give Worldwide Radio Coverage?” Wire/ess Wor/~  October 1945,
pp. 305-308.
global system). NASA was to support COMSAT
with R&D and with launch services, for which the
agency was to be reimbursed. The COMSAT Act
was passed in 1962, the first stock was issued in
1964, and its first satellite, Early Bird, was
launched into synchronous orbit over the Atlan-
tic in April 1965.7
In 1964, the INTELSAT Agreements were
opened for signature, and COMSAT was desig-
nated the manager for the system. INTELSAT pro-
vided a means for gaining international agree-
ment on the extent and type of services to be sup-
plied, the charges for such services, the procure-
ment policies, and a host of related matters. In
the United States, where there is no single gov-
ernmental entity responsible for providing tele-
communications service, the relationships among
the various potential suppliers of domestic satel-
lite telecommunications services are regulated by
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
In 1970, after many years of debate, the princi-
ple of open entry and competition for domestic
services was announced, followed by specific
authorizations of domestic satellite services by
FCC in December 1972,8 which finally opened
up the domestic market to a variety of suppliers
of such services. The regulatory and commercial
environment for domestic communications sat-
ellite services continues to change so as to affect
the structure of the industry and the relationships
among the various services and common or spe-
cialized carriers. In addition, maritime services
have been initiated, backed by the U.S. Navy’s
guarantee to lease services from the system for
defined periods. An international organization,
INMARSAT, somewhat parallel to INTELSAT, was
started for support of these services.
U.S. experience in the development of struc-
tures to provide services that exploit the
capabilities of satellites has been unique from
several standpoints:
1. New institutions were established: the quasi-
public, domestic corporation, COMSAT, and
the international entity, INTELSAT. Both
TCommunicat;onS  Statellhe Act of 1962, Public Law 87-624, 87th
Cong., H.R. 11040, Aug. 31, 1962.
Scomsat @j& to the Intelsat, Marisat, and Comstar satellite SYS-
tems, 95 L’Enfant Plaza, S. W., Washington, D.C. 20024.
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2.
3.
were important in gaining support and co-
operation from other nations.
The Federal Government initially provided
major support of R&D for communications
satellite technology, in accordance with the
act establishing COMSAT. The Nixon admin-
istration, however, as part of its policy of pro-
moting more activity in the private sector,
decided to downgrade NASA’s program in
satellite communications, terminating dem-
onstrations of new spacecraft and substitut-
ing a low-level program of technology devel-
opment. The Carter administration reversed
field: NASA’s R&D in space communications
was to be returned to a higher level.
The aerospace industry played the role of
major suppliers of satellites and ground
equipment; NASA provided reimbursable
launch services.
Before the space age, the communications in-
dustry was already well established: the outlines
of its structure were fairly clear; the services it
provided were well understood; and regulations
governing its activities were in place. A new tech-
nology, space satellite communications relays,
revolutionized the industry: space provided a
unique, high-altitude vantage point, to and from
which a variety of signals could be transmitted.
Consequently, national policies had to be revised
in order to cope with the new space systems.
The example of satellite communications shows
that NASA’s role in the R&D of applications
technologies may be interpreted in several ways,
depending on an administration’s staging of the
interaction between the private sector and the
agency. This history indicates some lack of clar-
ity in the legislative mandate. Willingness to take
risks in forming new institutional arrangements
(e.g., COMSAT or INTELSAT) can have a benefi-
cial effect on development of a specific service.
An organized user community, the readiness of
a given technology, an established tradition of
commercial services with an approximate value
set for each—all are important factors in deter-
mining the success of a space application.
Weather Satellite Services
The use of satellites for global synoptic cover-
age of the Earth began with the experimental
launch of Tires 1 in 1960, as a joint effort of DOD
and NASA. This satellite’s global cloud coverage
pictures were the first in a long series, character-
ized by incremental improvements in succeeding
satellites and by developments in their use in ob-
taining atmospheric and meteorological obser-
vations.g Because DOD’s requirements were so
different from NASA’s, two separate meteorolog-
ical satellite programs—one civilian, one military
—were established. NASA’s satellites were inte-
grated into the Federal Government’s system for
providing U.S. users with information regarding
local and synoptic weather. These satellites also
provided weather data to other nations and to
international entities. Here, as well as in other
civilian applications services, NASA led the way
in identifying appropriate technologies for air and
space platforms. In the case of weather satellites,
the relationship between NASA and its user agen-
cy was a somewhat turbulent one, occasioning
considerable interaction and debate before a suit-
able working relationship was developed. For
weather satellite services, NASA functions as a
launching agency and also provides (through
coordination with the user) the early experimen-
tal development of satellite sensors and platforms.
These are, at a suitable time in their evolution,
incorporated into operational systems for whose
management the user agency, currently NOAA,
is specifically responsible. (The present good
working relationship between NASA and NOAA
forms the background for the decision to assign
operational responsibility for civil operational
Earth resources sensing to NOAA.) The major pat-
terns that emerged from the early experience with
weather satellites were:
Ž Strong Government role. NASA developed
and NOAA operates a primarily civilian
service.
9NASA News,  capsule  t-iistory of Weather Satellites, Release No.
76-1 46; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washing-
ton, D.C, 20546,
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NOAA's weather satellite (SMS-2) photographed hurricane Katrina off the coast of Baja, Calif., Sept. 3, 1975 
Weather data distribution is a public service. 
Data are supplied to non-Government users 
at cost of reproduction, the Government 
beari ng the enti re cost of development of the 
system and of collection and dissemination 
of data. 
Separate civilian and military weather satel-
lite systems. Similarity of the measurements 
taken for the civilian and the military systems 
prompts periodic review of the standing pro-
oosal to ioin them. These reviews unfailing-
iy concl~de that specialized military applic~­
tions require an independent program. Like-
wise, the very different requirements of the 
civili~n syste~-widespread dissemination of 
uncensored data over various users in the 
United States, and interaction with the in-
ternational meteorological community-mil-
itate against a merger. 
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Extensive cooperation with other nations.
The United States participates in large-scale
experiments and provides open and ready
access to the results.
Open data policy. Data are supplied
. .
worldwide to”all users.
Because of the doubtful commercial potential
of weather satellite services, the Government’s
role of operator (as well as developer) of weather
satellite systems was not controversial. As a result,
the weather program, unlike the Landsat pro-
gram, has sparked no debate over management
structure, data handling, or pace of development.
If the data provided by the weather programs
were to be of commercial value, they would re-
quire additional processing and integration with
other, related data. Until the recent COMSAT in-
terest in assuming ownership of the meteorologi-
cal satellites along with the Landsat system the
possibility that the private sector might convert
such data collection and interpretation to its own
use seemed remote.
The weather satellite program has shown that
global cooperation has been most active and ef-
fective in meteorological and weather services–
areas where commercial and national security in-
terests are muted. Relations among NASA,
NOAA, and the user community demonstrate
that it is possible to have separate R&D, opera-
tional, and user responsibilities, and yet to main-
tain a viable service. Reasonable technological
progress has been made under this arrangement.
Separate military and civilian programs have ex-
isted because of differing user requirements, and
prospects that military and civilian users can
make greater use of common data streams, chan-
neled separately to each, must remain subject to
periodic review.
Scientific Research and Exploration
As pointed out in the section on the interna-
tional Geophysical Year, the initial rationale for
the U.S. civilian space program was based on the
IOj. V. Charyle, testimony before the Subcommittee on Space Sci-
ence and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technol-
ogy, U.S. House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on Sci-
ence, Technology and Space of the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, July 22, 23, 1981.
need for scientific research in space. A continu-
ing strong, science-based program has been char-
acteristic of the civilian space effort since its very
beginning. There are some important features of
the science program that require further com-
ment:
l
l
l
University participation. The major partici-
pants in science programs have been univer-
sity-based experimenters who provided the
basic ideas for measurements to be made
and, in some cases, the basic designs of the
instruments to be flown to make these meas-
urements. Commercial interest is almost in-
visible, and the principal competition for ex-
perimenter roles is between government lab-
oratory scientists and university science
teams.
National Academy of Sciences. 11 The Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, through its
Space Science Board, has done much to set
the agenda for space science, identifying
both a general rationale for many measure-
ment programs and the specific nature of the
most attractive experiments. The Academy’s
pronouncements have also had a major role
in such areas as lunar quarantine and plan-
etary contamination, even to the point of
stimulating major investments for such items
as a quarantine facility for handling lunar
samples and astronauts on their return from
the Moon. In planetary programs, the Acad-
emy’s recommendations were instrumental
in determining the criteria for judging the ac-
ceptable degree of risk that Earth micro-
organisms might contaminate a planet’s sur-
face. The Academy’s influence was reflected
in the programs by the requirements for pro-
longed heat soak sterilization, for spacecraft
encapsulization, and for selection of accept-
able trajectories of approach to the planet.
International cooperation. Historically, the
science program has been international in
scope, and it appears to be moving toward
even greater international cooperation in the
11 Outer  P~net5 &p/oration, 1972-1985, National Academy of Sci-
ences, Washington, D. C., 1971, and Opportunities and Choices
in Space Science, 1974, Space Science Board, National Research
Council; National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D. C., Nov.
11, 1974.
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design of missions and the development of
experiment payloads.
Difficulty of keeping project teams. As mis-
sions become more complex, expensive,
and international in flavor, and as the time
between mission opportunities grows, it
becomes increasingly difficult for U.S. sci-
ence teams to remain active and involved
with the program. Even assuming that only
the best teams are retained, there is never-
theless a narrowing of the base from which
new experiments and ideas originate, with
resultant long-term negative impact on the
quality of NASA’s science effort. Fewer flight
opportunities also may bring about a subtle
leaning toward NASA experimenters, al-
though it is intended that there be no bias
toward the in-house groups; and
Emphasis on spacecraft. The tendency
within NASA has been to focus on develop-
ment and launch of the spacecraft and its
payload, and its operation to obtain the
desired data. Data analysis and interpreta-
tion and continuing exploitation of the in-
formation or material from these missions
tends to be given lower priority and is almost
always in need of greater budget support.
Post-Apollo Planning
In the mid-1960’s, planners from NASA joined
PSAC, which had kept a close involvement with
space policy (despite being overruled at critical
points such as the choice of lunar landing mode)
to look toward the post-Apollo period and to con-
sider possible courses of action. In February 1967,
PSAC published a comprehensive report attempt-
ing to answer the basic question, “Where does
the Nation go in space in the post-Apollo peri-
od?”lz Consistent with the major emphasis of the
civilian program started by Apollo, one of the ma-
jor preoccupations of that report was the future
evolution of the manned flight program, for res-
olution of this issue would affect the budget more
than any other. The advisory panels that drafted
the report were acutely aware of the importance
of Apollo in stimulating a very vigorous and broad
lz~~e space ~fogfa~  in the Post-Apo/lo Period, a Report of the
President’s Science Advisory Committee, the White House, Febru-
ary 1967.
program, and recognized that the next step of
equivalent scope would be a commitment to
manned planetary exploration. They did not,
however, endorse such a commitment. Instead,
they recommended a more balanced program in
which manned planetary exploration was still
very much in the long-term picture, but which
would place greater emphasis on unmanned sci-
ence and applications missions in the short term.
Manned flight would continue, but at a much
more leisurely pace. Interestingly, the report rec-
ommended work toward a space station module
in the mid-l970’s, but suggested that this date
could slip depending on the pace of a national
commitment toward manned planetary explora-
tion. The major justification for such a station was
long-duration studies of how humans react to
lengthy exposure to the space environment. In
the foreword to the PSAC report, the President
set a conservative tone, stating that the “oppor-
tunities in space are great but the costs are high
. . . “ without endorsing a future program or set
of new guidelines.
NASA pressed forward with ambitious plans for
post-Apollo lunar exploration, further develop-
ment of the space station, manned planetary flight
options using Apollo-based hardware and exotic
new systems, such as the nuclear rocket then
under development. No approval of such plans
was forthcoming from a Johnson administration
that was preoccupied with the costs and public
impact of the Vietnam conflict. Thus, the dramat-
ic decline in NASA budgets mentioned earlier
began. Although NASA planning was somewhat
fragmented among the various program offices
and lacked coherence, the problem resulted prin-
cipally not from a lack of planning, but rather
from a failure to generate consensus on what the
Nation wanted from its civilian space program and
was willing to pay for.
Long-range planning exercises can have a ben-
eficial result because they help to clarify the op-
tions and develop consensus on what the next
steps should be. However, they have little effect
on obtaining political and budgetary commit-
ments, which often appear to depend more on
external factors such as national or international
crises.
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Earth Observations
The experience gained in flying weather satel-
lites and from military reconnaissance programs
(not publicly discussed at that time because of
a policy decision to protect the “fact that” such
activities were taking place) indicated both the
feasibility and value of Earth observations, pro-
vided there was sufficient resolution either spatial-
ly or spectrally to evaluate the nature of the ob-
served scene. J Since there were multiple uses
and users for Earth observation data, and no one
single user appeared to have a dominant role or
need, there was considerable delay between rec-
ognition of the value of satellite remote-sensing
observations and the initiation of a program to
obtain them from space. There were a number
of reasons for this delay. Among them were:
l
l
Concern by the national security community
that there would be some international pro-
tests if sufficiently high-resolution civil data
were to be collected that would have intel-
ligence/military value. This was resolved by
setting a limit on the resolution permitted for
any civil system;
Lack of a clear lead agency responsibility.
The Department of the Interior tried to solve
this problem in 1967 by announcing an
EROS satellite program for Earth observations
primarily of geological interest, but this an-
nouncement was made without obtaining
White House, Bureau of the Budget, Office
of Science and Technology, or National
Security Council (NSC) approval. Conse-
quently, it was killed quietly (largely because
these approval and coordination steps had
not been taken) in the budget process. NASA
had the responsibility for the necessary R&D,
and the weather satellite experience dem-
onstrated that a suitable working arrange-
ment could be established between the R&D
leader and the operator and user. NASA
began to exercise this role and pull together
the various potential users in connection
with the definition of the experimental Earth
13A Retrospective on Earth-Resource Surveys: Arguments About
Technology, Analysis, Politics, and Bureaucracy. U.S. Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency; Photogrammetric Engineering and
Remote Sensing, vol. 42, No. 2, February 1976, Washington, D.C.
Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS). But
this effort occurred at a time when the gen-
eral attitude toward space ventures was
changing from the expansionary vision of
Apollo to a more conservative and cost-
conscious approach. The recommendations
of PSAC are indicative:
. . . a reasonably clear case of potential util-
ity must be made, which includes potential
economic benefit, before significant
development costs are assumed.
. , . space technology has passed the point
where the demonstration of mere feasibil-
ity of a particular application has any tech-
nological or prestige significance.14
In this environment, NASA was initially
unable to provide credible cost-benefit data
and user contributions that would substan-
tiate the need for such a system. Further
studies ensued, more user support was en-
listed, and still the case for ERTS did not ap-
pear persuasive. Finally it was approved,
largely on faith that existence of a real data
stream from the satellite would stimulate
uses (and users) enough to build a positive
cost-benefit case to proceed toward an oper-
ational system.
Opposition from those who supported air-
craft for Earth surveys. While not as signifi-
cant as the factors mentioned above, the ac-
tive promotion of the use of high-altitude air-
craft as an alternative to spacecraft platforms
showed the acceptance of satellite remote
sensing. The arguments about the relative
merits of each approach are not important
to this assessment, but it is significant that
aircraft data collection would probably have
been carried out by one or more private con-
tractors whereas ERTS required NASA man-
agement, direction, and participation in data
handling, spacecraft operational control, etc.
While NASA opposed reliance on aircraft,
it nevertheless recognized their value and
subsequently organized a substantial high-
altitude aircraft program based on the U-2.
Of course, the ease of global coverage for
a satellite as compared with an aircraft was
not contested. It was simply unclear at that
laThe Space program in the Post-Apollo Period, PSAC, Wruav
1967.
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time how ERTS data on other countries
would be collected and used, particularly in
a processed or interpreted form.
l Lack of an organized user community in the
private sector. Much of the early interest in
Earth observations from space centered in
Federal Government agencies whose mis-
sions could be accomplished more effective-
ly if satellite data were available. Neither
State and local governments nor potential
users in the private sector were willing to
make early commitments. In each category,
there was a typical pattern: the potential user
might find the data useful, but was largely
incapable of analyzing his needs or even of
conducting the research necessary to under-
stand them more adequately. Therefore,
NASA was funded to support a wide array
of user experiments as part of ERTS-1, in
order to improve the base of understanding
of the value of the satellite output. (Lack of
an organized and established user commu-
nity for ERTS, or Landsat, as it was renamed,
contrasts with the situation for early space
telecommunications services where the enti-
ties for long-haul telephone services already
existed. Similarly, there has been no institu-
tional innovation for Earth sensing, either na-
tionally or internationally, as there was in the
case of COMSAT and INTELSAT.)
Space Task Group
At the beginning of the Nixon administration,
the Apollo program was rapidly coming to a suc-
cessful close, but no clear definition of a post-
Apollo space program had emerged. Early plan-
ning efforts had failed to yield a consensus, and
space program budgets had decreased dramat-
ically, presenting the new administration with
growing unemployment in the aerospace industry
as well as a major technological agency that did
not have clear signals regarding its future. in order
to address these problems, the presidential Space
Task Group (STG) was established under the
chairmanship of the Vice President. The STG
review was the first comprehensive interagency
planning effort that was carried out with respect
to the civilian space program. It also included a
component directed toward future military ap-
plications in space and was subject to special
security classification restrictions. Its principal
focus, however, was on the future nature and
pace of activities in connection with the civilian
manned space flight program, While NASA’s
leadership was not particularly pleased to have
its future programs become the object of an inter-
agency planning effort, it recognized the need
for broader consensus regarding its future objec-
tives, particularly because the new administra-
tion had made no budget commitment. (This lack
of budget commitment was a continuation of the
trend that had begun in the Johnson administra-
tion.) The assignment for STG included taking a
rather long-range perspective extending out
through the decade. As in the earlier review by
the PSAC, a key issue was the question of
whether to propose a new manned mission to
the planets.
In their recommendations, STG recom-
mended commitment to a balanced program that
included science, applications, and technology
development objectives, but no immediate com-
mitment to manned planetary missions. They sug-
1 srhe  poSt.Ap//o Space Program: Directions for the Future, Space
Task Group Report to the President, September 1969.
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gested no change in institutional structure nor an
operations role for NASA. Emphasizing interna-
tional cooperation, STG was given special em-
phasis and it was suggested that NASA should
give greater attention to possible cooperative op-
portunities. The major technological develop-
ment STG suggested was the reusable space shut-
tle system that could eventually lead to develop-
ment of a permanent space station. The clear pri-
ority was for shuttle development first, with space
station modules as a potential future technical
development. Manned planetary exploration was
retained as a long-range option for the civilian
space program with a “manned Mars mission be-
fore the end of this century as a first target.”
STG presented a number of budget options in
connection with these recommendations, permit-
ting the program that was recommended to be
carried out at several rates. The response to STG
recommendations was not immediately forth-
coming. The President’s advisers, faced with
other serious budget and international relations
problems including the Vietnam conflict, deferred
action on the basic recommendations until the
subsequent budget cycle. At this point, in a very
general response to the recommendations, the
clear image of a relatively conservative and con-
strained program emerged. New mission commit-
ments were folded into a general ceiling for the
agency that was established at slightly above $3
billion.
The Space Task Group effort was notable for
a number of reasons:
l
l
l
l
l
It was the first major interagency planning
effort with regard to the civilian space
program.
It involved participation from the general
public as well as agency representatives.
OMB was involved, with the explicit reser-
vation that its participation would not pre-
clude its normal budget review and analysis
when specific budget requests were pro-
posed.
It was comprehensive in including both
DOD as well as NASA interests, particularly
with regard to launch vehicles.
it took a long-term view, specifically focus-
ing on the next decade.
l It did not attempt to seek a single consen-
sus on the program level, but rather provided
a number of options from which the Presi-
dent could select.
STG provides an interesting example of the dif-
ficulty of making long-term plans for the space
program. The administrator of NASA was obvi-
ously in a position that he would have rather
avoided (it being certainly less difficult to deal
with a single OMB review on the budget and pro-
gram than to obtain consensus from an interagen-
cy group, several members of which may have
competitive objectives). Hence, STG represented,
on the surface, a very difficult forum for presen-
tation, analysis, and eventual development of a
consensus on the NASA program. In this forum,
the view of both NASA and DOD representatives
tended to favor continuing large-scale space in-
vestments with a multitude of new systems iden-
tified by their technical laboratory and support-
ing contractor structures. A more restrained note
was set by OMB and OSTP representatives. As
the deliberations in STG proceeded, the question
of a major new focus for the civilian program in
the next decade, equivalent to the role that
Apollo played in the previous decade, became
a major issue.
In general, STG believed that the technology
existed for a manned Mars mission and that such
a mission, if accepted as a new goal, could serve
to energize and focus attention on the space pro-
gram in a beneficial way. The Vice President be-
came convinced that such a mission would be
an exercise of leadership which he viewed as
missing from the space area and he supported
this goal as a target. He was not able to convince
the remaining members of the task group that this
goal was realistic, and acceptable to the public,
but it was endorsed in a somewhat ambiguous
way as a “potential” goal or “option” for the pro-
gram. In this way, it could serve to guide deci-
sions regarding the development of new capabili-
ty for man in space. In STG’S recommendations,
the terminology was chosen very carefully in
order to maintain an option for the Vice presi-
dent and the Administrator of NASA to make
further appeals that would support their program
objectives and yet have a report to the President
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that all STG participants could approve. In addi-
tion, there were certain “code words” that were
used that had considerable significance beyond
their direct connotation. For example, the use of
the term “new capability” implied very specifical-
ly a development program that would involve a
manned, reusable launch vehicle as the first
major element. On completion of this first devel-
opment, the next major commitment would be
to a continuing orbital habitat for man, i.e., a
space station. The order in which these new
systems would be developed was a major source
of controversy within STG, and the eventual
agreement on the shuttle as the first element rep-
resented a major change in direction within
NASA.
The space shuttle appeared to be a logical and
most effective way to maintain the capability for
continuing use of man in space while simulta-
neously providing a capability for launch and
recovery of unmanned space payloads as well.
At the time, the space shuttle was not completely
defined, but its essential and desirable operating
characteristics were clearly spelled out.lb The al-
ternatives for maintaining a manned flight capa-
bility were: continued use of Apollo hardware in
the future, wherein the cost and reliability of each
succeeding hardware set would become more
difficult to predict; or the development of a new
capsule and launch vehicle combination such as
the Titan Ill, a modified Gemini system.
Overall, STG accomplished several important
objectives. It clarified the nature of the major op-
tions facing the Nation with regard to the space
program. it identified the rough costs associated
with pursuing many of these options. It suggested
several new emphases for the space program (in-
ternational cooperation, new systems that were
reusable) and the increased development of ap-
plications. it made a clear call for continuing the
man in space program and suggested the logical
steps in that program. However, it did not pro-
claim a specific new Apollo-type goal. As a con-
sequence, in the minds of many space enthusi-
asts, it did not go far enough. On the other hand,
to those who were concerned about the magni-
lbNeW  Space Trans~fiation  Systems, an AIAA assessment, Jan.
9, 1973. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1290
Avenue of the Americas, N. Y., New York 10019.
tude of space expenditures and questioned the
value gained from those expenditures, the STG
report appeared to be too optimistic, too positive
regarding the nature of new space opportunities.
This ambiguity permitted individuals with some-
what different perspectives to see in it what they
wished to see while the report retained some of
its essential characteristics. Specifically, it per-
mitted the Vice president to advocate a vigorous
new commitment such as a manned mission to
the planets before the end of the century and
OMB to look at a program which eventually was
projected at a very modest continuing budget
level. STG issued its report as a public document
after briefing the President, and it was in this
period that public and congressional response
was evaluated to determine the nature of the
commitment that could develop around the con-
cepts that were proposed. It was only later, in
the context of specific budget reviews, that the
decisions would be taken on the STG recommen-
dations.
Interagency reviews can serve to build a con-
stituency for space program initiatives. For exam-
ple, the STG recommendation focused attention
on the space shuttle program as the next major
step in technology development. NASA in-house
planning exercises do not appear to have the
same effect. A key element is participation by
elements of the Executive Office of the President
in order to bridge the communications gap from
agency to President. Such reviews are not suffi-
cient to generate a political commitment to costly
new programs, but may be a necessary precursor.
The Shuttle Decision
In the period immediately after the STG report,
NASA programs continued with no major new
commitment to a new development. During this
period, the attention of the agency was focused
on completing revisits to the Moon using already
developed and purchased Apollo hardware, and
using a modified version of this hardware in a pro-
totype manned habitat called Skylab.17 Skylab
was an effort to stretch the utility of Apollo hard-
I zArneriCa  NeW &cade in Space, a report to the Space Task
Group prepared by National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion, September 1969.
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ware, demonstrate manned flight in Earth orbit
over a prolonged period, and perform a num-
ber of operations, including observations with a
solar telescope, During this period, NASA was
given initial exploratory funding for the space
shuttle design and early development work on
a new liquid hydrogen-liquid oxygen, high-pres-
sure rocket engine that would be suitable for a
shuttle. The need to make a major commitment
to the shuttle came to a focus in the context of
the review of the fiscal year 1973 budget that was
carried out in the fall of 1971. At that time, the
reelection campaign of 1972 loomed on the ho-
rizon for the Nixon administration. Also at that
time, unemployment in the aerospace industry
was a major political embarrassment, and the
review of the NASA program in the fall of 1971
gave particular attention to the short-term em-
ployment picture. NASA was by this time com-
mitted to a shuttle development program as the
next major step in the advancement of space
technology. Also developed by NASA was a
major economic evaluation of the shuttle based
on an elaborate mission model that projected
missions in various categories of activities out
through the end of the decade. In NASA’s presen-
tations, the economic benefit of proceeding with
a space shuttle was part of its argument in favor
of adopting this program. To the analysts in OMB,
however, this argument was unpersuasive, be-
cause, in part, shuttle development costs were
highly speculative and the mission model con-
tained a large number of questionable assump-
tions about the civilian program. In the analysis
for the fiscal year 1973 budget, the major issue
was whether or not the United States should con-
tinue with a manned flight program, and if so,
with what technical systems. OMB concluded
that the United States would derive a majority
of the benefits from space activities without a
manned flight component. However, this deci-
sion would have had dramatic impact on the
nature of the NASA establishment (resulting in
the closing of at least two major centers) and
would have lowered NASA budgets to approx-
imately $2 billion or less per year. At this rate,
there could still be a very vigorous unmanned
science and applications program. Manned flight,
on the other hand, could be continued, either
with modified and extended Apollo hardware,
with a new-generation space capsule, or as part
of a space shuttle program in which man would
be involved both as a pilot and as a participant
in Earth-orbital experiment programs (including
the launch and recovery of unmanned satellite
systems from low-Earth orbit).
A firm commitment to the space shuttle re-
mained an open question until the very last
Presidential decisions were being made on the
fiscal year 1973 program. During this period, the
employment impact of a positive decision on the
shuttle was analyzed in great detail. In January
1972, the President made a well-publicized com-
mitment to a space shuttle development program.
This commitment was constrained by some key
guidelines:
l
l
l
The shuttle would be carried out under a
budget target rather than on the basis of a
schedule that had to be met. The budget tar-
get that was eventually agreed to was for a
considerably scaled-down shuttle from the
one originally projected by NASA, with a
development program cost targeted at slight-
ly over $5 billion in constant 1971 dollars.
The shuttle was expected to be a “national”
program, that is, it would serve all agency
launch needs for payloads that were in the
shuttle range. Specifically, this requirement
implied that NASA and DOD would need
to define a common, acceptable payload bay
size, operating characteristics, and compati-
ble subsystems. (At the time, the questions
to be resolved included whether DOD
would have its own shuttle orbiter, whether
DOD would have its own crews, whether
classified payloads would be incorporated
with an unclassified payload, etc.) The major
premise was that such a substantial invest-
ment in a new technological capability could
not reasonably be made unless it would
serve or be capable of serving the broadest
set of national needs.
The initial concept included the possibility
that DOD would assume some degree of
funding responsibility for shuttle develop-
ment. This was subsequently modified in
view of the rather substantial DOD budgets
already in existence for other weapons sys-
tems and space developments. It was agreed
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that DOD’s share of the program develop-
ment costs would be limited to DOD fund-
ing for the west coast launch site for the shut-
tle and a companion interim upper stage de-
velopment for boosting shuttle payloads into
higher orbits.
l International cooperation in the shuttle pro-
gram was also an objective; it was satisfied
by the eventual agreement that the Euro-
peans would construct a laboratory module
to be carried as a shuttle payload.
The shuttle decision was a multiyear develop-
ment commitment, not as aggressive or substan-
tial as NASA would have liked, but yet ensuring
the continuing utilization of the technical devel-
opment and management capabilities of the
Johnson and Marshall Space Flight Centers and
a new development activity for the Kennedy
Space Center. Most viewed the shuttle as a pro-
gram that would act to stimulate some technology
development, but would not be so complex or
difficult to achieve as to be threatened by major
overruns or schedule delays. The shuttle had
great potential for changing the way people
would think about placing payloads into space;
e.g., it would change the design of these payloads
to allow reuse and repair, it would permit human
tending and space checkout prior to launch into
orbit, it would increase the flexibility of space
operations to allow larger crews and potentially
less-trained scientific personnel to conduct opera-
tions in space, and ultimately it would be the key
to any continuing Earth-orbital habitat for man,
since it would provide resupply at a much more
reasonable cost than use of expendable vehicles.
On the negative side, the President and Con-
gress recognized that initiating shuttle develop-
ment and terminating the limited program utiliz-
ing existing Apollo hardware would result in a
hiatus in manned flight for a period of 4 to 5 years.
During this period the Soviet Union would have
an opportunity to initiate new space spectaculars
with uncertain international and domestic polit-
ical impact. The commitment to substantial shut-
tle development funding within a constrained
NASA budget implied an additional problem. As
part of the shuttle commitment, NASA was given
some assurance it could plan on level budgets,
in constant dollars, for the duration of the shut-
tle development program. Thus, growth in shut-
tle funding requirements would have a tenden-
cy to squeeze out other new programs. It was
this aspect that was viewed with great alarm by
those who supported greater emphasis on space
science and applications activities. Thus, the shut-
tle decision was not a completely happy one in
this community. One of the most important
lessons to be learned from the shuttle decision
is that a commitment to continued manned space
flight has the greatest budget impact and is the
most politically driven part of the space program.
Such factors as aerospace employment or na-
tional image therefore have a strong bearing on
Photo credit: Nationa/ Aeronauts and Space Administration
Air Force Titan ///-C lifting off to l a u n c h  A p p l i c a t i o n s
Technology Satel l i te 6,  May 30,  1974.  The f irst  in a
generation of NASA communications satellites
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decisions that are made and must be factored into
the technical aspects.
Communications R&D Decision
NASA responsibility for a leadership role in
developing space capabilities, performing the
necessary R&D in all of the areas of interest in-
volving space systems, had included an early and
substantial role in developing the basic technol-
ogies that were vital to the increasingly sophis-
ticated civilian communications satellite business.
These technologies were demonstrated in a series
of applications technology satellites. The technol-
ogies included advanced stabilization techniques,
the control of satellite position in synchronous
orbit and, in the last satellite of the series, a
demonstration of broadcast technology from the
satellite to small, low-cost ground stations.
The second of these broadcast satellites that
was scheduled to be launched was terminated
by OMB. Additionally, OMB acted to reduce sig-
nificantly the role of NASA as developer and
demonstrator of advanced satellite telecom-
munications technology. The leadership for this
change in emphasis came from the Office of
Telecommunications Policy (OTP) and was con-
sistent with the trend to place greater responsibili-
ty in the private sector for telecommunications
systems developments. The assumption underly-
ing this decision was that NASA’s contributions
were not necessary to maintain the sophistica-
tion of current and projected communications
satellite systems. In addition, OTP believed that
the revenues obtained from satellite communica-
tions to support work in the industry at such
technical centers as the COMSAT Laboratories
were sufficient to enable incremental im-
provements to be made during the foreseeable
future. DOD’s R&D role in telecommunications
satellites was not similarly reduced, and it was ex-
pected that DOD would continue to support
technology advances in this area.
The most immediate effect of the decision was
to stimulate the technology development ac-
tivities of a number of potential foreign com-
petitors in the telecommunications satellite area,
because the basic approach of U.S. industry was
to continue to exploit the proved technologies
that were available and to package these tech-
nologies in larger and more capable satellites.
Thus, in the intervening years, the telecom-
munications technology advancements that were
typically a responsibility of NASA have for the
most part not occurred in the United States. Start-
ing from a very inferior technological position,
the Europeans and the Japanese have built con-
siderable competence in this field, and in some
areas appear to have leapfrogged U.S. technol-
ogy.
The decision of the Carter administration to
return more responsibility to NASA for R&D in
satellite communications provided, somewhat
belatedly, that the agency would again assert itself
in this field as an agent for technology push.
NASA has interpreted its charge to mean that sat-
ellite systems initiated under this new, invigorated
program should have a potential direct applica-
tion; the agency expects industry to support these
programs to some degree. The current plan in-
cludes, first, development of collaborative agree-
ments certifying to OMB that industry’s interest
is genuine, and second, provision that any dem-
onstration system, if successful, may have a direct
application,
Without Government support for high-risk ap-
plications systems R&D, the competitive posture
of the United States may slip vis-~-vis other na-
tions that do subsidize their industry. The cur-
rent legislative authority for NASA does not pre-
clude major reductions in its role as a sponsor
of advanced R&D, suggesting an opportunity to
clarify the meaning and significance of “leader-
ship in aeronautical and space activities” as stated
in the NAS Act,
President’s Space Policy
Statement of 1978
In october 1978, President Carter released a
space policy statement that summarized the im-
portant aspects of the administration review of
space policy and provided guidance regarding
the President’s view of national objectives in the
space program over the next several years. This
statement reaffirmed endorsement of a balanced
space program and committed the administration
to the continued development of the space shut-
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tle system and its use during the coming decade.
However, the statement made no new commit-
ments and specifically rejected any major new
technological development. No multiyear pro-
gram or goal was set to provide a focus for the
program and the general philosophy was best
characterized by the statement that “activities will
be pursued in space when it appears that national
objectives can most efficiently be met through
space activities. ” Overall, the policy statement
left many questions unanswered. It made several
statements about what the United States would
not do in space but remained very general regard-
ing the nature of what we would do in space. In
addition, it became clear that fiscal constraints
were likely, and as a consequence, commitment
to specific multiyear programs was very likely to
be taken only with great care. This announce-
ment was received with some dismay by the con-
gressional leaders involved with the space pro-
gram and by the aerospace community. This con-
cern spawned a number of hearings and pro-
posed legislative approaches to a more vigorous
space policy for the United States and led to the
request to. OTA for the current assessment.
NSC Policy Review Committee (Space)
The review of space policy undertaken by the
Carter administration revealed that there was no
procedure for adjudicating interagency disagree-
ments about space issues. To remedy this defect,
a policy review committee chaired by the Direc-
tor of OSTP was established within the NSC struc-
ture to address such issues as might arise. This
role had previously been played by the National
Aeronautics and Space Council until it was abol-
ished in 1973. An important consequence of util-
izing the NSC structure is a rather strong orien-
tation towards national security and military af-
fairs. Issues arising in the civilian space program
often have international importance, but as a mat-
ter of practice, they have been considered sepa-
rately from those concerning national security or
the military space program. The placement of this
mechanism under the NSC provides a somewhat
different flavor to the approach to civilian space
policysetting. It is also important to note that this
mechanism is intended to provide a means for
resolving issues but not to provide planning or
goal setting for space activities.
An alternative to the NSC structure would have
been to conduct space policy review under the
auspices of the Federal Coordinating Council for
Science, Engineering, and Technology, a group
that has a parallel function and is also chaired
by the Director of the OSTP. The Federal Coun-
cil has a charter, and is specifically charged with
the coordination of activities among the principal
agencies performing R&D, the recommendation
of policy, and associated questions. Yet this
mechanism was avoided in favor of the NSC set-
ting. In part, this recognizes the great importance
of space to the national security, the greater in-
fluence of the NSC, and the fact that the space
policy review originally arose in the context of
an issue regarding civilian/military space relation-
ships.
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OUR DEPENDENCE ON SPACE
The extent to which the modern world in gen-
eral and the United States in particular have be-
come dependent on space technology is not gen-
erally appreciated. If the United States were to
cease using space systems, day-to-day life and
business activities throughout society would be
disrupted. National security would be jeopard-
ized as well. This section outlines the effects of
doing without space, first in the civilian sector,
then in the military sector. Tables 3 and 4 list the
major U.S. space systems.
In the civilian sector, long-cl;stance communic-
ations would be perhaps hardest hit. Already
over two-thirds of all overseas telephone traffic
is carried over satellite links provided by the In-
ternational Telecommunications Satellite Organi-
zation (1 NTELSAT) system. Not only would private
citizens be unable to complete many of their
calls, but the rates for those calls completed
would have to rise in order to provide enough
capital to lay additional transatlantic cable to
replace the capacity lost from satellite circuits.
News reporting all over the world would be
severely restricted and delayed. Global television
reporting would be out of the question, so that
news from the international wire services would
be restricted to stories and photographs that
could be taped or transmitted as they were before
the space age, through uncertain and congested
ground links or via private courier. Newspaper
editors in the United States would be left in the
same quandary as their television counterparts,
especially in receiving news from remoter regions
such as the Middle East, South Africa, and South-
east Asia.
Domestic television service of the major net-
works would be severely curtailed, not only to
relatively remote locations such as Alaska and
Hawaii, but even within the continental United
States, About two-thirds of all cable television
service would be shut down, for much of both
the basic-service national programing as well as
premium pay-television programing is transmitted
to cable television systems across the Nation via
Table 3.—U.S. Government Civilian Satellite Systems
Program Orbit Purpose
GOES (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geosynchronous
NOAA (3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geosynchronous
TDRSS (first launch. . . . . . . . Geosynchronous
early 1983)
HEAO (High Energy
Astronomy Observatory). . . LEO
NIMBUS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Polar
TIROS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Polar
Landsat-3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Polar
Landsat-D (mid 1982). . . . . . . Polar
DE (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) Elliptical
(Dynamics Explorer). . . . . . . . (1) LEO
SBS (3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geosynchronous
RCA (4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geosynchronous
Comstar (4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geosynchronous
Westar (3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geosynchronous
AT&T (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geosynchronous
Marisat (3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geosynchronous
Meteorological
Meteorological
Communications relay from other
satellites to ground
Scientific
Meteorological
Meteorological
Earth observation
Electromagnetic field observation,
space science
Scientific
Communication data, voice, video
Communication data, voice, video
Communication (COMSAT) data,
voice, video
Communication (Western Union) data,
voice, video
Communication data, voice, video
Marine Communication (COMSAT) data
& voice
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.
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Table 4.—U.S. Military Satellite Systems
Program Satellites Functions
Defense Satellite
Communications System II
(DSCS 11).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Satellite Data System (SDS).
Air Force Satellite
Communications System
(A FSATCOM) . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . 4 active High capacity super high frequency
2 dormant spares communications. Part of Worldwide Military
Command and Control System (WWMCCS).
. . . . 3 Carries AFSATCOM transponders.
. . . . Radio transponders carrod on UHF communications among National Command
SDS, FLTSATCOM (other Authority, Joint Chiefs. Military Commanders in
satellites?) Chief, and nuclear capable forces.
Fleet Satellite Communications
( F L T S A T C O M ) .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 UHF and separate SHF uplink. Naval
Communications System operates over U.S.
Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean, Contains some
jam-resistant 5-KHz channels for AFSATCOM,
1,500-KHz channel for Presidential support for
network of regional commands.
Early warning of ICBM, SLBM launches by infrared
detection of rocket plumes. Also carries visible
light detectors and radiation sensors for
detecting nuclear explosions. Provides
surveillance of missile test launches.
Area-search and close-look remote sensing.
Defense Support Program
(DSP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Photographic Reconnaissance. . . 2 types
Electronic (Signals) Intelligence. . At least 5 launches
since 1973
Geodetic Satellite. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Defense Meteorological. . . . . . . . . 2 block 5D spacecraft
Navy Navigation Satellite
System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TRANSIT (5 operating?) NOVA
Global Positioning System
(GPS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..6 NAVSTAR (18 now planned)
Integrated Operational Nuclear
Detection System (IONDS). . . . . Aboard GPS, beginning with
NAVSTAR 5
Space Detection and Tracking
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ground-based cameras, radar,
and radio receivers
Photographic mapping in three dimensions.
Radar altimeter for topographical mapping of
Iand and seacoasts.
Visual and infrared images satellite programs (most
recent launch weather conditions, global failed)
coverage four times a day.
Measurement in Doppler shift of radio emissions
from satellites permits ship and aircraft
navigators to find position.
Precisely timed radio beacons will allow users to
determine position in three dimensions to within
10 m velocity to O.lm/sec.
Detect and monitor nuclear explosions worldwide
using bhangmeter sensors and GPS location
data.
Data funneled into Aerospace Defense Command
Space Defense Operations Center,
Colorado Springs, Colo. Identification and
tracking of objects in space.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.
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communications satellite transponders, Future
plans for a variety of direct broadcast satellite
television and information programs to private
homes and businesses would be canceled.
Several less obvious services would no longer
be possible. Weather reporting would be severe-
ly hampered; no synoptic view of large portions
of the Earth from either polar orbits or from geo-
synchronous orbit would be available. These
services are especially necessary for viewing the
development of large weather patterns over the
ocean several hundred miles off shore. Meteor-
ologists would have to rely once again on piec-
ing together fragments of weather observations
from observation ships, radiosonde balloons,
buoys, and light aircraft. Furthermore, observa-
tions of long-term changes in the ocean, atmos-
phere and polar ice would no longer be readily
available. Without them, we could not predict
long-term trends as well as we do now.
Navigation services would be significantly cur-
tailed. Already more than 1,000 ships rely on sat-
ellite transmissions to ascertain their positions
with great accuracy. Similar services soon to be
made available for use in remote land regions
would no longer be possible. Ship-to-shore and
ship-to-ship communications via the global mari-
time satellite communications system (MARlSAT)
would be dangerously reduced; the task of the
Navy, Coast Guard, and commercial ships on
search-and-rescue missions would therefore be
even more difficult. The International Maritime
Satellite Organization (l NMARSAT) would have
no raison d’être.
Satellite remote-sensing services, which have
been important for the Departments of Agricul-
ture, Commerce, and Interior, would be elimi-
nated. No longer would satellite sensors be avail-
able to improve the management of the Nation’s
agriculture, forest, range, land and water re-
sources—or to monitor large-scale catastrophic
events such as the eruption of Mount St. Helens.
Worldwide crop forecasting, an essential service
for the U.S. agricultural sector, would be made
much more difficult, nor would the United States
be able to help developing countries to inven-
tory and manage their own resources.
No longer would satellites be available for gath-
ering data for studying the movement of air
masses and the transformation of pollutants in the
lower atmosphere. Similarly, of longer term con-
cern, it would no longer be possible to monitor
the chemistry, radiation exchange, and dynamics
of the upper atmosphere in order to predict the
long-term effects of human activities on these
regions. Therefore, it might not be possible to
know until too late whether man-made chemicals
will continue to reduce the amount of ozone in
the ozone layer, and what ill effects such a reduc-
tion might have on human life in this generation
and the next.
The NIMBUS weather satellites of the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) with their coastal-zone color scanners,
would no longer observe the colors of the oceans
over vast areas—revealing the murky green re-
gions rich in plankton that are feeding grounds
for schools of fish. Without this information,
fishing fleets would expend 10 to 20 percent
more marine fuel to locate their catches, and
would pass along that increase in cost to the con-
sumer as a higher price for seafood.
The search for new sources of minerals and en-
ergy resources would be curtailed; sensors under
development, such as improved magnetometers
or the multilineal array would not be sent into
orbit. Without the data they promise to return,
the ability to search for resources of long-range
strategic importance, such as cobalt, titanium,
and petroleum would be hindered.
Not only would all these applications become
impossible, but many parts of space science
would cease. No longer would spacecraft be
launched into orbit to study the activity of the
Sun or to observe the atmosphere and surface
of the planets. In the absence of orbiting sensors
and telescopes above the atmosphere to investi-
gate radiation at wavelengths unattainable on
Earth, ultraviolet, X-rays, gamma rays, cosmic
rays, future understanding of the structure and
evolution of the universe would be severely lim-
ited.
Meanwhile, in the military sector, many sys-
tems on which we rely for national security and
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for which adequate substitutes do not exist would
be lost. Perhaps the most dangerous loss would
be the capability to monitor the military activities
of potential enemies. Surveillance satellites,
which monitor the ground with high resolution
at visible and infrared wavelengths, with syn-
thetic-aperature radar, and by electronic “ferret”
listening devices, are essential to ensure that for-
eign countries observe the terms of arms control
treaties and to provide early warning of a nuclear
attack. Military and diplomatic communications
abroad and at sea would be slower, less reliable
and less secure. There would be less ready access
to high-speed instant communications between
ground stations, field commanders, ships, sub-
marines and long-range strategic bombers. Nav-
igation and global positioning for military units
would be deprived of the high degree of preci-
sion available through the use of positional sat-
ellite systems.
The way in which our society does business
would be seriously affected by the loss of space.
Not only would the availability of space services
be cut off, but the revenue from those services
would cease to flow. Perhaps hardest hit would
be corporations in the communications business.
Many of the major cable television operators
would suffer, since their principal revenue flows
from satellite-carried pay-television programmers
such as Home Box Office, Showtime, and a doz-
en others. Furthermore, the loss of commercial-
ly sponsored “basic” cable programing beamed
from satellite transponders would cause adver-
tisers to cancel their commercials and withdraw
their support-resulting in the bankruptcy of a
number of programing sources. Western Union
with its WESTAR satellites, RCA with its SATCOM
satellites, would feel similar blows, although the
impact would be somewhat lessened since
the parent companies are diversified. Still,
those employees directly connected with
those companies’ space segments—plus com-
panies such as the Communications Satellite
Corporation (COMSAT) whose entire business
was related to space—would find themselves
either idled or in desperate straits.
A final but important result of the dependence
on space systems is that a large number of jobs
and business opportunities would be lost if space
activities ceased. Not only would future entre-
preneurial activities in such areas as materials
processing be cut off at the outset, the disap-
pearance of space science as an existing disci-
pline would wash up into the halls of major con-
tracting centers such as the Jet Propulsion Labo-
ratory in Pasadena, Calif., and in major univer-
sities heavily committed to space investigation
(some 10 to 20). With the dissolution of the
civilian space activities of the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA), agree-
ments with some 100 prime contractors would
be canceled–forcing those contractors to cancel
orders from subcontractors for specialized com-
ponents. Since approximately two-thirds of the
U.S. civilian space budget is awarded each year
to private contractors, as those commitments
disappeared some 50,000 jobs with contractors
related to space would also disappear—un-
doubtedly adding a bit more burden to the un-
employment rolls. Furthermore, those companies
affected would probably retrench a bit on cor-
porate advertising in various trade and lay pub-
lications. That loss in advertising revenue would
cause a number of the heavily space-oriented
publications to reduce the number of editorial
pages in each issue and to perhaps contract their
staffs.
Although many workers connected with space
activities would probably find other employment
(a good number in military and civilian high tech-
nology), an important infrastructure of expertise
and experience would be lost. The future U.S.
position in many areas of advanced technology
would also be jeopardized—e.g., sensors, data
analysis, precision control systems. in addition,
through losing the extension of our society’s col-
lective eyes and ears throughout the solar sys-
tem, and losing the heartpounding excitement of
sharing an astronaut’s launch and experiments
in orbit, the United States would lose an impor-
tant aspect of its shared national experience—
the sense of adventure, confidence, self-esteem
and world leadership provided by pursuing and
succeeding at space
years.
The conclusion of
United States would
terns is that it would
activities over the past 25
imagining what life in the
be like without space sys-
certainly be very different
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and in many respects poorer. The extent of our argue that our dependence on space is great and
present uses of space systems and the increas- will increase.
ing promise of future uses of space technology
CURRENT STATUS AND PLANNED FUTURE ACTIVITIES
This section reviews the civilian space activities video transmissions. It includes broadcasting from
of the United States in Government, industry, and one point to many, distributed over relatively
academia, and the direction those activities are large areas; position-location activities such as
likely to take in the near future (through 1990). navigation, traffic control, and search and rescue;
Department of Defense (DOD) space activities and transmissions to, from, and among mobile
are not treated in detail in this report except as transmitters and receivers (e.g., aircraft, ships,
they directly relate to the civilian program. Table motor vehicles).
5 offers a glimpse of the generic space flight ac-
tivities and spacecraft that have comprised the In the civilian sector, point-to-point satellite
U.S. civilian program. Table 6 shows NASA’s communications has been a commercial activ-
flight programs for the future. ity since the Communications Satellite Act of 1962
Applications
Communications
established COMSAT and designated it to repre-
sent U.S. interests in international, commercial
satellite communication. The Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) “Open Skies” deci-
sion in 1970 opened domestic satellite communi-
Broadly speaking, satellite communications cations services to competition among commer-
comprises point-to-point message, data, and cial entities. Today (early 1982) there are four
Table 5.—Selected Groups of Civilian Spacecraft Launched by NASA From 1950 to 1980
Launches
Sponsor Number
Purpose Spacecraft names (if not NASA) successful/total Years
Astrophysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Planetary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Communicaions—R&D
operational . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Meteorology—R&D
operational . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Geodesy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Terrestrial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oceanography . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Explorer, Orbiting Observatories ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . .
Pioneer, Mariner, Viking, Voyager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Echo, Relay, Syncom, ATS,
Intelsat, Westar, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Commercial . . . .
TIROS, Nimbus, SMS (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ITOS, GOES, NOAA(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NOAA. . . . . . . . . .
Explorer, PAGEOS, GEOS, LAGEOS (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ERTS, Landsat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Seasat (4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
60/74
20/24
13/16
39/43
22/24
19/22
717
3/3
1/1
1961-80
1962-78
1960-74
1962-80
1959-78
1966-80
1964-76
1972-78
1978
(l), (2), (3) Also benefit oceanography: (2 )  GOES ser ies  DCS
NOAA series DCS, IR
Spacecraft Sensor
(3) GEOS-3 ALT
(1) TIROS-N DCS, IR
NIMBUS-5 MR (4) Seasat sensor complement:
NIMBUS-6 DCS, MR ALT, IR, MR, SAR, SCAT
NIMBUS-7 CS, MR
SMS DCS
Sensor key:
ALT . . . . . . . Altimeter
Cs . . . . . . . . Color scanner
DCS. . . . . . . Data collection system
IR . . . . . . . . . Infrared radiometer
MR. . . . . . . . Microwave radiometer
SAR. . . . . . . Synthetic aperture radar
SCAT. . . . . . Scatterometer
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
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Table 6.—Selected Groups of Potential Future NASA Spacecraft
Earliest
Purpose Spacecraft names Acronym launch
Astrophysics l 8 explorer-class satellites 1981-87
l Space telescope 1985
Origin of plasmas in Earth’s neighborhood OPEN 1987
Gamma Ray Observatory GRO 1988
Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility AXAF 1989
Planetary l Galileo (Jupiter) 1985
Halley Comet Flyby 1985
Venus orbiting imaging radar VOIR 1988
Communications–R&D 30/20 GHZ 1987
Meteorology—R&D l Earth radiation budget experiment ERBE 1984
Upper atmospheric research satellite UARS 1988
NOAA next and GOES next 1989, 1990
Geodesy Gravity Satellite (1) GRAVSAT 1987
Terrestrial l Landsat D & D’ 1982, 1983
Oceanography Topography experiment TOPEX 1987
Free-flying imaging radar experiment (2) FIREX 1988
l These are the only spacecraft currently under development.
(1) Also benefits oceanography.
(2) Also benefits terrestrial.
separate domestic systems in orbit, with a total
of 10 satellites, providing voice, data, video, and
networking distribution services to a variety of
clients: 1 ) the Comstar system of COMSAT Gen-
eral provides services to the American Telephone
and Telegraph Co. (AT&T) and the General Tele-
phone and Electronics Corp.; 2) the RCA Ameri-
can Communications system furnishes point-to-
point and video network distribution services to
private customers as well as to cable and terres-
trial broadcasting systems; 3) Western Union’s
WESTAR supplies point-to-point services to pri-
vate customers and video and radio network dis-
tribution services to the Public Broadcasting Serv-
ice and National Public Radio; and 4) Satellite
Business Systems (SBS) provides data transmis-
sion services to industrial organizations. In addi-
tion, several other firms, among them Fairchild
Industries’ American Satellite Co., Southern Pa-
cific Communications, and Xerox Corp. ’s XTEN,
supply specialized communication services
through transponders leased from satellite-own-
ing corporations. Other firms, not in the business
of transmission, lease satellite data or voice chan-
nels directly from members of other sets of car-
riers.
In addition, COMSAT General owns and oper-
ates the MARlSAT system, providing message and
data transmission services to ships at sea. Until
1973, COMSAT also managed the INTELSAT sys-
tem, a global, commercial satellite communica-
tions system providing voice, data, and video
transmission services to 103 countries. As man-
ager for INTELSAT, COMSAT specified, procured,
arranged for launch, and controlled satellites in
the INTELSAT system. Under the definitive ar-
rangements, entered into force in 1973, most of
these functions have been taken over by the Di-
rector General of INTELSAT, assisted by an inter-
national staff, though COMSAT retains some re-
sponsibilities. Domestic carriers perform these
functions themselves for their own satellites.
NASA provides launches and launch services for
all corporations under reimbursable contract
arrangements.
Technology
Most communications satellites are placed in
geostationary satellite orbit (GSO), a circular orbit
the center of which coincides with the Earth’s
center, and which lies in the plane of the Earth’s
Equator. It has a radius of some 42,200 km, which
corresponds to an altitude of some 35,800 km
above the Equator. On the GSO, a satellite moves
around the polar axis with the same period and
in the same sense as does the Earth: as a result,
the satellite, if visible, would appear from the
Earth to be stationed at a fixed point in the sky.
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Because its celestial latitude is fixed at 0°, a GSO
satellite’s position is defined by its longitude.
The definition of the GSO given above is theo-
retical because several natural forces perturb the
orbit of the spacecraft. A satellite placed in GSO
and then left unattended will suffer changes both
in its longitude and in its latitude, Seen from the
ground, these changes become alterations in the
elevation and azimuth angle of the satellite. In
order to keep the satellite in GSO, it is necessary
to resort to artificial, “stationkeeping devices. ”
At present, stationkeeping is considered ade-
quately accurate if the satellite is maintained
within a range of &/–O. 10 in both longitude and
latitude. Because of the remaining motions of the
satellite, GSO is not actually a circle, but rather
a narrow torus with dimensions corresponding
to some 150 km of north-south variation and 30
km of altitude variation.
GSO belongs to a broader family of orbits
called geosynchronous; these orbits are generally
inclined with respect to the equatorial plane, they
may be circular or elliptical, but satellites move
on them with the same period, and with the same
sense of rotation, as the Earth. Geosynchronous
satellites are seen from the ground to describe
figures of 24-hour periods and varying shapes.1
Commercial communications satellites (except
for some early U.S. experiments and some devel-
oped by the U .S. S. R.) lie in GSO. The reason for
this choice is that advantages of GSO far out-
weigh its disadvantages. The advantages are as
follows:2
l
l
l
The satellite remains essentially stationary
relative to look angle of the Earth station an-
tennas; the cost of computer-controlled
tracking of the satellite can be avoided. A
fixed antenna (with provision for manual ad-
justment) will suffice.
There is no need to switch from one satellite
to another as one disappears over the hori-
zon.
Because the radius of GSO is so large, a GSO
satellite is in line-of-sight from 42.4 percent
of the Earth’s surface (or 38 percent, if angles
‘ International Aeronautical Federation, ‘ ‘On the Efficient Use of
the Geostationary  Orbit, ” 1980, p. 8.
2James Martin, Communications satellites, p. 45.
l
of elevation below 50 are not used). A large
number of Earth stations may thus intercom-
mu nicate.
Three communications satellites can provide
coverage of 90 percent of the globe; only the
polar regions cannot be reached.
The disadvantages of GSO satellites are:3
l
l
Latitudes greater than 81 .25° north and
south (or 77o, if angles of elevation below
5° are excluded) are not covered.
Because of the distance of the satellite, the
received signal power, which diminishes in-
versely as the square of the distance, is weak,
and the signal propagation delay is 270 mil-
Iiseconds. To minimize the effects of this
time delay and the associated effects of echo,
which are problems both in voice conver-
sations and in error correction equipment
used with high-speed data circuits, echo sup-
pressors and echo chancellors have been de-
veloped.
For a given position of GSO, there is a definite
area on the surface of the Earth within which all
points can effectively intercommunicate with
a satellite in that given position, the so-called serv-
ice zone. In order to cover a maximal service
zone, positions for the satellite are severely
limited. Satellites intended for intercontinental,
or generally, global service must by necessity
have priority for certain orbital longitude slots,
once the service zone has been defined. (This
comment applies not only to telecommunication
services, but also to the observation zone in cases
of meteorological or Earth observation missions.)
On the other hand, satellites that service or
observe a relatively small area of the Earth’s sur-
face can generally be positioned with greater flex-
ibility, the more so the lower the mean latitude
of the served areas. However, small service areas
that extend to higher latitudes will also be limited
in their satellite positions because of the limited
visibility of the GSO from high latitudes.
As a result of these various constraints imposed
on the positions of GSO satellites, with radiofre-
quency constraints not yet considered, the GSO
is not, and probably will never be, populated with
lbid., p. 45.
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a uniform density of satellites. [t follows that con-
gestion in desirable arcs of the GSO will proceed
more rapidly as demand for service grows than
was initially envisioned by the regulatory agen-
cies (fig. 1).
Radiofrequency allocations and GSO positions
are controlled by the International Telecommu-
nications Union (ITU). ITU is responsible for the
maintenance of international cooperation in com-
munications and it assigns operating frequencies
and GSO slots to satellite communications sys-
tems.
With the early satellites, the enormous dis-
tances involved, the limited channel capacity,
and the limited power available to the transpon-
ders–transmitter-and-receiver pairs on the
spacecraft-dictated that Earth stations use
powerful transmitters, very large antennas, and
sensitive receivers. Those requirements generally
still hold true, but contemporary commercial
communications satellites carry a dozen or more
transponders, each capable of relaying as many
as 600 voice channels. Wide-band signals are
beamed to the satellite from an Earth station on
an assigned up-link (Earth-to-space) frequency;
the satellite receives the signals and retransmits
them on a down-link (space-to-Earth) frequency
to an Earth station that may be thousands of kil-
ometers away from the transmitting Earth station.
By convention, to describe the band used by a
particular satellite, the up-link frequency is given,
followed by the down-link frequency (e.g., 6/4
GHz).
Satellites must be sufficiently separated to avoid
radio interference. The required separation be-
tween satellites depends on several factors, in-
cluding the beamwidths of satellite and Earth-
station antennas, the side-lobe performance of
Earth-station antennas, the modulation technique
employed, and the carrier frequency of the trans-
figure 1 .—The Communications Problem
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
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missions. Currently, a 30 separation of spacecraft
operating in the 6/4 GHz band is required. In any
case, only a limited number of spacecraft can be
accommodated in a given arc of geostationary
orbit.
Current commercial communications satellites
operate primarily in two bands of the microwave
region of the radio spectrum, the 6/4 and the
14/1 2 GHz bands (or, the C and the Ku bands,
respectively), well above the band used for ultra
high frequency (UHF) television broadcasting. At
these frequencies, signals are propagated in
straight lines, requiring the satellite to be within
line-of-sight of Earth stations. The very narrow
beam widths require that the ground and satellite
antennas be alined precisely, within a fraction of
a minute of arc.
As use of the 14/12 band is still in its early
stages, nearly all commercially operated com-
munications satellites operate in the 6/4 band.
Because this band is shared with heavily con-
gested microwave relay systems, collocating an
Earth station poses the problem of finding an in-
terference-free location. There are few such loca-
tions around large population centers, which
have the greatest need for communications serv-
ices. Moreover, relatively large antennas and
costly Earth stations are required to provide high-
density telephone-type traffic. Once the allocated
band is filled, further increases in satellite capac-
ity can be achieved only by reuse of the available
frequency spectrum. Reuse is possible both by
reducing the down-link beam width and by in-
creasing the satellite antenna gain so that different
beams cover different service areas.
Capacity can be further increased by polariza-
tion diversity. A vertically polarized beam can be
transmitted along with a horizontally polarized
beam of the same frequency, and the two can
be detected and received separately. Polarization
diversity occurs when two beams with identical
or overlapping frequency bands are orthogonal-
ly polarized. Receivers are designed to respond
to only one polarization, so that the same fre-
quency band can be used twice within the same
coverage area— i.e., using two polarized beams
in the same frequency range doubles the amount
of information that can be sent with that band-
width.
From 1980 to 1990, increasing demand for
North American satellite circuits will outstrip the
available capacity of the geostationary orbit for
6/4 GHz systems, even with the application of
frequency reuse techniques. In addition, the dif-
ficulty of locating Earth stations in and near the
communication sources in population centers
will accelerate the use of the higher frequency
bands. To meet these projected demands, addi-
tional satellites will become operational in the
14/1 2 GHz bands. Because there is no sharing
of these frequencies in the United States with the
terrestrial radio relay service, Earth stations could
be located directly in cities. Recent research (the
CTS experiment) has indicated that 3-m ground
antennas are adequate for J 4/12 reception. Tech-
niques such as increased satellite transmitter
power, higher antenna gain, and spot beam
spacecraft antennas must compensate for this use
of smaller ground antennas and the occasional
rain attenuation in the higher frequency bands
(discussed below). A disadvantage of spot beam
antennas is that the area they can serve is re-
duced. Thus, multiple spot beams must be pro-
vided, and satellite transmitter power increased
to cover the same total area as before.
A constraint on operations in the 14/12 GHz
band is that signals transmitted from the satellite
to Earth can suffer significant attenuation during
periods of intense rainfall (a problem that will
be worse at 30/20 GHz, the Ka band). Measure-
ments and analysis.have been made of the effects
of this attenuation on satellite signal propagation.
Satellite systems using this band must have high
power levels (a factor that increases their cost),
rely on paired Earth stations geographically sep-
arated (“diversity”), or have some other form of
backup, if all ground locations require that serv-
ice be available nearly 100 percent of the time.
However, for many commercial applications, rain
outages can be tolerated.
An important factor in satellite communication
in the 1980’s will be the use of the space shuttle
for many launches. The shuttle will facilitate the
introduction of physically larger, more powerful
satellites with increased capabilities. However,
to achieve synchronous orbit, expendable rockets
to boost payloads from low-Earth orbit (LEO) will
also be needed. In addition, so-called large plat-
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forms may be assembled in LEO, where their
components have been transported on two or
more shuttle flights, and then raised to GSO with
an expendable upper stage. Frequency reuse
techniques will be common on next generation
satellites, providing a further significant increase
in total available capacity. Future satellites will
also have increased sensitivity in up-link recep-
tion, increased effective down-link power, and
reduced susceptibility to interference from signals
associated with adjacent satellites in geostationary
orbit.
Except for AT&T’s LEO TELSTAR, flown in 1962,
the basic research, development, and demonstra-
tion (RD&D) establishing the practicality of
satellite communications was done by NASA,
with substantial industrial involvement. RD&D for
direct broadcast satellites, including early at-
tempts to develop market constituencies, was
also done by NASA. From 1973, when its satellite
communications research and development
(R&D) activities were curtailed on the assump-
tion that the private sector would continue the
R&D, until 1980, NASA did not pursue such ac-
tivities vigorously except for completing the direct
broadcast satellite programs of ATS-6 and, in con-
junction with the Canadians, CTS.
New Programs
In 1980, because of growing concern over the
perceived loss of a technological lead in com-
munications satellites, NASA reactivated its R&D
program at 30/20 GHz. This work is directed
toward wideband transponder capability in-
tended to explore the allocated but unoccupied
bands at 30/20 GHz. Technologies under devel-
opment include onboard switching, solid state
transmitters, switched, multiple-beam antennas,
and low-noise receivers for satellite use. NASA
hopes to demonstrate the new band technologies
in orbit on a new satellite, to be developed for
a 1986 launch. The system concept is based on
traffic projections developed for NASA by two
Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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satellite communications carriers, COMSAT and
American Satellite Co. NASA is also developing
adaptive, multibeam antenna technology at
L-band, the band in use for maritime (and aero-
nautical) satellite communications use.
While NASA pursues a program currently dom-
inated by R&D at 30/20 GHz, commercial enti-
ties are expanding their channel capacities in
lower frequency bands at 6/4 GHz and 14/12
GHz. SBS’S launch in the fall of 1980 marks the
first U.S. commercial satellite use of the 14/12
GHz band (Ku band). Canada’s ANIK-B and-C
were the first domestic satellites to exploit that
band, predating SBS by 2 years or more.
INTELSAT-V, launched in late-l 980, is carrying
traffic at both 6/4 and 14/12 GHz. Commercial
carriers’ plans for future satellites through the
199o’s continue to concentrate on these bands,
using multiple-beam antenna technologies and
the frequency reuse technologies first developed
in the late 1970’s and continuing in development
today. Multiple-beam antenna technologies refer
to the use of a single antenna to send and receive
more than one frequency signal. Frequency reuse
technologies refer to the ability to handle the
same frequency in different modes, thereby in-
creasing capacity without increasing spectrum
use.
Continuing advances in technology, many of
them by industry in the late 1970’s as markets
for 12 GHz Earth stations became viable, have
made it possible for commercial carriers to pro-
vide many of the services initially demonstrated
on ATS-6 by NASA under the classification “com-
munity broadcasting. ” Cable program distribu-
tion, interactive services such as multipoint
teleconferencing, educational broadcasting, and
remote health-care services are now being pro-
vided by the commercial carriers. These services,
together with the traditional point-to-point serv-
ices, are carried on first generation satellites
operating at 6/4 GHz.
Advances in bandwidth compression and fre-
quency reuse technologies appear, for perhaps
the next decade, to allow first generation satellites
to keep pace with traffic projections. Second gen-
eration satellites such an INTELSAT-V and Ad-
vanced WESTAR, which will start flying in the
nexts years, include increased capacity sufficient
to accommodate traffic projections by using new
technologies such as switchable, multiple-beam
antennas, onboard switching and signal process-
ing, and frequency reuse capabilities at frequen-
cies of 6/4, 14/1 1, and 14/12 GHz. These will re-
quire developing large, possibly deployable space
structures, distributed, solid state transmitters and
low-noise receivers, precise and possibly adap-
tive phase control, and attitude stabilization in
the presence of solar-array or antenna-structure
motions.
Except for the 9-m deployable antenna of
NASA’s ATS-6, DOD (on the Defense Satellite
Communications System, Phase Ill) and the com-
mercial sector (l NTELSAT-V, Advanced WESTAR)
have the lead in multiple, switched-beam anten-
nas and in somewhat larger, deployable anten-
na structures. ATS-6 included, these spacecraft
types are the first so-called orbiting antenna
farms, carrying capability for multiband, multi-
beam communications services. As future traffic
projections indicate a limitation of capacity, plans
for the first satellite generation of the 1990’s could
be expected to include 30/20 GHz frequencies
in addition to 6/4, 14/1 1, and 14/12 GHz. The
trend will be toward fewer, larger satellites carry-
ing more bands, more beams, and more diverse
services. These satellites will incorporate some
of the space construction techniques developed
during the 1980’s.
Commercial sector hardware is provided by in-
dustrial firms, many of them Japanese, French,
German, and Italian. As part of its reactivated pro-
gram, NASA will conduct R&D in advanced tech-
nologies for low-cost Earth stations. The results
of this R&D, which also involves industrial firms,
are intended for transfer to the private sector.
NASA’s customary applications experiment-dem-
onstration activities with its ATS satellite series
have been transferred to the National Telecom-
munications and Information Administration
(NTIA) in the Department of Commerce, together
with responsibility for stimulating new applica-
tions experiments and demonstrations and for ag-
gregating future markets.
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Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
Advanced WESTAR is a variation of the Track-
ing and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) being
leased by NASA from Space Communications Co.
TDRSS comprises two satellites in synchronous
orbit, controlled from a master station at White
Sands, N. Mex., and used to track and relay data
from LEO satellites to the ground. it will replace
much of NASA’s terrestrial Space Tracking and
Data Network (STDN) and will increase the po-
tential for continuous coverage of other, LEO sat-
ellites. For the lowest-altitude orbits, coverage will
increase from about 15 to 85 percent, providing
a great improvement in timely data acquisition
for NASA experimental and NOAA operations.
This capability will greatly reduce the need for
costly and unreliable satellite data recorders.
While Advanced WESTAR carries 6/4, 14/11, and
14/1 2 GHz capability, TDRSS also carries capa-
bility in the space research bands at 1.7/1 .8, and
2.0/2.3 GHz. Both spacecraft use the same basic
structure, including deployable antennas for
some of the three or four bands they carry. The
first TDRSS launch is planned for the shuttle in
early 1983, the second 6 months later. Two Ad-
vanced WESTARs will be launched in 1984; one
will be dedicated to commercial service and the
other will serve as a shared spare between NASA
and Space Communications Co.
Navigation
Most of the U.S. work on navigation has been
done by DOD. The Navy navigation satellite sys-
tem transmissions have been made available to
the public for the cost of the receiver and posi-
tion-fixing computer equipment. Position can be
fixed to an accuracy of 50 ft if processing time
is long enough (up to 12 hours). Such perform-
ance is suitable for ships but not for aircraft,
whose positions change too rapidly.
Work by NASA and the European Space Re-
search Organization in 1969-70 had defined a
system (Aerosat) that could work for aircraft.
Capable of handling 500 aircraft simultaneously,
it was also of interest for air traffic control.
Responsibility for Aerosat was transferred to the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) early in
1971. in 1973, work on it was terminated.
NASA has continued to pursue studies in search
and rescue, but not in navigation or traffic con-
trol, based on special receivers attached to NOAA
meteorological satellites to detect signals of dis-
tress beacons carried by aircraft and ships. NASA
is pursuing this experimental work cooperative-
ly with DOD, the Department of Transportation,
and with Canada, France, and the U.S.S.R. The
United States is providing the spacecraft, launch
vehicles, and the U.S. ground stations; Canada
is providing the space telecommunications equip-
ment and ground station in their country; and,
France is providing an onboard processor and
receiver. The Soviet Union will launch and main-
tain in orbit two spacecraft operationally com-
patible with the U. S., Canadian, and French sys-
tem and will operate their own ground station.
in addition to NASA, DOD, and the Department
of Transportation are expected to purchase and
operate ground stations and participate in the
program test and evaluation phase while NOAA
is providing the spacecraft for modification.
Satellite Remote Sensing
Remote sensing from satellites is one important
component of the general field of detecting,
recognizing, and evaluating objects from a dis-
tance by means of advanced electro-optical in-
struments with cybernetic interpretation. Radar,
sonar, astronomical and aerial photography are
all forms of remote sensing. Satellite remote sens-
ing is used in conjunction with aerial photogra-
phy and aerial radar scanning to assess and help
to control the productivity of the surface of the
Earth, to help locate subsurface resources, and
to understand, forecast, and, eventually, help
control the environment.
Satellite remote sensing will be discussed in this
section under the following three categories:
1) ocean sensing; 2) Earth resources sensing; and
3) environmental sensing. Listed in this order,
they lead from an area with no current opera-
tional systems to an area that has had operational
space systems for 14 years.
Ocean Sensing
This is the newest, least developed of satellite
remote-sensing efforts. NASA, NOAA, DOD and
Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program l 117
the oceanographic science community all recog-
nize the tremendous potential that satellites have
for the study of the world’s oceans. Gathering
ocean data from satellites may be the only rea-
sonable way to observe ocean processes routine-
ly and continuously. Currently, there are no exist-
ing or planned U.S. civilian operational ocean-
sensing satellite systems.
NASA’s SEASAT, which was flown in 1978 and
failed prematurely after 6 months, was a satellite
demonstration to show what an operational
ocean-sensing system could do. Each of SEASAT’s
complement of sensors had been flown before
but never together on a civilian, ocean-oriented
spacecraft.
Along with SEASAT, NIMBUS, and the Geody-
namic Experimental Ocean Satellite (GEOS) data
have been used in ocean studies. NIMBUS is
classed as an experimental weather/climate
spacecraft; GEOS was primarily to study ocean
waves. The data these satellites supply consist
primarily of global wind fields, sea states, surface
temperature, ice coverage, and ocean color.
SEASAT data have demonstrated that scatter-
ometer observations enable space mapping of the
detailed structure of the ocean surface wind
fields, including atmospheric fronts and
typhoons. Altimeter observations enable mapping
of surface waves and circulation features such as
the Gulf Stream and mesoscale eddies. Micro-
wave radiometer observations enable mapping
of the characteristics of sea ice. Color scanner
observations enable mapping of chlorophyll con-
centration. Taken collectively, these observations
will help enable the determination of the general
circulation of the ocean—both the wind-driven
and geostrophic components—along with sea ice
coverage and primary biological productivity in
the oceans.
Applications of ocean sensing divide into two
classes—operational and scientific. NOAA uses
the data from the experiments to support its oper-
ational responsibilities that include: the manage-
ment and conservation of marine resources; the
preservation, conservation, and development of
U.S. coastal resources; the prediction of weather;
and, the provision of maps, charts, surveys, and
other specialized data for navigation. Ocean sens-
ing from space is expected to contribute to safe-
ty, to improve the efficiency of weather forecast-
ing, and to reduce the cost of shipping opera-
tions, air transportation, offshore oil and gas ex-
ploration and drilling, platform operations, ma-
rine construction, commercial fishing, pollution
monitoring, ice monitoring, and marine search
and rescue.
NASA, in conjunction with academia, will use
the data primarily for R&D in weather and cli-
mate. NASA also will increase its participation
with the oceanographic community by support-
ing university scientists and encouraging further
commercial participation in carrying out a num-
ber of advanced studies for future research mis-
sions in applying satellite remote sensing to
oceanography.
NASA’s ocean research programs will include
processing SEASAT data records into final geo-
physical units and their subsequent analysis; eval-
uation of the performance of X/L/C-band aircraft
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) in conjunction with
experiments undertaken by the National Science
Foundation (NSF) on warm Gulf Stream rings and
coastal ocean dynamics; characterization of sea
ice properties by various remote-sensing tech-
niques; definition of altimetry dependence on sea
state; investigation of photoplankton productivity
associated with physical and chemical ocean
properties near the Nantucket Shoals, in coopera-
tion with the National Marine Fisheries Service;
refinement of techniques for assimilation of wind
data from the scatterometer into numerical mod-
els; and development of a shipborne Iidar system
for basic studies of optical oceanography. The
ocean processes program will develop techniques
for assimilating satellite data–especially scatter-
ometer wind data—into numerical models, and
demonstrate a remote-sensing system that will
supply specific global oceanographic data on a
routine and repetitive basis to meet specific user
needs.
Earth Resources Sensing
The U.S. program addresses the needs for gath-
ering the vital information required for managing
the world’s limited food, water, energy supplies,
and mineral resources, and for identifying poten-
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tial geodetic (primarily earthquake) hazards. Its
objective is to develop and demonstrate the use
of space technology for providing the United
States with a global capability for monitoring and
forecasting major agricultural commodities, man-
aging water resources, assessing land use, im-
proving the exploration for mineral and energy
resources, and understanding the dynamic char-
acteristics of the Earth’s crust. Many, if not most,
Federal agencies use space data in the day-to-day
conduct of their missions (see fig. 2).
Numerous State and local governments, many
in conjunction with academia, use satellite data
for a whole range of projects, including land cov-
er classification, wetland development, and water
management (see tables 7 and 8). The universities
are studying ways to manipulate the data and
apply them to a variety of problems. Industry has
made some use of space-generated data, espe-
cially in its search for nonrenewable resources.
Several companies that are characterized as “val-
ue-added” firms take the raw satellite data, ma-
nipulate it, integrate it with other data and sell
the information products to a variety of users.
Currently there are no plans for a Federal op-
erational Earth resources-sensing satellite system.
NOAA will shortly (1983) assume operation of
NASA’s experimental Landsat system, but there
are no plans for the Government to continue to
operate a satellite land remote-sensing system
once Landsat fails. NASA’s principal activities in-
clude pursuing the R&D necessary for develop-
ing and improving space remote-sensing capabil-
ities and the related information extraction tech-
niques, providing for the acquisition of space
data, and joint research, development, and test
projects with users. Its goal is to establish the
routine use of global data collection systems.
American industry has been the dominant source
of equipment, provided largely under Govern-
ment funding, for the U.S. remote-sensing effort.
It has supplied spacecraft, sensing instruments,
Earth stations, data processing equipment, and
information extraction devices.
Landsat Technology
Space Segment
The return beam vidicon (RBV), a kind of televi-
sion camera, was initally promoted for use in
Landsat by the Department of the Interior. The
RBV uses a shutter to expose a light-sensitive plate
and then scans the plate with an electron beam
to capture the image on videotape or to radio it
to the ground. Although Landsat 3 carries only
two RBVS, three of these devices would allow the
reconstruction of color pictures. Each RBV im-
age from Landsat 3 covers an area 90 km on a
side (180 km total swath) and has an equivalent
instantaneous field of view (IFOV) of 40 m. The
low distortion of the RBV makes its especially use-
ful for mapmaking.
The multispectral scanner (MSS) uses a mirror
to scan the scene on the ground one line at a
time, reflecting the light onto a series of detec-
tors (photoelectric cells) sensitive to four different
spectral regions. MSS scans a swath 185 km wide
and has an IFOV of 80 m, which for many scenes
is approximately equivalent to a photographic
resolution of about 160 m. MSS provides better
spectral resolution, but higher distortion, than
does RBV. It was therefore championed by the
Department of Agriculture (USDA) as particularly
useful for monitoring crops.
The thematic mapper (TM) is a remote sensor
with seven spectral bands covering the visible,
near-infrared, and thermal infrared regions of the
spectrum (see fig. 3). It is now scheduled for
launch in the third quarter of 1982 aboard Land-
sat D, from which it will achieve complete cov-
erage of the Earth’s surface every 16 days.
The TM is designed to satisfy more demanding
performance specifications than have previous-
ly been applied to an instrument of its type. In
response to these requirements, the design incor-
porates advanced state-of-the-technology materi-
als, structures, control techniques, calibration
mechanisms, data handling, and electronics. De-
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Figure 2.— Earth Resources Sensing
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The top photograph shows upper Delaware, Maryland, and the Virgina peninsula taken from the Landsat 1 satellite at an altitude
of 568 miles. The photo at bottom left shows a technician performing a quality control assessment of the Landsat 1 photo while
on the bottom right, a technician prepared a negative of the Landsat 1 photo for printing in the Goddard Space Flight Center process-
ing facility.
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Table 7.—Overview of Landsat Applications in the 50 States
Land
Water Forestry/ Wildlife resources Environmental Geologic
State resources rangeland management management management Agriculture mapping
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
lowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
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Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
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Nevada
New Hampshire
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New Mexico
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North Carolina
North Dakota
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Rhode Island
South Carolina
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SOURCE: National Governors Conference,
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Table 8.—Summary of Operational Landsat Applications in the Statesa
A.
B.
c.
D,
(4)
SOURCE: National Governors Conference
velopment and fabrication of the TM are pro-
ceeding on schedule. Most of the subsystem pa-
rameters which have been tested so far have met
or exceeded specifications.
Ground Segment
Data can be transmitted to Earth when the sat-
ellite is within view of one of the receiving sta-
tions (fig. 4)—the NASA stations in Alaska, Califor-
nia, and Maryland, and nine foreign-owned and
-operated stations that function under agreements
with NASA. Data acquired while the spacecraft
is beyond the range of a ground station are stored.
by an onboard, wide-band video tape recorder
until it is within range of a U.S. station. The rate
of data transmission from satellite to ground sta-
tion is on the order of megabits/second.
A control center at the Goddard Space Flight
Center (Goddard) monitors and commands the
satellite to acquire and transmit data directly to
U.S. or foreign ground stations.
The master recordings (station tapes) received
at U.S. ground stations of Landsat 3 are sent to
Goddard for preprocessing. This initial step in
data reduction consists of segregating data from
each of the spectral bands and applying two sorts
of corrections: a) radiometric corrections to ac-
count for the difference in response of the detec-
tors in the various spectral bands, and b) geomet-
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Figure 3.—Landsat Bands and Electromagnetic Spectrum Comparison
aThematic mapper.
SOURCE: U.S. Geological Survey,
ric corrections that account for distortions in the
satellite viewing process and relate the received
data to the exact position on the ground that was
observed by the satellite. The results of this pre-
processing are recorded in the form of high-den-
sity digital tape (H DDT), either as fully corrected
data, or with the required geometric corrections
only noted on the tape. Foreign ground stations
perform an equivalent function, although not all
of them apply a full set of corrections.
HDDTs are provided to the Department of the
Interior’s EROS Data Center in Sioux Falls, S.
Dak., and the USDA facility in Houston, Tex. At
the EROS Data Center, the data in HDDT form
are put through additional computer processes
to convert them into standard data products suit-
able for sale to public or private sector customers.
They, in turn, may use these products in that form
or further process them for their own use or for
resale to additional customers.
Two classes of standard data products are avail-
able: film imagery, which is convenient for those
accustomed to working with maps and photo-
graphs, and computer compatible tapes (CCTS).
The tape form is suitable for input to standard
computers and lends itself to automated or spe-
cialized data handling and analysis. The digital
form of CCTS makes them especially appropriate
for integration with other digital data.
For most uses, the data as they emerge from
preprocessing at Goddard and processing at
EROS are still in raw form. It is at this point that
firms in the private sector step in to process Land-
sat data further. Such firms constitute the value-
-added industry. Value-added firms are found
both in the United States and abroad; most of
them are small. The kinds of work they perform
are: image processing, image enhancement, im-
age interpretation, and integration of Landsat data
with data from other sources.
Other Remote-Sensing Programs
Currently Federal experimental or scientific
flight programs include the Landsat series,
Magsat, and the Heat Capacity Mapping Mission
(HCMM). Landsat 3 is aging but continues to be
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Figure 4. —Current and Probable Landsat Ground Stations
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the primary source of Earth resources data. Land-
sat D will soon be launched, and if plans to
launch the follow-on satellite, Landsat D’, come
to fruition, both are expected to operate until the
mid- to late-l 980’s. New sensor capabilities on
Landsats D and D’ are expected to be especially
useful for nonrenewable resources observations.
Magsat, launched in 1979, has charted the Earth’s
magnetic fields to aid in navigation and to pro-
vide a better understanding of the solid Earth for
geophysical and geologic studies; and, the
HCMM has made global measurements of Earth
surface temperature variation to aid in locating
mineral resources and in measuring water runoff
from snowmelt. NASA is also planning to fly ex-
periments on early space shuttle missions de-
signed to test the applicability of active micro-
wave measurements, and of high-resolution im-
agery for mapping investigations. IT is also study-
ing how to define the appropriate space systems
for gravity measurements for solid Earth studies,
for global stereoscopic imagery for resource ex-
ploration, and for improved remote sensors for
multiple applications.
NASA has also entered into joint R&D activities
with other Federal agencies (USDA, USDC,
USAID) to advance the understanding of how to
apply multiple data sources in improving agricul-
tural early warning and crop commodity forecast-
ing (AgRISTARS). The AgRISTARS program has
been somewhat restructured by lengthening the
schedules and changing the program scope in
several areas. This restructuring has been caused
by constraints on the fiscal year 1982 budgets of
the involved agencies and the delay in the avail-
ability of Landsat D. Other joint research activities
are planned with additional Federal agencies and
with international organizations for advancing the
scientific knowledge of the solid Earth.
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ENVIRONMENTAL SENSING
understanding the dynamics and limitations of
our environment is essential to our long-term sur-
vival and important to many day-to-day activities.
The global interrelationships between the atmos-
phere, ocean, land, and space environments can
be studied only from space. These programs are
aided by data from the ocean and Earth resources
sensing systems.
The operational meteorological satellite systems
of NOAA (GOES and TIROS) form the backbone
of the environmental program. Prediction of the
weather, monitoring and control of pollution,
ship routing, storm warning, and modeling of
long-term trends in climate and the stratosphere
are all areas of study.
NOAA’s operational responsibility regarding
weather and climate is to monitor the weather
and prepare weather forecasts for a myriad of
users. NOAA, therefore, has the responsibility for
the ground-based observation systems, the opera-
tional meteorological satellite system, and the
related receiving , analyzing, and disseminating
systems that turn the space and ground data into
weather forecasts. For the space segment, NOAA
coordinates with NASA for the improvement of
the space and space-tied systems and for the pro-
curement of spacecraft and launch arrangements.
NOAA is also charged with conducting R&D in
the analysis and application of satellite data.
The primary and routine use of the satellite data
from the NOAA system is, of course, weather pre-
dicting. NOAA transforms them into a broad vari-
ety of weather projections and distributes them
throughout the world. In addition to being used
in real-time weather predicting operations, they
are also placed in archives for future theoretical
research and case studies. These data are wide-
ly used by meteorologists and environmental sci-
entists in Government and academia in routine
operations throughout the world and are con-
sidered indispensable for conducting atmospher-
ic analyses and preparing short-range weather
forecasts.
Users of weather data vary in their involvement
with determining the standard weather forecast-
ing services provided by NOAA. Aviators in well-
established working groups provide regular data
on their needs through FAA. However, only
about one-third of the farming sector is well-
served by standard NOAA products. Private
weather services provide specialized forecasting
to many users whose requirements are not met
by those products.
NASA studies and flight missions are directed
at all characteristics of the atmosphere, including
upper atmospheric and tropospheric air quality,
global weather, severe storms, oceanic processes,
and general climate.
NASA launched three atmospheric research/
demonstration satellites in the late 1970’s,
SEASAT, NIMBUS-7, and Stratospheric Aerosol
and Gas Experiment (SAGE). As noted above,
SEASAT has ceased to function, but returned sig-
nificant ocean data, which are being studied.
NIMBUS-7 and SAGE are performing satisfactori-
ly. SAGE primarily measures atmospheric con-
centrations of ozone and aerosols in an attempt
to show how pollutants might be transported
globally. NASA has planned to launch the Halo-
gen Occultation Experiment (HALOE) and the
Earth Radiation Budget Experiments (ERBE) space-
craft in the mid-l 980’s. HALOE will measure
global atmospheric profiles of key species in-
volved in the depletion of stratospheric ozone.
ERBE is to measure the radiation balance over the
globe to gain basic insights into the reasons for
climatic fluctuations. NASA’s advanced planning
includes the uses of satellites for the simultaneous
global study of the radiative, chemical, and dy-
namic processes occurring in the upper atmos-
phere.
It is apparent that air pollution problems must
be solved on a regional basis, and that global
chemical budgets (e.g., carbon dioxide) act both
as tracers of transport processes and as a back-
ground for regional events. NASA, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA), and NSF are
focusing on these areas with field analytical and
laboratory studies to quantify the global carbon-
nitrogen-ozone and sulfur-ammonia-aerosol
chemical systems. Data derived from spacecraft
are essential to these efforts.
Severe storms, tornados, damaging downdrafts,
and destructive lightning are being studied by
NOAA and NASA to improve observation and
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forecasting of such events. Remotely sensed data
from NASA’s severe environmental storms and
mesoscale experiment, and ongoing mesoscale
modeling efforts for forecast improvement with
computer interactive systems will lead to a joint
NASA/NOAA project at NOAA’s National Severe
Storm Forecast Center, similar to the recently suc-
cessful frost-freeze warning demonstration in
Florida. Improved airborne wind measurement
tools and temperature and moisture sounders on
the GOES-D spacecraft are being evaluated.
International Weather Activities
WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION (WMO)
The United States participates in international
meteorological programs through WMO, a spe-
cialized agency of the United Nations that was
established in 1951. It was formed in order to es-
tablish, coordinate, and improve meteorological
services throughout the world, U.S. operational
and experimental meteorological satellites con-
tribute to this effort. WMO members obtain ac-
cess to meteorological information from U.S.
weather satellites indirectly through a WMO net-
work of international, regional, and national
meteorological centers, and directly from auto-
matic picture transmission (APT) receiving sets.
GLOBAL ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH
PROGRAM (GARP)
As part of the U.S. worldwide weather R&D
activities, NOAA, NSF, and NASA participate
through the National Research Council in GARP.
GARP’s goal is to conduct studies to understand
the atmosphere, It is sponsored by WMO and
the International Council of Scientific Unions,
with participation and funding provided by all
member nations. Current U.S. activities for GARP
are directed at analyzing parts of the data from
the recently successful GARP global weather ex-
periment, assessing the requirements for im-
proved operational forecasting and defining
future remote measurement requirements. This
experiment, conducted in 1979, provided a
unique set of data that did not exist before. As
a result, atmospheric numerical forecast models
have been improved and space research is be-
ing directed to improved temperature sounders,
surface pressure instruments, passive and active
microwave moisture sensors, wind sensors, and
rainfall measurements technique.
Materials Processing in Space (MPS)
MPS is both a set of new technologies designed
to exploit the unique environment of space and
a developing program to implement these tech-
nologies. The unique properties that make space
an ideal environment for processing certain kinds
of materials are: 1 ) the availability of unlimited,
unfiltered solar radiation; 2) the existence of a
near-perfect vacuum; 3) a range of temperatures,
from –200° to +200”F; and, most important,
4) microgravity–an almost complete absence of
gravitational force. VVith the exception of long-
term microgravity, these properties can be well
enough approximated on Earth to allow their ex-
tended effects on materials processing to be in-
vestigated. The factor of microgravity, however,
is what makes MPS so attractive.
Process variables such as temperature, compo-
sition, and fluid flow may be controlled far bet-
ter in an environment of microgravity. As a result,
some materials may be manufactured in space
with greater precision and fewer defects; others,
which cannot be made at all on Earth, may be-
come possible for the first time. MPS looks par-
ticularly promising for pharmaceuticals, elec-
tronic components, optical equipment, and metal
alloys.
Already, a U.S. program to implement these
technologies is taking shape. NASA has estab-
lished an MPS program to pursue the basic sci-
ence and the applied R&D of microgravity envi-
ronments. Within NASA’s MPS program, a Com-
mercial Applications Office has been set up to
encourage the private sector to participate.
EARLY WORK IN SPACE
During the earlier years of the Apollo Program,
several unusual phenomena, peculiar to micro-
gravity, were first observed. First considered only
as posing problems in the engineering of space-
craft systems, these phenomena were later rec-
ognized as clues for inventing processes to man-
ufacture products in space for use on Earth. To
broaden the discussion, NASA organized sympo-
sia in 1968 and 1969 for industry representatives
to discuss the possibilities of MPS. NASA also
established in 1969 a new program, “Materials
Science and Manufacturing in Space.”
Through the early 1970’s, in-space research
was conducted on Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo-
Soyuz missions. Aboard Apollo 14, 16, and 17,
several necessarily brief, but important experi-
ments were performed to investigate certain basic
processes (i.e., heat flow and convection, elec-
trophoresis, and composite casting). Skylab, the
orbiting space laboratory station, allowed for
much more extensive experimentation. Altogeth-
er, three teams of astronauts conducted 15 MPS
experiments. Skylab’s materials processing facili-
ty, including a multipurpose electric furnace, pro-
vided the means of studying more complex proc-
esses: crystal growth, metal alloying, eutectics,
welding and brazing, fluid effects, and combus-
tion, Again, the 1975 flight of the Apollo-Soyuz
test project continued the research conducted on
the Apollo and Skylab missions. The processes
investigated included: electrophoresis, crystal
growth of semiconductors, processing of mag-
nets, convection induced by surface tension, den-
sity separation during solidification of two alloys,
and halide eutectic growth. Throughout these
missions, the experiments performed in space
were essentially repetitions of techniques used
in terrestrial materials processing.
CONCURRENT WORK ON EARTH
NASA has perfected three terrestrial facilities
for attaining microgravity for short periods: drop
tubes and drop towers, aircraft flying high-altitude
parabolic trajectories, and sounding rockets.
These facilities allow relatively low-cost experi-
mentation for MPS investigators to establish and
set experimental parameters, to establish proof
of concept, and to provide specimens for labora-
tory research.
Drop tubes and towers allow spacelike micro-
gravity conditions to be achieved for some 2 to
4 seconds. In drop tubes, molten droplets are
released into a vertical evacuated tube (either 100
or 300 ft long) and are solidified during free fall.
in drop towers, small rockets (used to overcome
friction) thrust canisters containing experiment
packages down vertical guide rails. These appa-
ratus provide useful opportunities, however fleet-
ing, to study both high-temperature calorimetry
and changes in density, surface tension, and vol-
ume as liquids solidify.
Although longer in duration by an order of
magnitude (1 O to 60 seconds), the microgravity
attained by NASA aircraft (KC-132s and F-104Bs)
is much less steady than that of drop tubes and
towers. The aircraft, therefore, do not provide a
suitable environment for precise experimenta-
tion, but are useful for training crews and for
developing and verifying tests of experiment
hardware.
Since introducing the Space Processing Appli-
cation Rocket (SPAR) Program in 1975, NASA has
flown nine sounding rocket missions. These
flights provide 4 to 7 minutes of microgravity.
However, severe stresses during launch signifi-
cantly constrain the design of experiments. The
SPAR program has resulted in an inventory of
low-cost hardware suitable for longer duration
experiments during shuttle operations.
FUTURE PLANS
From the foregoing discussion of work already
done in space and on Earth, one can see that
significant future evolution of MPS experimenta-
tion lies in the direction of providing an extended
microgravity environment along with more com-
plex hardware. The space shuttle transportation
system holds the key to MPS development. Major
shuttle facilities for MPS experimentation (small
self-contained payloads, the materials experiment
assembly, and Spacelab) can be used on shuttle
flights lasting up to 1 month,
Small self-contained payloads are packages
flown in containers rented by NASA to compa-
nies, universities, or private individuals. The
payloads, designed by the users, operate under
their own power and carry their own recording
systems. Some of them may also be used as test-
beds for broader experimentation aboard Space-
Iab.
The materials experiment assembly (MEA), the
first article of new materials processing hardware
to be flown in the shuttle, is also designed to oper-
ate under its own power in its preliminary ver-
sion. Later models will draw power from the shut-
tle. Accommodating as many as four experiments
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in separately sealed subenclosures, MEA contains
a control computer, a heat rejection system, and
data recorders.
Spacelab, the centerpiece of NASA’s new MPS
system, has two major components, the module
and the pallets. The module provides a habitable
laboratory for scientists and engineers to work
comfortably in space. The pallets form an open
porch in the cargo bay of the orbiter, where in-
struments may be exposed to space and various
experimental apparatus may be accommodated.
Four MPS instruments are currently under de-
velopment for deployment on Space lab. The flu-
id experiment system uses Schlieren photography
and holography to study fluid behavior under
microgravity. In the vapor crystal growth system,
crystals are to be grown from fluids, vapors, or
melts of solid materials; the results are recorded
by video and holography. The pallet-mounted,
acoustic, containerless, positioning module is
used to control the position and rotation of a sam-
ple to be raised to a temperature of 1,600 degrees
by radiant heat. The solidification experiment
system employs a modular furnace in which up
to 16 samples per flight may be processed. So-
lidification may be achieved, either under uni-
form heating and cooling, or directionally, by
means of a temperature gradient.
There are several other MPS activities planned
for development if funds are approved. There are
also important long-term prospects for more ad-
vanced activities. These and the various foreign
efforts, current or planned, are discussed else-
where in this assessment.
Space Transportation
Currently the U.S. Government has the sole
capability in the United States to launch both
manned and unmanned payloads from Earth,
Each capability presents different opportunities
and different constraints.
MANNED SPACE SYSTEMS
The space transportation system (STS) that has
been developed by NASA, with extensive indus-
trial involvement under Government funding, is
the sole U.S. system planned to carry humans and
objects into space in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Ex-
pendable launch vehicles (ELVS) will continue to
provide launch services through the early transi-
tion period.
The major components of the STS initially in-
clude the reusable space shuttle, upper stages,
the remote manipulator system, and the work-
shop Spacelab. The shuttle will be launched from
both the east and west coasts of the United States
with a nominal payload capability of 65,000
pounds (29,500 kg) into LEO (1 85-1,110 km). It
can carry a crew of three to seven persons for
mission durations up to 30 days.
The space shuttle orbiter, an aircraft-like, re-
usable spacecraft, will be used to carry payloads
to Earth orbit and deploy them from its cargo bay.
The remote manipulator system can be attached
to the orbiter bay to aid the crew in deploying
or retrieving payloads in space, Upper stages will
be included with those payloads that must go far-
ther than LEO, i.e., on missions to the planets or
to geosynchronous orbit. Spacelab is a complete
orbital laboratory that fits into the cargo bay and
connects with the crew compartment of the
orbiter. It will make possible a variety of human-
directed experiments in the space environment.
Planned utilization of STS may be seen in table
9 and figure 5.
NASA is conducting numerous studies to pro-
vide advanced capabilities for STS:
l
l
l
l
l
l
Thrust augmentation—a study to supplement
the existing shuttle capability with strap-on
assist rockets;
Solar electric propulsion systems–solar-
powered ion-engine upper stages for vary-
ing orbit and payload requirements;
Orbita/ transfer vehic/es–manned and un-
manned vehicles capable of moving pay-
loads from the LEO attainable by the shut-
tle, either to a different LEO or to higher
orbits;
Teleoperator maneuvering system–a re-
motely controlled payload maneuvering
unit;
Deployable antenna —an experiment to test
the feasibility of deploying very large anten-
nas;
Space p/atforms–shuttle-deployable plat-
forms to perform as test beds for experiments
—.—
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Table 9.–STS Operations Traffic Model (34 flights through 1985)
Subtotal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 7 11 16 21 29 34 38 38 38 38 38 29 344
Refights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . – – 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 8 12 17 23 31 36 40 40 40 40 40 31 365
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
in space construction for space science and
applications;
l Large space structure experiments—to test
the ability to construct large structures in
space;
l Liquid-fueled upper stage—an upper stage
for use with the shuttle, that will be powered
by a liquid fuel rather than solid propellant,
thereby providing greater controllability and
payload capacity.
EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES
The existing Government expendable launch
vehicles used for routine civilian launches now
(Scout, Delta, Atlas, and Centaur) are scheduled
to be phased out by about 1985 or 1986. Should
the Centaur be selected for the liquid-fueled shut-
tle upper stage, its production will continue, but
not as an Earth to Earth-orbit launch vehicle. Fig-
ure 6 illustrates the normal payload capacity for
these ELVS.
As previously mentioned, the U.S. Government
is the only entity in the United States currently
launching payloads into space. However, at least
one privately owned U.S. company, Space Serv-
ices, Inc., has indicated that its Percheron
launcher will be ready in the near future (1 to
2 years). Maximum payloads for the Percheron
are planned to be 700 kg into LEO by 1982, and
200 kg into geosynchronous orbit by 1983.
Space Construction
NASA is planning numerous experiments to test
and demonstrate the ability and utility of con-
structing objects in space. It is clear that space
platforms for operational or experimental work
will need to be constructed in space because their
size will likely preclude launching them in one
piece from Earth. Component (beam) builders
have been tested on Earth and await testing in
space. Should a permanent orbiting space station
be included in the space program, its construc-
tion will of necessity be carried out in space. In
addition, if solar power satellites are deployed,
they will have to be constructed in space.
Design requirements are being established for
both manned and unmanned permanent plat-
forms that will incorporate evolutionary power
systems. NASA is analyzing the feasibility and
benefits of low-Earth orbital science and applica-
tions space platforms, which would aggregate
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Figure 5.—Shuttle Manifest Through 1984
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SOURCE National Aeronautics and Space Administration
many long-duration space experiments on un-
manned, shuttle-tended platforms. The postu-
lated initial system could accommodate science
and applications payloads, demonstrate on-orbit
servicing and payload exchange, conduct multi-
disciplinary investigations, and provide an evolu-
tionary space power system. It could grow to in-
clude a capability for materials processing ex-
periments, and eventually a habitat for life sci-
ence and human research (fig. 7).
NASA is also studying a large communications
platform that could alleviate the potential satura-
tion of orbit arc and frequency spectrum by ag-
gregating most communications payloads on a
common support bus. This platform would be
serviced and upgraded remotely by a teleopera-
.:” ”
tor (also under study). For the longer range, NASA
is studying a permanent, manned Space Opera-
tions Center to establish, service, upgrade, and
operate both the low- and high-altitude platforms.
Its future potential uses could be to tend and
refurbish a reusable orbital transfer vehicle or-
biting between low and geostationary orbits and
to construct and assemble large orbiting struc-
tures.
In order to plan for support of future possible
permanent platforms and facilities, NASA intends
to extend its research into a series of developmen-
tal test flights and space demonstrations in large
space structures, satellite services near to and
remote from shuttle, including satellite place-
ment, retrieval and repair, and proof test of a
satellite tethered from the orbiter.
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Figure 6.—Current NASA Expendable Launch Vehicles
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a) Payload values are for east launch from ESMC for Delta and Atlas Cc
b) Scout values are for launch from Wallops
c) Atlas E/F values are for launch from WSMC and use of a TE 364-4 AK
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Figure 7.—initial Space Station Conception
Illustration credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Solar Power in Space
The constancy and strength of sunlight in Sun
synchronous or geosynchronous orbits makes the
conversion of sunlight to electrical power espe-
cially attractive either for use in space or for trans-
mission to terrestrial receivers. Currently, the only
active program in the United States is NASA’s pro-
gram to provide an orbiting photovoltaic power
supply that could be used by a spacecraft, in-
cluding the shuttle, to supplement its normal
power supply. A 25 kW module can supply
power for a spacelab or construction mission of
60 days or more. After 60 days the flight would
be limited by such factors as food and drinking
water. The module could also supply plug-in
power for free-flying payloads that would dock
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with it, and it could be detached and parked in
orbit between shuttle missions. One version
couId itself fly free of the orbiter with instruments
for, say, studying the Sun or Earth. Another could
be attached to a free-flying spacelab for long-
duration missions like observing the Sun continu-
ously through two or more 28-day solar cycles
or studying plants or animal specimens through
several generations.
The solar power satellite (SPS), originally pro-
posed in 1968, was the subject of major studies
by NASA, the Department of Energy, the National
Academy of Sciences, and OTA4 (fig. 8). The lat-
4U .S. Department of Energy, Program Assessment Report State-
ment oi Flncflngs, NASA/DOE, Satellite Power Systems Concept De-
velopment and Evaluation Program, November 1980; National
Figure 8. —Solar Power
Array
st ructure
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ter two studies concluded that, although SPS was
technically feasible, its high initial cost, en-
vironmental and health uncertainties, and lower
estimates for the future demand for electricity
preclude a major research effort at this time. OTA
identified possible research funding levels that
range from $0 to $30 million. There are no spe-
cific research funds for SPS in the 1982 Federal
budget.
Academy of Science, Electric Power From Orbit: A Critque  of a
5atellite  Power system, 1981; Office of Technology Assessment, Solar
Power 5_ate//ites,  OTA-E-144 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, August 1981.
Satellite Reference System
ity
.
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SOURCE National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
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Space Science
Although OTA was not asked to assess space
science, we felt it necessary, as a point of infor-
mation, to describe the current U.S. space sci-
ence programs. Parts of the life sciences program
do have implications for the application of space
technology for human benefit. This area is cen-
tered in NASA and utilizes space systems, sup-
ported by ground-based and airborne observa-
tions, to conduct scientific investigations to ad-
vance our knowledge of the Earth and interstellar
space, the other stars of our galaxy, and the uni-
verse as a whole. NASA also conducts a life sci-
ences program to further the exploration and use
of space by studying space biology and medicine
and the origin and evolution of life. Near-term
activities focus on investigations of human phys-
iology and of the effects of the space environment
on man.
The Office of Space Science and Applications
at NASA funds the following science programs,
though the funding levels of some may be
reduced.
PHYSICS AND ASTRONOMY PROGRAM
The major objective of the physics and astron-
omy program is to increase our knowledge and
understanding of the solar terrestrial space envi-
ronment and the origin, evolution, structure, and
composition of the universe, including the Sun,
the stars, and the other celestial bodies. Space-
based research is being conducted to investigate
the physics, chemistry, and transport processes
occurring in the Earth’s magnetosphere, iono-
sphere, and atmosphere, and the responses of
the transport processes to solar phenomena and
variability; the structure and dynamics of the Sun
and its long- and short-term variations; cosmic
ray, X-ray, gamma ray, ultraviolet, optical, infra-
red, and radio emissions from stars, interstellar
gas and dust, pulsars, neutron stars, quasars,
black holes, and other celestial sources; and the
law governing the interactions and processes oc-
curring in the universe. Many of the phenomena
being investigated in the physics and astronomy
program are not detectable from ground-based
observatories because of the obscuring or distort-
ing effects of the Earth’s atmosphere.
HIGH ENERGY ASTRONOMY OBSERVATORIES
(HEAO) DEVELOPMENT
A major scientific objective of the HEAO pro-
gram is to observe and investigate not only those
)(-ray sources that are already known, but also
a much larger number which, because of their
distance or their low intensity, remained unde-
tected prior to HEAO. This work has detected
classes of intrinsically weak X-ray sources within
our own galaxy, as well as stronger sources out-
side our galaxy. Other equally important objec-
tives include the observation of rare species of
cosmic rays, which are crucial to our understand-
ing of heavy element formation, and the search
for nuclear gamma ray lines, which are impor-
tant in understanding the origin of the elements.
This program promises to advance our under-
standing of newly discovered processes that
release extraordinary amounts of energy. It will
also enhance our understanding of the creation
of matter, and deepen our knowledge of ob-
served phenomena such as quasars, pulsars,
novae, and supernovae.
SPACE TELESCOPE (ST) DEVELOPMENT
The space telescope is expected to make a
major contribution to understanding the stars and
galaxies, the nature and behavior of the gas and
dust between them, and the broad question of
the origin and scale of the universe.
It will enhance the ability of astronomers to
study radiation in the visible and ultraviolet
regions of the spectrum. Because of its location
above the atmosphere, it will be more sensitive
than ground-based telescopes of comparable di-
ameter and will record greater detail about the
objects under study. It will make it possible to
look far into the distant past of our universe.
The telescope should also contribute signifi-
cantly to the study of the early stages of stars and
the formation of solar systems and to the observa-
tion of such highly evolved objects as supernova
remnants and white dwarf stars. With it we may
be able to determine the nature of quasars, and
the processes by which they emit such enormous
amounts of energy. It will also be possible to
study nearby individual stars and perhaps deter-
mine if they have planetary systems.
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No budget cuts are foreseen for the space tel-
escope.
GAMMA RAY OBSERVATORY (GRO) DEVELOPMENT
The objective of the GRO program is to meas-
ure gamma ray radiation from the universe in
order to explore the fundamental physical proc-
esses powering it: Certain celestial phenomena
can be studied only at gamma ray energies. These
include direct evidence of the synthesis of the
chemical elements; high-energy astrophysical
processes occurring in supernovae, neutron stars,
and black holes; gamma ray burst sources; dif-
fuse gamma ray radiation and unique gamma ray-
emitting objects that may exist. Gamma rays rep-
resent one of the last frontiers of the electromag-
netic spectrum to be explored, because the re-
quired detector technology has only recently
been developed. The low flux levels of gamma
ray quanta, and the high background they pro-
duce through their interaction with the Earth’s
atmosphere, coupled with the demand for bet-
ter spectral, spatial, and temporal resolution of
source features, combine to require that large
gamma ray instruments be flown in space for a
prolonged period. Observations of gamma rays
are likely to provide unique information on the
most astronomically intriguing objects yet
discovered: quasars, neutron stars, and black
holes.
EXPLORER DEVELOPMENT
The Explorer program provides the principal
means of conducting astronomical studies and
long-term investigations of solar physics and of
the near-Earth interplanetary environment that
have limited, specific objectives and do not re-
quire major satellite observatories. Included in
the present program are missions to study atmos-
pheric and magnetospheric physics; magnetos-
pheric boundaries; interplanetary phenomena;
and X-ray, ultraviolet, and infrared astronomy.
SUBORBITAL PROGRAMS
The sounding rocket program provides versa-
tile, relatively low cost research tools that com-
plement the capabilities of balloons, aircraft, free-
flying spacecraft and the space shuttle in all the
space science disciplines, including the study of
the Earth’s ionosphere and magnetosphere, space
plasma physics, stellar astronomy, solar astron-
omy, and high-energy astrophysics. Activities are
conducted on both a domestic and an interna-
tional cooperative basis. The current level of ac-
tivity is about 60 rocket flights per year.
THE PLANETARY PROGRAM
This program includes the scientific exploration
of our solar system; the planets, their satellites,
the comets and asteroids, and the interplanetary
medium. The program objectives are to under-
stand the origin and evolution of the solar system,
to understand the Earth through comparative
studies with the other planets, and to understand
how the appearance of life in the solar system
is related to the chemical history of the system.
The strategy that has been adopted calls for
equal study of the terrestrial-like inner planets,
the giant gaseous outer planets, and the small
bodies (comets and asteroids). Missions to these
planetary bodies start at the level of recon-
naissance and exploration, to achieve the most
fundamental characterization of the bodies, and
proceed to a level of detailed study, The recon-
naissance phase of inner planet exploration
began in the 1960’s, and has now been com-
pleted.
Mars has provided a program focus because
of its potential as a site of biological activity, and
the Viking landings in 1976 carried out the ex-
ploration of this planet forward to a new, high
level of scientific and technological achievement,
setting the stage for the next step of detailed
study. Analyses of the Moon rock samples re-
turned by Apollo continue to be highly produc-
tive, as new insights into the early history of the
inner solar system are achieved and as our theo-
retical concepts are revised accordingly. The con-
tinuing Pioneer Venus mission is taking the study
of our nearest neighbor, and closest planetary
analog, beyond the reconnaissance stage to the
point where we have made a basic characteri-
zation of the massive cloud-covered atmosphere
of Venus.
The Galileo mission will conduct direct and
long-duration studies of Jupiter. The objectives
of this program are to conduct a comprehensive
exploration of Jupiter, its atmosphere, magneto-
sphere, and satellites, utilizing a new deep space-
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craft concept that combines both remote sens-
ing and direct measurements on an orbiter space-
craft with separate atmospheric probe. Galileo
is the only planetary program still under develop-
ment and is scheduled for launch in 1984.
MISSION OPERATIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS
The mission operations and data analysis pro-
gram funds the operations phase of planetary mis-
sions after development, launch, and initial in-
flight checkout are complete. IT also provides for
multi mission flight support. Currently, active
planetary missions being supported within mis-
sion operations and data analysis are Voyager,
Pioneer Venus, Pioneer 6-II, Helios, and Viking.
The objective of the Voyager mission to the
outer planets is to conduct scientific studies of
the Jupiter and Saturn planetary systems, in-
cluding their numerous satellites and the rings of
Saturn. While the two spacecraft are cruising to
the outer planets, they are also performing con-
tinuing investigations of the interplanetary
medium. Since their launches in 1977, the two
Voyager spacecraft have encountered both Jupi-
ter and Saturn and returned spectacular data and
pictures.
Subsequent to the Saturn encounters, the
spacecraft will continue to provide data on the
interplanetary medium. Voyager 1 will investigate
the outer limits of our solar system and Voyager
2 will go on to Uranus and Neptune.
LIFE SCIENCES PROGRAM
The objective of the life sciences program is to
conduct studies in the areas of space biology and
medicine, and thereby to expand scientific
knowledge of the origin and evolution of life, The
realization of this objective, which is intimately
linked to our understanding of the basic mecha-
nisms of biological and medical processes, is
achieved through a program of research con-
ducted both on Earth and in space. The near-term
activities will help us to discover and investigate
the effects of the space environment on humans
to facilitate their safe, useful participation in space
activities. The life sciences program utilizes a
composite of disciplines addressing all space-re-
lated problems in biology and medicine.
The life sciences program is composed of three
major programs. The first consists of flight and
ground-based experiments, whereby the physio-
logical effects of the space environment on
humans are explored. The unique properties of
space (e.g., microgravity, radiation, etc.) provide,
for the first time in our history, an opportunity
to explore significant problems in biology under
a controlled set of conditions that cannot be ade-
quately duplicated in laboratories on Earth. The
second is the continuous inflight observation of
crews venturing in space and the testing and re-
fining of countermeasures and establishing re-
quirements in human space exploration. The
third is the studies in exobiology, with special em-
phasis on a problem of profound philosophical
and scientific significance: origins and the
distribution of life in the universe.
The life sciences operational medicine program
is the catalyst responsible for bringing the science,
technology, and practice of medicine to bear on
solving the problems of sustaining, supporting,
and protecting individuals working in the space
environment. This includes assurances that phys-
ical welfare and performance are preserved and
that adequate treatment of inflight illnesses or in-
juries is provided.
The biomedical research program objective is
to develop the basic medical knowledge needed
to enable men and women to operate more ef-
fectively in space, The program is organized into
discrete elements with each designed primarily
to rectify a particular physiological problem ex-
pected to affect the human organism in pro-
longed or repetitive space flight. Thus, motion
sickness, bone loss, and hormonal disturbances
are the subjects of a continued search for mech-
anisms and countermeasures. The program is
largely dependent upon the use of ground-based
analogs of space flight.
The space biology activity will explore the role
of gravity in life processes and use gravity as an
environmental tool to investigate fundamental
biological questions. Specific objectives are to:
1 ) investigate and identify the role of gravity in
plant and animal cellular processes, embryonic
development, morphology and physiology;
2) identify the mechanisms of gravity sensing and
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transmission of gravity-perception information
within both plants and animals; 3) identify the
interactive effects of gravity and other stimuIi
(e.g., light) and stresses (e.g., vibration) on the
development of metabolism of organisms; 4) use
gravity to study the normal nature and proper-
ties of living organisms; and 5) extend the limits
of knowledge about plant and animal growth and
metabolism to provide for long-term survival and
multigeneration reproduction of life in space. This
program provides basic ground-based informa-
tion in support of future space flight experiments
and life support systems environment. This in-
cludes assurances that physical welfare and per-
formance is preserved and that adequate treat-
ment of inflight illness or injuries is provided.
Exobiology is the study of the origin, evolution,
and distribution of life and life-related molecules
on Earth and beyond. Sophisticated analyses of
life as we know it, its chemical precursors and
its origin, coupled with extrapolation to extrater-
restrial environments, affords a unique opportuni-
ty to address a most fundamental question regard-
ing the existence of such processes beyond the
Earth. Theories about chemical evolution and the
origin of life are being refined to reflect results
from the most recent planetary and astronomical
explorations. The current research program also
is uncovering an intimate association between the
origin and evolution of life on Earth and the proc-
esses that shaped the evolution of the solar system
itself. These discoveries have highlighted gaps in
our knowledge which, when completed as the
program expands, will ultimately allow tests of
the concept of universality of biological proc
esses.
It may be useful to describe one additiona
space science program that has now been sig
nificantly cut back, because this cutback has
ramifications for future international cooperation
in space applications.
The international solar polar mission (ISPM) was
a joint NASA and European Space Agency mis-
sion designed to obtain the first view of the solar
system from a new perspective—a view from far
above and far below the plane in which the plan-
ets orbit the Sun’s equator, i.e., over the poles
of the Sun. The two spacecraft would have aided
i n the study of the relationship between the Sun
and its magnetic field and particle emissions (solar
wind and cosmic rays) as a function of solar lati-
tude, and hence might have allowed us to gain
insight into the possible effects of solar activity
on the Earth’s weather and climate. The objec-
tive of the international solar polar mission was
to conduct an exploration of those regions of the
heliosphere above and below the equatorial
plane of the Sun. Observations in the extreme,
high-latitude regions of the sun have not been
made before, and evidence indicates that this
region of space is greatly different from the region
in which the Earth is located.
The U.S. spacecraft for ISPM was canceled on
account of budget constraints. The issues raised
by its cancellation are discussed in chapter 7.
PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON SPACE
Democratic government is based on the prem- ers, and molders of public attitudes and opinion
ise that there should be some linkage between as well as representatives of the public in the
public attitudes and political choice, not only in political process. Thus, the following account of
general but also with respect to specific issues on public attitudes about the space program needs
the public agenda. This linkage is not a one-way to be interpreted with the understanding that gen-
path, of course; public officials are leaders, teach- eral public opinion is only one determinant of
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public policy, and that its influence is rarely
direct. Public opinion more frequently acts as a
general constraint, setting boundaries within
which political leaders are free to chose, or as
an indirect shaping influence on the attitudes of
elites inside and outside of government; most
often, it is these attitudes that are closely cor-
related with specific policy choices.
From this analysis it follows that:
1.
2.
During the early years of the U.S. space pro-
gram, the general public was willing to ac-
cept the interpretation of society’s leaders
as to the significance of space activities. This
made it possible for the United States to first
adopt a moderate response to Soviet space
achievement, then to reverse policy and to
enter into competition with the Soviets, even
though public attitudes seemed to be op-
posed to such competition.
More recently, public understanding of the
space program, - and a supportive public at-
titude toward that program, have increased
to the point where they may have political
impact. Although an official’s position on
space-related issues may not be a crucial
determinant of electoral success, prospace
attitudes, and particularly, groups organized
to reflect them, appear to be having some
impact in influencing public policy with
respect to the U.S. space program.
It is important, however, even if the second of
these propositions is accepted, to recognize that
“while it has considerable intellectual interest and
entertainment value, space exploration is not a
daily concern of the general public. . . . The lev-
els of interest and information in this area are es-
pecially Iow.”s Thus it is likely that public atti-
tudes will provide the background, but not much
more, against which national space policy will
continue to be formulated.
Public Opinion and Space Policy: 1965-80
A striking example of a leadership decision not
being constrained by apparent public opinion is
the U.S. commitment to a manned lunar landing.
In the very month that President John F. Kennedy
announced that he was setting as a national goal
a lunar expedition before 1970, the Gallup Poll
reported that the public was opposed by a 58 to
33 percent margin to spending the up to $40 bil-
lion such an enterprise would require, Until very
recently, only once since 1965 has the percen-
tage of U.S. adults calling for the United States
to do more in space exceeded the portion believ-
ing that the Government should do less. Figure
9 compares this division of opinion for the period
‘National Science Board, Science Indicators, /980, p. 169.
Figure 9.–Long-Term Trend Polling Results of U.S. Public Opinion on the Federal Space Effort
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NOTE: Responses to question of whether government should “do more” or “do less” In support of space exploration, 1985-1981.
SOURCE: For 1965-1975, Herbert Krugman, “Public Attitudes toward the Apollo Program, ” Journal of Comrnurr/cations, vol. 27, No. 4 (1977), More recent data are
derived from Trendex Polls taken for the General Electric Co.
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from 1965 to 1981; the recent shift toward a
markedly more prospace position is clear from
this chart.
Table 10, which reports opinions for the 1973-
80 period, is even more revealing, both in terms
of the longer term trends and in terms of the cur-
rent uprising in prospace opinion. Only in recent
years have space “antagonists” comprised less
than an absolute majority, and the explicitly pro-
space group grew only slowly, from 7.4 percent
in 1973 to 11.6 percent in 1978. Most recently,
however, the figure for those believing the United
States is spending too little on space has jumped
to 18 percent, and space antagonists are now
only 39 percent of the total. The size of the
“space neutral” segment has stayed constant,
and thus the gain in support for expanded space
spending appears to reflect a real shift in opinion.
In 1980, for the first time, those of the opinion
that space spending should not be lowered out-
numbered those holding the opposite view, 53
percent to 39 percent.6
While prospace opinion appears to be increas-
ing, the priority assigned to the space program
has historically remained low. Tables 11 and 12
demonstrate this both for Government priorities
in general (table 11) and for priorities within sci-
ence and technology (table 12). What is most rel-
evant in table 11 is that only the “military, arma-
ments, and defense” category showed a greater
increase in percentage in favor between 1977 and
1980 than did the “space exploration program,”
although this increase only moved space one
rank up the priority scale. According to one ana-
lyst, “the increasing approval of space activities
among Americans over the past several years is
GRobert  D. McWilliams,  “The Improving Socio-Political  Situation
of the American Space Program in the Early 1980’ s,” paper prepared
for Fifth Princeton/AIAA Conference on Space Manufacturing, May
1981, p. 2.
Table IO.—Distribution of Opinion Toward Federal Spending on the Space Program:
1973 Through 1980 (percentages)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1980
Too little . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 7.7 7.4 9.1 10.1 11.6 18.0
About right . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29.3 27.5 30.1 28.0 34.4 35.0 34.6
Too much . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.4 61.0 58.1 60.2 49.6 47.2 39.1
Don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 3.6 4.4 2.5 5.9 6.5 8.3
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE National Opinion  Research Center Polls as reported In Robert D. McWilllams,  “The Improving  Soclo-Political Situa-
tion  of the American Space Program in the Early 1980s, ” paper prepared for Fifth Princeton/AIAA Conference on
Space Manufacturing, May 1981
Table ll.—Percentages of Americans Favoring Increased Funding, and Relative
Priority Rankings, for 11 Areas of Federal Government Spending, 1977 and 1980
1977 1977 1980 1980 Percent
percent rank percent rank increase
Halting the rising crime rate . . . . . . . . . . . 70.0 1 72.0 1 2.0
Dealing with drug addiction . . . . . . . . . . . 59.5 64.5 2 5.0
Improving-protecting Nation’s health . . . 58.5 : 57.1 4 – 1.4
Improving-protecting the environment . . 51.2 4 50.8 6 – 0,4
Improving Nation’s education system. . . 49.5 5 54.9 5 5.4
Solving problems of the big cities . . . . . . 46.9 6 45.8 7 - 1 . 1
Improving conditions for blacks. . . . . . . . 27.3 26.2 8 – 1.1
Military, armaments and defense . . . . . . 25.7 ; 60.2 3 34.5
Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.0 9 14.0 10 1.0
Space exploration program . . . . . . . . . . . 10.7 10 19.6 9 8.9
Foreign aid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 11 5.4 11 1.7
SOURCE’ Robert D. McWilliams,  “The  lmProving  Socio-Political  Situation of the American Space Program in the Early 1980s,”
paper prepared for Fifth Princeton/AIAA  Conference on Space Manufacturing, May 1981
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Table 12.—Public Priorities for Federal R&D Spending
Most preferred Least preferred
Funding objective Response Rank Response Rank
Improving health care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Developing energy sources and
conserving energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Improving education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reducing crime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Developing or improving methods
for producing food . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reducing and controlling pollution . . . . . . . . . .
Developing or improving weapons
for outer space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Preventing and treating drug addiction . . . . . . .
Developing faster and safer public
transportation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Improving the safety of automobiles . . . . . . . . .
Finding better birth control methods . . . . . . . . .
Discovering new basic knowledge about
man and nature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Exploring outer space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Predicting and controlling the weather . . . . . . .
815
754
630
587
368
358
266
259
210
155
139
135
99
60
11
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
60
40
55
82
253
113
403
195
430
284
705
577
705
592
12
14
13
11
8
10
5
7
1,5
4
1.5
3
technology funding from your tax money?”
not a trend that is riding mainly on the coattails
of militarism or growing faith in science and tech-
nology. Rather, it seems that Americans may be
coming to view the space program as being con-
ducive to the achievement of other types of goals
of which they are in favor. ”7
One indication of what the public expects from
space exploration is presented in table 13. A na-
tional survey taken for NSF asked adults to iden-
tify benefits they believed would result from ex-
ploring outer space. Listed in table 13 are those
benefits mentioned either first or second by re-
spondents. What is striking about the results is
the high ranking given to an indirect benefit of
the program (“improve other technologies”) and
the low rankings given to direct economic bene-
fits (“find industrial use, “ “create jobs and other
economic benefits”). Compared with other tech-
nology-related issues such as nuclear power
or chemical food additives, a greater proportion
of Americans see space exploration as produc-
ing substantially more benefits than potential
harm.8
It is possible to construct a profile of those who
most “support” and those who most “oppose”
the U.S. space program, if “support” and “op-
pose” are defined as deviations of more than 10
percent from the average of all Americans. Table
14 contains such a profile, Those who support
the space program tend to have one or more of
the following characteristics: male, between 25
and 34, college-educated, professional or tech-
nical employment, working for government, in-
come over $25,000/yearr and living in the West.
Opponents of the space program tend to be:
female, over 65, black, less than a high school
degree, laborers and service workers, and under
$5,000 income. One more relevant characteristic
that emerges from another opinion study is that
those who support increased space spending are
significantly more likely to vote than those who
believe that too much is spent on space; over 72
percent of those who supported an increase in
space budgets in 1980 voted in the 1976 Presi-
dential election, while only 56 percent of those
calling for reduced spending voted that year.9
71 bid., p. 8
‘National Science Board, op. cit., p. 170. 9MclA/illiams, op. cit., p. 16.
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Table 13.—Perceived Benefits From Space Exploration
First or
Benefits second mention
Improve other technologies (e.g., computers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
Find mineral or other wealth, other resources, sources of energy . . . . . . . . 200
Increase knowledge of universe and/or of man’s origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
Find new areas for future habitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Contact other civilizations, other forms of life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Improve rocketry and missile (military) technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Find industrial use for space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Find new kinds of food/places to raise more food products . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Create jobs and other economic benefits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Learn about weather and how to control it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
SOURCE: Institute of Survey Research, p. 164
Table 14.—Profile of Public Attitudes of Space
Exploration: “In General, Do You Favor or Oppose the
Exploration of Outer Space?”
Percent Percent
Group characteristics favor oppose
All . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 31
Men. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 22
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 38
Age 25 t0 34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 23
Age over 65 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 50
Black . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 49
O to 8 years of schooling . . . . . . . . . . . 32 50
9 to 11 years of schooling . . . . . . . . . . 40 50
Some college, no degree . . . . . . . . . . 74 19
Bachelor’ s degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 15
Graduate degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 10
Professional or technical job. . . . . . . 78 16
Operatives and laborers . . . . . . . . . . . 43 43
Service workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 41
Work for government . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 17
Under $5,000 income . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 55
$25,000 to $49,999 income . . . . . . . . . 76 17
Over $50,000 income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 15
Live in West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 20
aonlY those ~ha~acteristics tflat differ by more than 10 Percent ‘rem overall
opinion are included.
SOURCE: Institute for Survey Research, Vo/ //, Deta//ed  Fmd/rrgs,  p 170.
The demographic makeup of the “prospace”
group appears to be undergoing some changes
in recent years, although its general characteris-
tics as profiled in table 11 have remained stable.
Among those changes:
l recent increases in prospace attitude are
much more marked among the most highly
educated;
l formerly, “lower” and “working” classes
were more antispace than were “middle”
and “upper” classes. Recently, however, the
“middle” and “working” have become
l
l
more space positive than either “upper” or
“lower” class respondents;
prospace attitudes have increased substan-
tially among whites and only negligibly
among blacks; and
support for space is increasing faster for
divorcees than for any other marital class.10
There has been a suggestion that the shifts in
space-positive attitudes with respect to variables
of social class and education “provide a classic
example of how social change tends to begin and
develop in society. Innovations generally find
their beginnings in the ideas and efforts of the
more highly educated members of the upper-
middle class and, if they survive and grow more
prevalent in the upper strata, they then tend to
catch on at the lower socioeconomic levels.” The
same analyst argues that “the resurgence of
space-positivism in America since 1975 was
spawned by the upper and middle social classes.
The trend then began to spread throughout the
general public with the classic pattern that has
characterized other prominent American social
movements such as the feminist and civil rights
crusaders.’” 11
One of the most striking recent developments
in the space policy field is the emergence of a
number of organized prospace groups. As the
quotation just cited suggests, the aggregation of
individual opinions into more-or-less broadly
based interest groups with middle and working
class roots is part of the traditional pattern by
IOMCwilliarnS,  o p .  cit., pp. 10-1s.
11 Ibid., p. 14.
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which issues are given increased attention on the
public agenda. perhaps this is what is happen-
ing with respect to space. The following section
describes the recent emergence of a space in-
terest group network.
Interest Groups and Space Policy
During the 1970’s, interest groups organized
around one or a few issues and claiming to repre-
sent broad sectors of the general popuIation—
so-called “public” interest groups—became an
increasingly important influence on public policy.
In part, the increased influence came at the ex-
pense of political parties as vehicles for articulat-
ing, influencing, and implementing the public’s
policy preferences.12 Thus the rapid increase in
space interest groups in recent years may be a
development of political significance. A May 1980
survey of space interest groups identified 39 orga-
nizations with nationwide activities.ls In the past
2 years, and particularly with the transition in ad-
ministrations, there have been a number of one-
time efforts organized ad hoc to mobilize opinion
on space policy; these groups have provided a
base for such mobilization efforts.
There is an active “Coordinating Committee on
Space” that attempts to identify areas of agree-
ment and disagreement among the major pro-
space groups; its membership includes 11 of the
most active organizations. There are two general
types of prospace groups: 1 ) traditional profes-
sional groups, and 2) citizen support groups.
Most prominent among the former are:
. American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, the professional society for
people in the aeronautics and astronautics
field, with almost 30,000 members.
l American Astronautic/ Society, a group of
individuals with professional interest in
space. Current membership is about 1,000.
1 zchar[es  Chafer, “The Role of Public Interest Groups In SPace
Policy, ” jerry  Grey and Christine Krop (eds.), Space A4anufactur-
irrg ///, Proceedings of the Fourth Princeton/AIAA Conference (New
York: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1979),
pp. 185-189.
13Trudy  Bell, “Space Activists on the Rise, ” /nsight, August-
September 1980, pp. 1, 3, 10, 13-15.
l
l
l
Aerospace Industries Association, a consor-
tium of major aerospace firms that functions
as a trade association.
Nationa/ Space C/ub,  a Washington-based
group of business and government leaders
in the space field.
University Space Research Association, a
consortium of universities active in space
research that operates several facilities under
NASA contract.
Among the most active and/or largest of the
public interest or citizen support space groups
are:
l
l
l
l
l
l
De/ta-Vee,  a citizen-supported, nonprofit
corporation that channels public contribu-
tions into the support of specific space activ-
ities, such as the continued operation of the
Viking spacecraft on Mars and a U.S. Hal-
ley’s Comet Mission.
High Frontier, a group formulating a national
strategy to make maximum use of space
technology to counter the threat of Soviet
military power, to replace current nuclear
strategy with one based on space defense,
and to promote the industrial and commer-
cial potentials of space.
Institute for the Social Science Study of
Space, which sponsors research and publica-
tions related to the social science aspects of
space exploration and development.
L-5 Society, which emphasizes human settle-
ment in space as a long-term goal. Founded
in 1975 by Gerard K. O’Neill,  it has broad-
ened its scope to most aspects of space pol-
icy. Its membership is between 3,OOO and
4,OOO individuals.
Nationa/ Space /nstitute, the largest of the
broadly based space groups, with over
10,000 members. Founded in 1975 by Wern-
her von Braun, its emphasis is on communi-
cation with general audiences.
P/anetary  Society, which promotes aware-
ness of and public involvement in planetary
exploration and search for extraterrestrial
life. Publishes newsletter, supports research,
organizes meetings. Has grown to over
100,000 members in just over a year.
———
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l
l
l
Space Foundation, a private foundation for
support of space industrialization.
Space Studies Institute, a research perform-
ing and supporting group with focus on use
of nonterrestrial resources.
World Space Foundation, a group support-
ing research projects to accelerate space ex-
ploration (e.g., solar sail).
The purposes of these and other space groups
fall into three general categories:
1. educating and informing the public;
2. conducting research themselves; and
3. funding external research.
Recently added to the list are groups explicitly
engaging in political activities. There were at-
tempts to organize prospace Political Action
Committees (PACS) for the 1980 election, and at
least one prospace PAC remains in existence.
The influence of these various organizations
and groups on space policy is difficult to estimate.
Certainly, as the Reagan administration took of-
fice in january 1981 and as the proposed NASA
budget was cut several times in the following
year, there have been a number of attempts by
one or a coalition of these groups to mobilize
opinion in support of specific projects (e.g., a mis-
sion to Halley’s Comet) or for the civilian space
program in general. Whether the reductions in
the NASA budget would have been even more
severe, had not these groups been active, is a
question difficult or impossible to answer.
Finally, note should be taken of the emergence
of a Congressional Space Caucus, and a support-
ing Congressional Staff Space Group. This caucus
is initially limited to the House of Representatives;
its goal is to increase the awareness of Members
and staff of the benefits of the Nation’s space
effort.
Space Achievement and
Public Opinion: 1981
With two successful flights of the shuttle Col-
umbia and the encounter of Voyager 2 with
Saturn, 1981 was a year of spectacular space
achievement for the United States. Several public
opinion polls have confirmed that the citizens of
the United States were quite supportive of these
achievements.
l
l
l
A May 1981 Harris survey, taken less than
1 month after the initial shuttle flight, found
76 percent of Americans calling the shuttle
“a major breakthrough for U.S. technology
and know-how’ and a 63 to 33 percent
majority favoring the expenditure of several
billions of dollars over the next decade to
develop the full potential of the shuttle. The
Harris poll noted that “after the 1969 Moon
landing, a 64 to 30 percent majority did not
feel it was worthwhile to spend an additional
$4 billion on the Apollo space program” and
commented that “current support for spend-
ing on the space program is even more sig-
nificant in view of the current overwhelm-
ing preference for cutting Federal spend-
ing. ”
An August 1981 Associated Press-NBC
survey found that 60 percent of U.S. adults
thought that the United States was not
spending enough or was spending about the
right amount on the space program, and 66
percent believed that the shuttle was a good
investment for the United States.
An October 1981 Associated Press-NBC poll
confirmed the results of the earlier survey,
finding that 60 percent of respondents think
the shuttle program is a good investment, 30
percent do not, and 10 percent aren’t sure.
A further examination of the results of the May
Harris poll suggests both that support for the
space program is not evenly distributed across
all strata of U.S. society and that the reasons for
the support differ substantially among respond-
ents (see tables 15 and 16). The August poll found
that 49 percent of respondents believed that the
emphasis of the Nation’s space program should
be primarily on national defense, 32 percent cited
scientific exploration, 10 percent cited both, and
9 percent were not sure. By October, these re-
sponses had shifted, with 43 percent in support
of a defense emphasis and 40 percent favoring
an emphasis on scientific exploration. In this lat-
ter poll, 46 percent of respondents believed that
the United States should keep its space program
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Table 15.—How Would You Rank the Importance of Various Uses
of the Space Shuttle?
Only Not very
Very somewhat important
important important at all Not sure
Percent Percent Percent Percent
Doing experiments with new
pharmaceutical products that can
help cure disease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 11 5 2
Developing a military capability in
space beyond what the Russians are
doing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 20 10 2
Putting new communications satellites
in space at a much lower cost . . . . . . 64 25 9 2
Doing scientific research on metals,
chemicals, and living cells in space . 55 27 16 2
Picking up other U.S. space satellites
and repairing them in space. . . . . . . . 47 32 19 2
SOURCE: May 1981 Harris Survey.
Table 16.— “IS the Space Shuttle Program Worth
Spending Severai Billion Dollars Over the Next 10
Years to Develop its Full Potential?”
Not
Worth it worth it Not sure
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
College educated . . . . .
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Blacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Republicans . . . . . . . . .
Democrats . . . . . . . . . .
Conservatives. . . . . . . .
Liberals . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Percent
63
71
76
52
45
71
57
66
57
Percent
33
26
21
43
53
26
39
30
41
Percent
4
3
3
2
3
4
4
2
SOURCE: May 1981 Harris Survey.
separate from the programs of other nations, 32
percent favored a joint space program between
the United States and the U. S. S. R., and 15 per-
cent favored joint ventures with other countries,
but not with the Soviet Union.
Opinion polls, taken singly, do not reveal fund-
amental views underlying the shifting tides of
opinion. Thus, the facts that by 1981 the success
of the shuttle and of the Voyager missions spurred
public interest in the U.S. space program and that
a clear majority of the public was found to favor
the program do not in themselves prove that
there is deep public support for space. But,
viewed in the context of a quarter century of
space activities, the recent upswing in opinion
in favor of the space program appears significant.
First of all, current support is part of a long-term
trend of increasing support. It cannot, therefore,
be explained as the result only of shuttle and
Voyager successes. Second, the trend of increas-
ing support coincides with the proliferation and
growth of citizens’ support groups. As public
education about space is perhaps the major over-
all goal of these groups, their efforts have been
the effect, if not the cause, of continued rising
interest in space. Third, the Space Caucus, aris-
ing as a “back bench” movement within Con-
gress, rather than in response to the leadership,
is evidence for a genuine space constituency, i.e.,
one whose real interests, economic, political, or
scientific, are at stake. These three conditions sug-
gest that public awareness of space issues is in-
creasing and that official space policy may begin
to receive more constant scrutiny among at least
the attentive public. This would seem to bode
well for those who believe that increased under-
standing of the benefits of U.S. activity in space
will lead to continued and firmer public support
for that activity.
—Chapter 6
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Chapter 6
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE CIVILIAN AND
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS
INTRODUCTION
Over the years, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), the Department of
Defense (DOD), and other Federal agencies have
evolved a set of interlocking responsibilities for
U.S. space activities. NASA is designated as the
lead agency for most U.S. civilian space efforts.
DOD, in accordance with the National Aeronau-
tics and Space (NAS) Act of 1958, undertakes “ac-
tivities peculiar to or primarily associated with the
development of weapons systems, military opera-
tions, or the defense of the United States (includ-
ing the research and development (R&D) neces-
sary to make effective provision for the defense
of the United States). ” Responsibility for coordi-
nating the efforts of the civilian and the military
programs was initially vested in the National Aer-
onautics and Space Council (see ch. 10) and a
Civilian-Military Liaison Committee, although
both were later abolished under Presidential re-
organization plans. It was explicitly recognized
that the President was ultimately responsible for
dividing specific responsibilities between DOD
and NASA.
The premise that there is a need for separate
civilian and national security space programs has
been examined and reaffirmed by several high-
Ievel policy reviews in the intervening years–
each concluding that the characteristics of the
primary missions of each program justified the
distinct institutional structures that had been de-
veloped. These reviews also affirmed that rela-
tions between the two programs should be con-
tinually scrutinized and that opportunities for
cooperation or better coordination should be
sought.
Now that NASA and DOD have been conduct-
ing space programs for nearly 25 years, under
separate charters but with overlapping interests,
it is appropriate to consider the current status and
probable future of their relationships in light of
overall U.S. civilian space policy. The recent rapid
growth and projections of even more rapid future
increases in military space programs and budgets
make such a reconsideration essential.
Access to Classified Information
Any analysis of the relationships between the
civilian and the national security programs that
is intended for public dissemination has to con-
front the problem of access to classified informa-
tion. Information is classified and placed under
restrictive security controls if its unrestricted
publication is deemed to harm the national secu-
rity. Classified data were not used in the prepara-
tion of this report. Though discussion of the im-
plications of classified-unclassified program rela-
tionships at an unclassified level is necessarily in-
complete and sometimes unconvincing, it is nev-
ertheless the only available approach to presen-
tation of such matters to the general public. The
material that follows has been written in such a
way as to provide sufficient insight into the types
of issues the classified programs generate and to
ensure that the analyses and discussion of options
are reasonable. Inevitably, there will be conclu-
sions or observations that could be evaluated
more completely in a classified document.
It must also be recognized that there are dif-
ferent degrees of classification within the military/
intelligence programs. The most highly classified
are the so-called “National Technical Means”
and related systems; information about these
systems is very closely kept, even within the na-
tional security community. These systems are
mostly involved in strategic reconnaissance.
Many military systems, on the other hand, such
as communications and navigation satellites, are
not themselves classified, though certain details
of the technologies involved are kept secret.
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Cooperation Between DOD and NASA in U.S.
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Summary Assessment
Separate Programs
Space systems provide an increasing number
of vital services to support a variety of military
and intelligence missions. Continued technolog-
ical advances, along with the need to counter an
increasing level of military space activities by the
Soviet Union, will expand the range of desirable
national security programs. Similarly, on the civil-
ian side advancing technology will make possi-
ble space activities that could contribute signifi-
cantly to a number of high-priority national objec-
tives. These include: 1 ) to enhance the image and
prestige of the United States through continuing
man-in-space activities; 2) to provide a base for
commercial space services, most notably for com-
munications; 3) to conduct research; 4) to extend
the technology base for space and launching
systems; and 5) to perform valuable public serv-
ices such as meteorological observations, storm
warning, and other Earth observation or commu-
nication tasks.
In today’s environment of growth in expendi-
tures for national security combined with reduc-
tions in civilian activities, it is necessary to con-
sider the continued appropriateness of separate
programs and separate institutions. This is
especially important with the advent of the space
transportation system, which represents a large
new area of common interest and new opportu-
nities for technology sharing. Three basic options
seem possible: 1 ) separate civilian and military
programs; 2) independent space R&D agency for
all Federal space programs, civilian and military;
and 3) absorption of NASA by DOD and other
Federal agencies. These options are discussed
under the heading “Institutional Change. ”
Technology Transfer
Classification barriers necessarily protect sensi-
tive national security information, but their ex-
istence disposes many in the civilian community
to attribute unknown but vastly superior capa-
bilities to classified systems. This leads to the
claim that if military technology could be trans-
ferred more rapidly and more thoroughly to the
civilian sector, civilian programs would benefit
greatly from these superior capabilities. This view
is, for the most part, oversimplified and fails to
recognize important differences in agency mis-
sions and the resulting needs for space systems.
Different mission objectives entail different em-
phases on performance characteristics and other
design considerations in the development and
adaptation of advanced technology. For exam-
ple, a military system may have to be able to
operate in a hostile environment, so that military
specifications are frequently more stringent than
those for civilian purposes.
Nevertheless, the adequacy of technology
transfer between civilian and national security
programs remains an important issue that will be
examined in some detail in this chapter, The fol-
lowing observations summarize this analysis:
l
l
l
l
Technology flows in both directions, and
both sectors have benefited from such trans-
fers. General-use space technology is trans-
ferred with relativ ease; mission-specific
technology only with great difficulty.
There are few incentives and, frequently,
practical penalties for either a national secu-
rity or a civilian program manager to enter
cooperative technology sharing arrange-
ments with other programs.
The need to protect certain information and
technology for national security purposes
limits its accessibility to civilian users.
Procedures exist to enable selected individ-
uals from civilian agencies to gain access to
classified systems and information, but this
access is imperfect for a variety of reasons;
continued management attention is needed
to keep these procedures functioning effec-
tively.
Asymmetrical Relationships
The need to protect national security space ac-
tivities and products results in a continuing asym-
metry in the relationships between the two pro-
grams. In general, systems operated by DOD are
of high national priority; they are established in
response to needs that are not easily questioned
by those outside of the national security decision-
making structure. Similarly, the determination of
the boundary between classified and unclassified
technology is made within the national security
community. As a result, limitations have been set
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on the allowable performance of civilian systems.
These limitations tend to persist and act as con-
tinuing constraints on civilian users; in some
cases, the civilian user community does not know
the details of the restrictions that exist. There are
few opportunities for the civilian community to
question these restrictions, except within forums
such as the National security Council (NW,
where civilian agency interests are inevitably of
secondary importance. These asymmetries sug-
gest the need for a forum in which the civilian
and national security space relationships can be
equitably reviewed from a disinterested perspec-
tive, as discussed in chapters 3 and 10.
National security concerns affect most, if not
all, civilian space applications programs; there-
fore, a discussion of the relationships between
the two sectors is especially pertinent to this
assessment. An outline of the DOD-operated pro-
grams is given in the following section, but the
limitations that result from describing them on
the basis of unclassified data must be kept in
mind.
STATUS OF NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS
The national security uses of space technology
are quite varied; however, they are all “applica-
tions” in that space technology is one means to
achieve various national security objectives. The
United States depends heavily on space-based
systems: 1 ) to conduct continuing surveillance of
activities in many areas of the world, particular-
ly those controlled by its potential adversaries,
and to monitor compliance with international
agreements; 2) to provide timely warning of at-
tacks on the United States and allied territory; and
3) to communicate with U.S. military forces
around the world and at sea. The U.S. national
security community is also actively exploring
other space activities, including: 1 ) the need to
protect both civilian and security assets already
in orbit from Soviet antisatellite systems; 2) the
ability to assure “freedom of the roads” for U.S.
spacecraft and launch vehicles by developing a
deterrent in the form of an antisatellite intercep-
tor; 3) and the long-range potential of space-
based weapons for defending the United States
and its allies against hostile actions. The sum total
of these activities comprises a fast growing na-
tional security space program; many military ana-
lysts see space technology as having a revolution-
ary impact on national strategy and national pow-
er in coming years. ’
‘A recent study of the potentials of armed conflict in space is G.
Harry Stine, Confrontation in Space (Prentice-Hall, 1981); see also
the recently published report High Frontier, from the Heritage
Foundation.
Current Systems
Precise figures regarding expenditures for
DOD-supported space efforts are unavailable
because many of them are classified. Figure 10
compared published data on spending for civilian
(NASA) and military (DOD) space activities. Over
the past several years, the national security
budget has been growing at a much faster rate
than the civilian one, and is now larger in abso-
lute terms than the civilian budget. When one
recognizes that the single major item in the NASA
budget, the shuttle, will have DOD as its single
largest user, the emphasis on national security ap-
plications of space becomes even more marked.
Current national security space systems per-
form (although in a very different context) func-
tions similar to those performed by civilian space
systems. Classification of these systems prohibits
a full description of them in this analysis;2 the
following brief descriptions are thus intended on-
ly to emphasize the support role played by cur-
rently operational national security space sys-
tems:
zFUrther  information on intelligence and defense activities in space
is contained in, for example, Trudy E. Bell, “America’s Other Space
Program,” The Sciences, December “1979; Eberhard Rechtin,
“Future Milita~  Applications in Space,” Speech to International
Aerospace Symposium, Paris, June  1981; Thomas H. Karas, /rnp/ica-
tions  of Space Technology for Strategic Nuclear Competition, Oc-
casional Paper 25, The Stanley Foundation; j. Preston Layton, “Mil-
itary Space in Transition, ” Aeronautics and Astronautics, October
1981; the annual Aeronautics and Space Report of the President
contains an approved description of naticmal security space efforts.
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l Earth observation. —It was only in October
1978 that the existence of strategic surveil-
lance satellites was officially acknowledged
by an American President,3 although the
media and general public had assumed their
existence for many years. Earth observation
satellites are used to perform several different
national security-related functions, including:
1. early warning of missile attack;
2. verification of compliance in related in-
ternational arms-control agreements
such as nuclear testing and strategic mis-
sile deployment; and
3. surveillance of various areas of the
world to gather data required for U.S.
strategic and tactical planning.
Miiitary systems require degrees and kinds
of performance not required for civilian pur-
poses. Many different kinds of satellites and
sensors are used to satisfy specific require-
ments. To the degree that military systems
JPresident  Carter gave public recognition to the existence of in-
telligence satellites during an Oct. 1, 1978 speech at the Kennedy
Space Center.
l
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are more specialized and provide advanced
performance, transfer of this technology to
the civilian sector will continue to be an
issue, especially as civilian needs become
more specialized in turn.4
Communications. –Although the bulk of
routine military messages are carried over
civilian-operated communication circuits,
both terrestrial and satellite, there is also a
variety of satellite communications systems
available for the exclusive use of the military
services and national command authorities.
These military satellites are crucial links in
the Nation’s command, control, and com-
munications systems; approximately one-
third of U.S. long-distance military traffic
goes by dedicated DOD satellites.
A continuing problem in national secur-
ity communications via satellite is how to
4A Pionwring  analysis  of the use of space SYStETTIS  for surveillance
and warning is Philip Klass, Secret Sentries in Space (Random House,
1971 ); see also, “Study on the Implications of Establishing an in-
ternational Satellite Monitoring Agency,” prepared for the 2d U.N.
Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, Aug. 6, 1981, pp. 15-18.
— —
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combine various existing and future systems
into a coherent “architecture” which would
allow the integrated use of communications
capability by both civilian and military
authorities under various crisis and conflict
situations. At issue here is how dependent
the military should be on nonmilitary com-
munications channels and how much invest-
ment the military should make to ensure
that civilian channels are survivable and l
secure under various conditions. For exam-
ple, there has been substantial attention
given to protecting the tracking and data
relay satellites so that they can be used for
defense as well as civilian purposes.
Navigation. –There has been a long tradition
in the United States of providing navigation
services for both military and civilian uses;
that tradition has been extended into the l
joint use of operational Navy navigation sat-
ellites. DOD’s global positioning satellite
(GPS) system, now in an advanced stage of
development, will provide navigation assist-
ance and position location for all military
services, and will also be available for civilian
use, albeit with somewhat degraded capa-
bilities. Six Navstar satellites are now in orbit,
with a total of 18 envisaged for the complete
system.
Meteorology. —The military operates its own
weather satellites using technology rather
similar to the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA) satellites that
serve civilian needs. There have been several
analyses of the potential for combining civii-
ian and military meteorological satellite oper-
ations into a single system, but no such
merger has been approved.
Transportation. -The national security com-
munity has used the same launch vehicles,
Cooperation Between DOD and NASA in Meteorological Satellites
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with certain variations, (except for the
Saturn-class boosters used exclusively for
manned Apollo launches) to boost its satel-
lites into orbit as has the civilian space pro-
gram (e.g., Atlas-Agena, Titan 11, Atlas-Cen-
taur, Titan Ill). This pattern will continue with
the shuttle. However, the military has sepa-
rate checkout and launch facilities, both at
Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg Air Force
Base, for expendable launch vehicles, and
is building a shuttle launch complex at
Vandenberg. joint use of the shuttle implies
joint use of mission control facilities at
Johnson Space Center, though the Air Force
is hoping to construct its own Consolidated
Space Operations Center in Colorado
Springs. There has been some suggestion of
two separate shuttle fleets, one for civilian
and one for national security use.
Future Developments
For the most part the systems discussed above
support ground-, sea-, and air-based military
operations and extend or enhance existing logis-
tical capabilities. Under consideration now, how-
ever, are weapons systems that couId operate in
space. There is a vigorous science and technology
development program oriented toward a wide
range of future applications, including antisatellite
systems and directed energy weapons. If the
United States should decide to develop and de-
ploy some sort of space-based, antisatellite or bal-
listic missile defense system, such an effort would
require a major expansion of our space infrastruc-
ture, including the development of space plat-
forms, space power systems, and space construc-
tion facilities. Pursuing such a course would im-
ply major changes in strategic thinking, and thus
a decision to develop space weapons systems is
as much an issue of national policy as it is of tech-
nological potentials
Another area of future development is manned
military space operations. Some see a need for
manned observation, inspection, command and
control, servicing, or other operations in Earth
orbit. Military use of the shuttle will provide expe-
5Rechtin, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
rience on which to base future decisions on the
military role of man in space.
Large-scale development and deployment of
manned and unmanned military systems in
space, beyond those currently required for sup-
port purposes, will be based on decisions, not
yet made, concerning military doctrine and na-
tional policy. The notion that space is a fourth
theater of war which can supplement or supplant
air, sea, and ground operations is not fully ac-
cepted by either the civilian or the military leader-
ship of the national security community. Exten-
sive manned military operations and/or weapons
in space are still very much in the exploratory
stage. In addition, current international treaties,
such as the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with
the Soviet Union, as well as hopes for future arms-
control agreements, may prevent or delay the de-
ployment of space weaponry. There is a substan-
tial degree of international concern, expressed
at the United Nations (U. N.) and elsewhere,
about any expansion of the arms race into outer
space.
Civilian-National Security
Relationships in Space: 1957-81
The decision to house defense-related space
operations and the R&D leading to them within
DOD and to create a new civilian agency for non-
defense space research were made in the imme-
diate wake of Sputnik, as the Eisenhower adminis-
tration began to organize the U.S. space effort.
These decisions were controversial; individuals
both in and outside Government, particularly in
Congress, the defense industry, and the military
services, believed that the Nation should under-
take a single integrated space program under mil-
itary management.G However, President Eisen-
hower and the majority of Congress believed that
there were significant advantages for the coun-
try in separating the national space effort into
separate elements and in creating a separate man-
- —
bThe  following account of the origins and early evolution of U.S.
space policy and institutions is drawn from a number of sources
including: John  Logsdon, The Future of the U.S. Space Program
(Praeger Publishers, 1975); Robert L. RoshIt, An Administrative His-
tory of NASA, /953-1963, NASA, 1966, and Enid Bok Schoettle,
“The Establishment of NASA, ” in Know/edge of Power: Essays on
Science and Government, The Free Press, 1966.
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agement and institutional structure for each
element.
Similarly, President Kennedy rejected the no-
tion, raised early in his administration, of com-
bining NASA and Air Force space programs under
military auspices. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy
viewed the national space effort as having distinct
civilian and military components, and decided
to use the civilian space program as one of the
major arenas for competition with the Soviet
Union.
Early Policy Choices
Several factors influenced the decision by the
Eisenhower administration and by Congress to
establish a separate civilian space agency. One
reason was the view of the scientific community
that the major objectives of the civilian space pro-
gram should be scientific in character, and that
these objectives could best be met by a separate
agency not linked to DOD programs. A more tell-
ing concern was Eisenhower’s view that there
were specific and positive benefits for the United
States, in terms of both foreign policy and
domestic politics, in creating an open space pro-
gram under civilian control. These benefits were
particularly evident, given that the Soviet space
program was closed. The United States could
claim that its civilian space program was an accu-
rate reflection of the open, achievement-oriented
character of American society, while at the same
time developing whatever national security space
systems were deemed necessary through a sec-
ond, much less open program. Cooperation with
other countries, desirable both to meet specific
needs for access to sites for tracking stations, and
to further general foreign policy goals, would be
greatly facilitated by such a separation.
At the policy level, Eisenhower and his top ad-
visors did not deal with military and civilian space
efforts in isolation, but rather viewed them as
parts of a single national space program. Eisen-
hower authorized DOD to undertake whatever
military space efforts could be justified by existing
and future military requirements, but he did not
approve the futuristic plans generated within the
Air Force (such as a manned Moon-base) and the
Army. Nor did he approve ambitious NASA plans
for the 1960’s. There were attempts to develop
a comprehensive national space policy under
NSC auspices. The objective of such a policy was
the development and exploitation of U.S. outer
space capabilities to achieve scientific, military,
and political goals, and to establish the United
States as a recognized leader in this field. How-
ever, Eisenhower and his advisors did not believe
that the political returns from space achievement
were large enough to merit a major investment
of resources, and thus were unwilling to approve
an aggressive civilian space program aimed at po-
litical objectives.
President Kennedy was willing to approve such
a program, however, and, in Apollo, the United
States undertook an enterprise justified primar-
ily by national prestige and political payoff.7 The
policy that Ied to the Apollo commitment was for-
mulated in the context of developing an inte-
grated national space policy. Apollo was the cen-
terpiece of an across-the-board acceleration of
both civilian and military space programs, aimed
at achieving U.S. preeminence in all areas of
space technology. Kennedy was told that “the
nonmilitary, noncommercial, nonscientific but
civilian projects such as lunar and planetary ex-
ploration are . . . part of the battle along the fluid
front of the Cold War.”B
While Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy
both desired a national space program in con-
sonance with overall national policy objectives,
one which maximized returns on both the civilian
and military investments of national resources,
coordination of the two programs was not a
straightforward matter. During the 1960’s the
civilian space program, and particularly its cen-
tral activity, Apollo, developed in ways that made
close interactions with major defense space appli-
cations difficult. Although NASA did maintain
Earth-oriented science and applications pro-
grams, its major manned and unmanned efforts
such as Apollo and planetary exploration were
oriented outward, away from Earth. Though there
were attempts to undertake joint planning for
tracking stations, meteorological satellites, and
7A full account of the Apollo decision is contained in Logsdon,
op. cit.
Blbid.,  p. 126.
Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs l 153
geodetic satellites, none of these resulted in close-
ly integrated civilian-military activities. The ex-
ception was in the area of launch vehicles. NASA
used the Atlas, developed by the Air Force, for
its Mercury program and the Air Force developed
Titan for the Gemini program. In fact, with the
exception of Saturn, which was used only for
NASA’s Apollo program, launch vehicles for all
these manned satellites were shared; DOD had
no use for such a large and expensive launch
vehicle as Saturn. As DOD requirements for some
launch vechicles, such as the Thor and Atlas,
decreased, these were transferred to NASA.
In particular, the decision to accomplish Apollo
by means of lunar-orbit rendezvous (LOR) was
a watershed in separating civilian and military
manned space flight programs for almost a dec-
ade.9 There was extensive controversy preceding
the decision for LOR. Many argued that if Earth-
orbit rendezvous were used to accomplish
Apollo, the knowledge gained from rendezvous
of spacecraft and assembly of structurs in low-
Earth orbit would be valuable not only for the
lunar program, but also for national security activ-
ities. However, NASA, driven by a desire to meet
the lunar landing goal before 1970, chose LOR
as the method most likely to make this achieve-
ment possible. This choice, in addition to NASA’s
emphasis on planetary exploration in its un-
manned scientific programs, to a large degree
separated the central element of the NASA pro-
gram from national security space efforts during
the 1960’s and early 1970’s.
Program Relationships in the Early Years
The NAS Act, which provided for separate civil-
ian and national security space programs, also
called for “close cooperation among all interested
agencies of the United States in order to avoid
unnecessary duplication of effort, facilities, and
equipment. ” As this directive was carried out,
there were substantial interactions between civil-
ian and national security space efforts during the
first decade of the national space program, even
gjohn M. Logsdon, “Selecting the Way to the Moon: the Choice
of the Lunar Orbital Rendezvous Mode, ” Aerospace Historian, June
1971, contains an account of this decision.
though NASA had set its sights on the Moon. At
the project and program levels, these interactions
were on balance cooperative and productive.
However, at the policy and institutional level
there were, perhaps inevitably, stresses between
separate programs in the same technological
arena. It is beyond the scope of this assessment
to detail these interactions, but the following brief
summary may provide some sense of their char-
acter. 1°
MANNED SPACE FLIGHT
It was the armed services that during the 1950’s
did the first detailed planning for manned space
flight, but NASA was assigned the U.S. manned
mission in 1958. Project Mercury was based on
Air Force plans, and the Air Force was left with
only a modest, and never fully funded, space
glider program (Dyna-Soar), which was eventual-
ly canceled. At one point the Air Force contem-
plated a “Blue Gemini” program using NASA’s
Gemini vehicles; when NASA balked, DOD set-
tled for a modest series of experiments on Gemini
flights. Late in 1963, Defense Secretary Mc-
Namara approved the Manned Orbital Labora-
tory program for the Air Force. This program was
terminated in 1969 because foreseeable military
requirements were inadequate to justify it, despite
the $1.3 billion already spent. Since that time
NASA has had complete responsibility for the
manned flight portion of the national space pro-
gram, although this situation will change when
the shuttle begins to fly missions dedicated to na-
tional security.
LAUNCH VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT
Immediately after the acceleration of the U.S.
space program in 1961, there was an intensive
attempt to integrate future launch vehicle devel-
opments. This attempt was not successful, and
NASA went on to develop Saturn boosters for
Apollo missions while DOD added the Titan Ill
as the heavy-duty launcher for military and
intelligence programs. When it came time to con-
sider whether to continue to use Saturn as the
workhorse for the post-Apollo civilian space pro-
IOAn account of early INA!jA-DOD  relationships is contained in
W. Fred Boone, NASA Office of Defense Affairs: The First Five Years,
NASA Historical Note HHR-32, 1970.
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gram or to develop a new type of reusable launch
vehicle, the policy was made in an explicit con-
text of joint civilian-national security require-
ments, although the development task was as-
signed to NASA. That the shuttle would be a mul-
tiuse launch vehicle with its design suited to meet
defense and intelligence requirements as well as
civilian needs was essential to the program’s
approval. ’ 1 ,
COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES
Originally, NASA was assigned responsibility for
developing passive communications satellite
technology (e.g., Echo), whereas DOD devel-
oped active communications satellites. There was
an early shift in this division of labor, and NASA
by 1960 had begun to develop active communi-
cations satellites for civilian use. With the cancel-
lation of the Army’s ADVENT geosynchronous
satellite program due to technical and manage-
ment problems, it was left to NASA to develop
geosynchronous communications satellites,
which have proved to be the key to both civilian
and military satellite communications efforts. Dur-
ing the 1960’s and 1970’s both NASA and DOD
had active R&D programs investigating commu-
nications satellite technology appropriate to dif-
fering civilian and military requirements.
lljerw Grey, Enterprise (Morrow, 1979), PP. 66-68.
METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITES
DOD sponsored the initial research on meteor-
ological satellites; this work led to the TIROS pro-
gram, which was transferred to NASA and then
became the basis for the first operational civilian
weather satellite. DOD used the same contrac-
tor to develop weather satellites dedicated to
military uses. The result has been the existence
of two systems which, while using the same
“bus” contain different sensors and fly in different
orbits, and a continuing controversy over the
need for separate weather satellite systems.
EARTH OBSERVATION PROGRAMS
The advantages of the view from outer space
for strategic surveillance were obvious from the
beginning, and DOD and various intelligence
agencies began highly classified Earth observa-
tion programs. As the sensors developed for these
early national security programs (e.g., the Return
Beam Vidicon) were supplanted by more ad-
vanced models, some of them were declassified
and became part of NASA’s civilian remote sens-
ing experiments in the late 1960’s. There has
been a continuing tension between the desire to
maintain maximum secrecy about the capabilities
of U.S. surveillance systems and the desire to use
both the products of those systems and the com-
ponents developed for them for operational civil-
ian applications systems.
CURRENT POLICY AND POLICY REVIEW PROCESS
Policy Formulation and Program
Stresses in the Post-Apollo Period
Carrying out the Apollo commitment kept
NASA fully occupied during the 1960’s, and for
the most part relations between the civilian and
national security space programs were conducted
on a case-by-case basis, mainly at the project and
technology level. Only occasionally, as in the
controversy over control of Gemini and post-
Apollo manned programs, did the tensions rise
to the policy and institutional level. The major
channel for interaction was the Aeronautics and
Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB), a joint
NASA-DOD body. NASA also established an
Office of Defense Affairs, which was active in
maintaining liaison with defense and intelligence
space efforts. Tensions rarely escalated to a level
at which White House policy offices such as the
National Aeronautics and Space Council and the
Office of Science and Technology got involved
in their resolution.
During the past decade, however, there have
been several Presidential-level policy reviews of
the national space effort that have dealt with
civilian and national security programs in a com-
mon framework. Perhaps the basic point to be
made about these reviews is that each examined
and revalidated the policy that civilian, military,
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and intelligence programs should be carried out
in separate institutional frameworks, although
each review also recognized opportunities for
closer cooperation and coordination among
these separate programs.
The first such comprehensive review was car-
ried out during the summer of 1969 under the
auspices of a Space Task Group (STG), created
ad hoc and chaired by the Vice President. (The
deliberations of the STG are described in some
detail inch. 5.) President Nixon charged STG with
providing him a “definitive recommendation on
the direction the national space program should
take in the post-Apollo period. ”12 The review
considered future directions of both the civilian
and military space programs, but its focus was
on the future for the civilian manned program.
A major and lasting result of STG’S review was
the concept of a reusable space shuttle to serve
almost all national launch vehicle requirements,
from commercial uses to intelligence missions.
To realize this concept, technical characteristics,
as well as managerial and funding patterns, were
negotiated by NASA and DOD (represented pri-
marily by the Air Force). As has become evident
since the 1969-72 period, the interagency plan-
ning did not resolve all of the program issues that
have subsequently caused continuing NASA-
DOD tension over the shuttle program.13
By 1977, enough stresses had built up among
the civilian, military, and intelligence space pro-
grams that president Carter authorized a Presi-
dential-level space policy review. The stated pur-
pose of the review was “to resolve potential con-
flicts among the various space program sectors
and to recommend coherent space principles and
national space policy.”14
Recent Policy Reviews
The Carter administration adopted the NSC pol-
icy review process as the primary mechanism for
considering and developing space policy, both
IZTlle space TaSk  Group was established by a Feb. 13, 1969,
memorandum from the President.
1 JEdgar  U Isamer, “Space Shuttle Mired in Bureaucratic Feud,”
Air Force, September 1980.
14Th e unclassified  version of the results of the review of SPace
policy was issued in the form of a White House press release on
June 20, 1978.
civilian and military. The initial review was car-
ried out under the guidance of Presidential Re-
view Memorandum 23, which considered ques-
tions about civilian-military relationships and
resulted in Presidential Directive 37 (PD/NSC-37).
This review was followed by further interagency
review requested by the president in June 1978,
which led to a second Presidential Directive
(PD/NSC-42) and a public announcement on U.S.
civilian space policy in October 1978. In this
statement, President Carter identified decisions
that were designed to set the direction of U.S.
efforts in space over the next decade. Among
other things, the announced civilian space policy
was to promote a balance of applications, sci-
ence, and technology development that would
“increase benefits for resources expended
through better integration and technology trans-
fer among the national space programs and by
using more joint projects when appropriate. ”
As part of the Presidential review several deci-
sions were made in specific applications areas,
either as program guidance or for the conduct
of further studies.
l
l
l
NASA was to chair an interagency task force
to examine options for incorporating current
and future remote-sensing systems into an
integrated national system, with emphasis on
defining and meeting user requirements.
The Defense community, NASA, and NOAA
were to conduct a review of meteorological
programs to determine the degree to which
these programs might be consolidated in the
1980’s and the extent to which separate pro-
grams supporting specialized defense needs
should be maintained. The possibility for in-
tegrated systems for ocean observations from
space was also to be examined.
With respect to technology sharing, steps
were to “be taken to facilitate technology
transfer between the space sectors. The ob-
jective was to maximize efficient utilization
of the technologies while maintaining nec-
essary security and management relation-
ships.
In November 1979, president Carter approved
further civilian space policy that amplified the
policies established in PDs 37 and 42. The new
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policies were contained in Presidential Direc-
tive/NSC-54.
The policy decisions in PD-54 were the result
of extended interagency debate, and were based,
in part, on the results of the various studies and
reviews mandated by PD-42.
PD-54 directed that DOD and the Department
of Commerce (DOC) maintain and coordinate
dual polar-orbiting meteorological programs, with
each continuing to procure systems and operate
separate satellites to meet the differing needs of
the military and civilian sectors. When new polar-
orbiting satellites became justifiable they were to
be jointly developed and procured by DOD,
DOC, and NASA in order to maximize tech-
nology sharing and minimize cost. An “ap-
propriate” coordination mechanism was to be
established to assure effective cooperation and
to prevent duplication.
For oceanic programs, PD-54 further stated that
if oceanographic satellites were to be developed,
DOD, DOC, and NASA were to pursue joint de-
velopment, acquisition, and management. A
committee was to be established with expanded
representation to forward recommendations on
policy issues to the policy review committees in
NSC for consideration and actions.
The classified character of the basic documents,
accentuated by the use of NSC as the forum for
discussion, has made congressional and public
discussion difficult. This has been a continuing
problem in raising and resolving many issues of
civilian-military relationships.
Current Administration Policy Review
The various policy reviews of the 1977-79
period continue to provide the formal underpin-
ning and guidance that govern today’s programs
in both civilian and military applications. How-
ever, the Reagan administration has initiated a
broad examination of the extant policy. Although
strongly driven by the administration’s perceived
need to constrain the Federal budget, the review
is intended to be comprehensive, and will include
an examination of the provisions of the NAS Act.
The review will focus on the use of the space
transportation system for civilian and national
security purposes and on commercialization of
civilian Earth observation systems.
The President’s science adviser has undertaken
the review, which will be coordinated via a “Cab-
inet Council” mechanism. The Policy Review
Committee (Space) of the Carter administration
has now been disbanded. There are new pres-
sures on several fronts. The administration’s
budget cuts have necessitated a wholesale reeval-
uation of many planned civilian space program
initiatives in applications and also in space sci-
ences. In addition, the success of the shuttle has
introduced the need to focus on civilian-military
relationships at a new level of detail.
CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL AND PROGRAMMATIC CHARACTERISTICS
OF CIVILIAN AND NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE EFFORTS
The possibility and desirability of closer civilian-
national security relationships in space depend
on the strengths and weaknesses of the current
structure and the differences and similarities be-
tween the two areas of space activity. Although
the two programs have certain common interests
and a history of cooperating to solve common
problems, their different goals and consequent
divergence in evolution have resulted in different
institutional and program characteristics. These
are reviewed below.
Mission Differences
NASA is an R&D agency with its primary mis-
sion the development and demonstration of
space and aeronautics systems and associated
technology, the provision of launch services, and
the operation of research and scientific satellites.
NASA has a tradition of evaluating the potential
of space technology in a broad societal context
with a long time horizon. NASA’s R&D efforts are
linked to the requirements of various users, but
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its strongest tendency is towards development of
new technologies rather than meeting short-term
needs of users. Civilian missions require the col-
laboration of the widest possible body of users
to help share and justify the very large front-end
costs of space systems. For example, the design
of civilian remote sensing systems has been af-
fected by the need to resolve the data require-
ments of a multitude of civilian missions and to
determine a fair allocation of costs. Conflicts
among agencies over instrument selection, sys-
tem characteristics, and technical tradeoffs will
continue to plague the Government-sponsored
growth of operational systems.
DOD’s space activities, by contrast, have some
characteristics of technology push, but they are
primarily responsive to the requirements of mil-
itary operations. DOD has a clear and vital mis-
sion, national defense, and space technology is
seen as one means, among others, for accomp-
lishing it. The military users of space technology
are within DOD, and the problems of transfer
from developer to user are fewer than if the two
were in separate organizations. DOD has been
considering possible changes in management that
would reflect the military’s increased dependence
on space systems and allow for efficient use of
the space shuttle. These include establishing a
separate Space Command, either in the Air Force,
or as a fourth service.
In congressional testimony early in 1981, the
Secretary of the Air Force identified an order of
priority for the various program activities that the
Air Force conducts in space.
l First priority was given to the maintenance
and development of a reliable and satisfac-
tory launch vehicle capability. Employing the
shuttle to maximum advantage for missions
related to national security and protecting
against possible delays and failures in the
shuttle program were considered vital.
l Second priority was given to surveillance and
warning satellites. These functions general-
ly cannot be performed by alternate ground-
based facilities.
l Third priority was assigned to satellites
related to communications. Though commu-
nications satellites are important, alternate
ground-based means of communications
(undersea cables, short-wave) are usually
available.
Fourth priority went to weather observation
and navigation. Because other means exist
to carry out their tasks, they are lower in
priority than other satellite systems.
Openness v. Need for Secrecy
The NAS Act mandates, among other things,
that NASA provide for the “ . . . widest prac-
ticable and appropriate dissemination of informa-
tion concerning its activities and the results there-
of. ” The specific provision to make information
available to the public contrasts sharply with the
information policies governing classified military
and intelligence programs, which operate under
stringent requirements to protect information, in-
cluding even the fact that some of the programs
exist.
The differences in orientation between the civil-
ian and military programs have been maintained
from the beginning of the programs to the pres-
ent and are fundamental to consideration of
policies on technology sharing and other interjec-
tor relationships.
l
l
There are inherent conflicts between the
need for secrecy in national security pro-
grams, and the free exchange of data char-
acteristic of the civilian space program.
These conflicts extend into the project office,
where secrecy requirements imposed on
sensitive national security projects are a con-
tinuing fact-of-life, though they are essential-
ly nonexistent on the civilian side.
For technology sharing, these differences
generate a basically asymmetrical relation-
ship. Activities or technology in the civilian
sector are examined in detail for potential
national security uses. The reverse does not
hold except through specific interagency
mechanisms that have been formed to pro-
mote information exchange. Even with in-
formation exchange, the civilian commun-
ity rarely has an opportunity to affect national
security planning. The reverse is less true.
National security planning may often affect
civilian programs.
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l Military and intelligence missions normally
enjoy a high relative priority within the
Government. This is reinforced by the
secrecy surrounding such programs, making
it dificult for most members of the Executive,
of Congress, and the public to criticize them
effectively or to bargain for increased atten-
tion to and funding for civilian activities. The
result is that the military or national secur-
ity program can seek out or develop new
technology to aid in accomplishing their mis-
sions, using the full range of classified and
unclassified experience, whereas civilian
programs have definite limits set on use of
sensitive or classified technology.
l in some cases, not only technical details of
military or intelligence space systems, but
even the fact that such a system exists may
be classified. This creates a special burden
upon the program managers and the con-
tractor teams, and makes it very difficult to
carry out technology-sharing activities with
other programs. The precautions that may
be necessary to protect the “fact of” a cer-
tain system would act as a significant deter-
rent to the ability of the classified program
team to volunteer its assistance.
Differences in the Institutional
Support Base
At NASA’s founding, it incorporated the Na-
tional Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, its
technical centers, and a number of DOD activi-
ties such as the Army Ballistic Missile Group in
Huntsville, Ala., and the Jet Propulsion Labora-
tory in pasadena, Calif. Thus, NASA inherited an
infrastructure of Government-owned facilities and
supporting technical staffs that were already famil-
iar with all phases of the agency’s projects, from
early definition to the production and test of flight
hardware. When NASA expanded to meet the
demands of Apollo and other new program activ-
ities in the early 1960’s, it elaborated the pattern
of relatively autonomous technical centers (see
ch. 9). NASA’s technical personnel and special-
ized facilities represent a unique national
resource, developed at great cost and represent-
ing over 20 years of experience in designing and
operating successful space systems.
DOD’s role in operating the military and na-
tional security programs, on the other hand,
evolved very differently. Although encompassing
an extensively laboratory structure, DOD moved
away from the “arsenal approach” of in-house
technical laboratories in the years following
World War Il. The process of developing ballistic
missiles, the prototype for DOD’s space effort,
followed a pattern in which a Government proj-
ect team of civilian and military personnel acted
as overall managers for a private contractor team;
one major contractor acted as system integrator.
This pattern persists today. Technical assistance
for specific parts of the system is often obtained
from government laboratories, but the labora-
tories typically do not undertake management.
Practically the entire DOD space program man-
agement is vested in the Air Force Space Divi-
sion, a part of the Air Force Systems Command.
This Space Division is supported by the Aero-
space Corp. as system engineers. Thus, whereas
NASA development management activities are
done largely at separate centers, DOD activities
are centralized. The Space Division has responsi-
bilities equivalent to those of NASA in that it is
responsible for all procurement, launch, and on-
orbit control and recovery. Generally, when a sat-
ellite system becomes operational, the mission
aspects of the satellite system come under the
control of a user command, say Strategic Air
Command or Defense Communications Agency,
while the Space DiviSion maintains control of
other aspects of the satellite system including
replacements. The Space Division can and does
call on other DOD agencies and laboratories. The
Space Division has direct control of the launch
facilities at the Eastern Test Range at Cape Canav-
eral and the Western Test Range at Vandenberg
AFB.
Thus, in both the civilian and military space
programs, a great deal of the national capability
resides in the contractors, and to the extent that
a single contractor may support both programs,
significant technology transfer occurs, without
documentation and without the need for specific
efforts. Within NASA, programs are largely devel-
oped and managed by the centers, and any con-
sideration of technology sharing or closer institu-
tional relations between NASA and DOD needs
to take into account these differences in the two
programs.
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International Aspects
International cooperation was one of the objec-
tives set for NASA in 1958, and the United States
has pursued an extensive cooperative program
with technical, economic, and political benefits.
Although certain foreign countries participate in
some DOD space activities, their participation is
based on joint defense objectives; its character
is quite different, from NASA’s international
activities.
There would likely be tension between security
requirements and any extensive interaction be-
tween other countries and the United States in
civilian space efforts if there were a much closer
civilian-military relationship. Some of these ten-
sions are already evident as the military and non-
U.S. users both plan to use the shuttle. Scientists
in foreign countries might also be less willing to
deal with a U.S. space program closely linked to
national security activities.
The relationship between the civilian and mil-
itary space programs is affected by the presence
or absence of treaties, laws, and rules of conduct
governing activities in the “international com-
mons” of outer space—i.e., by the entire interna-
tional legal framework. During the 1960’s prec-
edents were set that strengthened the U.S. posi-
tion that governments could carry on non-
threatening activities constrained only by the pro-
hibition in the 1967 “Treaty on Principles Gov-
erning the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space” on weapons of mass
destruction. The SALT I agreements in 1972 fur-
ther recognized that there were “national
technical means of verification” (presumably
overhead reconnaissance by spacecraft) and that
such collection devices should not be interfered
with. Civilian remote sensing systems such as
Landsat and meteorological satellites have also
operated on a global basis without restriction;
partly to forestall criticism, the United States has
made data from these systems available to all
countries. The emergence of significant programs
by France, Japan, and others during the 1980’s
may complicate the existing ground rules and put
additional pressure on the United States to main-
tain open programs conducted in cooperation
with other nations, particularly with less
developed countries. Current discussion in the
U.N. and elsewhere about restricting the gather-
ing and dissemination of civilian data should not
be expected to affect U.S. military satellites.
An additional factor that may drive the U.S.
space program to emphasize international visibil-
ity and accessibility would be the need to re-
spond, for practical political considerations, to
a newly emerging Soviet presence in peaceful
space applications. The Soviets are known to
have carried out an ambitious program of launch-
ing and recovering film camera satellites with
high-resolution data. The lag by the U.S.S.R. in
critical areas of technology, particularly com-
puters, has until recently caused the Soviets to
say little about their space applications programs
while playing up manned space flight activities.
However, the Soviets recently issued an impor-
tant paper to the U. N.* that describes their appli-
cations programs in greater detail than previously
available (described in detail in ch. 7). In partic-
ular, the Soviets claimed to be planning a “quick-
Iook” sensing system with several types of multi-
spectral sensors. Mindful of the tremendous im-
pact of Sputnik, 25 years ago, forums such as the
upcoming U.N. conference, UN ISPACE ’82, to
be held in Vienna in August 1982, may well pro-
vide the occasion for the Soviets to announce
plans to make their data available to other
countries.
Common Civilian-National Security
Needs and Cooperative Activities
Many of the problems faced by both civilian
and national security space programs have com-
mon roots in the inescapable realities of the harsh
space environment and the stringent require-
ments associated with launching payloads into
space. In the early stages both the civilian and
military space programs depended on using the
most suitable military systems. Improving their
reliability was an early and important common
task for both civilian and military authorities. As
a result, a wide range of basic system details were
shared. They included rocket engine design,
*“National Paper: U. S. S.R.,” prepared for the Second U.S. Con-
ference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
A/Conf. 101/N P/30, Sept. 2, 1981.
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structures, electronics, guidance, control systems,
and a variety of subsystems.
Both programs have common needs for ground
launch complexes with adequate instrumentation
for prelaunch, launch, and postlaunch monitor-
ing and control of satellites and vehicles, and
launch safety and tracking. These common needs
have resulted in highly integrated operations at
both Vandenberg AFB (polar orbit and high in-
clination launches) and at Kennedy Space Center
(low inclination, deep space, and synchronous
orbit launches).
There is also a continuing common need for
better understanding of outer space. This includes
scientific observations of electromagnetic radia-
tion at all wavelengths, the characteristics of solar
radiation, studies of the Earth’s atmosphere and
its attenuation, propagation and reflection char-
acteristics, and variations in gravitational effects.
Beyond these basic common needs, some civilian
and national security programs, such as those for
meteorology and communications, have very
similar technical characteristics.
Combining programs that provide specific types
of information, such as the weather data, has
been an attractive but difficult goal. Meteorolog-
ical data is valuable principally if it is put in the
hands of users as rapidly as possible, and con-
flicting demands for data between customers may
mean that one set of users will be slighted if the
system is less than sufficient for total coverage.
Military needs for aircraft operations, for exam-
ple, may constrain the satellite’s orbital timing
and type of data gathered in ways incompatible
with civilian weather forecasting.
In collecting observational data of the Earth,
the civilian community has information needs
that are both identical to and quite separate from
those of the military. Both communities have
quite similar requirements for medium-scale
maps. However, the military need for intelligence
requires high resolutions not needed for most
civilian programs. As civilian programs have ma-
tured, additional resolution and spectrum needs
have caused some convergence of technical re-
quirements, which further complicates the task
of preserving the security of the DOD-operated
systems while improving the capability of systems
used for civilian operations. An example of the
difficulties encountered in implementing joint sys-
tems is the National Oceanographic Satellite Sys-
tem (NOSS) (for description see pp. 50-51).
ISSUES AND POLICY OPTIONS
Technology Transfer
Inherent in the establishment of separate na-
tional space programs has been concern for ef-
fective “technology transfer” among different
activities and agencies. In many cases costly tech-
nologies developed to meet the objectives of one
space program may have direct utility for other
programs. Sharing hardware and expertise can
avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, save
scarce financial, technical, and human resources,
and enhance program capabilities.
In considering technology transfer, one must
distinguish space-related technology (launch
vehicles and facilities for guidance, command,
and control of launchers and satellites) from appli-
cations-related   technology (sensor systems, com-
munication equipment, data collection, and proc-
essing technologies). A special result of applica-
tions technology is the data themselves (e.g.,
remote-sensing images), which can be shared
without transferring the technology used to gath-
er or process them. in general, space-related
technology has been more easily transferred,
because it is less sensitive and less specialized
than applications technologies.
Technology can be transferred either from civil-
ian to military/national-security (MNS) programs,
or vice versa. Substantially different issues arise
depending on the direction and type of technol-
ogy involved. In general there are few if any
restrictions placed on the transfer of civilian or
NASA-developed technology to MNS programs.
Problems arise when classified technology or data
appears to be of use to the civilian sector.
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l Transfers to the civiIian sector of space-
related technology developed for the military
are relatively direct and open for unclassified
programs and technology, but involve addi-
tional controls and supervision when there
are classification considerations that affect
the MNS programs. In practice, there is con-
siderable sharing of military space-related
technology between the sectors.
l By far the most complex and difficult rela-
tionships to manage are those involving the
transfer of applications-related technology
from the military/national security sector to
the civilian sector. Since the national security
applications are highly sensitive, there are
necessarily strict limitations on access to
technical information, even to evaluate its
potential usefulness for civilian purposes.
The key to effective transfer is to combine
awareness of different programs at the policy and
administrative level, to exchange information at
the technical level, and to agree on joint respon-
sibilities:
l The easiest transfers to implement are those
that involve the direct use by a private con-
tractor of technology developed in a classi-
fied program to meet similar needs in an-
other. This situation allows a lower bid to be
made, and enables the contractor to assure
adherence to costs and schedules. Since
contractors cannot themselves approve the
transfer of classified technology, the Govern-
ment must take the lead in facilitating such
actions, even though the same personnel
and facilities may be used by the firm in-
volved,
. Procedures for transfer are most complex
when a classified technology is suitable for
a civilian program but no channels have
been established for the two programs to in-
teract. Frequently, no direct interface be-
tween classified and unclassified programs,
or even between separate classified activities,
is allowed at many technical and managerial
levels.
The objective of technology sharing or transfer
arrangements is to ensure that the broadest use
is made of available technology and that national
resources are not wasted through unnecessary
duplication of effort. The condition governing
such transfers is that disclosure of the technology
not reduce the effectiveness of a program or proj-
ect, or harm national security.
There are several factors that impede the tech-
nology transfer process at the program-manage-
ment level. There are few internal incentives to
transfer technology to other programs; from the
point of view of national security program man-
agers, transfer to civilians may compromise secu-
rity and tie up valuable time, money, and man-
power in conducting and supervising the transfer.
Unless there is a clear quid pro quo in the form
of additional resources or the prospect of future
aid from the civilian program, technology transfer
will have low internal priority.
The competitiveness of the aerospace industry
in part offsets the reluctance to share informa-
tion and expertise. Competitiveness works in two
major ways. In the first place, it causes new pro-
prietary technology to be developed to improve
products and sales potential across the space sec-
tors. In the second place, the competitive bid-
ding for Government work promotes technology
sharing because using an existing technology is
less costly in time and resources than develop-
ing a new one. These factors provide an incen-
tive for both Government and industry to con-
sider existing technology and hardware in the
development of system requirements, specifica-
tions, and design approaches. Additionally, even
if a complete system such as a space vehicle may
be classified, technology sharing of many unclas-
sified subsystems or component technologies
may be possible.
In practice, there is a continuing exchange of
data and viewpoints between programs in the
several sectors at both formal and informal levels.
in many instances informal exchanges and discus-
sions are preferred over formal, because of lower
visibility and the greater flexibility afforded by the
absence of formal arrangements and their related
institutional/bureaucratic implications. Without
access to classified information it is impossible
to evaluate the overall efficiency of these relation-
ships.
Technology transfer is further enhanced in
those situations when a common contractor base
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is involved across sectors, or when personnel
from one sector and technology are able to move
to similar or related functions in other sectors.
A good example of the latter has been active or
retired military personnel working with NASA.
In addition to various informal and intra-indus-
try mechanisms for technology transfer or shar-
ing, there is a formal body to coordinate between
NASA, DOD, and AACB. AACB is the highest
level formal coordinating mechanism between
DOD and NASA. By a 1960 interagency agree-
ment, the responsibilities of AACB included:
l planning of NASA and DOD activities to
avoid undesirable duplication and to achieve
efficient utilization of resources;
l coordination of activities of common
interest;
l identification of problems requiring solution
by either NASA or DOD; and
l exchange of information between NASA and
DOD.
AACB is cochaired by the Deputy Administrator
of NASA and the Director of Defense Research
and Engineering (DDR&E) of DOD. Both of these
are policy-level officials. AACB has panels to deal
with issues that arise in several main areas. AACB
is concerned primarily with defining broad poli-
cies rather than working out detailed arrange-
ments for cooperative activities. Technical details
have generally been coordinated by special inter-
agency committees or working groups organized
for those purposes. Many joint NASA/DOD sub-
panels and committees, which report to AACB
panels, have been established to assist interac-
tion. There are also many individually negotiated
agreements and understandings.
Security Classification Barriers
Civilian access to classified technology is inevi-
tably limited. As defined in executive orders that
establish the rules for security classification, there
are specified levels of potential damage to the na-
tional security that must exist before security clas-
sification and controls can be imposed. When
such conditions exist, the relevant information
is classified at its appropriate level and restricted
to those individuals possessing the requisite clear-
ances and “need-to-know.”
Because the effectiveness of a national secur-
ity program may depend on the security protec-
tion of key attributes, there are many legitimate
incentives for managers of classified programs se-
verely to limit knowledge or access by personnel
who have secondary, as opposed to primary, rea-
sons for program involvement. Technology shar-
ing inevitably falls in the “secondary” category.
On the civilian side there are incentives to remain
free from the restrictions and encumbrances that
classification and security controls require. Shar-
ing classified sector technology with programs in
the civilian sector, therefore, has disincentives on
both sides. It is warranted only when it can be
established that there are sufficient benefits and
savings to civilian programs to justify the transfer,
given additional program costs and potential
security risk.
Interagency Government mechanisms have
been established that provide for selected civilian
personnel to be cleared in order to have access
to sensitive programs and related technology.
Because of the security considerations and “need
to know” criteria, the number of such person-
nel is kept as low as is judged feasible, to dis-
charge technology transfer or other coordination
objectives. The few cleared civilian agency per-
sonnel are responsible for knowing the entire
range of civilian interests in their field and for
identifying the potential match between civilian
program needs and the classified system technol-
ogy. When the civilian need occurs, an evalua-
tion is made of the potential benefit in relation
to the security risk of release. Though in prac-
tice there is wide variation, the relationship be-
tween classified and unclassified programs can-
not fail to be unbalanced. Personnel working in
classified programs can readily learn about tech-
nologies under development in unclassified pro-
grams, but the reverse does not hold. A security
concern at the margin will almost always out-
weigh an otherwise equivalent civilian benefit.
There are long-standing controversies concern-
ing the security classification programs of the
Government. The issues have not been whether
there should be classification, but how to pro-
vide appropriate levels of security protection for
necessary programs without abuses and without
undue shielding of Government activities from
public scrutiny. Because determinations of
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whether given entities are to be classified and if
so, to what degree, are necessarily made by
members of the national security community
(under guidelines established by the President as
Commander-in-Chief), whose primary responsi-
bility is to protect national security, not to foster
civilian applications, there is an inevitable tenden-
cy to “play it safe” by stringently classifying all
sensitive materials.
Persons who have had experience in both civil-
ian and national security programs acknowledge
that there are instances of failure, but also note
successes in technology transfer; given the inher-
ent difficulties, they generally argue that the pro-
cesses are as good as it is reasonable to expect
within current policy guidelines.
The uneven relationship between national
security and civilian interests is frustrating, pri-
marily to personnel in the civilian sector. They
distrust the capabilities and incentives of classi-
fied program managers to evaluate the potential
for civilian uses of technology developed in clas-
sified programs. Civilian sector personnel are not
in a position to “browse” through classified tech-
nology, or to pursue ideas or insights generated
in the normal course of engineering or scientific
endeavors. Civilian frustration is particularly acute
when independent civilian investigation leads to,
or stumbles onto, technology that has already
been classified or is then placed under security
restrictions.
Within the executive branch, interagency
boards and mechanisms charged with exchang-
ing information and coordinating implementation
of policy guidelines provide oversight of transfer
processes. Congressional oversight is provided
through the Select Committees on Intelligence
and the various committees that oversee the civil-
ian and other military space programs. An entirely
new dimension will be brought into being if sig-
nificant operational space systems are developed
and operated by private commercial firms.
Additional problems arise from the existence
of various levels of security controls within the
classification scheme, whereby those privy to cer-
tain kinds of information may not have access to
other parts or to the whole. Internal Government
reviews have been carried out periodically to re-
examine: 1 ) the need to provide continuing pro-
tection for specific classified systems, technology,
and data, and 2) the degree of protection that
may be required. Oversight is provided by prop-
erly cleared congressional committees and staff.
Because the congressional oversight function ex-
tends to many other aspects of the DOD-oper-
ated space program, there is need for continu-
ing review of security classifications in order to
ease barriers to technology transfer and to the
broader use of data from DOD-operated systems.
Interagency Review Mechanisms
The current practice of permitting access to a
limited number of key individual from NASA and
other civilian agencies with a need to know
about the nature and capabilities of classified sys-
tems provides an initial indication of what is avail-
able and what is possible. The subsequent steps,
leading to detailed understanding of the classified
system and its components, and relating this un-
derstanding to the possible civilian setting in
which the technology might be used, are all de-
pendent on this initial, survey-type exposure to
the classified systems. Therefore, it is incumbent
on DOD (and other national security entities) to
continue the practice of clearing individuals at
various levels in the civilian user agencies and
to provide them with periodic briefings on clas-
sified systems and technologies. it is equally nec-
essary for agencies with a need for such infor-
mation to select individuals for access to highly
classified information who are capable of mak-
ing broad judgments about the desirability of
technology transfer. Individuals at the policy
level as well as at the technical and managerial
levels are needed in order to cover the various
aspects of the agencies’ needs.
The next steps in the transfer process call for
more detailed knowledge of the technology and
a degree of individual specialization that will vary
greatly depending on the nature of the technol-
ogy. At this level, quite often an expanded set
of cleared people is required from the civilian
agency, with a very narrow focus on the specif-
ics of the system or subsystem involved. This
degree of access will depend on a determination
that the technology in question can be transferred
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without compromise. This determination inevi-
tably is made by DOD or another national secur-
ity agency. If a decision is made that a technology
(or piece of hardware) may not be transferred,
an appeal may be made up to the management
level at AACB. Further appeal would require re-
ferral to an interagency forum at the White House
level, usually via the NSC mechanism. Because
of the special clearances required for the discus-
sions in such a’forum, the NSC mechanism is well
suited for this purpose. Alternatively, the “mech-
anisms for consensus” discussed in this report
could also serve as the interagency forum, with
properly cleared representatives from the agen-
cies involved.
It should be emphasized that there is no indica-
tion that there has been arbitrary or capricious
application of the security barriers to preclude
civilian use of military technology. The central
fact is that national security authorities have lit-
tle incentive to press for greater access or use of
their technology, systems, or data. Such broad-
ened access is potentially threatening because of
the loss of control it implies—the prospect that
more information is being released than is desir-
able. These legitimate concerns are not readily
dismissed, nor can they be easily tested by the
civilian agencies. Thus, the interagency mecha-
nism needs a “third party” such as the NSC staff,
the Science Adviser, or perhaps the Vice Presi-
dent, to ensure that such questions receive bal-
anced consideration. Congress can play an im-
portant role through hearings, oversight, and ex-
plicit incentives, both in uncovering the scope
of the problems and in resolving them.
Future of the Space Shuttle System
The shuttle program represents the largest cur-
rent area of interaction between the civilian and
military space sectors, and it will be the continu-
ing focus for many of the civilian-military policy
issues in the period immediately ahead. The shut-
tle will be central to both the civilian and military
space programs.
From the beginning of consideration of the
shuttle, the Air Force worked closely with NASA
to incorporate defense requirements into the
vehicle. Formal coordinating mechanisms were
established, with AACB serving continuously as
the mechanism for coordinating formal policy at
the highest level. The Presidential decision on
the shuitle in 1972 directed it to serve all users,
civilian and military. This decision entailed
development of a vehicle that would integrate
civilian and military requirements, and military
requirements had a significant bearing on many
of its design specifications.
NASA has borne most of the development
funding for the shuttle, rather than sharing this
responsibility with DOD. The initial plan was to
limit the Air Force to building and operating the
Vandenberg shuttle launch and landing facility,
and to paying for operating costs for DOD mis-
sions. The Air Force later assumed development
responsibility for the inertial upper stage.
The rationale for NASA’s lead role in funding
and management has been that sharing between
the two organizations would complicate the man-
agement of an already difficult and challenging
program and drive up the program’s total costs,
and that NASA was better equipped to design and
oversee manned systems than DOD. A formal
NASA/DOD memorandum of understanding
(MOU) on management of the space transporta-
tion system was signed in early 1977, and revised
in early 1980. The basic MOU establishes the
broad policies; there are additional agreements
and MOUS on specific aspects of the program.
A major problem with this arrangement is that
NASA has had to cut other programs to pay for
shuttle overruns. Given DOD’s much larger
budget, it has been argued that the Air Force
should shoulder some of the shuttle costs; the Air
Foce has resisted in order to avoid being put in
a budget situation similar to NASA’S. An arrange-
ment to “fence off” the shuttle budget so that
it competes with other national programs, and
not with either agency’s continuing projects,
would help to alleviate many tensions between
NASA and DOD.
At the present time, interaction between NASA
and DOD elements proceeds at all management
levels, with active coordination on a daily basis.
Inevitably, there has been a continuing series of
strains and issues that stem from differences in
basic mission and outlook between the two orga-
nizations. Many decisions must be made by
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NASA without the opportunity for total coordina-
tion with all parties of interest, including DOD.
Operations of the space shuttle bring civilian
and DOD-operated payloads into the same
stream of activities, from prelaunch preparations
through recovery and postlaunch processing,
with the result that special provisions must be
made to ensure that adequate protection is pro-
vided to sensitive information and systems. When
examined in detail, the transportation system can-
not be divorced from its payloads. Every payload
entails specific operating characteristics that then
become subject to some of the same controls that
exist for the compartmented classified systems.
Given this added complexity, many have sug-
gested that separate shuttle orbiters uniquely con-
figured for DOD launches would be preferable
to joint facilities, and that DOD ought to operate
a separate shuttle fleet altogether. In the future,
maintaining payload-shuttle compatibility for
civilian and DOD payloads will be difficult unless
this common-use principle is strongly supported
at the highest levels in the Government, because
each agency desires to maintain direct control
over all aspects of their programs.
There have been suggestions that it might be
appropriate to have DOD assume funding and
management responsibility for the entire shuttle
system after it becomes operational, for it appears
that among the users DOD would have the larg-
est number of missions. This role for DOD would
have several advantages:
l
l
l
as the major user, DOD could ensure com-
patible scheduling for its high-priority
launches;
under current budget constraints, operations
costs and engineering refinements for the
shuttle could more easily be funded by
DOD; NASA could concentrate on science,
applications and man-in-space programs;
and
security requirements for DOD payloads
could more easily be accommodated ‘under
DOD shuttle management.
The disadvantages of such approaches are con-
siderable, however:
l
l
l
l
NASA, as the development authority, has a
detailed understanding of the shuttle and its
complexities; this knowledge base is shared
between the NASA centers and their con
tractors and cannot be easily shifted to DOD
(or to any other organization);
there are several non-U.S. payloads currently
scheduled for launch by U.S. vehicles; these
and future launches will be more difficult to
accommodate under DOD management.
There is likely to be some foreign resistance
to cooperative programs dependent on
DOD launches;
the major technical support base for the
shuttle—the NASA centers—would be in a
different agency and would be less easily ac-
cessible to the operational manager (unless
centers were transferred to DOD); this situa-
tion would create difficulties in implement-
ing changes and improvements to the shut-
tle system; and
the image of the U.S. space program would
be altered; although still conducted for
“peaceful purposes, “ it would be controlled
by the military.
Man-in-Space
One of the features of the shuttle is that man
is an integral part of the system, required for its
successful operation and available to operate ex-
periments, to deploy payloads, and to recover
them in order to return them to Earth or to repair
and refurbish them in orbit, as appropriate. For
launch of DOD-operated systems, the astronaut
crew will need to be aware of the system’s oper-
ating characteristics and may be able to contrib-
ute to improved operation by using man’s unique
attributes. These may be DOD personnel or
selected non-DOD astronauts. Clearly, foreign
astronauts or experimenters could not be em-
ployed on such missions. Beyond this limitation,
there is a great deal of commonality between
civilian and DOD-operated missions, and signifi-
cant advantage can be taken of this fact, with con-
sequent net economies.
The next major step in advancing the capability
of man-in-space is expected to be an extended
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lifetime manned space station in LEO. Experi-
ments in such a station are likely to address
civilian and DOD objectives, and the lessons
Iearned will have significance for both civilian and
national security purposes. Certain DOD mis-
sions, such as the possible launch of large space
platforms with directed energy weapons, could
require a significant role for men in orbit. A space
station is likely to be of broad value for both
civilian and national security purposes, and re-
quire continued DOD-NASA coordination for
manned space flight. The current policy calls for
such coordination, but the mechanisms are large-
ly informal.
If a decision is made to proceed with space sta-
tion development, it will likely be designed to sat-
isfy broad national needs including those of the
national security community. In order to satisfy
this objective, the national security community
will need to be brought into the space station
program at an early phase, and should have a
formal and significant presence in the planning
process leading to program approval, when and
if this occurs. The history of the shuttle demon-
strates that such large-scale, long-term, and highly
complex developments can be successfully pur-
sued and be responsive to the needs of several
agencies. The shuttle has also demonstrated that
such programs are not easy to execute. Many of
the problems with the shuttle concerning inter-
national perceptions, separating classified and
unclassified systems and personnel, and devis-
ing a joint management structure, would recur
with a space station. Given our experience with
the shuttle, special attention should be given to
providing adequate long-term funding from both
the civilian and the military agencies.
Common-Use Systems (Unmanned)
The U.S. space effort has derived considerable
benefit from its ability to use civilian and DOD
technology almost interchangeably wherever
such technology was most appropriate to mission
needs (with the highly classified and sensitive
DOD-operated systems a partial exception). Per-
haps the earliest example was the use of DOD
missile propulsion and guidance systems as space
launchers. This joint use has continued, as the
basic Thor, Atlas, and Titan missiles form the core
of a modified and improved family of expendable
space launch vehicles. Even the shuttle uses sol-
id-fuel strap-on rocket technology with its roots
in DOD missile experience and DOD space
launches.
in spacecraft design, detailed characteristics of
DOD-operated payloads are not generally re-
vealed, but as described in earlier sections, there
have been significant common uses in this area.
Beyond detailed design features such as solar cell
arrays, radioisotope power supplies, pointing and
stabilization instruments, thermal coatings, tem-
perature control devices (such as the heat pipe),
fuel cells, small thrusters, and a host of other sub-
systems, there are several major systems that can
meet both civilian and DOD needs.
One of the potential common-use areas is in
navigation. The Department of Transportation is
the lead agency for the civilian national naviga-
tion plan and is responsible for coordination of
navigation system planning, with the Coast Guard
and the Federal Aviation Administration as ma-
jor participants. In space, however, DOD has
taken the lead in the development of global nav-
igation systems. In the earlier transit system and
more recently in the new GPS system, DOD’s
needs are being addressed; civilian users are also
being accommodated, though not with the same
positioning accuracy as is available to DOD users.
In general, civilian use has been considered in
making GPS decisions, but non-DOD agencies
have responded inadequately, leaving the entire
burden of justification to the military rather than
viewing GPS as a joint national system like the
shuttle.
In telecommunications, the military makes use
of civilian systems by leasing transponders from
INTELSAT and from U.S. suppliers. The Navy, for
example, uses maritime communications links
provided by COMSAT’S MARlSAT satellites. Pres-
ent-generation communications satellites dedi-
cated to DOD are not, however, normally shared
with civilian users. As the technology continues
to mature, and advance concepts such as the
Large Communications Platform (LCP) become
realistic possibilities, joint DOD-civilian LCPS may
evolve. There are numerous issues surrounding
the concept of LCPS that need to be resolved
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(discussed inch. 3), and the questions that result
fro DOD involvement would add a further degree
of complexity to ownership, management, fund-
ing, and use of such systems. There appear to
be no insurmountable barriers to DOD involve-
ment in an LCP, and there may be significant
benefits from use of such a system. These factors
suggest a general guideline that should be fol-
lowed for DOD programs as well as for those in
the civilian sector: proposed DOD research,
development, and demonstration programs in
areas where there is significant civilian interest
and technology base should be reviewed to
determine if there is technology available from
the civilian or commercial sector that can be ap-
plied to the DOD requirement.
In other applications areas, such as meteorol-
ogy and Earth (and ocean) observations, there is
a degree of common use: DOD uses data col-
lected from platforms primarily supplying civilian
users. The executive branch has initiated periodic
reviews of meteorological satellites (metsats) to
ensure: 1 ) that maximum use is made of com-
mon systems, and 2) that if there are separate
civilian and DOD platforms (as in the case of the
medium-altitude metsats), there is a clear and per-
suasive justification for separate programs. For
ocean observations, the concept of a NOSS was
proposed as a common-use system to satisfy the
needs of three agencies—NASA, NOAA, and
DOD. Contributions to the program were to
come from the three agencies, and the sensor sys-
tems and platform characteristics were to be de-
termined by common agreement. Data were to
flow into the two user agencies, NOAA and
DOD; NASA was to be the principal space R&D
agency. The planned multiagency sponsorship
broke down, however, when DOD funding sup-
port did not materialize because of concern that
the attempt to meet multiple needs would raise
the cost beyond what the Navy was willing to
pay.
The experience with NOSS indicates that
shared or common use of space systems—al-
though desirable from the standpoint of efficient
use of national resources—does not occur, and
cannot be sustained, without careful attention
to management and funding channels and to ap-
proaches that reduce interagency stresses. It
should be possible for the United States to carry
out such multiagency programs, but the record
to date has not been particularly promising. A
similar situation exists in the land remote-sensing
arena. There are multiple agency interests, both
for civilian and national security purposes, in data
from Landsat-type systems, but no single agen-
cy can justify the investment in a satellite plat-
form. A cooperative agreement among agencies
would appear to be one approach that could
move the U.S. program from experimental to
operational status. But long-term Cooperative
funding of a common project such as this appears
to be beyond our current capabilities.
Civilian Use of Data From
DOD-Operated Systems
One of the delicate subjects in the relationships
between civilian and DOD-operated space pro-
gram activities is the use of remote-sensing data
derived from classified systems for civilian pur-
poses. There are presumably two security con-
cerns related to the dissemination of data prod-
ucts from classified programs: sensitive technol-
ogy and sensitive information content.
l
l
The question of whether classified sensor or
applications characteristics (e.g., sensor
acuteness) are reflected in the data products
of a classified system generally can be deter-
mined in advance for an entire class of prod-
ucts. Such products, in theory, could then
become eligible or not, on the basis of tech-
nology, for direct utilization outside of
classified controls and established need to
know. Data might be modified so as to con-
ceal the characteristics of the instruments
used. In general, too, the sensitivity of tech-
nology declines steadily with the passage of
time.
The question of whether sensitive informa-
tion content is contained in the products of
a classified system, generally can be deter-
mined only on a case-by-case basis and even
then may be very difficult to evaluate. For
example, the possibilities of disclosing poten-
tially embarrassing information about a for-
eign country are almost impossible to dis-
prove, particularly in “worst-case” analyses,
if the original sources of data were classified.
—- .—
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Information content, therefore, may have
longer-lasting sensitivity than the technology
involved.
The unyielding complexities and uncertainties of
attempting to identify and weigh these two types
of sensitivities have effectively limited civilian uses
of the data products from systems that have pri-
mary national security-related missions. It is infea-
sible in an unclassified report to present a
rounded evaluation of the mechanisms that are
employed to declassify and disseminate informa-
tion initially obtained from classified space
systems. There are, however, some aspects that
are appropriate for open discussion, and il-
luminate the types of issues that are involved:
 Executive orders that have defined the cri-
teria for classification also provide for the
orderly downgrading and ultimate declassi-
fication of data as their original sensitivity
declines with age. Sensitive intelligence in-
formation is eligible for exemption from
automatic downgrading at specified inter-
vals, but not from the requirement for peri-
odic review. As a result of these overall pro-
visions, there are mechanisms and proce-
dures within all national security related
departments and agencies that regularly ef-
fect the release of data that were once
classified. However, the delay often amounts
to a decade or more.
. Information itself, even when derived from
currently classified sources, is released occa-
sionally to sharpen public understanding of
issues or programs. DOD and the Depart-
ment of State, for example, regularly report
on the strategic-military capabilities and pro-
grams of the U.S.S.R. or other foreign coun-
tries. In such cases there is no reference or
attribution to the specific source of the in-
formation. Such decisions inevitably turn on
the judgment of the responsible officials,
who weigh the potential benefits and risks.
One problem is that many civilian agencies
often do not have highly placed officials with
the proper security clearances to deal direct-
ly with their opposite numbers in the military
and intelligence agencies. This leaves key
decisions entirely in the hands of national
security authorities.
Any DOD/civilian program interaction in the
use of classified data products, even through
screening mechanisms controlled by national
security interests, inevitably increases the expo-
sure of the national security programs. At the
same time, such joint activity imposes some na-
tional security controls or considerations on the
civilian activities. While these relationships can
be balanced within the context of Federal Gov-
ernment activities and operations, there are no
mechanisms in place to handle such interaction
with the private sector, State and local govern-
ments, or academia. To make broad and routine
civilian use of data products generated by clas-
sified systems it would be necessary to effect
fundamental changes in policy at the national
level.
An important option, therefore, would be to
conduct an interagency review and/or a congres-
sional inquiry of: 1) the degree to which national
security systems can satisfy civilian user needs,
and 2) the funds, personnel, and hardware re-
quired to satisfy appropriate needs. In the plan-
ning of next-generation DOD and intelligence
systems, the possibility of accommodating well-
defined civilian needs should be explicitly con-
sidered. It may also be appropriate to articulate
a general policy in this area, in order to over-
come the obvious reluctance of national security
authorities to be burdened by considerations of
civilian utility. Such a policy directive might in-
clude the following points:
DOD-operated systems will be designed to
respond to national security needs and are
consistent with the overall principles of
“peaceful purposes,” as stated in the NAS
Act, and relevant treaty obligations such as
the Outer Space Treaty;
to the extent that such systems can satisfy
civilian user needs, they will be planned and
operated to do so, subject to the provision
that acceptable performance of the primary
missions be a priority;
cost of incremental additional operations,
hardware, personnel and supplies, to the ex-
tent these can be explicitly identified, will
be borne by the civilian user or users; and
there will bean interagency mechanism for
coordinating the activities required to carry
out the above tasks.
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Institutional Change
Introduction
The world is a much different place in 1981
than it was in 1958, when the current policy and
institutional framework for the national space pro-
gram was developed. The United States and other
leading countries have had almost 25 years to
assess the ways in which space achievement
might, as President Kennedy suggested in 1961,
“hold the key to our future on Earth.”
In carrying out the ApolIo mission, NASA grew
into a capable organization, one which became
larger than anyone anticipated in 1958. On the
basis of its over two decades of experience, NASA
has also developed into a particular kind of insti-
tution in the eyes of the world, of the U.S. public,
and of its own staff. Any consideration of changes
in the overall structure of the U.S. space program
cannot ignore the results of these past 23 years
of activity. In particular, it must recognize that
the political environment, especially the nature
and scope of foreign competition and the degree
of U.S. domestic support, has altered a great deal
since 1958.
One major change is that the U.S. national
security space program is larger and more vital
to our defense posture than anyone except a few
visionaries expected in 1958. As DOD and the
intelligence community exploit existing space
capabilities and explore the potential of future
space systems, they have given an ever more im-
portant role to space technology in U.S. securi-
ty planning. The national security space program
has also evolved with particular institutional char-
acteristics, and two decades have demonstrated
that there are substantial differences in organiza-
tional style and methods between the civilian and
military space programs.
As discussed previously, there have been
repeated interactions between the separate space
programs, and those interactions reflect a mixed
record of cooperation and conflict. periodic as-
sessments of this record and of the reasons for
maintaining separate program structures have all
concluded that the existing relationships are fund-
amentally sound, What the following discussion
examines is whether this conclusion remains valid
in the 1980’s.
The Original Rationale Reconsidered
The reasons for establishing separate space pro-
gram structures in 1958 were discussed previ-
ously. Briefly restated, they included: 1 ) that there
were clear defense and intelligence applications
of space technology, and that those applications,
including the R&D supporting them, were best
carried out under the management of national
security agencies; 2) that there were also scien-
tific, economic, and political justifications, not
tied to national security applications, for space
activities, and that these required a sizable non-
military space program; 3) that the national in-
terest was best served by keeping these “other”
space activities outside the national security
framework, because:
l
l
they were not relevant to DOD’s mission and
might even interfere with high-priority secu-
rity-oriented space projects by, for example,
competing for resources and technical talent
or by making it harder to keep the security-
related efforts classified; and
the existence of a separate civilian space pro-
gram meant that the United States could
make use of that program as a tool of domes-
tic and foreign policy by openly engaging in
both cooperative and competitive interna-
tional space efforts of a nonmilitary charac-
ter, and could more easily transfer the results
of the Government’s space research efforts
into the civilian economy.
This analysis will present the implications and
alternatives that flow from differing assumptions
about the civilian and military programs and their
proper relationships. The issue is whether the ad-
vantages of maintaining the current separation
outweigh the benefits of closer policy, institu-
tional, and programmatic relationships among the
various Government space programs. If it appears
that there is no longer adequate justification for
a large, institutionally distinct civilian space ef-
fort on the current scale of NASA, then the issue
becomes how best to reduce or redeploy the ex-
isting capabilities (facilities and personnel) of the
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civilian space effort to meet current priorities and
needs.
Options for Future Civilian-National
Security Relationships
At this time the United States has a civilian
space program which, despite past accomplish-
ments and a high degree of technical and mana-
gerial expertise, is having difficulty gathering
political and budgetary support for new pro-
grams. On the other hand, the national security
uses of space technology are receiving high prior-
ity. From the national perspective, what would
be the implications of a closer NASA-DOD rela-
tionship including even the possibility of merg-
ing the civilian, defense, and/or intelligence pro-
grams into a common structure?
There are three distinct kinds of relationships
the two programs can have, depending on the
status of the two sectors:
l Option 1: Separate Civilian and National
Security Programs:
A. Separate projects with provisions for
technology transfer (status quo).
B. Single project, with designated lead
agency (space shuttle, metsats).
C. Ad hoc joint management/funding for
specific projects.
l Option 2: independent Space R&D Agency
for both civilian and national security proj-
ects (with operations conducted separately).
l Option 3: Absorption of elements of NASA
by DOD and other Federal agencies.
The following will present the advantages and
disadvantages of the three options.
Option 1:
Separate civilian and military programs.
The general rationale for this approach was
presented in the previous section. In addition,
there are specific pluses and minuses depending
on how relations are handled:
A. Separate projects with provisions for tech-
nology transfer. —This is the current prac-
tice for most projects:
1. Benefits:
l
l
l
l
Allows defense and intelligence
space programs to be managed in
the context of their particular goals,
without slighting civilian programs.
Preserves high degree of security for
DOD/intelligence programs.
Maintains well-established manage-
ment patterns for all sectors.
Stimulates beneficial competition
between projects.
20 costs:
l
l
l
l
May lead to overemphasis within
NASA on developing new technol-
ogy rather than meeting national
needs and satisfying potential users.
Accepts some duplication and ineffi-
ciencies.
Increases difficulty of planning and
funding national programs of interest
to civilian and military/intelligence
sectors.
May lead to premature commitment
to a major civilian post-shuttle devel-
opment program to maintain vitality
of independent civilian sector.
B. Single project with designated lead agen-
cy.—This has been the procedure adopted
for the space shuttle (and attempted for
NOSS), where both sectors are able to
agree on the need for a common capabil-
ity. One agency (in this case, NASA) is
chosen as the lead agenc:y and designs and
develops the technology according to its
own management procedures, in consulta-
tion with other users. In the case of the shut-
tle, the current plan is that operations will
also be managed by one agency:
1. Benefits:
l Avoids duplication of effort and asso-
ciated costs.
l Increases political and financial sup-
port for long-term projects.
l Facilitates coordination between de-
veloper and user.
2. costs:
 Leads public and international com-
munity to confuse civilian and mili-
tary programs.
. In the case of the shuttle, has ab-
sorbed a disproportionate amount of
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C. Joint
NASA budget and personnel, with-
out direct support from DOD; lead
agency tends to be left “holding the
bag.”
management/funding for selected
projects.–This has not been the practice,
but might be useful to avoid some of the
problems associated with separate pro-
grams and lead agency responsibilities:
1. Benefits:
l As for the previous case; in addi-
tion, joint management and funding
would ensure careful attention by
both parties and ease the strains on
the lead agency.
2. costs:
l As above; however, joint manage-
ment might complicate decision-
making.
Given the underlying separation of the civilian
and national security programs, any of the above
three approaches can be used for specific proj-
ects. This gives management considerable leeway
in establishing patterns for cooperation and fund-
ing; in the case of joint civilian-military projects,
congressional oversight would have to involve
several subcommittees.
Option 2:
Independent space R&D agency for all Federal
space projects, civilian and military.
In this case, an essentially new agency would
be created to manage all U.S. space-related R&D.
Based primarily on existing NASA and Air Force
capabilities, the new agency would be oriented
toward serving a variety of national needs, in-
cluding those of DOD and the civilian agencies
(Departments of the Interior and Agriculture,
etc.). The operation and maintenance of systems,
once developed, would be the responsibility of
the mission agencies.
1. Benefits:
 Links NASA’s technical capabilities
in areas such as manned space flight
and space propulsion to high-prior-
ity national security objectives.
l Provides political support and policy
rationale required to preserve the
l
l
l
l
major part of NASA’s facilities and
personnel.
Allows for budgetary and program-
matic coordination of entire U.S.
space R&D effort, civilian and mili-
tary, including what are now distinct
DOD programs; better balance be-
tween technology push and user pull
in what are now NASA programs.
Permits total Federal space budget to
be adjusted to policy priorities and
allows the new agency to be reim-
bursed from other Government
agencies and private sector for its
R&D work in direct support of their
requirements.
Routine links to users would facilitate
transition from R&D to operations for
programs now in NASA.
Facilitates joint programs in areas
such as space transportation of in-
terest to entire space community.
2. costs:
l
l
l
l
l
l
Inverse of most benefits of option 1;
puts the space agency in a less public
support role and makes it difficult to
use for political and foreign policy
purposes.
Likely, in current context, to result
in unbalanced R&D program with
national security requirements pre-
dominant (this might also be consid-
ered a benefit).
Disrupts established DOD-contrac-
tor relationships.
Does not answer question of what
to do with space science programs
such as planetary exploration, be-
cause agency emphasis would be on
user-oriented applications; likely to
lead to reemphasis of space science.
Potential loss of NASA’s role as inno-
vator and developer of new technol-
ogies relevant to the civilian econ-
omy.
Some highly classified national secu-
rity programs will still remain off-
Iimits.
3. Requirements:
l Establishing extensive pattern of
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mutual trust and cooperation be- l
tween new agency and various users
of its R&D services. l
l Requires some means for resolving
conflicts between different users
over how to employ the new agen- l
cy’s technical capabilities and over
Minimizes problems of transition
from R&D to operations.
Provides opportunity to trim or elim-
inate nonessential parts of NASA in-
stitutional base.
May facilitate transfer of space sys-
tems to the private sector.
priority to be given to different pro- 2. costs:
gram activities. l
l Change in congressional oversight of
civilian space activities, with more l
emphasis on mission-agency ori-
ented committees (Armed Services,
Agriculture, Natural Resources, etc.). l
Option 3:
Absorption of NASA by DOD and other Federal
l
agencies.
In this case, NASA would be dissolved with key l
elements, such as the centers, being taken over
by DOD, other Federal agencies, and private
firms or universities:
1. Benefits: l
May reduce costs.
Links technical and institutional
capabilities relevant to national secu-
rity objectives directly to users with-
in DOD and intelligence agencies.
Loses the benefits posited for op-
tion 1.
Gives up an established and success-
ful institution for uncertain efficien-
cies and budget savings.
Not clear that NASA centers could
easily be absorbed within DOD and
other mission agencies.
No single locus for space R&D in
support of civilian mission agencies
and U.S. private sector.
Public and congressional reaction
likely to be mixed, but predominant-
ly negative; same for overseas reac-
tion.
Makes ambitious civilian programs
such as Apollo or permanent
manned stations much more difficult
to consider.
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Chapter 7
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN SPACE
INTRODUCTION
The shape, direction, and very existence of the
U.S. civilian space program owe much to inter-
national competition. The basic events are well
known: the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the
sudden public discovery of the “space age;” the
continuing series of Soviet space “firsts” in un-
manned and then manned satellites; and the
sometimes desperate attempts by the United
States to catch up, culminating in President
Kennedy’s 1961 commitment to a manned lunar
landing by 1970, ahead of the Russians. (For a
more detailed description of the early phases of
Soviet-American rivalry in space, see app. G.)
During these years of competition the United
States and the Soviet Union had a virtual monop-
oly on space systems and technologies: boosters;
tracking systems; communications, remote sens-
ing, and weather satellites; and manned space-
craft. Other countries, lacking the military and
political motivation, did not at first choose to ex-
pend the resources needed to develop independ-
ent space capabilities.
We will not attempt hereto describe the course
of these developments during the 1960’s; the
main elements of the current Soviet space pro-
gram will be presented later (see pp. 204-209).
Suffice it to say that the U.S. program had, by the
end of the decade, succeeded in demonstrating
its superiority in virtually every area—without,
however, forcing the Soviets to abandon their
own efforts or to concede permanent U.S. pre-
eminence.
The important point is that, beginning in the
1960’s but accelerating rapidly in the 1970’s,
other countries began to enter the field. Political
motivations, as will be seen, played and continue
to play a crucial role; to a large extent these were
identified with maintaining economic competi-
tiveness vis-a-vis commercial rivals, particularly
the United States. As the U.S. post-Apollo space
activities, both public and private, have come to
concentrate more on potential economic payoffs
rather than on large prestige projects, and the
Soviet program has turned toward the long-term
goal of permanent manned orbital platforms, the
commercial competition in space applications
technologies and systems from Europe and Japan
has become increasingly important. The signifi-
cance of competition between nations has also
altered, due to the expanded global use of space
technology rising largely out of the successes of
the U.S. space program. International organiza-
tions for global communications, such as
INTELSAT and INMARSAT, have continued to
grow and now include most of the world’s users
of telecommunications. Through the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
and the U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment, many developing countries have gained
first-hand experience in the ways satellite com-
munications and remote-sensing systems can
supply services crucial for economic growth. As
one result, the laws and regulations governing the
use of outer space have been widely discussed
by international bodies such as the International
Telecommunication Union and the U.N.’S Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
Space technology has become an important po-
litical resource whose effective use by the United
States will be affected by the development of in-
ternational competition. In what follows we will
outline, for each major foreign program, its or-
ganization and goals, its main efforts in the four
applications areas (communications, remote sens-
ing, materials processing, and transportation), and
the prospects for cooperation and/or competition
with the United States.
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EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY AND JOINT EUROPEAN EFFORTS
Since the early 1960’s Europe has attempted
to mount a coordinated space program to com-
pete with the United States and Soviet programs
in key areas and to ensure European participa-
tion in the economic, scientific, and political
benefits of space activities. The latest and most
successful organization to attempt this task is the
European Space Agency (ESA), made up of 11 full
members—Belgiu m, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the united Kingdom–
and two associate members—Austria and Nor-
way. ESA is involved in space science, applica-
tions, and launch vehicle development, as well
as the formulation of policy for European coop-
erative ventures (see fig. 1 1).
At the beginning of the space age, individual
European states recognized that they could not
mount space programs on the scale of those in
the United States or U.S.S.R, unless there was ex-
tensive cooperation among interested parties.
Even so, there was no attempt to match the
manned capabilities being competitively devel-
oped by the superpowers. European interest has
been focused on basic science, on applications
satellites for regional use, and on supporting an
industrial/technical infrastructure that could con-
tribute to high-technology enterprises. Despite
these shared interests, however, there have been
continuing difficulties caused by: 1 ) differences
between members about what programs to sup-
port and general policies to follow, 2) problems
Figure Il.—Organizational Structure of the European Space Agency
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in allocating contracts between industries in
various countries, 3) disagreement about the ap-
propriate degree of cooperation with, and de-
pendence on, the United States, and 4) competi-
tion between ESA and national programs.
Policy and Budget?
ESA was founded in May 1975 following several
years of negotiations and compromises among
the major participants. ESA inherited the pro-
grams and facilities of its predecessor organiza-
tions, the European Space Research Organization
(ESRO), the European Launcher Development
Organization (ELDO), and the European Space
Conference (ESC). (For a description of Europe’s
pre-ESA activities, see app. G.) An important point
is that, unlike NASA, ESA is specifically allowed
to operate applications systems, once developed,
with the costs being borne by the users of the
system.1 A second difference, one which partially
offsets the first, is that ESA is responsible for
carrying out an “industrial policy” designed to
“improve the worldwide competitiveness of
European industry,” while ensuring that member
states participate equitably and, in particular, that
the return to any member state—i.e., the value
of the contracts let by ESA—is approximately pro-
portionate to the members’ contributions (the
principle of “juste retour” or fair return). The ESA
convention explicitly states that it shall “exploit
the advantages of free competitive bidding in all
cases, except when this would be incompatible
with other defined objectives of industrial pol-
icy. ”z Hence considerations of cost or efficien-
cy may have to take a back seat to the principle
of fair return, with predictable results for time-
liness and cost effectiveness. This is one of the
inevitable shortcomings of a mu Itinational agen-
cy, and a prime reason why operational systems
have generally been handled outside of ESA.
The ESA members contribute to the organiza-
tion in two ways: mandatory activities, which in-
clude the scientific programs and basic organiza-
tional expenditures; and optional activities,
which are specific programs for satellite design
I “Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agen-
cy,” done at Paris May 30, 1975, art. V.
“’Convention,” art. VI], par. 1 sec. d.
and operations, launch facilities, and space trans-
portation. 3 The major programs, such as Ariane
and Spacelab, are optional, which means that
members can request to be specifically excluded.
Mandatory contributions are based on each
state’s national income; however, no one state
can contribute more than 25 percent of the total
budget. For optional projects, interested par-
ticipants pay a variable percentage which is ne-
gotiated between the participants. The degree of
national support for various programs in 1981 is
given in table 17.
ESA’S budget for its first full year of operation
(1976) was approximately $600 million, of which
one-third went for mandatory and two-thirds for
optional programs. This compares with NASA’s
fiscal 1976 appropriation (for space) of $3.22
billion. In 1980, ESA’S budget had risen to $846
million, while NASA’s was $4.68 billion. In both
years, the ESA budget was between one-fifth and
one-sixth NASA’S. (These figures do not constitute
a complete comparison of United States and
European civilian space expenditures, since they
fail to include non-NASA programs in the United
States, both Government and private sector, as
well as the space budgets of individual European
countries). Since ESA’S two most expensive proj-
ects, Ariane and Spacelab, are largely complete
and are not likely to be soon replaced by com-
parable programs, ESA’S budget is not expected
to increase over the coming years.4
Current and Projected
Applications Programs5
Communications
European communications needs and pro-
grams have been defined largely by the national
PTTs (postal, telephone, and telegraph agencies)
acting through CEPT (Conference Europeene de
Postes et Telecommunications and the European
3“Convention,” art. V.
4As a multinational organization, ESA has had to develop an ac-
counting system to provide for changes in exchange rates between
member states. ESA accounts are kept in ESA Accounting Units (AU)
rather than any single national currency. The value of the AU vis-
a-vis  other currencies is reevaluated annually; in 1981, one
AU =!$1 .4.
‘Unless otherwise indicated, figures and information in this sec-
tion are taken from Europe’s P/ace in Space, ESA, Paris, January
1981.
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Table 17.–Contributions of Member States to the Principal ESA Programs in 1981
Meteosat ECS Ariane
General expioita- phase Marecs Marecs develop-
budget Science tion Sirio-2 OTS ECS 3 bis A B Spacelab ment
Member states:
Belgium . . . . . . . . . 4.71
Denmark. . . . . . . . . 2.63
France . . . . . . . . . . 22.45
Germany. . . . . . . . . 26.82
Ireland . . . . . . . . . . 0.54
Italy. . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.51
Netherlands. . . . . . 6.29
Spain . . . . . . . . . . . 5.29
Sweden. , ., ... , . . 4.16
Switzerland . . . . . . 4.19
United Kingdom . . 14.42
Other participants:
Austria . . . . . . . . . . 0.68
Canada. . . . . . . . . . 2.23
Norway. . . . . . . . . . 0.08
Other income. . . . . —
4.49
2.51
21.40
25.57
0.54
12.46
6.00
5.04
4.25
3.99
13.75
—
—
—
—
4.06
2.41
23.70
25.66
—
15.07
—
—
3-48
20.60
—
—
—
5.02
3.30
—
7.50
9.00
—
72.39
0:50
1.50
3.50
1.83
0.48
—
—
—
5.17
2.90
24.69
25.00
—
14.38
2.50
—
4.91
4.59
15.86
—
—
—
—
3.27
0.33
25.93
30.68
—
14.78
0.94
0.17
1,62
2.13
20.15
—
—
—
—
3.19
0.74
26.52
30.42
—
13.85
1.77
0.53
3.97
0.55
18.46
—
—
—
—
0.95
—
11.92
19.08
—
2.20
4.63
0.95
2.96
—
55.81
—
—
1.50
—
SOURCE: From Europe’s Place in Spacer p,9.
Broadcasting Union (EBU). More recently, fore-
casting and coordination have been done within
the Interim Eutelsat Organization, set up within
CEPT in 1977 to establish a European satellite
communications system.
OTS (Orbital Test Sate//ite).–The OTS project
was approved by ESRO in 1971 and launched
into geosynchronous orbit in 1978 (aboard a U.S.
Delta 3914) after development by British Aero-
space Dynamics Group. With a capacity of 3,000
telephone circuits, it has been used for various
experimental purposes including high-speed sci-
entific data transmission and television broad-
casting. Current projections are that it may be
able to provide useful services for up to 5 more
years. Program cost has been $365.4 million.
ECS (European Communications Satellites).–
The OTS was designed to prove the usefulness
of an operational European telecommunications
system. In 1978, ESA approved a five-satellite
system, based on the OTS design, to provide re-
gional communications needs for 10 years. in-
terim Eutelsat will pay user fees for international
trunk telephone services and for television trans-
mission between members of the European
Broadcasting Union. High-speed data transmis-
sion and communication with off-shore oil and
gas platforms may also be provided. British
Aerospace Dynamics Group is the prime contrac-
0.14
—
5.74
13.29
—
1,28
1.49
0.34
6.61
—
69.89
—
—
1.22
—
5.07
1.81
12.07
64.78
—
1.00
2.53
3.38
—
1.00
7.60
0.76
—
—
—
1.92
0.40
79.34
5.31
—
5.31
0.34
4.18
0.63
0.08
2.49
.
—
—
—
— —
tor for the estimated $632.8 million program (not
including ground terminals); the first satellite is
scheduled for an Ariane launch in 1982.
Marecs.–Marecs is a direct descendant of
Great Britain’s Marots program for ocean com-
munications, but its design is based, like ECS, on
the experimental OTS. Two satellites will be
placed in geostationary orbit over the Atlantic (the
Atlantic satellite may eventually be relocated over
the Indian Ocean) and Pacific to provide ship-
to-ship communications. The international mari-
time satellite organization, inmarsat, is leasing the
satellites for its mission. The British Aerospace
Dynamics Group is prime contractor, and Britain
has put up most of the development funding,
some 55 percent of Marecs A and almost 70 per-
cent of Marecs B. (In the OTS and ECS programs,
by contrast, Great Britain contributed a more
usual 15 to 20 percent.) Marecs A was launched
on the fourth Ariane test flight December 20,
1981, and Marecs B is scheduled for the first
operational flight in September 1982. Program
cost is $359.8 million.
L-Sat (large-satellite). –The L-Sat is a descendant
of an earlier program, H-Sat, which was aban-
doned by France and Germany in favor of going
ahead with more rapid deployment of their own
joint (non-ESA) operational communications and
television direct broadcast system (see descrip-
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tion, p. 188). As presently envisioned, L-Sat would
be a very large, advanced experimental commu-
nications satellite to test the feasibility of direct
TV broadcasting and specialized/business com-
munications using small roof-top size terminals.
In addition, it would include equipment for ex-
periments with the as-yet unexploited 30/20 GHz
band. The British have been most enthusiastic
about L-Sat development, which is seen as com-
petitive with U.S. technology for future INTELSAT
satellites, and British Aerospace has been
awarded the prime contract. Still in the design
definition stage, its estimated launch (either on
the space shuttle or an advanced Ariane), is set
for 1986. The estimated development cost is $520
million (1 980 price Ievels).b
One of the striking facts in looking at ESA’S
communications program is the leading role
played by Great Britain and British industry. Since
there are national and bilateral European projects
being conducted outside ESA, Britain is not the
only European country fostering satellite telecom-
munications expertise, but it has one of the
broadest and most forward-looking programs (see
pp. 40-41 for further discussion).
Remote Sensing
ESA has been active in both meteorological and
remote-sensing development, though with pri-
mary emphasis on the former,
Meteosat 7 and 2.—The Meteosat program was
approved by ESRO in 1972; Meteosat 1 was
launched (by Thor-Delta) in 1977, and placed in
a geostationary orbit allowing it to survey Europe,
Africa, and the Mediterranean. It provides raw
imagery to central European ground-processing
stations for short-term weather forecasting, as well
as relaying the processed data to users and trans-
mitting imagery from U.S. weather satellites sta-
tioned over the Western Hemisphere. Meteosat
1 has also contributed to global programs set up
by the World Meteorological Organization. in
1979, Meteosat 1 suffered a partial failure of its
power system; Meteosat 2 was launched in June
1981 on the third Ariane test flight. The prime
GESA  News Release,  “New European Te lecommunicat ion Sate l -
lite, Program is Approved,” Dec. 22, 1981. ESA News Release, “ESA
Microgravity  Programme Gets Underway, ” Jan. 18, 1982.
contractor for the $301 million program was
Aerospatiale of France.
Sirio 2.—Sirio 1 was an experimental Italian
communications satellite; the spare, Sirio 2, will
be launched by ESA in 1982 to provide meteor-
ological data transmission to African ground
centers, as well as to conduct scientific ex-
periments. Cost for the Italian-built satellite will
be $40.6 million.
Earthnet. -A mandatory ESA program, Earth net
consists of four receiving stations and two proc-
essing centers which receive remote-sensing and
meteorological data from U.S. satellites: Landsat,
Nimbus-7, the Heat Capacity Mapping Mission,
and (formerly) Seasat. The data are available to
all ESA members as well as to outside requesters.
Spacelab Remote-Sensing Programs. –The first
Spacelab flight, scheduled for 1983, will carry two
European remote-sensing experiments. One will
use a very high resolution camera for 1:100,000-
scale mapping. The second involves the develop-
ment of a microwave remote sensor to collect
data through cloud cover.
ERS 1 (European Remote-Sensing Satellite).–
The Earthnet and Spacelab projects, along with
other activities, are designed to prepare for an
advanced remote-sensing satellite, ERS 1. ERS 1
will be used to monitor icepacks and to sense
coastal and ocean regions; its instruments include
a synthetic aperture radar, a radar altimeter, and
wind and wave scatterometers. Tentative launch
date is mid-1987. (It should be noted that a major
civilian operational/commercial remote sensing
system, SPOT, is being undertaken by France,
Sweden, and Belgium as a national project; the
proposed ERS will use the SPOT bus but contain
different instruments. For a description of SPOT,
see pp. 25-29.) ERS-1 is considered to be one ele-
ment i n a continuing program of Earth observa-
tion satellites. Studies are underway for further
satellites, including one for land remote sensing.
Materials Processing
ESA does not yet consider materials process-
ing to be an applications area per se, but rather
an area in which to do basic research that may
someday lead to useful products or processes.
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The term “materials science” is used instead of
materials processing; experiments in both biology
and materials science will be carried out as part
of an approved 4-year “microgravity pro-
gramme” budgeted at $52.4 million.7
ESA’S main contribution to materials science
will be through Spacelab, although sounding
rockets are also being used. Spacelab will be the
major facility for space-based experimentation in
the physical and biological sciences during the
next decade. Spacelab consists of a pressurized
module capable of being carried in the payload
bay of the space shuttle and allowing experiment-
ers to work at a variety of projects in a shirt-sleeve
environment. There are also pallets that allow
equipment to be exposed directly to vacuum and
radiation (see artist’s rendition). Equipment for
conducting processing experiments will include
furnaces and remote manipulators.
Spacelab is ESA’S largest cooperative project
with NASA. ESA is responsible for designing and
delivering, free of charge, an engineering model
and a first flight unit (delivered in December
1981 ), which NASA is scheduled to launch in
mid-l983. The first flight program will involve a
joint European-American crew conducting a va-
7ESA News Release, “ESA Microgravity  Programme Gets Under-
way,” Jan. 18, 1982.
riety of test projects. In 1980, NASA contracted
to purchase a second spacelab, including a pres-
surized module and five instrumentation pallets,
for $183.9 million from the prime contractor, the
German firm ERN0.8
Spacelab is Europe’s first attempt at construct-
ing a manned system; partly for this reason, and
also because of internal management problems
compounded by continuing changes in the re-
quirements for integration with the shuttle orbiter,
the project has cost considerably more than in-
itially estimated, and has also been subject to
delay. The 1973 agreement between NASA and
ESA called for delivery of the first unit by 1979;
however, since the shuttle program has also been
behind schedule, these delays have had little ef-
fect. The increase in costs, however, has caused
problems among the ESA supporters. According
to the ESA agreement, if costs rose above 120 per-
cent of original estimates, the supporters could
withdraw or renegotiate the terms. In 1979,
estimated costs to completion (approximately
$860 million; dollar amounts are inexact because
of built-in inflation escalators and exchange-rate
fluctuations)9 were 140 percent of the original
a“Europe Competes With U.S. Programs, ” A W&ST, Mar. 3, 1980,
p. 89.
“’Sweeping Changes Spur Spacelab Pace, ” AW&ST, Feb. 11,
1980).
——
Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space l 181
estimates. Italy in particular felt it could not con-
tinue to fund Spacelab at its original level of 18
percent and threatened to block the project
(largely because its share of Spacelab’s industrial
participation had fallen to 11 to 12 percent) unless
its contribution was reduced. As a result, Italy’s
contribution dropped from 18 percent in 1979
to 1 percent in 1981, with the shortfall being
taken up by other contributors in proportion to
their level of participation.
There have also been various tensions between
NASA and ESA over secondary issues. One prob-
lem has been the flight schedule for Spacelab mis-
sions, especially since the number of shuttle
flights for the first several years has recently been
cut back. ESA is also concerned that changing
specifications for shuttle payloads will lead to ex-
pensive redesign of Spacelab components. ”
Some European scientists think that NASA re-
quirements for documentation and prior con-
sultation on Spacelab experiments are overly
stringent and reflect a desire to restrict European
participation .12 NASA counters that preparations
for manned missions are of necessity more
rigorous than for other types of flights. Some
Americans think that, despite the money saved
by cooperative development, an American
SpaceJab program would have been faster and
would have produced a design better suited to
U.S. needs and to the shuttle’s capabilities, and
that the (politically motivated) inclusion of the
Europeans has resulted in a less-than-optimal
technology.
It is difficult to evaluate these charges and
countercharges objectively; in large part, they
stem from the inevitable problems of conducting
any major cooperative program in advanced
technology, especially one with significant poten-
tial economic effects. Since, for budgetary
reasons, the alternative to a European Spacelab
was not a U.S. Spacelab, but no Spacelab at all,
many U.S. criticisms are strictly hypothetical. The
question of who will exploit Spacelab’s capabil-
‘Khris  Bulloch, “Spacelab Status: Some Action at Last, ” /rtteravia,
November 1981, p. 1,168.
11 Eric  Quistgaa~d,  DirectoF  General of ESA, statement before
Senate Commerce Committee, Mar. 25, 1981, p. 7.
‘
z
’’ U.S.-Europe Collaboration Variable, ” A W&ST, Sept. 1, 1980,
p. 275.
ities most effectively-the United States, the Euro-
peans, or perhaps the Japanese—remains open.
Launch Vehicles
The Ariane I launcher, ESA’S most expensive
single program, has recently completed a four-
flight test program; the first operational flight will
take place in September 1982.
Ariane I is a three-stage expendable vehicle,
including an advanced liquid oxygen/liquid
hydrogen third stage. For a comparison with U.S.
launch vehicles, see table 18.
The current design of Ariane is only the first
in a series of as many as five models; successive
designs are planned to improve payload capac-
ity and performance through the 1980’s. The ESA
member states have already approved a program
to develop Ariane 2, 3, and 4. Ariane 2 will be
able to place 4,4oo lb in a transfer orbit, and
Ariane 3,5,280 Ib.ls Ariane 4, under study by ESA
and CNES, will more than double the perform-
ance of Ariane 1; its further development was ap-
proved in January 1982, and first launch is sched-
uled for 1985. An even more ambitious improve-
ment, a fifth Ariane version having a liquid ox-
ygen/liquid hydrogen second stage and able to
launch 12,100 lb into transfer orbit, is also under
consideration for potential development by the
end of the decade.
1 Jjeffrey Lenorovitz,
“Arianespace  Completing Payload Plans, ”
AW&ST,  JUly 6, 1981, pp. 19-20.
Table 18.—Capacity of Ariane and U.S. (Commercial)
Launch Vehicles (in lb)
Transfer
LEO orbit
Ariane 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,500 3,700a
Space shuttle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65,000 —- -
Space shuttle with Delta upper
stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 2,750
Space shuttle with internal upper
stage (under development) . . . . . . — 5,000
Thor-Delta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,490 2,420
Atlas-Centaur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,200 4,510
aThe~e flgure~  ~~~ume the Ariane  IS launched from the Kourou  launch  ‘ite ‘ear
the Equater,  while U.S. launches are from Kennedy Space Center In Florida.
The equatorial site gwes  any geostatlonary  payload an approximately 15 per.
cent performance improvement over KSC
SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment
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First launch of Ariane /
Utilizing a dual launch system (SYLDA), each
Ariane is capable of carrying two separate pay-
loads on each flight. Launches will be made from
the French-owned, ESA-funded Kourou spaceport
in French Guiana, South America. Located close
to the Equator, Kourou is well placed for launch-
ing stationary satellites (which orbit over the
Equator). With only one pad, it is currently ca-
pable of launching five to six flights per year, but
construction of a second pad has been approved
for operation in 1984 or 1985, allowing for 10 an-
nual launches and providing redundancy.
When the Ariane was first proposed, there was
considerable skepticism as to whether it could
be competitive with the space shuttle and the
various U.S. expendable vehicles. There were
strong political reasons why several European
countries, especially France, desired an inde-
pendent launch capability (see app. G); in addi-
tion, it appears that, as a result of several con-
siderations, the Ariane will be able to compete
with the shuttle for many kinds of payloads
through the 1980’s. First of all, the shuttle itself
is 2 years behind schedule, and has not yet been
flown sufficiently to convince users of its reliabil-
ity. Second, U.S. production of expendable was
slowed down and in some cases virtually halted,
in expectation that the shuttle would replace all
of them during the early 1980’s. As a result, the
cost of the Thor-Deltas and Atlas-Centaurs has
risen sharply over the last several years. Third,
the commercial demand by a number of likely
users, especially for communications satellites,
is projected to be much larger in the coming
decade than was previously thought. Even with
the shuttle operating at its initially projected pace,
there would be demand for additional launch
services.ld However, because of recent and pro-
jected budget cutbacks there will be fewer shut-
tle flights than previously scheduled, another cir-
cumstance forcing users to turn to alternate
launch vehicles. Fourth, Arianespace is offering
customers highly attractive terms, including
below-market financing through European banks,
and an extended period in whic:h to make repay-
ment. For these reasons, the Ariane is likely to
“Jerry Grey, “Case for a 5th Shuttle and More Expendable Launch
Vehicles,” Astronautics and Aeronautics, March 1981.
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have a full manifest for the foreseeable future,
despite the superior capabilities of the shuttle.
Frederic D’ Al lest, chairman of Arianespace, proj-
ects continued use of Ariane for at least 20 years
despite competition from reusable spacecraft.15
The Ariane is now scheduled for a series of ESA
and INTELSAT launchings (under ESA auspices)
in 1982. As of january 1982, there were approx-
imately $350 million worth of firm orders for
Arianespace, which will take over Ariane opera-
tions in 1983.16 There were also a large number
of reservations, which may be turned into firm
orders in the future. These include non-European
customers such as Colombia, Australia, and the
Arabian Satellite Corporation .17 Recently, Ariane-
space received its first firm order from an Amer-
ican company, General Telephone & Electronics,
to launch two domestic communications satellites
in 1984.18 Other orders have followed from West-
ern Union and Southern Pacific Communications.
Ariane is being marketed in the United States
through an arrangement with Grumman Aero-
space Inc. Arianespace policy is to sell its services
to “any customer whose payload is designed for
peaceful use;” this includes payloads from the
French military, NATO, and a British Defence
Communications Satellite.19 Control over the
political aspects of launch policy is retained, ac-
cording to ESA’S agreement with Arianespace, by
the ESA Council.
The development and subsequent operation of
Ariane have been marked by a number of pecu-
liarities. We have seen the dominant role that
France played in proposing and developing the
project. The prime contractor has been not a
private firm or industrial consortium, as for other
ESA programs, but CNES (Centre National
d’Etudes Spatiales or National Center for Space
Research), the French Government equivalent of
NASA. CNES in turn has let contracts primarily
to French firms, in particular Aerospatiale, the
I sj~ffrey  Lenorovitz,
“Arianespace  Completing Payload Plans, ”
AW&ST,  jU!y 6, 1981, p. 19.
“’’Why NASA’s Shuttle May be Left in the Dust, ” Business Week,
Jan. 18, 1982, p. 38. .
‘
7
’’ Arianespace Press Kit, ” a t  34th  In ternat iona l  A i rshow,  Par is ,
June 1981, pp. 10 -13 .
‘
a
’’ Europeans Win Orders to Launch 2 GTE Satellites,” Wa// Street
)ourna/,  Nov. 25, 1981.
lgArianespace  Press Kit, p. 13.
prime contractor, and SEP (Societe Europeenne
de Propulsion), which is building the propulsion
system. Overall, France has funded over 60 per-
cent of the project, rising to 79 percent in 1981.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the
Ariane program is the arrangement for commer-
cial operation. Instead of leaving it to ESA or
CNES, a quasi-private corporation called Ariane-
space has been established to produce, finance,
market, and launch Ariane vehicles. ESA and
CNES remain responsible for further development
of Ariane 2-5, and for operation of the Guiana
spaceport.
Arianespace is incorporated in France and
owned by firms from the states that funded
Ariane’s development, by CNES, and by Euro-
pean banks. French investors (including CNES
itself, which is the largest single shareholder with
34 percent), will own 60 percent; German ones
20 percent; and the remainder is split up into
smaller portions. Its initial capitalization was ap-
proximately $20 million. The first chairman of
Arianespace, Frederic D’Allest, is the former
CNES project director for Ariane, and the pro-
duction and launching teams will be transferred
directly from CNES in 1982.20 Clearly, the new
firm will be dominated by the French, and it is
not surprising that France was the prime mover
behind Arianespace’s emergence. The idea of a
private firm was first suggested in 1979, with the
original proposal by CNES calling for 70 percent
French ownership. The basic rationale was that
only a commercially oriented operation could
manage Ariane so as to compete effectively with
the shuttle; trying to operate in a framework re- ,
quiring the unanimous consent of 11 sovereign
nations would be far too inefficient. 21 In subse-
quent negotiations with ESA and the potential
partners, the French percentage was reduced to
approximately 60 percent. The most difficult part
was getting the agreement of other ESA members
to turn over the technology and facilities, in-
cluding future developments, to Arianespace;
Germany was particularly opposed. In 1980,
France withheld support for Spacelab funding for
2 months until Germany signed a political dec-
zOArianeSPaCe  Press Kit.
2)
’’ Europeans Organize Commercial Ariane Satellite Launch Com-
pany,” AW&ST,  July 9 1979, p. 18.
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Advertisement from AW&ST, May 1982
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Iaration agreeing to the transfer to Arianespace.22
Arianespace is currently scheduled to assume re-
sponsibility in 1983 following a series of seven
ESA flights in 1982 and early 1983.
with
largest
Ariane,
is likely
Future Plans
the imminent completion of ESA’S two
applications programs, Spacelab and
the level of ESA activities in the 1980’s
to diminish, For the immediate future the
valuable industrial and technical teams organized
for these projects will remain occupied building
the second Spacelab and designing Ariane 2-5.
No comparable applications projects have yet
been approved to take their place (though there
has been consideration of a plan to develop
Spacelab into a free-flying platform as part of a
cooperative program with the United States). A
reduction in ESA activity may reflect the pref-
erence of several member nations for national or
bilateral programs, especially for commercial ap-
plications systems, where the cumbersome ESA
apparatus can impede timely decisions. It also
reflects a general worsening of the major Euro-
pean economies over the past several years,
especially those of West Germany and Great Brit-
ain. Under its recently elected Director General,
Eric Quistgaard, ESA has been preparing a 10-year
plan for the future which is likely to emphasize
basic science within an overall reduced budget.
The proposed plan estimates a reduction to an
annual budget of $532 million to $598 million,
compared with a 1980 level of $845.8 million .23
in establishing future programs, it will be
necessary for the major partners to compromise
as they did in the past. The British interest in L-
Sat development remains high, while the Ger-
mans are more interested in exploiting Spacelab
by conducting scientific and materials process-
ing missions, and expanding Spacelab’s capabil-
ities. France would like to see aggressive develop-
ment of the Ariane, including a possible auto-
mated processing station (Solaris) or a manned
reusable vehicle. 24 If a successful compromise is
ZZ’’New Commercial Organization to Take Arial~e Responsibil-
ity,” AW&ST, Apr. 7, 1980, p. 45.
ZIJeffrey  Lenorovitz, “Europeans Making Plans to Meet Long-term
Goals?” AW&ST,  Mar. 9, 1981, p. 88.
ZQpeter  Marsh, “what  Shou Id Europe Do in Space, ” New SCien-
tist, Jan. 29, 1981, pp. 290-292.
not reached, many of these programs may be-
come exclusively national efforts.
According to an address given by Dr. Massimo
Trella, Technical Director of ESA, at the Paris Air
Show in June of 1981, overall European space
activities will continue to grow in the 1980’s at
least as rapidly as in the 1970’s, but the division
of responsibility between ESA and national efforts
can be expected to change. ESA and the various
national programs will cooperate in defining and
coordinating a European program, while ESA
itself “will build up, more than before, its identi-
ty as an R&D organization devoted mainly to
large projects. More clearly we believe that com-
mercially exploitable systems should be more the
responsibility of other initiators in Europe. ” Dr.
Trella specifically mentioned development of an
advanced remote-sensing system .25 However, on
the same occasion Michel Bignier, ESA’S Direc-
tor of Space Transportation Systems, outlined a
future program which emphasized materials
processing, development of Ariane 3 and 4, and
building and maintaining large space stations.2b
Clearly ESA’S future mix of programs and overall
emphasis remain to be determined.
Cooperation/Competition With
the United States
Cooperation:
The bulk of European cooperative efforts with
NASA have been scientific. With one major ex-
ception (to be discussed below) these have
worked out well. A large number of cooperative
missions, in which NASA provided free launch
services in exchange for scientific experiments
and data, have been conducted with ESRO and
ESA.27 In general, scientific cooperation is ar-
ranged directly between ESA and NASA; only
Spacelab has required a formal intergovernmental
agreement. (Lower level agreements, called
ZSMaSSirnO  Trella,  “EsA  Policy Directions—Collective VETSUS  Na-
tional Programmed,” paper delivered at International Aerospace
Symposium, Le Bourget,  France, June 2-3, 1981.
2bMichel Bignier, “Expectations for the Future,” International
Aerospace Symposium, Le Bourget,  France, June  2-3, 1981.
zzFor details, see United  States C’ki/;an Space programs, 1958-78,
report by Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research
Service, for the House Committee on Science and Technology,
January 1981, pp. 839-841.
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memoranda of understanding, are made with
U.S. Department of State (DOS) concurrence,
while letter agreements require no DOS action
whatever.)
In the field of applications the cooperative
record is somewhat more mixed. Serious strains
arose when, in 1972, the United States withdrew
a previous offer for the Europeans to produce a
“Space Tug” as part of the Space Transportation
System (see app. G). Further mistrust was aroused
when the United States backed out of the Aerosat
program in 1977. Aerosat was a combined ESA/
U.S./Canadian project to develop an experimen-
tal air traffic control satellite system. Beginning
in 1974, ESA and other partners invested con-
siderable time and money only to have the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (the U.S. participant)
withdraw because of its inability to fund further
development.
A third example is the recent deletion of the
U.S. spacecraft from the joint International Solar
Polar Mission (ISPM). Though ISPM is a scientific,
not an applications project, this withdrawal has
reinforced European doubts about general U.S.
reliability. ISPM was to have involved two space-
craft, one United States and one European, which
would simultaneously fly over the Sun’s “north”
and “south” poles. Without U.S. participation,
much of ESA’S projected $150 million investment
will have been wasted; nevertheless, the U.S.
spacecraft was eliminated in Reagan administra-
tion cuts implemented in February 1981. Though
ESA objected vigorously and member states pro-
tested at the ambassadorial level, additional funds
were not appropriated.28 These U.S. actions have
raised questions about whether ESA can afford
to trust future U.S. commitments, given the
vagaries of annual executive and congressional
budget decisions and the dependent position of
ESA in most projected cooperative projects.
Despite these problems, preliminary talks have
begun on possibie major areas of future coopera-
tion, including joint processing experiments,
possible expansion of Spacelab into a modular
free-flying platform, and joint development of a
Zejeffrey  Lenorovitz, “ESA  Seeks Reinstatement of NASA Solar-
Polar Effort, ” AW&ST,  Mar. 2, 1981, pp. 22-23; statement of Eric
Quistgaard, Senate Commerce Committee hearing, Mar. 25, 1981,
pp. 1-5.
manned space station based on Spacelab mod-
ules. 29
In general, the advantages of cooperation tend
to diminish when the project requires much
direct contact on a day-to-day level; it is
preferable for work to be done as independent-
ly as possible, to avoid time-consuming joint deci-
sions. A second difficulty with cooperation in
space applications is that the prospect of even-
tual commercial competition between partners
can cause suspicion and reduce its attractiveness
to industrial participants.JO
Despite these difficulties, international coopera-
tion was strongly stressed in Massimo Trella’s June
address, particularly for high-risk, high-expense
programs: “ESA intends to take the initiative in
this direction in order to explore with all in-
terested partners how a wider and more ambi-
tious international cooperation could be defined
and implemented in a strategic R&D program me
in space in the next decade.”31 It should be noted
that the United States is not specifically men-
tioned; ESA has so far not engaged in cooperative
programs with the Soviet Union, though some
tentative offers were once made without success.
Other European countries, notably France, have
done so and it cannot be ruled out that ESA, part-
ly out of frustration with U.S. unpredictability,
may seek out the Soviets despite the difficulties
involved in collaborating across the iron Curtain,
Competition
Although the total European civilian space
budget is only a fraction of either U.S. or Soviet
expenditures (Europe spends only 0.04 percent
of its gross national product (GNP) on space to
the United States’ 0.2 percent), the areas in which
European technology is commercially competi-
tive with the United States are significant and
growing. The competition from Ariane is perhaps
most striking, insofar as launch vehicles are the
true symbols of space capabilities and were for
so long a U.S.-Soviet monopoly. Perhaps equal-
29
’’ Coming Next–A European Base in Space, ” New  Scientist,
Nov. 51981, p. 356; see also Craig Covault, “NASA Mulls interna-
tional Effort on Space Station, ” A W&S7;  Mar. 1, 1982, p. 20.
30
’’ U.S.-Europe Collaboration Variable, ” AW&ST,  Sept. 1, 1980,
p. 275.
31 Trella, “ESA  Policy Directions, ” p. 7.
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equally significant, however, are European suc-
cesses in gaining contracts from INMARSAT and
Arabsat for communications satellites, and plans
to bid for future generations of INTELSAT satellites
as well. The French SPOT remote-sensing system
(discussed below), is scheduled to offer an alter-
native to U.S. Landsat data beginning in 1984.
Though it can be argued that some of the Euro-
pean success may be attributed, not to superior
technology, but to the desire of international
organizations and non-U. S. purchasers to de-
crease their dependence on the United States,
it is clear that European systems are in many cases
equivalent, if not superior, in capabilities and cost
effectiveness. However, U.S. objections that
European space technologies, in particular
Ariane, benefit from unfair financial practices,
such as government-subsidized below-market
financing for users, are likely to lead to strains
between the U.S. and European agencies,
European success, despite lower expenditures,
is related to several factors:
l
l
l
l
focus on relatively few high-opportunity
areas;
assimilation of U.S. technology in key areas,
avoiding unnecessary duplication;
sustained support by the major countries,
particularly France and West Germany; and
the ability to compromise when necessary,
founded on a strong perception that building
and maintaining an industrial base in space
technology is necessary for Europe’s long-
term economic vitality.
Though decisions made through ESA may take
more compromise and negotiation than com-
parable U.S. program choices, they are less like-
ly to be precipitously changed or canceled; the
government-to-government character of agree-
ments gives them considerable weight. As long
as these conditions remain in effect, the United
States can expect a high level of competition from
ESA and its member states.
EUROPEAN NATIONAL PROGRAMS
In addition to their participation in ESA, which
for most countries constitutes the bulk of their
space spending, several European states have
substantial separate national or bilateral pro-
grams. The activities of France, West Germany,
Britain, and Italy are of particular interest.
France
The French space program is the largest and
most comprehensive in Europe and the third
largest in the world, after the United States and
Soviet Union. The French have major programs
in space science, applications, and launch vehi-
cles. Activities are carried out in several ways: on
a national basis; bilaterally with West Germany,
other European countries, the Soviet Union, the
United States and several third world countries;
and multilaterally through ESA.
The French program has been characterized
by: 1) an ongoing commitment to developing a
comprehensive and independent space program
while avoiding dependence on the United States
or U. S. S. R., particularly for launch services; 2) ex-
tensive cooperation between government agen-
cies and industry; and 3) the development of
military capabilities associated with France’s in-
dependent nuclear deterrent, including ongoing
relationships between civilian and military
programs.
The decision to cooperate with both the United
States and the Soviet Union is indicative of
France’s longstanding desire to mediate between
East and West and to avoid exclusive dependence
on either superpower. The idea of France as a
“third Force,” separate from the United States
and NATO (which France partially withdrew from
in 1959), was strongly promoted by DeGaulle,
who came to power in 1958. DeGaulle saw
France as the natural leader of a resurgent
Europe, and hence encouraged the formation of
(presumably French-dominated) European mul-
tilateral associations. Space was an arena in which
the French felt Europe needed to compete;
188 l Civilian Space Policy and Applications
France was a major supporter of ESRO and ELDO
(particularly the latter) and, eventually, of ESA.
(For a description of France’s initial space activ-
ities, see app. G.) In 1964, out of a total civilian
space budget of $76.8 million, France spent $29.6
million on ELDO, and $1 million on ESRO. In
1975, the first year of ESA’S existence, $133 mil-
lion out of a total of $254 million, or better than
50 percent, went to ESA,32 and in 1981 France
was ESA’S largest contributor with approximate-
ly $211.5 million, or 25.06 percent of ESA’S total
budget (largely for the Ariane).
However, the percentage of CNES’S budget go-
ing to ESA, as opposed to national and bilateral
programs, has dropped in recent years as ESA
spending has slowed and a number of bilateral
and national projects have begun to take shape.
The total 1981 budget is Ffr 2,617 million, 37.2
percent larger than in 1980; national programs,
however, are up 107 percent at 344.82 million,
and bilateral expenditures increased by four times
to Ffr 487.52 million.33 In 1982, CNES plans to
spend 82 percent more on national programs,
within an overall budget that will increase by 18
percent.
The CNES budget comes primarily from the
Ministry of industry and other civilian ministries;
in 1981 Ffr 192.8 million came from the Ministry
of Defense, while Ffr 596 million came from
CNES’S own resources.34
Current Applications Programs
COMMUNICATIONS
France is currently involved in three major sat-
ellite communications programs. The first is a
longstanding experimental bilateral effort with
West Germany called “Symphonic,” the two sat-
ellites of which, launched in 1974 and 1975, are
still partially active. Each Symphonic is a geosyn-
chronous satellite with a capacity of 200 tele-
phone or 2 TV plus 18 telephone channels. Sym-
phonic 1 and 2 were built by a consortium
(CIFAS) made up of French and German com-
panies and launched by the United States (after
JZWor/d-W;de Space Programs, p. 168.
33
’’ Space Still a Growth Industry in France,” /nterav;a,  May 1981,
p. 406.
34
’’ Budget and Programs of CNES for 1981,” CNES, p. 3.
some objections regarding possible conflict with
INTELSAT–see app. G).35
France and West Germany are currently en-
gaged in another joint project for direct televi-
sion broadcasting, with each country operating
its own 3-channel satellite for domestic purposes.
The satellites, designated TDF-1 for France and
TV-Sat for Germany, are being developed by the
Munich-based Eurosatellite Corp., made up of
two French firms, Aerospatiale and Thomson-
CSF, and two German ones, Messerschmitt-
Blohm-Bolkow and AEG-Telefunken. The French
contribution for development (divided between
CNES and government communications agen-
cies) is estimated at Ffr 980 million; the satellites
are scheduled for Ariane launch in late 1984 and
eariy 1985.36
The DBS joint effort was an outgrowth of a pre-
viously described ESA experimental communica-
tions project, H-Sat, which was initially backed
by France, West Germany, and Italy. However,
in 1978 France and Germany withdrew because
of concern over the slow pace of H-Sat develop-
ment. In particular, the two countries wished to
compete in the foreseen European and global
market for DBS satellites and groundstations,
which they saw as expanding rapidly in the
1980’s. An operational system was felt to provide
greater economic opportunities than another ex-
perimental system. The agreement to develop
TDF-l /TV-Sat was signed in 1979.37 In addition
to allowing it to enter foreign markets, French na-
tional television estimated that direct broadcast
would enable it to provide 100 percent coverage
of the entire country for less than half the cost
of building additional terrestrial relays.
Another cooperative venture is the SARGOS
project, part of a joint U.S./Canadian program
called SARSAT designed to provide emergency
search and rescue for ships and planes. France
is supplying three SARGOS units to fly on the U.S.
NOAA E, F and G satellites. SARGOS is an out-
growth of another project, ARGOS, for collect-
Jsworid.w;de  Space Activities, p. 161.
3G’’Space  Still a Growth Industry in France, ” p. 406.
qzsee “The French Space Effort, ” /rrteravia,  june  1979, p. 51 O;
also  Roberto Grandi and Giuseppe Richeri, “Western Europe: The
Development of DBS Systems,” Journa/ of Communication, v. 30,
spring 1980, p. 176.
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ing and processing meteorological data from
remote platforms, i.e., ballons, buoys, etc. The
total French contribution in 1981 to both pro-
grams was Ffr 24.7 million.38
France is also engaged in a major national com-
munications satellite program called Telecom 1
which is being funded by the Direction Generale
de Telecommunications, with CNES project lead-
ership, for a projected 1983 launch. Telecom 1
will provide domestic telephone and telex serv-
ices within France as well as between France and
its overseas territories, including some military
traffic. A major use will be in providing internal
business communications similar to those
planned for the U.S. Satellite Business Systems
Corporation .39
REMOTE SENSING
Since 1978, CNES has been engaged in a na-
tional program (with some support from Belgium
and Sweden) to develop an operational land
remote-sensing system called SPOT (Systeme
Probatoire d’ Observation de la Terre). Through
the prime contractor, Matra, CNES is designing
a two part satellite consisting of a multipurpose
bus with power-supply and stationkeeping sys-
tems, and a sensor payload that can be altered
as the system develops. The SPOT satellites will
be placed in Sun-synchronous 832 km orbits de-
signed to provide 26-day repetitive coverage of
the entire Earth. The initial design calls for two
types of coverage: 1 ) multispectral observation
with 20 m resolution, and 2) black and white ob-
servation with 10 m resolution. (This compares
with Landsat 3’s multispectral resolution of 80 m,
and Return-Beam-Vidicon of approximately 30
m). Both of SPOT’s instruments can be pointed
by remote control so as to cover any area of in-
terest within a path 950 km wide; each individual
swath is 60 km in width. This pointing capability
makes it possible to provide semistereoscopic im-
ages, i.e., successive views of the same area from
different angles, which are particularly useful for
mapmaking and geological interpretation. It also
allows for viewing a particular region more often
than once every 26 days; such frequent coverage
is necessary for agricultural purposes.
3a
’’ Budget and Programs of CNES for 1981 ,“ p. 23.
39
’’ Space Still a Growth Industry in France, ” p. 406.
The SPOT images are produced by a linear ar-
ray “push-broom” scanner that produces a con-
tinuous picture 60 km wide on the ground. The
images are transmitted digitally from the satellite
to ground receivers or they can be stored on tape
recorders for delayed transmission. The central
receiving and control station is located at
Toulouse in southern France. Other countries will
be able to build their own stations, subject to
agreements directly with CNES; or, data and proc-
essed data products will be purchasable through
Spotimage, a joint government-industry organiza-
tion being set up to market SPOT services. In
many respects Spotimage will be similar to the
previously described Arianespace; CNES will hold
34 percent of the company’s shares, with the re-
mainder split between various French firms and
government agencies.40 SPOT transmissions are
designed to be compatible with the U.S. Land-
sat and Landsat-D receiving stations, so that coun-
tries that already possess receivers for Landsat will
be able to receive SPOT, with some adaptation,
Though each SPOT satellite has a design life
of only 2 years, the system is planned to operate
for at least 10 years, so that users can count on
continuity of data for long-term remote-sensing
programs. After the initial launch, scheduled for
April 1984, additional satellites will be orbited to
ensure continuous service. These satellites will
be financed partly by Spotimage, and partly by
CNES through its revenues from foreign receiv-
ing stations.41
The basic reasons for France’s decision to build
its own remote-sensing system are similar to those
for its other space applications projects. These
include: 1 ) to encourage national high-technol-
ogy enterprises; 2) to gain independence from
the U.S. civil remote-sensing system, Landsat, and
to demonstrate French equivalence to U.S. and
Soviet capabilities; 3) to reap the economic and
political benefits of providing global coverage to
other countries; and 4) to develop an indigenous
remote-sensing capability for military purposes.
@“FrenCh  Marl@lng  services  of Spot Satellite Network, ” AWLLST,
Jan. 11, 1982, p. 99,
41see  ~~SpoT-Satel[ite.Ba~  Remote Sensing System, ” CNES bro-
chure, 1980; jean-Pierre Fouquet, “The SPOT Satellite, ” paper pre-
sented at 19th Goddard Symposium, Washington, D. C., Mar. 26,
1981.
190 l Civilian Space Policy and Applications
In line with this last motivation, a military recon-
naissance version of SPOT, known as SAMRO,
is already being evaluated. SAMRO would use
the SPOT bus, but with higher resolution optics
and secure communications links. Such a satellite
would give France the ability to monitor military
activities around the world on a continuous
basis. 42
The success of SPOT in gaining a large share
of the global market will depend on several fac-
tors. First, how advantageous will users view
SPOT’s 10 to 20 m resolution, as opposed to
Landsat-D’s 80 m (MSS) and 30 m (TM)? Some
users, particularly agricultural ones, will find the
increased resolution helpful, while others may
find it unnecessarily precise. One of the often
mentioned reasons for SPOT’s high resolution is
to make it attractive to European agricultural
observors, since European farms are typically
smaller than U.S. or Soviet ones.43 However,
some countries may be concerned that SPOT’s
high resolution will provide foreign users with too
much information. Political agreements on re-
stricting dissemination of SPOT data may be re-
quired to avoid opposition from a number of
states, and Spotimage has announced that it will
abide by agreed-on international regulations re-
garding data dissemination.
The second and probably most important ques-
tion is the status of competition from other
remote-sensing systems, particularly the U.S.
Landsat D and proposed D’ satellites, which are
planned to be operating at approximately the
same time (see ch. 3).
SPOT remains unproven both technically and
institutionally. However, the commitment to a
long-term operational status through a private
corporation, Spotimage, will help greatly in giv-
ing SPOT the credibility it needs to attract cus-
tomers. In particular, worries about the continuity
of the system (which are evident among Landsat
users on account of Landsat’s currently unre-
solved budgetary and institutional problems)
should be much less than with Landsat. Spot-
image plans to provide an across-the-board range
42
’’ France Studies Reconnaissance Version of SPOT Spacecraft,”
AW&ST, Aug. 10, 1981.
qJSee “The French Space Effort, ” /nteravia, June 1979, P. 508.
of services, including the provision of baseline
data for further processing; processed data prod-
ucts for specialized purposes; and aid, advice,
and equipment for potential customers. As with
Landsat, users can arrange directly with CNES to
receive, archive, and distribute SPOT data
through national or regional receiving stations.
A smoothly functioning corporate entity, especial-
ly one heavily backed by the French Govern-
ment, would provide strong competition to any
future U.S. system.
A key question will be the prices charged by
both SPOT and Landsat D-D’. Landsat prices are
currently government subsidized and in no way
reflect the true costs of developing, constructing,
and operating either the ground or space seg-
ments. If Landsat or any equivalent is run by a
private firm, the prices for clata would have to
rise to reflect these costs. Spotimage prices,
though not yet established, will also be substan-
tially higher than those paid by today’s users;
however, it is not likely that either the U.S. or
French governments, having invested heavily to
build a prestigious remote-sensing system, would
allow the other to substantially undercut its prices
for equivalent service. To maintain a market share
of commercial buyers, as well as the political
gains of supplying data to third world and other
countries, each operator will need to keep prices
competitive with the other. Whether these prices
will be heavily subsidized for political and public-
service reasons, as at present, or come closer to
reflecting the true costs of land remote sensing
remains to be seen; all such decisions will depend
at least as much on political as economic factors,
including possible competition from future Soviet
and Japanese systems.
MATERIALS PROCESSING
French MPS activities, at this time, are modest
in scope, with a budget of approximately $1 mil-
lion to $2 million per year. Bilateral materials
processing experimentation agreements are in ef-
fect with Germany and the U.S.S.R. A Franco-
Soviet crystal growth and solidification experi-
ment was carried out aboard the Soviet manned
laboratory, Salyut-6, and future cooperative MPS
research is anticipated. In addition, French ex-
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periments on crystal growth and the dynamics
of metal alloy solidification are planned for
Spacelab 1 and 3.
In general, the French effort is smaller and more
research directed than German activities. CNES
has funded a major study, however, on an am-
bitious program called “Solaris,” an unmanned
orbital space station which would be able to con-
duct MPS experiments and could be made avail-
able during the 1990’s. Solaris would be orbited
by an Ariane-4 launcher, operating for a lifetime
of up to 15 years. Among its many purposes, the
Solaris could serve as an automated orbital ma-
terials processing station, handling up to 2 tons
of materials in its furnaces. Feedstock would be
transported to the station by Ariane-launched un-
manned spacecraft. Modules containing proc-
essed materials would be returned to Earth from
Solaris via unpowered reentry vehicles. The proj-
ect is still in the conceptual stage and no cost
figures are currently available. It is conceivable
that Solaris might be accepted as a major proj-
ect for ESA during the 1980’s, thereby spreading
the costs and stimulating MPS research activities
in a number of member countries not presently
pursuing such investigation. Solaris not only
represents a major potential French initiative
utilizing the Ariane launcher, but is a direct
challenge to the U. S./ESA and Soviet manned lab-
oratories (Spacelab and Salyut, respectively)
which currently plan materials-processing ac-
tivities. CNES plans to study manned facilities
before deciding on a space-station concept.
LAUNCHERS
The Ariane and its future development have
been discussed previously. Among additional
possibilities mention should be made of the
Hermes manned reusable shuttle, a proposed
22,000-lb, 5-man vehicle that might be launched
by the advanced Ariane V. Though only in a very
preliminary design stage, the Hermes plan shows
that the French have by no means resigned them-
selves to a completely unmanned role in future
space activities .44
44’’The French Space Effort,” /nteravia, June 1979, pp. 508-509;
“Solaris: France Proposes Large Unmanned Space-Processing Plat-
form,” /nteravia, May 1981, p. 822.
FOREIGN COOPERATION/COMPETITION
Aside from ESA, France has major bilateral co-
operative programs with West Germany, the
Soviet Union, and the United States; it is the only
country besides India to deal extensively with
both the major space powers. In 1981, France
budgeted Ffr 379.8 million for German projects,
almost all for joint TDF-1 /TV-Sat development.
Thirty-seven million francs were spent with the
United States, largely for the ARGOS/
SARGOS project described above, and for up-
coming experiments on Spacelab.
Of the 56 million francs earmarked for projects
with the Soviet Union, none are for applications
projects per se.45 However, the fact and extent
of cooperative projects are politically significant
in themselves. Furthermore, in light of the his-
torical problems with U.S. commitments, it is
clear that the French see access to Soviet launch-
ers and facilities as a potential hedge against U.S.
delays and vacillation. The most visible of upcom-
ing France-Soviet ventures will be the scheduled
1982 visit of a French astronaut to the Soviet’s
Salyut 7 (or a reactivated Salyut 6) space station.
Two French candidates have been training in the
Soviet Union since September 1980.% The Soviets
have made a practice of launching non-Soviets
for brief orbital stays; to date, however, all such
visitors have been from “fraternal Socialist coun-
tries,” and the flight of an astronaut from a major
Western power can be expected to provide the
Soviets with a great deal of favorable publicity.
The French national space program, working
closely with French industry, will be a major
source of commercial competition for the United
States in the 1980’s. French competitiveness is
result of several factors:
technically advanced programs in commer-
cial areas such as DBS, land remote sensing,
and launch vehicles;
establishment of institutions (Arianespace,
Spotimage) to market systems aggressively
on a global basis;
4s’’Budget and Programs of CNES for 1981 ,“ CNES, p. 23.
46~~French  Cosmonauts Training for Mission With sOVklS,”
AW&ST,  Dec. 21, 1981, pp. 55-56)
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close government-industry collaboration as
an accepted feature of French commercial
practice;
long-standing government commitment to
building space capabilities on a par with the
United States and Soviet Union; and
support received through agreements with
ESA and bilateral partners.
West Germany
The bulk of West Germany’s space efforts are
conducted in association with ESA or bilaterally
with other countries. Germany is one of ESA’S
major supporters, supplying almost one-fourth of
its annual budget. The Ministry for Research and
Technology (BMFT) coordinates and funds most
German R&D efforts; projects are managed by
the German Research and Test Establishment for
Aeronautics and Space Flight (DFVLR), which
manages Government engineering and test
centers, and by the German Research Associa-
tion (DFG), a self-governing organization that
allocates funds from various public and private
sources to universities and scientific societies.45
Space-related expenditures in fiscal 1981
amounted to $371 million, of which $82 million
went to DFVLR. Total funding from 1978 to 1982
is projected to be $1.7 billion .48
Germany’s major aerospace firms also play a
key role in initiating and funding research proj-
ects; these include Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm
(MBB) and VFW-Fokker, which recently merged,
and several large electronics firms such as
Siemens and AEG-Telefunken.
Unlike France, Germany has never aimed at
achieving an across-the-board set of space
capabilities, but rather at encouraging an in-
digenous aerospace industry, promoting poten-
tially valuable scientific and industrial research,
and supporting European efforts in various ap-
plications areas. Compared with France there has
been greater emphasis on industrial and univer-
sity initiatives and participation, with Government
47
’’ Review of National and Co-operative International Space Ac-
tivities for the Calendar Year 1980,” UNCOPUOS,  A/AC.105/286/
Add. 1, Feb. 19, 1981, pp. 34-35.
4“Foreign Materials Processing Expenditures,” internal NASA staff
paper, May 1, 1981, p. 1.
coordination through the Research Ministry. De-
spite—or perhaps on account of—the extensive
German experience acquired during World War
II, there have been no attempts to produce a Ger-
man launcher, although Germany has been a
major contributor to Ariane. Instead, Germany
has launched numerous orbital and suborbital
payloads on U. S., French, Swedish, and British
rockets. The first German scientific satellite, called
Azur, was launched by the United States in No-
vember 1969.
Applications Programs
Almost all of Germany’s efforts in communica-
tions and remote sensing are being conducted
through ESA or bilateral projects with France,
described previously. In 1981, West Germany will
provide the largest single share of ESA’S expend-
itures for Meteosat, OTS, ECS, and Spacelab.Ag
In addition to communications, Germany’s
strongest emphasis has been placed on materials
science and processing. Since the German firm
ERNO (a subsidiary of VFW-Fokker) is the prime
contractor for Spacelab, and Germany is the
major financial contributor (64.78 percent in
1981 ), German interest in Spacelab exploitation
has been high. In addition, chemicals and mate-
rials processing have traditionally been areas of
German technical and industrial leadership. The
Ministry of Science and Technology provided ap-
proximately $57 million for MPS work from 1978
to 1980 and is authorized to spend $50 million
more between 1982 to 1985. Additional funds are
available from non-Federal sources. so
The German MPS program is intended to meet
the as yet largely undefined needs of the user
community. The ultimate goal of Government
support is substantial involvement of German in-
dustry in such areas as chemistry, process tech-
nology, metals, composite materials, and
crystals .51
Early West German experiments were carried
on the 1975 Apollo/Soyuz manned mission. A
49Europe’s Place in Space, ESA, January 1981, P. 9.
‘“’’ Foreign Materials Expenditures, ” p. 2.
SICommercja/jzation  of Materials Processing and Manufacturing
in Space, position paper prepared for OTA by TRW, Inc., Apr. 14,
1981, p. 25.
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variety of methods are now being followed, using
suborbital sounding rockets, small self-contained
payload packages (so-called “Getaway Specials”)
attached to the space shuttle, and full-scale
Spacelab missions. Future flight opportunities
using “free-flying” automatic experimental units
for longer periods of time than can be attained
with the present shuttle/spacelab system are also
being examined. Primary elements of the Ger-
man MPS Program are:52
l TEXUS (technological experiments under
microgravity): Using British-built Skylark
sounding rockets, certain experiments are
being flight tested in advance of future
Spacelab missions. Five TEXUS flights have
been accomplished since 1977, and two
launches per year are planned starting in
1981. TEXUS flight results to date indicate
this approach is scientifically and technolog-
ically useful. West German experiments
have also flown on U. S. SPAR sounding
rockets.
l MAUS (materials science autonomous ex-
periments under zero-G conditions) pro-
gram: Instruments partially based on TEXUS
program findings are to be carried in 25 Ger-
man-purchased getaway special canisters.
These autonomous packages provide ex-
periments with much longer microgravity
duration than attainable with sounding
rockets.
l Spacelab: Germany is supporting major ex-
periments on Spacelab, including a materials
processing laboratory to be flown on Space-
Iab 1 in mid-1983. Materials science ex-
periments will be conducted in the materials
science double rack, a largely German con-
tribution to the first Spacelab mission. The
facilities include the following: 1) high-
temperature thermostat, 2) mirror heating
facility, 3) isothermal heating facility,
4) capillarity measurement equipment,
5) cryostat, 6) fluid physics module, 7) gra-
dient heating facility, 8) UHV chamber, and
9) common support equipment.
‘*See G. Greger, “Science and Technology of the German MPS
Missions, ” paper presented at 1980 AAS Annual meeting, Boston,
Mass., Oct. 20-23, 1980.
A wholly German Spacelab mission, the
D-1, is now scheduled for September 1984.
The D-1 will carry the Biorack for investiga-
tions of cell and molecular biology, and an
advanced fluid physics module. These will
perform a mixture of open experiments, for
which data will be freely disseminated, plus
a number of closed experiments with poten-
tial commercial benefit. For these latter, Ger-
many has proposed to pay a pro rata share
of the normal Spacelab users’ fee; the exact
financial arrangements have not been con-
cluded. Prime objectives for the mission are
experiments in the fields of metals, mono-
crystals and materials for electronic applica-
tions, boundary layer and transport phenom-
ena problems, and physical chemistry and
processing.
The German program stresses involvement
with the industrial sector in addition to purely
scientific exploration. The Ministry of Science and
Technology is working closely with both MAN,
Inc., and Volkswagen. The work at MAN involves
“skin technology”; this is a process by which
complex refractory metal alloys used for turbine
blades can be melted and resolidified in space
with an oxide skin, which is a plasma sprayed
on the surface of the container. New immiscible
metal alloys for potential use as bearing materials
are of interest to Volkswagen. sq
Although the German Government has not
supported any launcher-related programs, aside
from Ariane, mention should be made of a private
German firm called OTRAG (Orbital Transport-
und-Raketen Aktiengesellschaft), which has spent
$65 miliion to $70 million since 1974 trying to
develop a mass-produced expendable rocket for
inexpensive satellite launches. To date, OTRAG
has claimed four successful test flights and until
recently planned to launch its first orbital flight
in 1982.54 OTRAG hopes to attract private firms
and third world countries by providing relative-
ly simple services at prices that Ariane and, the
space shuttle cannot match. The rockets would
use off-the-shelf components and an extremely
cheap fuel made of diesel oil and nitric acid.
S3TRW  paper, op. cit, pp. 25-26.
54
’’ German Company Testing Launch Vehicle in Libya,” AlW&ST,
Mar. 23, 1981, p. 25.
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The political controversy surrounding OTRAG
has been intense, largely as a result of the loca-
tion of its test facilities. Until 1979, OTRAG
operated out of a 39,000 mi2 area in Zaire, where
it had agreed to pay the Mobutu government $50
million per year or 10 percent of gross revenues,
whichever was greater, once commercial opera-
tions commenced.55 However there were numer-
ous protests, not only from Zaire’s neighbors,
who feared the rockets might have military uses,
but also from the Soviet Union, which was in-
tensely concerned at any evidence of German
development of an independent launch capabil-
ity. The German Government was embarrassed
and tried various means to put OTRAG out of
business, including passage in 1978 of the so-
called “Lex OTRAG” prohibiting the export of
OTRAG rockets or components. Eventually in-
ternational pressure forced Zaire to expel
OTRAG; however, the company soon relocated
its test facilities in Libya, partly, according to
OTRAG president Frank Wukasch, because
Libya’s ruler Muammar Qaddafi “cannot be
blackmailed” into expelling the company. 56
OTRAG’S presence in Libya reinforced fears that
its missiles might be used for military purposes,
perhaps against Israel. Recently, it was reported
that OTRAG had withdrawn from Libya and
would seek new facilities, perhaps in India or
South America. 57
COOPERATION/COMPETITION WITH THE
UNITED STATES
The German attitude towards cooperative ven-
tures with the United States has generally been
more positive than the French, as shown by Ger-
man willingness to take the lead in building
Spacelab. A large number of cooperative space
science projects are also underway. Cooperation
with the Soviet Union has been negligible for
political reasons.
Though there are few major areas where Ger-
man projects will directly compete with the
United States, German aerospace and electronics
firms have been strong competitors for compo-
55A w&sT, Sept. 12, 1977, p. 42.
5bBradley  Graham, “Rocket Firm’s Third World Ties Test Bonn’s
Patience,” Washington Post, Aug. 14, 1981, p. 17.
57’’Otrag Ends Libyan Launch Work,” A W&ST, December 1981.
nent and subsystem contracts on INTELSAT and
other communications satellites. The Research
Ministry is particularly interested in expanding
German capabilities in this area.58 The experience
gained in ESA communications projects and par-
ticularly through joint TV-Sat development with
France will give German industries the ability to
compete for complete systems in the emerging
DBS market.
Great Britain
During the 1970’s British civilian space spend-
ing has been done almost exclusively as part of
ESA projects. (For a brief description of early
British space activities, see app. G). Even within
ESA, Great Britain has chosen to concentrate on
communications and general science, and has
contributed relatively little to ESA’S two largest
projects, Spacelab and Ariane. British choosiness
has been a function in part of budget restrictions
caused by generally poor economic performance
compared with its continental partners, and to
a fundamental historical uncertainty as to wheth-
er to opt for close ties with the United States, with
Europe, or with the Commonwealth, Largely be-
cause of its traditionally close relationship with
the United States, Britain has not favored devel-
opment of a European launcher, whether the
Europa or Ariane, considering it uncompetitive
and unnecessary. With a strong university re-
search base and relatively weak industries, Brit-
ain has preferred to concentrate on basic science
and on a few areas, especially communications,
in which British firms such as Marconi and British
Aerospace could hope to become international-
ly competitive. In general, the above constraints
have made the formulation and implementation
of any coherent space policy very difficult. There
is little public or political consensus as to Britain’s
proper role in space activities, and the major
political parties often fail to follow through on in-
itiatives begun by their predecessors. A Sep-
tember 1980 memorandum by the British Royal
Society, which proposed establishing a National
Council for Space, pointed out that: “The pres-
ent U.K. efforts in space science and technology
are fragmented and there is a serious lack of
Se’’West German Space Program, ” /nteravia, April 1980, p. 312.
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cohesion to such an extent that there appears to
be no overall domestic space policy.”59
Organization and Funding
Government responsibility for space has been
split between several organizations. The Depart-
ment of Trade and industry has funded civilian
programs, while the Space Research Council, part
of the Department of Education and Science, has
supported scientific projects, including cooper-
ative ventures with ESRO and NASA. The Post
Office (now British Telecom) has operated com-
munications networks including INTELSAT re-
ceiving stations.
In 1972, the total budget was $55.1 million, of
which $15.5 million went to ELDO and ESRO.
By 1976, the budget had risen to $80,2 million,
all of which was spent within ESA.60 In 1981,
Great Britain was ESA’S third-largest contributor
with 14.88 percent of the total budget, amount-
ing to $125.6 million, and was the majority con-
tributor to the Marecs ocean communication sat-
ellite program. 61 Present plans call for a substan-
tial increase in space spending, with emphasis on
nationally funded communications satellites. 62
Current Applications Programs
The area in which the British have been most
active over the past several years is communica-
tions satellites. Within ESA, British Aerospace
(BAe) has been the consortium leader for the
OTS, ECS, and Marecs systems, and Britain was
the prime mover behind ESA’S decision to devel-
op the experimental L-Sat multipurpose commu-
nications platform. In addition, there has been
considerable activity by British agencies and
private firms, spurred by the Thatcher govern-
ment’s recent decision to open up private com-
petition in telecommunications by removing
British Telecom’s monopoly over network oper-
ations.63 I n June 1981, BAe announced forma-
sqsP~ce~l;g~~,  BritiSh  ! nterplanetary Society, Feb. 2, 1981 t P. 33;
see also Johnny Hawkes  (former Director of space  Dept. Of in-
dustry),  “Britain in Space: Time to Consolidate, ” New Scientist,
Jan. 14, 1982.
b~world-wide  space Activities, P. 222.
61E”~ope’s place in space, ESA, Par is ,  January 1981 t P 9.
62peter Marsh, “Britain Plans Big Boost for Space Budget, ” New
Scientist, Feb. 23, 1982.
63 Pe te r  Marsh, “communications in the 1980’s—Satellites  or Fibre
Optics?” New Scientist, July 23, 1981.
tion of a company called Satellite Broadcasting
Co., Ltd., to provide common carrier DBS serv-
ices. Two satellites plus a ground spare would be
required at an estimated cost of L100 million;
services would be leased to British broadcasters
such as the BBC and Granada television.
Another possible venture would involve BAe
and IBM in a business communications service,
similar to the newly created U.S. Satellite Business
Systems, of which IBM is a major partner. It is
not clear whether such a plan could succeed
within Britain alone, and expansion into the Euro-
pean market, with the attendant difficulties of
operating across national boundaries, may be
envision ed. 64
In a somewhat different field, BAe and Marconi
have joined forces, after pressure from the
Defense Ministry, to build the British Ministry of
Defence’s proposed communications satellite,
Skynet IV/Satcom. Although both BAe and Mar-
coni had initially sought out U.S. industrial
cooperation, an all-British program was deemed
preferable. Launch is estimated to be in early
1985. 65 British Telecom (formerly the Post Office)
is planning its own Europeanwide business sat-
ellite system which will make use of nine trans-
ponders; two each placed on all four ECSs, and
one leased from France’s Telecom 1. The eight
ECS transponders will cost approximately $150
million. Users will purchase ground stations that
will provide access to any point in Europe; the
system will be operated through an agreement
with Interim Eutelsat.66
it is clear that British industry is eager to move
into the potentially lucrative areas of DBS and
satellite business communications, if necessary
in conjunction with foreign partners who can pro-
vide financial and/or marketing support. A major
question remains as to whether European opera-
tions will be possible given prospective competi-
tion from Eurosatellite (the manufacturer of
TDF-l /TV-Sat) backed by national PTTs. In addi-
tion there are numerous regulatory pitfalls, as well
b4’’BAe  Aiming To Become Major Satellite Operator?” /ntera via,
August 1981, pp. 754-755.
bS’!Sky
 net IV-NOVV  an AJ1-British  Mil i tary Satcom  s)@f21Tl,”  /fl-
teravia, September 1981, p. 859.
bK’’Satellite  Business Communication Comes to Britai n,” F/ight
/nternationa/, Feb. 7, 1981, p. 342.
196 l Civilian Space Policy and Applications
as possible challenges from INTELSAT, if the new
services threaten to take business away from the
Intelsat system.67 It is still early enough in the
evolution of satellite systems for any number of
developments to occur, including joint ventures
between British and European companies. BAe
recently formed a partnership with the French
firm Matra, called Satcom International, to bid
on satellite hardware, and similar agreements
may be made for services.
Italy
Italy has been a consistent supporter of Euro-
pean space activities and in 1981 contributed
9.94 percent of ESA’S budget, or around $82.9
million. Italy has not taken the lead in any major
applications projects, but has chosen to support
a variety of programs that would provide Italy’s
aerospace and electronics industries with con-
tracts for advanced technologies. Difficulties in
meeting its financial obligations to the Spacelab
program in the face of large cost overruns led Italy
to reduce its contribution from 18 percent of
Spacelab funding in 1979 to 1 percent in 1981.
The recent decision to use Italy’s Sirio 2 com-
munications satellite for ESA communications has
given Italy the lead role in that project.
Aside from its European multilateral contribu-
tions, Italy has maintained a small national pro-
gram centered around its unique off-shore launch
platform, located on the Equator off the shore of
Kenya in the Indian Ocean. The San Marcos plat-
form has been the site of numerous small satellite
and sounding rocket launches, mostly by U.S.
rockets but including British and European ones
as well, which have taken advantage of its equa-
torial position for experimental flights. The first
Italian satellite, San Marcos 1, was launched by
a U.S. Scout in 1964; subsequent San Marcos
series satellites were launched from the San Mar
cos platform, also by Scout.
In 1977, Italy orbited an experimental geosta-
tionary communications satellite, Sirio 1, on a
U.S. Thor-Delta. The ground spare for that proj-
ect, Sirio 2, will be launched in April 1982 by ESA
to disseminate meteorological data; the Italian
‘7’’Communications  in the 1980’ s,” New Scientist, July 23, 1981.
Compagnia Nazionale Satelliti di Telecomunica-
zioni is prime contractor on the project.
Unlike all other European states except Por-
tugal, Italy’s participation in INTELSAT is done
through a private firm, Telespazio, rather than a
national PTT. Since 1976, Telespazio has also op-
erated a Landsat receiving station at Fucino.
The Italian space program has suffered from
lack of central coordination and public support,
as well as the strains of Italy’s turbulent economic
and political situation. Space activities have been
coordinated and funded by the National Re-
search Council (CNR), which began to fund
space-related activities in 1960. Other ministries
and agencies, such as the Post Office and the
Defense Ministry, also play a role. In 1972, Italy
spent $19.4 million on space, $9.8 million of
which went to ELDO and ESRO; in 1976 this had
risen to $60.5 million, almost all in ESA.68 Recent-
ly, the government approved a plan to double
Italy’s space expenditures over the next 2 years;
most of the increase will go to fund national pro-
grams. These may include a national communica-
tions satellite (Italsat) and a television DBS system,
as well as several cooperative ventures with
NASA: IRIS, a small booster for the shuttle
payload bay; and the so-called “tethered
satellite,” which is designed to be attached to the
shuttle in orbit by a long umbilical cord.69 Italy
has been a strong supporter of ESA’S experimental
L-Sat communications platform, and will use one
of the first satellite’s 2 TV-channels for direct
television broadcasting.
Recently the Italian Defense Ministry has pro-
posed a domestic military communications sys-
tem, SICRAL, for secure voice and data transmis-
sion and for use in civil emergencies. The satellite
hardware will be designed and manufactured by
Italian firms for eventual launch on either the
shuttle or Ariane.70
Other European Programs
The space efforts of other countries in Europe
have taken place almost entirely within the Euro-
G8Wor/d. Wide Space Activities, p. 176.
Ggpeter  Marsh, “Italy Joins the New European Space Race, ” New
Scientist, Apr. 1, 1982.
70Andrea Lorenzoni, “SICRAL:  A Proposed Italian Defence Sat-
ellite System,” /nteravia, August 1981, p, 793.
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pean agencies, ESRO, ElDO, and now ESA. A few
non-ESA projects, however, deserve mention,
particularly the proposed Nordsat regional com-
munications system to provide television and
radio broadcasting between Sweden, Norway,
Denmark, and Finland. Under discussion since
1972, the system is designed to promote Scan-
dinavian cultural unity–the details, which have
been understandably difficult to arrange consider-
ing the many countries involved, are not as yet
determined. 71 In connection with this proposal,
Sweden is developing a satellite, known as Vik-
ing, for 1984 Ariane launch; it will investigate
magnetospheric conditions preparatory to a pos-
sible communications satellite program. Saab-
Scania is building the payload, while Boeing pro-
vides the satellite bus; Viking will provide Sweden
with crucial experience in satellite communica-
tions operation, and will also further the Swedish
goal of encouraging an indigenous commercial
space systems industry. Studies have also been
done for a second Swedish satellite, Tele-X, for
71see R, Grandj,  and G. Richeri,  “Western Europe: The Develop-
ment of DBS Systems, ” )ourna/  of Communication, spring 1980,
pp. 175-176.
a variety of experimental communications activ-
ities .72
Another potentially interesting development is
Compagnie Luxembourgeosie de Telediffusion’s
(CLT) plan to provide multinational direct televi-
sion programing via satellite by 1985. The com-
pany’s potential difficulties illustrate the problems
faced when operating across European bound-
aries. CLT is Europe’s largest commercial (i. e.,
nongovernment) broadcaster, covering large por-
tions of France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark,
and the Netherlands. Since it is in direct com-
petition with national broadcasters, foreign
governments, particularly Germany, have op-
posed ClT’s expansion plans, in part by trying
to discourage investment in CLT stock. CLT is pro-
posing a three-channel $250-million satellite that
could broadcast simultaneously in French, Ger-
man, and Dutch, reaching a potential 100 million
viewers. Launch reservations have already been
made on both Ariane and the Shuttle.73
72
’’ Sweden Moves Ahead on Research Satellite,” A W&ST, Sept.
1, 1980, p. 49.
73’’The No. 1 Broadcaster Fights Back From Space, ” Business
Week, May 4, 1981, pp. 66-67.
Organization and Policy
Japanese interest in space science and tech-
nology began in the mid-l 950’s, when mukilat-
eral planning was underway for the International
Geophysical Year (1957). Alone among the major
space-capable countries, Japan’s space efforts
were not initially prompted by military concerns.
The postwar Japanese constitution specifically
prohibited the buildup of large military forces,
and public opinion has been consistently op-
posed to any signs of militarism and to large ex-
penditures for military purposes. Because of the
worldwide association of space programs with
military capabilities, Japan carefully placed its first
space establishment at the University of Tokyo,
the country’s foremost educational institution.
The Institute of Space and Aeronautical Sciences
(ISAS) was founded in 1954, and (though it re-
cently became an independent institute) is still
responsible today for Japan’s scientific programs.
Beginning in the late ]9s0’s and through the
1960’s ISAS developed the Kappa and Lambda
series of solid-fuel sounding rockets, which
formed the basis for Japanese scientific and ap-
plications experiments. The difficulties of rocket
development were enhanced by inadequate
guidance and stabilization technology, which was
in turn due partly to a self-imposed reluctance
to fund technologies that might give the rockets
enough accuracy to be perceived as having mil-
itary capability.TA  ISAS went on to develop orbital
rockets; the first successful 24-kg test satellite was
launched by an advanced Lambda, after several
years of failure, in February 1970. The Mu-class
orbital launcher achieved its first success in 1971
and has been operated by ISAS since then from
its Kagosh ima test range.
TAworjd.wide  Space Activ/t/es, p. 185.
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In 1960, the National Space Activities Commis-
sion (NSAC, later SAC) was established in the
Prime Minister’s office to give advice on Japan’s
overall space program. It operates today as a
major source of high-level planning, along with
the Science and Technology Agency (STA). In
1964, the STA created the National Space De-
velopment Center to conduct rocket tests; this
was due in part to dissatisfaction with ISAS’S pure-
ly scientific orientation. In 1969, this became the
National Space Development Agency (NASDA),
which is today the principal agency for civilian
applications and test programs, launcher devel-
opment, and tracking facilities.75 NASDA operates
the Tsukuba Space Center near Tokyo, Japan’s
main satellite test facility, as well as the
Tanegashima launch site, located on an island in
the south of Japan.
Other space-related activities are conducted by
the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications in
satellite communications, and the Transport Min-
istry, which operates the weather service, in me-
teorological satellites. A private firm, Kokusai
Denshin Denwa Ltd., is responsible for relations
with INTELSAT. NASDA cooperates with other
ministries and agencies in the research and design
of applications programs, as well as conducting
launches (see fig. 12).
The Japanese budget for space research was
very small, though growing, through the 1960’s.76
With the establishment of NASDA annual funding
has increased rapidly, from a total of $23.5 million
in 1968 to almost $477 million in 1981. Of this
the bulk, almost 80 percent, goes to NASDA, with
the remainder split between ISAS and other gov-
ernment programs (see fig. 1 3).
The budget is drawn up by the SAC on a year-
ly basis. In addition, the SAC prepares long-range
comprehensive plans. The latest 15-year pro-
posal, drawn up in 1978, calls for a total 15-year
expenditure of$14 billion to fund an across-the-
board program in space science, applications,
and launch-vehicle development. ” The SAC
stressed that “Japan should develop the necessary
technical capabilities to carry out her comprehen-
— — —
Tssee world-wide  space Programs, p. 186; also NASDA 80-81,
National Space Development Agency of Japan, pp. 3-4.
Tbsee Wor/d-W;de  space Activities, p. 204.
77’’Japanese  Commission Proposes Ambitious 15-Year Space
Plan,” AW&ST, Mar. 27, 1978, p. 23.
sive space program, although it is not necessary
to produce everything domestically."78 Active in-
ternational cooperation and peaceful develop-
ment were emphasized as guiding principles,
Current and Projected
Applications Programs79
Communications
In December 1977, the Japanese orbited an ex-
perimental geostationary communications sat-
ellite, the CS-Sakura, aboard a U.S. Delta rocket.
The Sakura has been used by the Radio Research
Labs of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunica-
tions for experiments in 30/20 GHz propagation
(the first country in the world to do so), and to
gain experience in the control and operation of
communications satellites. An operational system
consisting of two satellites, the CS-2a and CS-2b,
is planned for launch in early and mid-l983, re-
spectively (CS-2b will be an orbital spare); the
recently developed N-11 launch vehicle will be
used. The satellites themselves were built by a
group led by Mitsubishi Electric and Ford Aero-
space.80 The operational system will provide
emergency communications as well as links with
remote islands; the signals will be receivable by
small transportable Earth stations in either K or
C band, and will represent the first operational
use of 30/20 GHz technology, The satellites will
be managed by the Telecommunications Satellite
Corp. of Japan, established in 1979.
A parallel program in direct television broad-
casting is also being conductecl, with the BSE-Yuri
satellite launched in April 1978 by a U.S. Delta
for geostationary experiments in audiovisual
transmission. The operational system, with two
satellites, BS-2a and BS-2b, is planned for N-11
launch in early 1984 and mid-1985. The Ministry
of Posts and Telecommunications has funded the
system, which will enable it to transmit images
to mountainous and outlying areas. al
zsMaSaO  yoshiki,  Acting  Chairman, SAC, “Japan’s Space pro-
gram, ” paper delivered at International Aerospace Symposium,
Paris, France, June 2-3, 1981, pp. 1-2.
~lnformation in this section, unless otherwise noted, is taken from
NASDA 80-81, NASDA  1980.
“’Japan Gaining Maturity in Satellite Technology,” A W&ST, Mar.
3, 1980, p, 92.
8’ “Japanese Gain Capabilities in Advanced”Space Effort,” A W&ST,
Mar. 9, 1981, p. 109.
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Figure 12.—Schematic Chart of National Organization for Space Activities
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Figure 13.—Japanese Budget for Space Activitiesa
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The impetus toward operational development
of these systems has come from a desire to
develop expertise in the design and operation of
communications satellites for commercial/in-
dustrial exploitation. Satellite broadcasting is par-
ticularly useful for communicating within Japan’s
mountainous and far-flung territory, which in-
cludes many small islands. They were preceded
by extensive ground-based R&D during the
1960’s, including cooperative experiments with
NASA on signals propagation, and the assump-
tion of control over NASA’s advanced experimen-
tal communication satellite, ATS-1, in 1974.82
In connection with Japan’s communications
program mention should be made of a failed ex-
perimental program, the Ayame and Ayame 2 sat-
ellites. Designed to further test satellite control
and communications facilities, both failed to
BIWor/d. w/jde Space Activities, p. 200.
achieve geostationary orbit when launched in
1979 and 1980 by the Japanese N-1 rocket. The
first failure was due to a collision with the third
stage motor after separation, the second to an ap-
parent misfiring of the apogee engine. The reper-
cussions from these consecutive mishaps, which
cost the Japanese an estimated $100 million, have
been great; not only was the chairman of NASDA
forced to resign83 but, more importantly, the
Japanese were moved to accelerate their efforts
to achieve independence from the United States
in space capabilities. Both failures were traced
to probable malfunctions of U.S.-supplied equip-
ment. Though in the past the Japanese have relied
heavily on the United States, dissatisfaction with
U.S. technology can only mean fewer contracts
for U.S. firms and more emphasis on indigenous
>
83’’Tw0  Mission Failures Force Space Official’s Resignation, ”
AW&ST, june 3, 1980, p. 26.
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development and/or deals with European com-
panics.84
In the area of ground stations for communica-
tions satellites, Japanese firms have long been
leaders in the manufacture and sale of INTELSAT
compatible stations and subsystems to develop-
ing countries. Both Mitsubishi and Nippon Elec-
tric have made extensive sales abroad; in addi-
tion, Japanese firms have obtained subcontracts
from Hughes and other U.S. companies for work
on INTELSAT payloads.
Remote Sensing
Japan has the world’s largest fishing fleet and
depends on the oceans not only for food, but for
the transportation of vital raw materials and ex-
ports, to a greater extent than any other devel-
oped country. In addition, Japan is a frequent vic-
tim of typhoons formed in the Central Pacific,
where meteorological facilities are poor and thin-
ly scattered. Hence there is a special interest in
the development of ocean-monitoring satellites,
both for weather prediction and for exploitation
of ocean-based resources.
Many of the early sounding rockets were used
for meteorological experiments. The first ded-
icated Geostationary Meteorological Satellite,
GMS-Himawari, was launched in July 1977 by a
U.S. Delta. Still in operation, it has provided the
Japan Meteorological Agency with cloud-images
for public dissemination, along with infrared
temperature information, and has disseminated
data to other countries in the region. Himawari
was also Japan’s contribution to the World Me-
teorological Organization’s Global Atmospheric
Research Program (GARP). A second satellite,
GMS-2, was launched in August 1981 on an N-l!
vehicle; it was developed by a group led by
Nihon Electric and Hughes Aerospace.85 The
GMS-3 is scheduled for launch in the summer of
1984.
Under development is a geodetic survey sat-
ellite, GS-1, for a possible launch in 1985. The
GS-1 will be designed to be highly reflective, al-
lowing ground stations to bounce lasers off it for
measurement purposes.
The most ambitious current program is the
Maritime Observation Satellite, MOS-1, which
will be Japan’s first satellite to provide continuous
global Earth observation. It is designed to observe
ocean surface phenomena and will include visi-
ble, infrared, and microwave scanning radio-
meters. The primary sensor will be the multi-
spectral self-scanning radiometer, a charge-
coupled device (CCD) providing 50-m resolution
imagery. Hence MOS will provide operational ex-
perience with land remote-sensing data collec-
tion and data-processing, comparable to Land-
sat and Spot. It is currently scheduled for an N-11
launch in August or September 1986.
A proposed follow-onto MOS is the Earth Re-
sources Survey Satellite, ERS-1, a 2,700-lb remote-
sensing spacecraft currently in preliminary design.
ERS-1 would be launched in 1988 aboard the new
large-capacity H-1A launcher. Possible instru-
mentation includes synthetic aperture radar,
stereo camera, and visible infrared measurement
systems.86 The ERS-1 would eliminate Japanese
dependence on outside systems such as Land-
sat and SPOT, and could be used to further the
search for foreign sources of energy and other
raw materials. In addition, it would allow Japan
to compete with these systems for the sale of
remote-sensing data and data products. B’
Materials Processing
Japan is cultivating an on-going MPS program
as an element of its 15-year space development
policy. MPS work in developing alloys, com-
pound materials, electronic materials, and med-
icines, as well as the life sciences, is going for-
ward with experiments on both the U.S. Space
Shuttle and the TT-500-A, a Japanese suborbital
rocket:
l TT-500-A; This small two-stage suborbital
rocket with recoverable payload sections
provides approximately 7 minutes of micro-
gravity (under 1o-4 G), comparable to
U.S. SPAR and German TEXUS. NASDA
the
has
“’japanese  Gain Capabilities in Advanced Space Effort,” AW&ST,
Mar. 9, 1981, p. 108.
as’’japan Gaining Maturity in Satellite Technology,” p. 92.
sG’’japanese Gain Capabilities, ” p. 107.
87’’japan Gaining Maturity,” p. 92.
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established a space experiment schedule for
the IT-500-A of two flights per year. An early
1981 launch carried a metallic compound
processing experiment, while an August
flight evaluated semiconductor processing
techniques.
Space Shuttle: NASDA anticipates funding
annual missions with Spacelab, inaugurating
its use with a first material processing test
(FMPT) in fiscal year 1985. The FMPT will
make use of half or one-third of the available
space in the shuttle-carried Spacelab. A
Japanese payload specialist will join shuttle
crews to conduct the FMPT and later shuttle-
based experiments.88
Though the Japanese hope for major potential
gains from MPS investments, they do not expect
them in the near future. MPS experimentation is
seen as a way of insuring a competitive position
10 or 15 years from now.
Launch Vehicles
The Japanese have not had an easy time de-
veloping their own launch vehicles. During the
1960’s, ISAS was responsible for designing an
orbital launcher; after several years of failure a
Lambda sounding rocket was able, with the ad-
dition of a fourth stage, to launch Japan’s first
satellite in 1970. The Mu series of solid-fuel
rockets was more successful, and the first orbit
was achieved in 1971. The Mu launchers have
been improved with radio guidance and are used
by ISAS for scientific flights. Nissan Motors is cur-
rently designing an advanced version, the
M-3-kai-l, which will be used for Japan’s 1st
planetary exploration flights in the mid-1980’s,
including a planned Halley/Venus mission in
1985.
in 1969, NASDA assumed primary responsibili-
ty for launcher development for applications sat-
ellites. Instead of attempting to develop further
versions of the Mu launcher, NASDA decided to
approach the United States for access to technol-
ogy for the Thor-Delta launcher and licensing ar-
rangements to manufacture parts of the Delta in
Japan. The U.S.-Japanese Agreement on Space
Activities, signed on July 31, 1969, gave Japan
86’’japan’s  Space Program,” p. 16.
Delta technology, subject to an agreement not
to transfer it to any third party. The first flight of
the new N-1 launcher took place in September
1975, when an 85-kg test satellite, Kiku ETS-1, was
placed in a 1,000-km circular orbit. Basically the
N-1 consists of a Thor first stage, built under
license in Japan by Mitsubishi Industries; a
Japanese developed liquid-fuel second stage; and
a U.S. Thiokol third stage. In all, approximately
67 percent of the N-1 is supplied by Japanese
firms. The N-1 can lift 130 kg into geostationary
orbit; in February 1977, it launched Japan’s first
geostationary satellite, making Japan the third
country in the world, after the United States and
Soviet Union, to do so.
An uprated version, the N-11, had its first suc-
cessful test flight in February 1981. The N-ii can
carry 350 kg, or over twice the N-l’s payload, to
geosynchronous orbit. Mitsubishi Industries is the
prime contractor; the major differences from the
N-1 are the use of additional solid-fuel strap-on
boosters and the replacement of the Japanese-de-
signed second stage by an improved version of
the U.S. Aerojet second stage used on the Delta.
As a result the Japanese contribution to the N-11
is only 56 percent, less than for the N-1.89 The N-11
will replace the N-1 by 1983 and is planned for
use through the mid-l 980’s.
For the latter 1980’s and 1990’s a new booster
design, the H-1A, is under development. The
major innovation is a planned liquid oxygen/
liquid hydrogen second stage, to be built by Mit-
subishi. The initial version of the H-1A will be able
to place 550 kg into geosynchronous orbit; a pro-
posed follow-on version would be able to launch
800 kg. The H-1A will also use an inertial-guidance
system instead of the radio guidance of the N-1
series. Projected development costs are $755 mil-
lion; the first operational flight of the full three-
stage rocket is scheduled for 1987.90 The H-1A
is necessary for the launch of advanced heavy
satellites such as the proposed ERS-1, and will
give Japan a launcher roughly equivalent to ESA’S
Ariane 1. However, there are currently no plans
to market any projected launchers on a commer-
cial basis.
89’’japanese  Gain Capabilities,” p. 109; “Japan Gaining A4aturi-
ty, ” p. 96.
90’’japanese  Gain Capabilities,” p. 109.
Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space l 203
——
Japan’s launch capabilities have been severe-
ly restricted by agreements with the Japanese
fishing industry that allow missiles to be fired only
at two times of the year, January-February and
August-Se ptember.91
To date the Japanese have no firm plans for
developing a manned launched capability; Jap-
anese payload specialists will fly on space shut-
tle missions during the 1980’s, with the first
Japanese astronaut scheduled to fly in fiscal year
1985. However, there have been very preliminary
designs for a “mini-shuttle” capable of carrying
a four-man crew plus 1,100 lb of cargo. Such a
vehicle is seen as eventually necessary for full ex-
ploitation of the scientific and applications pro-
grams currently under way.92
Cooperation/Competition With
the United States
As is clear from the preceding description of
its major applications programs, Japan has in the
past worked closely with NASA and with U.S. in-
dustry. The transfer of Thor- Delta technology has
been the largest single result of that cooperation;
in addition there have been numerous scientific
exchanges. Many of Japan’s applications satellites
have been designed in part by U.S. firms engaged
in joint ventures with Japanese companies. The
Japanese plan to use Spacelab extensively.
At the same time it is clear that the Japanese
intend to use the technology and expertise gained
through cooperation to build up their own in-
dependent government and private sector capa-
bilities. The immediately resulting systems have
been developed to meet national and public
needs in communications, meteorology, and re-
mote sensing; the major commercial effect has
been to begin to remove Japan as a market for
U.S. systems and launch vehicles. Eventually,
however, there is no doubt that Japan will at-
tempt to export its equipment and services. There
is a long and well-known pattern of rapid Jap-
anese entry into foreign markets, following on
successful assimilation of imported technology,
9’ “Japan Space Effort Moves Into Operational Phase,” A W&ST,
Mar. 8, 1982, p. 107.
glMasayoshi Kanabay ashi, “japan Sets Mini-Entry in Space  Race, ’
Wa//  Street Jourrra/, July 20, 1981.
development of domestic markets, and the mas-
tery of techniques for mass production and mar-
keting. Though most of these successes, as in con-
sumer electronics and automobiles, have not
been in advanced-technology areas, the govern-
ment and industry have recently been emphasiz-
ing technically sophisticated products in the belief
that Japan must compete there to sustain eco-
nomic growth through the end of the century.
Space technology is definitely a major area of in-
terest, and government and industry have been
working closely together to prepare for Japanese
entry into world markets.
A recent study undertaken by Japan’s influen-
tial Ministry of International Trade and Investment
(MITI) predicts that by the mid-1 990’s space will
be a $4.5 billion per year industry (current sales
of Japanese companies are $480 million, almost
entirely to the government). The study empha-
sizes not only export potential but technological
spinoffs; an indigenous space industry is vital
since: “As unilateral introduction of technologies
from foreign countries is getting more difficult,
it is necesary to strengthen Japan’s own bargain-
ing power through accumulation of necessary
technological know-how, ” Recognizing that
Japan is some 5 to 10 years behind the United
States and Europeans in key areas, especially
launch vehicles, there is emphasis on taking ad-
vantage of Japanese strengths in quality control,
mass production, and marketing. 93
Despite the disadvantages of a smaller eco-
nomic and technical base to draw on than either
the United States, Europe, or the Soviet Union,
and the lack of major military programs to en-
sure political and financial support, Japan has suc-
ceeded in achieving a position of high technical
and industrial competence in the entire range of
space activities. Though not yet able to offer full-
scale commercial products or services (with the
exception of ground stations), the development
of this capability is only a matter of time. Japanese
success has been the result of a number of fac-
tors, including:
l a sustained commitment to civilian space
development by government and industry
93//epofl of the Deliberation Council on Basic Problems in the
Space /ndustry, MITI,  Apr. 20, 1981.
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as an integral part of overall plans to keep
Japan competitive in advanced technology;
careful borrowing of technology, mostly
from the United States, and assimilation of
that technology by Japanese industry;
close cooperation between government and
industry, with general coordination by the
Space Advisory Council;
strong economic performance over the past
two decades, together with a rapid matura-
tion of national scientific and industrial skills;
and
willingness by both government and in-
dustry to make and adhere to long-range
plans.
Competition from the Japanese appears assured
during the coming decade and is likely to be par-
ticularly strong in Third World countries, where
Japan’s proven ability to provide high-quality
products at low cost may give them an edge over
less reliable European and American competitors.
In addition, it cannot be ruled out that growing
pressure on Japan to increase its military budget
and regional defense responsibilities may bring
about attempts to make use of its expertise in
space technology for military purposes, with the
additional boost that such a decision would give
to indigenous aerospace and electronics indus-
tries. Recently, it was reported that Japan was
considering the deployment of a military recon-
naissance satellite system, which might be built
alone or with U.S. cooperation .94
94’’japan Reported Making Plans for Reconnaissance Satellite,”
Aerospace Dai/y, Jan. 11, 1982, p. 45.
NON-WESTERN SPACE PROGRAMS: SOVIET UNION,
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, INDIA
Soviet Union
The Soviet Union has for many years main-
tained a space program approximately equivalent
to, and in some areas considerably ahead of, that
of the United States both in terms of total
resources allocated and the kinds of missions car-
ried out. During the 15 years since it became
clear that they would not win the race to land
a man on the Moon, the Soviets have made in-
cremental and continuing improvements to their
launcher and manned-vehicle systems, as well as
developing operational capabilities in domestic
and international communications, meteorology,
and remote sensing. Over the past several years
the Soviets have launched many more satellites
than the United States (see table 19).
Table 19.—Total (Civilian and Military) Successful
Orbital Launches
United States U.S.S.R.
1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 88
1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 87
1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 89
SOURCE: Charles Sheldon 11, “United States and Soviet Progress in Space:
Summary Data through 1980 and a Forward Look,” Congressional
Research Service Report #81-27 S, Jan. 15, 1981, p, 49.
Unfortunately, the extreme secrecy with which
the Soviets have surrounded their programs
makes it difficult to accurately evaluate their pres-
ent capabilities and future plans. This secrecy is
due to an unwillingness to acknowledge failures
and/or technical backwardness for fear of damage
to Soviet prestige; to concern that foreign coun-
tries might steal or imitate Soviet technology; and
to the military nature of most of the Soviet space
program and the lack of separation between ci-
vilian and military space institutions. It is
estimated that 70 percent of Soviet space efforts
are purely military, 15 percent are dual mili-
tary/civilian, and the remaining 15 percent purely
civil. gs All launches are conducted by the Stra-
tegic Rocket Forces; the Soviet Air Force operates
the Star City cosmonaut training center. Details
of the internal organization are not generally
available and are subject to controversy. impor-
tant planning and advisory roles are played by
the State Committee on Science and Technology
and the Soviet Academy of Sciences.
‘sSoviet  ~j/;taV  power, U.S. Department of Defense, September
1981, p. 79.
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For these reasons, and because the Soviet pro-
gram is not oriented towards commercial systems
that would be competitive with U.S. or other
space technologies, we will not examine the
Soviet program in as much detail as the European
and Japanese. Brief descriptions of major opera-
tional applications systems will be given, with em-
phasis on potential international implications.
Communications
Soviet satellite communications development
initially took a different path than that of the
United States. The U.S. satellite communications
industry, after initial experiments in the early
1960’s with low-orbit satellites and passive reflec-
tors (such as the Echo series), soon turned to ac-
tive geosynchronous satellites. Because of the
relatively well-developed U.S. domestic commu-
nication network, satellites were at first aimed
primarily at the rapidly expanding overseas mar-
ket; the United States took the initiative in form-
ing INTELSAT and designating the newly created
COMSAT organization to provide the technology
and management expertise to make INTELSAT
function. In the Soviet Union, however, improv-
ing domestic communications, particularly to the
less-developed central Asian and Siberian re-
gions, was a high priority, while international traf-
fic was minuscule. The Soviet Molniya 1 system
began operations in 1965, using large satellites
placed in elliptical 1 2-hour orbits. Such orbits are
easier to attain than geosynchronous ones, allow-
ing heavier satellites to be used; they also pro-
vide better coverage to areas far north of the
Equator, though they require relatively expensive
tracking antennas. Similar orbits have been used
for the Molniya 2 and 3 series, first launched in
1971 and 1974 respectively. The Molniyas have
provided domestic telephone and television serv-
ices, including color TV transmissions; as more
advanced Molniyas have become available, the
Molniya 1 series appears to have been reserved
for military requirements.9G
For a number of reasons the Soviet Union and
its allies were reluctant to join INTELSAT when
it was founded in 1964. The Soviets objected to
U. S./COMSAT management, to the use of U.S.
96’’U.S. and Soviet Progress in Space, ” p. 52.
technology, and to the system of weighted voting
whereby influence was determined by a coun-
try’s overall use of the system; the Soviets used
only 2 to 3 percent of global international traf-
fic, compared with the United States’ s 50 to 60
percent. Instead, in 1968 the Soviet Union and
eight other socialist states (Poland, Czech-
oslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania,
Bulgaria, Mongolia, and Cuba) proposed an alter-
native system, which in 1971 was formally agreed
to and called Intersputnik. Although it is open
to any state, few other countries (Syria, Vietnam,
and Laos), have joined, for both political and
technical reasons. There is relatively little com-
mercial/private traffic between most Intersputnik
members and the rest of the world; in addition,
since the intersputnik network was initially based
on use of the Molniya satellites, it was difficult
and expensive for INTELSAT Earth stations, which
are designed to work with fixed geosynchronous
satellites, to make use of the moving Molniyas.
in recent years, however, the Soviet Union has
begun to orbit geosynchronous Statsionar satel-
lites which are designed to be more acceptable
to global users. In addition, as their international
communications needs have grown the Soviet
Union, Cuba, and Rumania, (to be followed soon
by Poland) have begun to use INTELSAT through
Earth stations on their own territories. Increasing
de facto integration of global satellite communica-
tions appears to be occurring, even in the ab-
sence of formal agreements.97
The Soviets’ first geostationary communications
satellite was launched in 1974. A large system of
geostationary satellites, called Statsionar, has
been established to serve the Soviet Union and
East Europe with a number of different kinds of
satellites: the Raduga series, six satellites of which
had been launched through 1980, for domestic
TV and telephone relay; the Ekran series, with
six satellites, for domestic television; and the Gori-
zont series of four satellites for international and
domestic television transmission. The current ln-
tersputnik system relies heavily on the Statsionar
gTSee Nicholas Matte, Aerospace Law: Telecommunications Sat-
e//ites, prepared by the Centre for Research of Air and Space Law,
McGill University, for the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada, 1980, pp. 118-123.
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satellites, and more are expected to be launched
in the near future; the Soviets are currently several
years behind in their projections for overall sys-
tem deployment.98
The Soviets have also announced plans for sev-
eral new global communications systems de-
signed to compete with western ones. The Loutch
series of eight satellites is intended to provide
services comparable to INTELSAT, using 14/11
GHz frequencies; the Volna mobile communica-
tions system of seven satellites plans to offer serv-
ices to ships and planes similar to those of Marisat
and Aerosat. To date none of these planned sat-
ellites have been flown.99
It would appear that the Soviets, after many
years of concentrating on domestic and regional
capabilities, are hoping to compete on a more
global scale. Such an effort stems from: 1) increas-
ing confidence in their technology, based in part
on military experience gained in communicating
with a rapidly expanding number of naval vessals
and foreign bases and 2) an increase in interna-
tional civilian communications with Western and
third world states, due largely to expanded trade
relations. Not enough is known about the critical
factors to estimate whether Soviet competition
will be effective: these include the system’s
technical characteristics and reliability, its com-
patibility with other global and regional systems,
how the prices charged for services compare with
Intelsat and other alternatives, the institutional
characteristics of any potential user group, and
political considerations.
Remote Sensing
The Soviets have no specifically designated
civilian land remote-sensing system. Large
numbers of short-term film-return Cosmos mis-
sions have been flown for military purposes, and
some of these have undoubtedly provided civilian
data. Ocean surveillance for the military has been
carried out using nuclear-powered active radar
satellites; two specialized nonnuclear ocean-
ographic satellites are reported to be in opera-
98
’’ Soviets Continue Aggressive Space Drive, ” AW&ST, Mar. 9,
1981.
99
’’ Soviets Increasing Space Activities, ” AlV&ST, Mar. 3, 1980,
p. 83.
tion. The latest such satellite, Cosmos 1151, was
launched in January 1980.100
Perhaps the most ambitious civilian-oriented
remote-sensing work has been done on manned
missions, particularly the Salyut 6. Some 50,000
photographs have been taken using a large
MKF-6m multispectral camera built by Carl Zeiss
Jena in East Germany, and some of the data ob-
tained has been shared with allied and develop-
ing countries, such as Cuba, Vietnam, Morocco,
and Angola.l O1
The Soviets have been distributing weather
photos from their Meteor series meteorological
satellites since 1966; their first retrograde Sun-
synchronous launch, capable of providing daily
coverage of a particular area at the same time of
day, was made in 1977. Meteor satellites have
carried a variety of experimental sensors in-
cluding, recently, advanced Earth resources in-
strumentation.1°2 In July 1980, the Soviet Union
launched a prototype remote-sensing satellite
with three experimental multispectral sensors
providing ground resolution up to 30 m, with data
to be relayed to the ground via radio. It is planned
to extend this to a full-scale operational system
with 50-m visible-band resolution .los
In the U. N., the Soviets have proposed since
1979 that distribution of “local,” i.e., 50 m or less,
remote-sensing data be subject to the prior con-
sent of the state being viewed; this does not af-
fect Landsat 3 MSS imagery but would apply to
TM data from Landsat D, as well as France’s pro-
posed SPOT system. The Soviet proposal is de-
signed to restrict the usefulness of U.S. and other
Western remote-sensing systems, as well as to
limit the dissemination of potentially damaging
information about the Soviet Union and its allies
(e.g., agricultural data that might give foreign
lm’’Review  of National and Co-Operative Space Activities for the
Calendar Year 1980,” UNCOPUOS,  A/AC’. 105/286/Add. 3, May
1, 1981, p. 11.
1°’ “The Salyut 6 Mission, ” /nteravia, November 1978, p. 1,084;
“Relevance of Space Activities to Monitorifig  of Earth Resources
and the Environment, ” prepared for 2d U.N.  Conference on the
Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/Conf.  101/BP/3,
Apr. 28, 1981, p. 8.
‘02’’Craig Covault, “Soviets Initiating Program on Modular Space
Station,” AW&ST,. July 21, 1981; “Review of Space Activities,” p. 10.
1°3’’ National Paper: USSR, ” prepared fcjr 2d U.N.  Conference
on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/Conf. 101/
NP/30, Sept. 2, 1981, p. 19.
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firms a better bargaining position with Soviet pur-
chasers). The United States opposes such a re-
striction. 104
There are presently no known Soviet plans to
distribute remote-sensing information outside the
U. S. S. R.; entry of the Soviets into the global
market, even on a selective basis, could have a
significant effect on future Western commercial
systems. The Soviets would be likely to sell/
distribute data for political purposes, which could
mean undercutting global prices while criticiz-
ing Western systems (especially those run as
private commercial enterprises) for being too ex-
pensive for and/or violating the sovereignty of
developing countries.
Materials Processing
Processing experiments have had a high priority
on recent Soviet space flights, especially aboard
the Salyut 6 orbiting laboratory.l05o~ Two separate
furnaces, the Splav-01 and Kristall, have been
used to conduct experiments on semiconductors,
crystal growth, alloys, glasses and metal oxides;
samples have been taken to the ground for de-
tailed analysis. Approximately 300 to 350 Soviet
scientists are reported to be actively engaged in
materials research related to space processing.l06
As usual, details of Soviet results are not public-
ly available; activities appear to be at the basic
science level, and can be expected to continue
with future Soviet manned flights. Soviet spokes-
men are characteristically optimistic about space
manufacturing; a typical observation is cos-
monaut Konstantin Feoktistov’s recent claim that
there will eventually be “whole plants for man-
ufacturing products in zero-g. ’’107
Launch Vehicles and Manned Operations
The Soviets have developed a number of ex-
pendable launch vehicles; the most commonly
‘wJames Kay, “The Legal Implications of Remote Sensing by Sat-
ellite, ” prepared by Centre for Research of Air and Space Law,
McGill University, for the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada, March 1981, p. 73.
IOSB.  BeIitsky, “Soviet Manned Space Flight 20 Years on, ” @aCe-
//ight, vol. 23, No. 5, May 1981, pp. 154-155.
IWWS. MUSt spend More to Maintain Lead in Space 7-echnology,
GAO Report FGMSD-80-  32, Washington, D. C., Jan.  31, 1980, p. 8.
‘
07
’ ’Soviets Show Assembly of Space Station Units,” AkV&ST, June
29, 1981, p. 21.
used is the Sapwood (A) launcher, a derivative
of the original ICBM design dating back to the
mid-l950s, which in present modified versions
can launch Soyuz manned vehicles up to 6,575
kg. The larger Proton (D) launcher can carry
20,000 kg to LEO and has been used to launch
the Salyut space stations; it is not considered
reliable enough for manned launches. 108
The Soviets have so far failed to produce ad-
vanced ELVS comparable to the U.S. Saturn V,
which could lift 136,000 kg to LEO, or a reusable
vehicle such as the space shuttle. This has been
due in part to their inability to develop high-
energy liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen propulsion
systems, without which launching heavy pay-
loads requires a very large number of stages and
strap-ens. The Soviets apparently attempted to
launch a Saturn-size vehicle on at least three oc-
casions from 1969 to 1972 as part of their manned
lunar program, but were unsuccessful. There are
currently unconfirmed reports that the Soviets are
once again seeking to launch a very large ELV,
as well as to develop a reusable vehicle some-
what smaller than the shuttle. Both advances
would be useful in implementing the Soviet aim
of developing large permanently manned orbiting
Space stations.l09
In recent years the main emphasis of the Soviet
space program has been on developing and using
the Salyut series of manned orbiting laboratories.
The first Salyut prototype was launched in 1971;
since then five more have been orbited, four suc-
cessfully. Several (Salyuts 2, 3, and 5) have ap-
parently been military in nature, mainly for high-
resolution reconnaissance; Salyuts 4 and 6 have
been civilian.ll0 Salyut 6, still in orbit, has been
by far the most successful. Weighing 42,000 lb,
it has been visited by 13 separate 2- and 3-man
Soyuz crews, including a large number of non-
Soviet nationals. The Salyut 6 has also rendez-
voused with unmanned Progress tankers, which
can dock automatically to resupply the men
aboard. This has enabled the Soviets to conduct
long-duration missions, including the world
1°8’’ U.S. and Soviet Progress in Space, ” pp. 23-25.
1°9Craig  Covau  It, “Soviets Developing 12-Man Space Station, ”
AW&ST,  June  16, 1980, pp. 26-29.
11ONicholas  johnson,
“The Military and Civilian Salyut  Space Pro-
grammed,” Spacef/ight,  August-September 1979, p. 364.
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record of 185 days in orbit recorded by Valery
Ryumin and L. Popov in 1980. Numerous exper-
iments and studies have been conducted to test
the spacecraft themselves as well as the effects
of weightlessness on human beings, other plant
and animal life, and inorganic materials. Salyut
cosmonauts have succeeded in working outside
the spacecraft to make repairs and to deploy in-
struments, such as a 33-ft radio telescope. 111
In June 1981 Salyut 6 was visited by a new large
(30,000 lb) unmanned craft, designated Cosmos
1267, which is twice as large as the Pro-
gress/Soyuz vehicles. The automatic docking per-
formed by the two vehicles appears to point the
way to the construction of large modular space
stations with many times the interior room of the
current Salyuts.112 The Soviets have consistently
pointed to the establishment of such stations as
the central goal of their space program and as
a necessary step in conducting further space ac-
tivities, including eventual manned missions to
the Moon and planets. In March 1982 the Soviets
launched a new station, Salyut 7.
Cooperation and Competition With
Other Countries
The bulk of Soviet joint and cooperative proj-
ects have been conducted with allied socialist
states. In 1967, the Interkosmos program was
founded to coordinate activities between the
Soviet Union, its East European allies, and other
communist states such as Mongolia, Cuba, and
more recently Vietnam. A number of scientific
satellites have been flown using instruments,
designed by member-states, under the overall
direction of the Soviet Union. Instruments and
experiments, such as East Germany’s multispec-
tral camera, have also flown on the Salyut series;
many of these were associated with the flight of
guest cosmonauts from participating states. To
date, cosmonauts from Czechoslovakia, Poland,
East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania,
Mongolia, Vietnam, and Cuba have been trained
in the Soviet Union and spent time on board
Salyut 6. These missions have helped give the
Soviet program a politically valuable international
image; further such flights, including cosmonauts
from non-l nterkosmos nations, such as France
and possibly India, are being planned.
Soviet-U.S. space relations have had several
ups and downs, generally mirroring the overall
political climate. The period of initial rivalry from
1957 through the Apollo program was character-
ized by extreme competition and mutual claims
of superiority, often made difficult to verify on
account of the secrecy with which the Soviet pro-
gram was conducted. The Apollo success was
typically downplayed by the Soviets, who stressed
the superiority of their unmanned Lunokhod
lunar explorers and the “wastefulness” of the
U.S. manned program, implying that the Soviets
had never intended to send men to the Moon.113
However, even during this period the two coun-
tries found it necessary to cooperate in establish-
ing legal and regulatory principles for space ac-
tivities. In the early 1970’s, as the end of the Viet-
nam War allowed closer relations to develop and
“detente” became the official policy of both the
U.S. and Soviet leadership, planning began for
a cooperative manned mission, the Apollo-Soyuz
test project (ASTP). In May 1972, a comprehen-
sive agreement was signed in Moscow as part of
the Nixon-Brezhnev Summit. The agreement cov-
ered a variety of mutual scientific and technical
exchanges in addition to ASTP.11A The ostensible
rationale for the mission was to develop a joint
docking system so that, in case of emergencies,
spacecraft from either of the two states could
rendezvous with those of the other. However,
the joining together of the two spacecraft became
symbolic of the then current “thaw” in relations,
and was seen by proponents as leading towards
extended cooperation in future space (and non-
space) activities. Critics saw it as an expensive
political stunt which was likely to give the Soviet
Union greater benefits than the United States, in-
] 1 ‘Craig Covault, “Radio Telescope Erected on Salyut  6,” AW&ST,
Aug. 13, 1979, pp. 54-55.
I \z)ames  oberg,  “The Soviet Aim: a permanent base in sPace, ”
New Scientist, Oct. 1, 1981.
11 Jjames Oberg, “The Moon Race Cover-Up,” Reason, August
1979, pp. 34-37.
1 ldsoviet  space Programs 1971-75, Staff Report for Senate  com-
mittee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Aug. 30, 1976, vol.
11, p. 105.
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sofar as the perceived technical parity between
the two systems would tend to elevate the public
image of the Soviet Union as no longer “behind”
i n  s p a c e  t e c h n o l o g y .  F o r  v a r i o u s  r e a s o n s  t h e  J u l y
1975 rendezvous of Apollo and Soyuz 19, though
spectacular, did not lead to further major coop-
erative activities; this was largely due to the dif-
ferent directions the two programs took in the
second half of the 1970’s, as well as to increas-
ing political tensions. Some of the cooperative
projects, such as U.S. biological experiments car-
ried on Cosmos flights in 1975, 1977, and 1979,
and exchanges of data from each country’s plan-
etary missions have continued, but there are no
plans for a resumption of major scientific or ap-
plications exchanges. In 1977, a second agree-
ment was concluded between NASA and the
Soviet Academy of Science outlining cooperation
in the development of a compatible sea search-
and-rescue system, along with further coopera-
tion in manned space flight. Although preliminary
meetings were held, the studies were never com-
pleted; the Soviets blame the United States for
not fulfilling this latter part of the agreement. 115
The Soviets and United States are at odds in
the U.N. over a variety of space issues, such as
the proper restrictions to be placed on DBS and
land remote-sensing systems. More importantly,
the growing military importance of space tech-
nologies for surveillance, communications and
navigation has made each side more concerned
about the other’s capabilities, and less prone to
cooperate directly with the other. The Soviets
have consistently criticized the shuttle as a space
weapon while carrying out active tests of an an-
tisatellite system.
Despite extensive publicity for space exploits,
the Soviets have made only minor attempts to ac-
tively disseminate either space technology or its
benefits to third-world countries, as the United
States has done through NASA cooperative agree-
ments and the Agency for International Develop-
ment (Al D). Outside of allied socialist countries
and the United States, significant cooperation has
been pursued with only three countries–France,
India, and to a lesser extent, Sweden. India’s first
satellite, called Aryabhata, was launched by the
‘l’’’ National Paper: U. S. S. R,” p. 110.
Soviet Union in 1975; in 1979 an Earth-observa-
tion satellite, Bhaskara-1, was launched, and
Bhaskara-11 was orbited in November 1981. Co-
operation with France, outlined earlier in the sec-
tion on the French space program, has been pur-
sued in materials processing, space biology, and
manned flight.
The Soviet space effort is large and varied and
the above has done no more than sketch their
major programs. As opposed to the U.S. space
effort, it seems fair to say that over the past
decade, the Soviet program has been character-
ized by steady growth and extension of their ca-
pabilities. Despite slowness in meeting certain
goals for communications services, ambitious
programs in communications, remote sensing,
and especially the construction and operation of
orbital stations have been successfully im-
plemented. However, it is still an open question
whether increased Soviet capabilities, and in-
creased confidence in their technology, will in-
duce the Soviets to offer applications services to
a broader range of global customers. Space tech-
nology is one of the few areas in which the
Soviets could be competitive with the West, and
the political and economic gains of supplying
hardware and services would be attractive.
However, Soviet inexperience at operating in a
competitive business environment may prove, in
this as in other fields, to be a major barrier. In
addition, the marketing of services—as opposed
to simple hardware—which require close coop-
eration between supplier and customer would
run counter to the Soviets’ long-cherished prac-
tice of maintaining maximum secrecy about their
technical capabilities, especially in areas where
the military is so closely involved. For these
reasons it is likely that the Soviets will choose to
compete selectively, for discrete political aims,
rather than enter into general competition for sat-
ellite communications, remote-sensing, or launch
service markets.
People’s Republic of China (PRC)
The PRC’S launch technology has been derived
from the Soviet Union, primarily the SS-4 (Sandal)
medium-range liquid-fueled missile, designs for
which were given to the Chinese in the late
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1950’s before relations between the two coun-
tries broke down. The central impetus for the
development of further launchers and satellites
has been to meet security needs: to carry nuclear
warheads to the population centers of the Soviet
Union, and to provide military reconnaissance
and communications.
The first Chinese satellite, the 173 kg China 1,
was launched in April 1970 by a CSL-I (Long
March 1 ) launcher. Since then 10 more satellites
have been launched (including a recent three-
in-one payload of scientific satellites). Little is
known about their characteristics, though some
were clearly for military reconnaissance and com-
munications. Starting with China 3 in 1975,
launches were made with the FB-1 (Storm) vehi-
cle, a version of their CSS-X-4 ICBM, approx-
imately equivalent in size to the U.S. Atlas. The
FB-1 can launch a satellite of up to 2 tons into
LEO.1l6
The Chinese are known to be working on a
new launcher, the Long March 3, which would
use the two stages of the FB-1 plus a liquid
oxygen/liquid hydrogen upper stage. If successful,
this would make them third in the world, after
the United States and ESA (perhaps fourth if the
Japanese succeed first), to use high-energy
cryogenic fuels. The Chinese recently announced
that the Long March 3 would be launched in 1983
or 1984 and would probably carry China’s first
experimental geosynchronous communications
satellite. 117
To date the PRC has no operational commu-
nications, meteorological or remote-sensing
satellites, but plans are under way to develop all
three technologies. Since 1972 and the United
States-Chinese rapprochement, China has re-
ceived significant data and know-how from the
United States. INTELSAT-compatible receiving
stations have been bought and established near
Peking and Shanghai. An experimental COMSAT,
the STW-2, is scheduled for a 1983 or 1984
launch over the Pacific, and indigenous Earth sta-
tions and transmitters have been built.118 Trans-
1 IGEdelson  Haas et al., “Eyewitness Report on Chinese Satellite
Work,” Aeronautics and Astronautics, February 1980, p. 44.
“z’’ China Launches Three-in-One Satellite Payload, ” Aerospace
Dai/y, Sept. 22, 1981, pp. 113-114.
118’’ Eyewitness Report,” p. 41.
mission tests using the France-German Sym-
phonic have included video teleconferencing and
high-resolution facsimile transmission. According
to terms of the “1979 Understanding on Coopera-
tion in Space Technology” (part of the United
States-China Agreement on Cooperation in Sci-
ence and Technology), the Chinese Communica-
tions Satellite Corporation indicated a desire to
purchase a U.S. communications satellite (to be
launched by NASA) including ground equipment,
but plans have been postponed indefinitely due
to financial constraints. Discussions also took
place in 1979 and 1980 with non-U.S. partners
such as West Germany’s Messerschmitt-Bolkow-
Blohm.119
PRC currently receives meteorological data
from the U.S. Tires-N and NOAA- 6, and the
Japanese GMS-1 satellites through indigenous
receiving stations. The Central Meteorological
Bureau had planned to launch a Sun-syn-
chronous weather satellite in 1982, and a com-
plementary geosynchronous satellite in 1985. The
1982 satellite’s radiometer was to have a 4-km
resolution (compared with the U.S. ITOS’ resolu-
tion of 1 km). Due to cutbacks in Chinese R&D
expenditures, the status of these plans is
uncertain.
In remote sensing, the Chinese plan to use
Landsat and SPOT data extensively before devel-
oping their own system; the “1979 Understand-
ing” indicates China’s intention to purchase a
Landsat ground station from U.S. industry, and
procurement activities are continuing. The
Shanghai Institute of Technical Physics is reported
to be working on various sensors including a
multispectral scanner.l20 In January 1980, NASA
and the Chinese Academy of Sciences concluded
a memorandum of understanding giving the PRC
direct access to Landsat data.
There have been several reports that the
Chinese are planning seriously for eventual
manned flights and have begun to train astronauts
for future missions.l2l However, China’s recent
reassessment of internal economic and scientific
119’’MBB,  Chinese Discuss TV Satellite,” AlV&ST,, Mar. 31, 1980,
p. 63.
120’’ Eyewitness Report, ” p. 43.
‘
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’ See David Ritchie,  “Dragon in the Sky: China’s Space Pro-
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priorities has apparently resulted in a postpone-
ment of plans for manned flights in the 1980’s.’22
Until recently China’s space capabilities were
barely known. Since the death of Mao and the
determination of China’s new leadership to
modernize the country by increasing foreign
trade and educational/scientific exchanges with
the West, a number of official and unofficial
foreign delegations have been allowed to visit
Chinese space facilities. In turn, large numbers
of Chinese have visited U. S., European, and Jap-
anese facilities, and many Chinese students are
now attending Western engineering and graduate
programs in the sciences. Up to now, except for
initial aid from the Soviet Union, Chinese efforts
have been almost exclusively home-grown. Mil-
itary requirements have been paramount, but
there has also been recognition that satellites
could play a large role in upgrading China’s in-
ternal communications and television networks,
in locating and managing mineral and energy re-
sources, and in agricultural planning. Given the
previous lack of access to outside technology,
Chinese capabilities are impressive, and are likely
to expand rapidly in the near future if outside
contacts increase and internal constraints are
relaxed. The major difficulties are likely to be a
shortage of trained scientists and technicians, due
to the educational disruptions of the cultural
revolution; lack of capital and other strains
caused by ambitious plans for rapid moderniza-
tion of the entire economy; and lack of foreign
exchange for the purchase of outside technology.
Though Mao’s absolute insistence on domestic
self-reliance has been relaxed, China is likely to
be interested in such purchases primarily as a way
of gaining access to technology to be copied or
otherwise appropriated; hence, although China
will not in the near future be competing with
foreign firms or governments for commercial con-
tracts, it is also not likely to be a major buyer of
space systems.
India
India has had a formal space program since the
formation of the Indian National Committee for
Space Research (l NCOSPAR) in 1962. In 1969,
1 Zzsee  ‘Jchinese  Astronauts  Train in Simu Iators,  ’ A W&ST,  Jan.
26, 1981, p. 63.
INCOSPAR was absorbed by the Indian Space Re-
search Organization (ISRO), which in 1972
became the central body of the newly created
Department of Space.
Unlike China’s, India’s space activities have not
been motivated by military concerns (the military
has a separate interest in antitank and antiaircraft
missiles). Although India is an underdeveloped
country, it has, because of its size and long-
standing contacts with the West, a considerable
pool of scientific and administrative talent. The
space program is designed to use these resources
to encourage development, to foster technical
and scientific leadership, and to serve as an ex-
ample (in accord with India’s overall position of
neutrality between East and West and a leader
of the nonaligned movement) of indigenous Third
World achievements in areas usually considered
the preserve of advanced developed countries.
Hence there is an emphasis on developing a com-
prehensive space capability, and especially sys-
tems for rural communications, land manage-
ment, and weather forecasting. Foreign assistance
has been welcomed from a number of countries,
largely for demonstration projects and joint pro-
grams, with the intention of building on the ex-
perience gained to provide similar services with
indigenous resources. Through 1979, India’s total
investment had amounted to some $230 million,
with somewhat higher expenditures anticipated
in fulfilling the latest 10-year plan. 123
India has built and launched a large number
of Rohini sounding rockets, in addition to pro-
viding a launch platform for U.S. and Soviet
sounding rocket experiments.124 In July 1980,
India successfully tested its four-stage solid fuel
SLV-3 launcher, orbiting the 76-lb Rohini I
research satellite; in 1981, it launched a second
Rohini, which failed to achieve orbit. Plans are
under way to produce an augmented SLV, using
strap-on boosters, that could place 330 lb into
LEO, as well as to develop a new launcher capa-
ble of orbiting a 600-lb remote-sensing satellite
by the mid-1980 ’s. Though strongly denied by
India, there are fears, especially in Pakistan, that
’23H,  P. Mama, “India’s Space Program: Across the Board on a
Shoe String,” /nteravia, January 1980, p. 60.
‘Z4’’ World-Wide Space Activities, ” p. 119.
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India’s launchers may be used as, or be the pre-
cursor to, a delivery system for nuclear weapons.
India’s first satellite, the Aryabhata, was
launched by the Soviet Union in 1975; it was
largely Indian-built and designed, with Soviet
assistance. In 1979, the Soviets launched India’s
Bhaskara I remote-sensing satellite, which suf-
fered a partial power failure. The Bhaskara 11, con-
taining two television cameras and three micro-
wave radiometers~, was launched in November
1981, and has provided television pictures of the
sub-continent.
Another cooperative venture was the June 1981
launch of an experimental communications sat-
ellite, the Apple (Ariane Passenger Payload Ex-
periment), on ESA’S third Ariane test vehicle. The
satellite suffered a partial failure of its solar-
powered electrical system but has continued to
function with reduced capability.l25
India plans to establish an operational com-
munications system, called Insat, using two
satellites purchased from Ford Aerospace and
launched by the U.S. Insat-1 was launched in
April 1982, and will relay messages and data be-
tween approximately 32 proposed ground sta-
tions, as well as provide direct television service
to rural communities via several thousand inex-
pensive antennas.126 Insat will also carry a VHRR
to provide’ meteorological information. Eventual-
ly, ISRO plans to produce its own follow-on
system, building on experience gained with Ap-
ple and Insat.
India’s commitment to Insat has been due
largely to the positive experience gained with two
125’’ Apple Satellite Operational Despite Panel Failure,” AlV&ST,
Sept. 14, 1981, p. 19.
12bBen jamin Elson, “U.S. to Launch Insat  Satellite for India,”
AW&ST,  Apr. 5, 1982, pp. 56-63.
major cooperative communications satellite proj-
ects, one with the United States and the other
with Europe. The Satellite Instructional Television
Experiment (SITE), which lasted for 1 year from
August 1, 1975, to July 31, 1976, was a joint pro-
gram with NASA using the ATS-6 large commu-
nications satellite to broadcast educational televi-
sion programs to 5,000 Indian villages. India was
responsible for maintenance of the ground equip-
ment and for developing the programs; the over-
all reaction proved highly favorable and enabled
the Government to disseminate important infor-
mation on health care, agricultural techniques,
and birth control to previously inaccessible
areas. Additional experiments, including telecon-
ferencing and emergency communications, were
conducted through the Symphonic Telecommu-
nications Experimental Project (STEP) from July
1977 to mid-l 979, using the French-German ex-
perimental Symphonic communications satellite.
In remote sensing, India is one of 11 foreign
countries to have a Landsat receiving station.
Located at Hyderabad, it is operated by the Na-
tional Remote Sensing Agency. Current plans call
for a remote-sensing satellite to be developed and
launched sometime in the mid-1980’s, building
on experience with the Bhaskara series.
India has amassed a large amount of experi-
ence in designing, building and operating a varie-
ty of applications systems. The commitment to
achieving an independent capability to use space
technology is longstanding and based on the ben-
eficial results of past usage. Though direct compe-
tition with Western or Japanese systems is not
likely in the near future, Indian experience in
adapting space capabilities to developing coun-
try needs could eventually give them an advan-
tage in providing services and/or hardware to
Third World countries.
OTHER SPACE PROGRAMS
Canada ipated in a large number of joint scientific proj-
ects with the United States, including the
Canada’s space activities are coordinated by Canadian-built Alouette and ISIS ionospheric
the Interdepartmental Committee on Space (ICS), research satellites, launched by NASA. The
with overall responsibility in the Minister of State Department of Communications cooperated with
for Science and Technology. Canada has partic- NASA and ESA in operating the experimental
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Communications Technology Satellite (CTS) from
1976 to 1979, which pioneered operational use
of the 14/12 GHz band. Spurred by the difficulties
of communicating with remote regions in the
North, Canada in 1972 became the first Western
country to initiate operational domestic com-
munications via satellite; the Anik A series of three
comsats were built by Hughes and launched by
the United States. In 1978, Telesat Canada began
using RCA’s Anik B for voice, data, and televi-
sion transmissions. Three Hughes-built Anik C
spacecraft are scheduled for launch beginning in
November 1981.
Canada is also engaged in a major bilateral pro-
gram with NASA to develop a remote manipu-
lator arm for the U.S. space shuttle. Spar Aero-
space Ltd. is developer for the $100 million proj-
ect. The first arm flew on the second shuttle flight
in November 1981. As with ESA’S Spacelab, Can-
ada has agreed to pay for development of the arm
and the first prototype, in return for a NASA com-
mitment to purchase additional arms from
Spar.127
Brazil
Brazil has had an active interest in space ac-
tivities since 1961, especially satellite communica-
tions and remote sensing to manage its far-flung
territories and to assist in the development of the
Amazon Basin. The Centro Tecnico Aerospecial
(CTA) has been responsible for developing the
Sonda series of sounding rockets, which are
launched from Brazil’s launch facility at Natal in
the northeast part of the country. The United
States, Germany, and other countries have also
used Brazil’s facilities; a new launch center is now
being prepared closer to the Equator.
In 1975, Brazil and NASA conducted the SACI
(Advanced Satellite for Interdisciplinary Com-
munications) experiment, using NASA’s ATS-6
satellite to transmit television programs to remote
primary schools. Brazil currently leases four
transponders from INTELSAT for domestic use
(with plans to increase this to 81/2 transponders
by 1986), and plans to purchase its own comsat
(with provision for technology transfer), to be
launched in 1985.
Brazil is, after the United States, the largest user
of Landsat data, and has operated a Landsat
ground station since 1973, along with process-
ing facilities. There are currently plans to design
and build four remote-sensing and meteorolog-
ical satellites, with the first one to be launched
in 1988.128
‘27Craig  Covault, “Remote Arm Aids Shuttle Capability,” A W&ST,
Sept. 7, 1981, pp. 57-58.
lzBjim Brooke, “Brazil’s Space Program Prepared to Launch 4 Sat-
ellites by 1993, ” Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1981, p, A22.
DOMESTIC/REGIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
In addition to the national programs outlined
previously, there are a number of regional satel-
lite communications systems that are either
already in operation or in various stages of
planning,
Indonesia has had the two Hughes-built sat-
ellites of its Palapa  A system operating since 1976
to link its widespread island area. Spare channels
have been leased by other countries in the
region. The first Palapa B satellite is scheduled
for launch in 1983 and will be used by the Philip-
pines, Thailand, and Malaysia. The Arabsat
system, with 21 Middle Eastern countries as par-
ticipants, is scheduled for a first flight in Decem-
ber 1983. France’s Aerospatiale is the prime con-
tractor, with Ford Aerospace the major U.S. par-
ticipate. Australia’s Australsat is planned for the
mid-l  980s. Regional systems have been discussed
for Southern Africa and South America, par-
ticularly the Andean region, prompted by Col-
ombia’s well-developed plans for its Satcol
telephone and TV system.12g  Currently, a large
number of countries lease spare transponders
from INTELSAT satellites and purchase ground
stations for domestic use. This activity, along with
the national and regional systems mentioned, in-
lz%ee Theo Pirard, “Space Systems Operated and Prepared by
Developing Countries, ” Spacef/ight,  May 1981, pp. 137-139.
214 l Civilian Space Policy and Applications
dicates the scale of global interest in satellite serv-
ices. This is important, first because of the im-
plications for the current international com-
munications system, i.e., for INTELSAT; and also
because, given the stakes, competition for sales
of satellites, ground equipment, and launch serv-
ices between U. S., European, and Japanese firms”
is likely to be fierce. The proliferation of satellites
for local and regional use threatens to take
business away from INTELSAT, damaging its fi-
nancial viability. As communications needs
become greater and more specialized, and as it
becomes progesssively more difficult to allocate
scarce orbital slots and frequencies, many coun-
tries are determined to have their own system,
or a share of a local system, regardless of whether
such a move is warranted by local demand or
by financial considerations. Such decisions are
supported by increasingly competitive private
and national suppliers of telecommunications
equipment, who encourage the purchase of spe-
cialized services. The long-term effects on
INTELSAT are unclear but may lead to higher
prices or reduced service, which would be
especially harmful to those countries that are too
small or poor to purchase their own system.130
A possible solution would bean expansion of the
INTELSAT system to provide local and regional
services. This would require a satellite-ground-
station system designed to operate in low-density
rural areas, perhaps including direct-broadcast
capabilities.
130See john McLucas, “Global Cooperation in Satellite Commu-
nications in a Decade of Policy Divergence, ” paper presented at
International Aerospace Symposium, Paris, France, June  2, 1981.
REMOTE SENSING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
In the field of land remote sensing, the ana-
Iogue to INTELSAT has been the U.S. Landsat
system, which has provided black-and-white and
multispectral photographs on a global basis for
the cost of reproduction. U.S. policy was estab-
lished in 1969, when President Nixon stated at
the 24th U.N. General Assembly that “this pro-
gram will be dedicated to produce information
not only for the United States but also for the
world community. ” Foreign nations and agen-
cies can either purchase data from the EROS Data
Center, or receive it directly by establishing their
own receiving station, which can (with the cur-
rent Landsat satellites) provide images over a
2,700-km radius (see map). Especially in develop-
ing countries where maps are often incomplete
and outdated, and information about land use,
forest cover, drainage patterns, mineral deposits
and the like is difficult and expensive to obtain,
satellite imagery has been used extensively to aid
in economic development.’s’ Over the years,
substantial assistance has been provided, large-
ly by the U.S. Agency for International Develop-
131 For an outline of some of these uses, see “Relevance of Space
Activities to Monitoring of Earth Resources and the Environment, ”
background paper for second U.N. Conference on the Exploration
and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/Conf. 101/BP/3, Apr. 28, 1981.
ment and also by other developed countries and
international organizations, to enable various
countries to use Landsat. Effective use requires
skilled technicians and equipment to process the
data, as well as integration of satellite informa-
tion with many other information resources. Mul-
tilaterally funded training centers to encourage
these capabilities are being established in Upper
Volta, Kenya, and Thailand.
As was discussed above, other global land
remote-sensing systems besides Landsat are
planned for the mid-l 980’s. Though such com-
petition may eventually improve the quality of
services available, much depends on whether the
competition is political or commercial in nature.
Private-sector operation of !-andsat, which could
put remote sensing on a more commercial basis,
is of concern to many developing countries who
see such a move leading to higher prices as well
as possible violations of their sovereignty by
private companies outside effective government
control. On the other hand, a “price war” be-
tween, say, politically motivated Landsat, SPOT,
MOS, and possible Soviet systems might prove
beneficial to users but might also undermine the
willingness of the sponsoring governments to
continue their operation. The multiplication of
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Globesat section in chapter 10 of this report. At
the present, however, no country or organiza-
tion has taken the lead in proposing such a system
or in establishing the institutional and financial
framework that would be needed. Discussion of
ways to better use and integrate remote-sensing
data, along with other issues of concern to
developing countries, will be on the agenda at
the upcoming second U.N. Conference on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE 1982)
to be held at Vienna this coming August. A
number of proposals to establish new U.N.
bodies dealing with space activities and/or to ex-
pand the scope of existing ones will be proposed
at the Conference and passed on by the General
Assembly in the fall of 1982.
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Chapter 8
COMMERCIALIZATION OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
A commercial activity is generally understood
to be one undertaken for profit in the public mar-
ketplace; “commercialization” then implies the
transfer of technology from a research and devel-
opment (R&D) and/or federally supported opera-
tions stage to a for-profit stage, usually under
private sector ownership and control. It is difficult
to give a precise definition for commercialization
because the term assumes a variety of specific
meanings depending on the context in which it
is used. For example, aerospace companies earn
a profit on the aircraft they manufacture for the
military, but military aircraft are generally not con-
sidered to be commercial products, except inso-
far as they are sold to other countries. Civilian
aircraft, on the other hand, are considered thor-
oughly commercial, in that they are designed,
developed, and sold to make a profit in a com-
petitive marketplace. Nonetheless, such aircraft
depend partly on technology developed by the
Federal Government, either for military use, or
in a Government research program.
Though the desired result of all efforts toward
commercialization may be similar (i. e., to earn
a profit in a competitive environment), the proc-
esses necessary to achieve this result and the
sources of the technologies involved are often
quite different. Such differences become signifi-
cant in a context such as the U.S. space program,
in which commercialization of space technology
is encouraged as a matter of policy. The purposes
of this chapter will be to: 1 ) identify some of the
problems involved in trying to commercialize
specific space technologies; 2) examine private
sector attitudes towards commercialization; and
3) describe some of the current Government pro-
grams implemented to encourage commerciali-
zation.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the spe-
cial factors that space introduces to the process
of industrial innovation. New product, process,
and service innovations are analyzed along with
the barriers and inducements to their commer-
cialization. The remainder of this chapter dis-
cusses several of the current space-related, prof-
itmaking activities and indicates areas in which
the private sector may invest in the future.
PROCESS OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION IN SPACE
Overview
In most areas of business opportunity, Federal
R&D funds support or supplement larger private
R&D investment. Public funds are generally
thought to be justified for basic research into high-
risk pursuits with long payback times, or for tech-
nologies having obvious social benefits. With re-
spect to space, and with the notable exception
of some communications applications, the private
sector has invested relatively little in R&D explor-
ing new business possibilities. This puts the Fed-
eral Government in the position of pushing tech-
nological opportunities in an area without sub-
stantial business interest beyond the aerospace
community or an established or integrated mar-
ket. The purpose of this section will be to explore
the Government’s recent emphasis on commer-
cializing space technology and the reasons
behind the reluctance of the private sector to in-
vest capital in space research.
Although the basic characteristics of the inno-
vative process (see app. H) can be applied to any
industry, innovation in space technology raises
several unique problems. Among the special
characteristics of space-based innovation, the
following stand out:
l Entry costs are extremely high. No form of
ground-based research, development, and
demonstration can do away with the require-
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ment for testing of systems in space before
a new business using space-based technol-
ogy can apply it commercially. Access to
orbit is very expensive, and will continue to
be expensive even in the shuttle era, particu-
larly if compared with the costs required to
develop and demonstrate the commercial
viability of most Earth-based innovations.
Even with the less stringent design re-
quirements of the shuttle payload bay, space
systems are more expensive to design than
their Earth-bound equivalents. The cost of
using the shuttle as a laboratory to verify or
develop potential innovations may discour-
age many potential developers. This addi-
tional expenditure, incurred well before
commercial feasibility has been established,
is a radical departure from normal product
development on Earth.
Ž Government controls the means ot access
to space. Until some entrepreneur is capable
of operating a reliable space launch system,
access to space will be through launchers de-
veloped and operated by the Government,
In few other business sectors is an essential
element of the innovative process totally
under Government control. Access to
launches, launch assurances,. availability of
support facilities, and the cost of space
transportation may all be influenced by non-
business considerations such as changes in
an administration’s space policy, national
security constraints, or fluctuations in con-
gressional and public support. If the neces-
sary space facilities are not available when
needed, the resulting costly delays could be
fatal to a new commercial program.
l The markets for space industrialization are
undeveloped. Unlike innovations that
emerge from an existing or clearly possible
market opportunity, some space-based busi-
nesses will be based on totally new capabil-
ities that will have to create new markets.
Communications satellites, the often cited
example of successfully commercialized
space technology, were a more efficient
substitute for existing means of long-distance
communication. This interchangeability of
technologies is not characteristic of many of
the other space-based business opportunities
which have been identified to date.
l Public interests dominate space activities.
There are few areas of space applications in
which one or more of the following public
concerns—national security, international
economic competition, return to the public
from the investment of Government funds,
improving the quality of public services pro-
vided by Government—are not influential.
As a result, it is difficult to disentangle space
applications from their public-sector origins.
For the foreseeable future, it is difficult to
understand how space systems will be devel-
oped and operated as totally private ventures
without some form of Government oversight
or involvement.
Product, Process, and Service Innovation
Much of the current discussion concerning
space industrialization has focused on the unique
characteristics of the space environment and the
new product, process, and service innovations
that may result from the use of this environment.
There is a tendency in such discussions to regard
space industrialization as an undifferentiated set
of activities, each offering equal opportunities for
investment and commercialization. Important
distinctions concerning the sophistication and
reliability of the relevant technologies and the
presence or absence of a market for the proposed
innovation are often overlooked. Consequently,
space activities that have pregent commercial po-
tential are often confused with those that mere-
ly offer productive avenues for basic research.
It is important to review a few of the current and
proposed space activities in order to understand
how their many individual differences affect their
potential for successful commercialization. The
following section will take a brief look at satellite
communications, remote sensing and space trans-
piration, with a more detailed examination of the
commercial prospects for materials processing in
space.
Satellite Communications
To understand how communications satellites
fit into the overall scheme of space industrializa-
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tion, it is necessary to view this technology in an
historical perspective and to disregard for the
moment its present complex manifestations. I n
the late 1950’s in the United States there was a
great deal of Government and private interest in
satellite communications. The private sector, not-
ably AT&T, was keenly aware of the commercial
potential of such systems and was proceeding
with its-own research while keeping a close watch
on the progress of both the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) and the De-
partment of Defense. The research of AT&T even-
tually resulted in the design and construction of
Telstar, the U.S. first civilian active repeater
satellite. 1
The fact that AT&T initiated and funded its own
satellite research program without first obtaining
from NASA a guarantee for financial or technical
assistance is a point that deserves some scrutiny.
Corporate investment in new product devel-
opment is generally undertaken only after a
critical appraisal of the relevant technology, the
anticipated development cost and anticipated
return, and the market demand. AT&T’s decision
to extend its communications network into space
was no exception to this general rule.
From the technological point of view, commu-
nications satellites had three distinct advantages
over many of the space projects that are presently
under consideration. First, a communications sat-
ellite is, or rather can be, a very simple device.
All that is required is the proper placement above
a specific Earth point and the ability to reflect
either radio or microwaves to another Earth
point.2
Secondly, much of the research and testing of
a communications satellite could be done on the
ground. This meant that development time would
be faster and research costs would be lower and
more predictable.
Finally, corporate developers had the assurance
of knowing that when their product was finished
1 D. Smith, Communications Via Sate//ife, 1976, p. 82.
‘Using this basic concept, the U.S. Army Signal Corp, in 1945,
undertook project Diana, which was an attempt to use the Moon
as a passive reflector of radio signals. This research led to the devel-
opment, in 1959, of a two-way transmission system between Wash-
ington and Hawaii. Ibid., p. 30.
it would provide them with three distinct advan-
tages over ground-based communication sys-
tems. These advantages are insensitivity to
distance, broadcast ability, and flexible routing.
Distance insensitivity means that the cost of com-
municating between two points remains the same
no matter how far they are apart. This must
be contrasted with communications by cable,
where the cost is nearly proportional to the length
of the cable. A satellite is also capable of broad-
casting simultaneously to several Earth points,
whereas a cable can carry communications only
between two specific locations. Flexible routing
means that a satellite’s circuits can be switched
to different routes as traffic patterns change. Ter-
restrial circuits, on the other hand, must be plen-
tiful enough to meet peak demands on specific
fixed routes,
Another important factor that went into AT&T’s
decision to invest in satellite communications was
its dominant market position. In addition to its
large domestic telephone market, by the time
Early Bird was launched in 1965, AT&T owned
a majority interest in all the transatlantic cables
connecting North America and Europe. Unlike
the firms which today may be considering some
type of enterprise in space, AT&T had a strong
hold over the market it was about to enter. In
a similar vein, Western Union’s development of
“Westar,” the first domestic satellite system,
should be viewed in light of Western Union’s
position as the sole domestic telegraph carrier.
Its decision to offer domestic satellite service pro-
ceeded in large part from its evaluation that a
market for this specialized service existed.
In the early 1960’s, communications satellites
were also attractive from a financial point of view.
A Rand Corp. report published at this time had
estimated that a low-altitude satellite system
would cost approximately $8,500 a year per
channel, compared with $27,000 for a new un-
derwater cable system.4 Though these projections
were not entirely accurate, the commercial re-
sults of the use of communications satellites are
reflected in the history of transatlantic telephone
charges. In 1966, immediately after the first com-
3h4. Kins]ey, Outer Space and /nner Sanctums, 1976, P. 131.
4D. Smith, op. cit., p. 67.
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munications satellite went into operation, month-
ly charges for transatlantic phone circuits
dropped sharply and have continued to fall since
that times This reduction in price reflects the fact
that satellites are a cheaper, more efficient means
by which to accomplish long-distance terrestrial
communications.
Remote Sensing
Remote sensing of the Earth from space is the
second of the space applications with near-term
commercial potential. (For a more detailed dis-
cussion of this subject see ch. 3.) When Landsat
1 was launched in July of 1972, the U.S. Govern-
ment owned and operated, through NASA, both
the space and ground segments of the system.6
Recently, responsibility for the operation of a
civilian remote sensing system has been as-
signed to the Commerce Department’s National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). Eventually NOAA will take over the
operation of the Landsat spacecraft now operated
by NASA with the ultimate goal of transferring
both the space and ground segments of the sys-
tem to the private sector.
Though there is a considerable amount of inter-
est in remote sensing, it is unclear whether the
private sector can accept the full responsibility
for a complete Earth resource system. There are
three main reasons for this reluctance.7 The first
is that, unlike satellite communications, the mar-
ket for remote sensing is quite new. Though it
is potentially strong, it is now too undefined to
allow accurate projections of return on invest-
ment. The second problem is that the Govern-
ment is now and will probably remain the largest
user of remotely sensed data. The success of pri-
vate enterprise in this area will depend on wheth-
er or not the Government decides to satisfy its
civilian remote sensing data requirements from
a private operator, the price it will pay for such
services and whether the Government will agree
not to compete with the private sector. The third
Sj. E. Schnee, “inventory of Space Activities (Economic), ” pre-
sented at the Symposium on Space Activities and Implications, insti-
tute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, October 1980.
bFor a brief history of the Landsat program and technology see:
National Academy of Sciences, Resource Sensing From Space, 1977.
7See generally: An Interagency Task Force “Private Sector involve-
ment in Civil Remote Sensing, ” June  15, 1979.
problem is that the prices now charged for data
will not support systems costs. Up until this time
the costs of data have reflected only the marginal
cost of reproduction. This has been possible be-
cause NASA, during the R&D phase of its remote
sensing program, subsidized all of the operation-
al costs. In the near future the French and Japa-
nese may be operating government-subsidized
remote sensing satellites. If this is the case, U.S.
firms, whose price structures must reflect the total
costs of operations, may not be able to compete
in the world market.
As a result of these factors, it is unlikely that
the private sector will be interested in owning the
remote sensing system as presently configured
until investors perceive that the probable return
on investment is at least comparable to that
available from other risk-investment opportuni-
ties. It should be noted that Landsat may not be
an appropriate model by which to gage the costs
of a commercial remote sensing system. Because
Landsat is an R&D system, it is encumbered with
many costs and inefficiencies that could be elim-
inated in a commercial system developed to meet
specific user needs with appropriate and cost-
effective technology.
At this time corporations are involved only indi-
rectly in remote sensing from space. In addition
to the products and services developed and man-
ufactured by the aerospace industry for the vari-
ous Federal programs, the private sector has also
developed and provided analytical hardware,
software and services to private and Government
users.
presently, there are over 50 organizations in the
United States involved in the analysis of remote-
ly sensed data on a commercial basis. These orga-
nizations use the imagery acquired from space
to evaluate areas of the Earth’s surface for such
varied purposes as hydrocarbon resource poten-
tial, estimating crop production and land use
surveys. Several firms are also selling hardware
designed to process remotely sensed data.
[n the near future, it would appear that private
involvement in remote sensing will be limited to
providing the above mentioned hardware sales
and “value-added” services. Only when the mar-
kets are sufficiently large, with data prices reflect-
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ing the true costs of acquisition, can the private
sector be expected to own and operate remote
sensing systems.
Space Transportation
Recently there has been considerable discus-
sion concerning the possibility of establishing pri-
vately owned launch systems. This discussion has
focused on three alternatives: 1) commercializa-
tion of the U.S. present expendable launch ve-
hicles; 2) transfer of shuttle ownership and/or
operation to the private sector; and 3) private
development of a new generation of low-cost ex-
pendable launch vehicles. At present, the
absence of a comprehensive Government policy
which favors and encourages the participation of
the private sector in launch system ownership has
inhibited such developments.
The present expendable launch vehicles (ELVS),
such as the McDonnell Douglas Delta and the
General Dynamics Atlas-Centaur, are already
operated on a quasi-commercial basis. These
vehicles are commonly purchased through NASA
by communications companies for communica-
tions satellite launches. Although the vehicle is
launched by the Government, its cost and and
those related ground services are borne by the
private sector purchaser. The transition from the
quasi-commercial provision of launch services to
a purely commercial system may be difficult to
accomplish. Because the Government has his-
torically developed and operated launch vehicles
and presently owns all of the sophisticated U.S.
launch facilities, some form of Government-in-
dustry cooperation would seem to be a necess-
ity. This, in itself, should not be a cause of con-
cern because, as the aeronautics industry proves,
Government and industry can work together to
the mutual benefit of each. The problem that
does arise, however, is that in certain instances
the goals of the Government are not those of
industry.
For example, the present Government commit-
ment to the shuttle entails several costs which
NASA, at present, does not intend to recover
from shuttle users. This type of subsidy allows the
shuttle (and likewise the Ariane launch vehicle
of the European Space Agency (ESA)) to be priced
in a manner that does not reflect the true costs
of operations. From NASA’s standpoint as an
R&D agency this subsidy may be desirable be-
cause it encourages the use of a newly developed
system. However, the shuttle price then becomes
the price the private sector must match in order
to compete for commercial payloads. Because
a commercial operation must not only meet its
costs but also generate a profit, it is questionable
whether proven technology such as the U.S. ELVS
can be commercially competitive in the absence
of some form of Government assistance. Such
assistance couId come in the form of a promise
of a certain number of government launches, ac-
cess to government launch facilities or more tradi-
tional incentives such as tax breaks. However,
given this country’s long-term commitment to the
shuttle, it seems unlikely that such assistance will
be forthcoming.
There has been some discussion concerning
the possibility of converting surplus military
rockets, such as the Polaris or Minuteman, to
commercial launch vehicles. Given that the Gov-
ernment would support such a plan, the main ad-
vantage to using these vehicles would be their
extremely low cost. There would, however, be
a number of disadvantages. Because these vehi-
cles do not have the power to carry large pay-
loads to geostationary orbit, they could not be
used to launch many of the newest communica-
tions satellites. Furthermore, the fact that these
launch vehicles would be surplus equipment op-
erated by nongovernment personnel would make
it difficult, at least initially, to obtain launch con-
tracts from companies accustomed to the security
of dealing with NASA. It would be unlikely that
customers would be willing to entrust valuable
payloads to an unproved private company par-
ticularly if adequate launch insurance were not
available.
Transfer of the shuttle to the private sector has
also been considered. Such a decision would in-
volve a major policy shift on the part of the Gov-
ernment, with substantial institutional and finan-
cial reprecussions. Important questions would
have to be examined: 1) what part, if any, of the
shuttle development costs should the Govern-
ment attempt to recoup; 2) could the national
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security needs of the United States be met by a
privately owned shuttle; and 3) could a private
shuttle compete in the international arena with
foreign, subsidized launch systems? None of
these problems necessarily prevents the shuttle
from being owned and operated by the private
sector; however, the resolution of any of these
problems requires a substantial degree of Govern-
ment involvement.
Several private firms have also consitiered the
possibility of developing a new generation of low-
cost launch vehicles. However, even using
proved ELV technology, the high cost and long
development time associated with such an en-
deavor have so far prevented the successful de-
velopment of such a vehicle. Were such a firm
to be technologically successful, commercial suc-
cess would still depend on a positive Government
attitude toward such an enterprise. Questions
such as launch safety, payload regulation, acquisi-
tion of new launch facilities, and launch agree-
ments with foreign governments would still re-
quire resolution. The time and expense involved
in developing a private launch system combined
with government delays and regulatory complica-
tions may well create too heavy a burden for the
private sector to carry alone.
Materials Processing in Space (MPS)
As indicated earlier in this report (see ch. 3),
the unique properties of outer space, most not-
ably microgravity, are amenable to a number of
industrial processes. Some of the organic and in-
organic materials that may in the future be proc-
essed in space have already been mentioned
above. it should be noted, however, that the nas-
cent state of MPS technology and the lack of
clearly defined markets place materials process-
ing in a long-term, high-cost, high-risk category
that is generally beyond the interest and finan-
cial capabilities of most private commercial con-
cerns. It is unrealistic to expect any major finan-
cial commitments from the private sector until
the technical capability and economic feasibil-
ity of new space processing techniques have been
demonstrated. At least for the near future, the
responsibility for proving the technical and eco-
nomic feasibility of new space technologies will
rest on the Government acting, either alone or
in joint ventures with the private sector. Because
of the emphasis NASA placed on commercializ-
ing MPS technology, it is useful to examine this
space application in some detail.
BARRIERS TO COMMERCIALIZATION
OF MPS TECHNOLOGY
Most of the products and processes presently
being considered for development in space are,
at best, in the basic research stage of the innova-
tive process. Though it would be correct to say
that the private sector will begin to invest in space
industry only after achieving a more sophisticated
understanding of how materials and processes
behave in space, such an analysis identifies only
one aspect of its reluctance. A number of com-
mercial, legal, and organizational factors must
also be considered.
Few attractive investments.—of all the barriers
to process innovation in space, the most impor-
tant is that the ideas for new products and proc-
esses that have been suggested simply are not
very attractive investments. Industrial R&D proj-
ects are a discretionary expenditure, and there-
fore must compete for corporate capital with
other investment opportunities. A project’s ability
to compete is a function of the amount of risk
it involves, its estimated front-end costs, and its
foreseeable rate of return.
The risks involved in space innovation are con-
siderable. For example, several pharmaceutical
products have been identified that may be pro-
duced either more cheaply or with greater ease
in outer space. However, before any of these
products could reach the market a number of sig-
nificant problems would face the manufacturer.
First, there would have to be a period of ground-
based R&D where the techniques to be employed
in space would be developed. Next, the process
would have to be verified in space. This prob-
lem depends on the availability of NASA test facil-
ities, such as the shuttle, which in turn depends
on how the current political and economic envi-
ronment affects NASA funding. Because the Gov-
ernment has the right to terminate contracts
unilaterally, a company that has spent millions
of dollars on R&D could find itself without ac-
cess to shuttle flights. Though the Government
might have to reimburse a client’s costs on a con-
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tract it canceled, such reimbursement would not
include the opportunity costs—that is, the costs
of devoting resources to a space processing pro-
gram in place of some other business opportuni-
ty. If the process were verified in space, Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) approval would still
be necessary before the new pharmaceutical
product could be marketed, and–depending on
the complexity of the manufacturing process—
new legal and regulatory agencies might be
necessary.
Even if all of these R&D hurdles could be
cleared, the economic success of a drug manufac-
tured in space would still depend on the com-
pany’s ability to produce and sell large enough
specific annual quantities of a new product. It is
unlikely that the shuttle, as it is presently con-
figured, could guarantee such a requirement.
Long-term MPS facilities based in space and dedi-
cated to commercial space processing neither
exist nor are planned for the near future.
It is by no means certain that a firm wishing
to manufacture a product in space would have
to face all of the complications enumerated
above. The results of MPS experiments under-
taken over the next 2 to 5 years may reveal many
commercially attractive opportunities for prod-
ucts or services that can be performed on the
shuttle as presently configured. Nonetheless, the
risks involved in space-based product research
do create a substantial barrier to investment.
In addition to the technical and institutional
risks involved in utilizing the space environment,
there are also uncertainties regarding cost and
development time. The present shuttle pricing
schedule does not reflect the true costs of opera-
tions. A recent General Accounting Office report
has suggested that NASA should void its pricing
policy (except for those launches that have legally
binding agreements) and charge “substantially
higher prices for future Iaunches."8 Uncertain-
ties as to the price of future shuttle missions make
it difficult for business planners to estimate the
cost of space-based product development.
Firms interested in investing in a new product
must estimate that product’s potential rate of
“’NASA Pricing Policy on the Space Transportation System,” GAO
Report to Congress, Feb. 23, 1982.
return. When considering the rate of return that
a space-based industry might generate, one must
take into account the development time of such
a project. Because a dollar held today has greater
buying power than a dollar held in the future,
the dollar that is anticipated in the future must
be “discounted” to reflect its actual value in
today’s dollars. This means that the longer any
project takes from its R&D phase to commer-
cialization, the greater the profit must be when
the project begins to make money. This is par-
ticularly true during times of high inflation and
high interest rates. The combination of technical
uncertainties and potential problems in obtain-
ing the shuttle flights necessary for project
verification makes it difficult to predict the
development time for space-based projects. The
combination of high-cost, high-risk, long-payback
time and uncertain rate of return makes it difficult
for space-based projects to compete for internally
generated corporate capital with other, more
traditional, investment opportunities. Similarly,
conventional methods of financing such as equity
capital or borrowing may not be available, and
the degree of risk involved here may also discour-
age the flow of venture capital into this area. g
Uncertainties as to value of space environ-
rnent.-ln addition to the view that there is little
to be done in space, there is a tendency in the
business community to believe that whatever can
be done in space can also be done on Earth.
Though it is often stated that the microgravity of
space is fundamentally different from Earth grav-
ity and cannot be duplicated, new technologies
have been developed which do minimize the ef-
fects of gravity on Earth. Examples of this fact can
be seen in recent developments in containerless
processing and in the manufacture of latex po-
lymers.
It is believed that one of the advantages to in-
space manufacturing will be that materials can
be processed without picking up impurities from
the wall of the container that holds them. Recent-
ly a U.S. firm working with NASA developed a
containerless processing system for making spe-
cial glass products on Earth. 1o in this system the
gThe space  industrialization  Act of 1979: statement Of Russell Car-
son at hearings on H.R. 2337, before the Subcommittee on Space
Science and Applications, 96th Cong, 1st sess., p. 1767.
!Olndustry  Week, Mar. 3, 1980, P. 90.
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glass is suspended within a chamber by sound
beams in a process called acoustic levitation.
Another example of an Earth-based advance that
has a space counterpart is the manufacture of
latex polymers. It is believed that, in space, latex
polymers could be enlarged to as much as 40 mi-
crons. Although it had been assumed that the
gravity on Earth would limit the expansion of
these materials to 2 microns, Norwegian scien-
tists using new chemical techniques have in-
creased the size of latex polymers to 10 mi-
crons. 
11 Though neither process functions as effi-
ciently as would similar space-based processes,
they are accomplished without the enormous ex-
pense and administrative complexity of space-
based manufacturing. Industry will be hesitant to
invest in space as long as there is at least some
hope that Earth-based manufacturing techniques
can accomplish similiar results.
Prior investment in Earth technology.–Even if
industry could be sure of the commercial viability
of some of the projects that have been proposed,
its prior investment in Earth-based technology
may make it reluctant to pursue new innovations
in space. Radical innovation, whether in space
or on the Earth, usually means discarding expen-
sive equipment before a company has had time
fully to depreciate it. For example, it has been
suggested that the U.S. auto industry’s enormous
investment in automating the manufacture of cast
iron brake drums probably delayed by more than
5 years its transition to disc brakes.12 Some com-
panies prefer safer methods of maximizing prof-
it, such as advertising, market research, and
automation, rather than risking investment in new
products and processes. The majority of industrial
product and process development is directed at
reducing costs and increasing profits in the short
run. For this reason it is more common for in-
dustry to seek new methods of making existing
products more cheaply or marketing them more
effectively than to develop new products.
This is not the first time that this conflict
between old technology and new has been an
issue in the space debate. In the early 1960’s,
‘ 1 Ibid.
IZRobert  H. Hayes and William j. Abernathy, “Managing Our WaY
to Economic Decline” Harvard Business Review, july and August
1980, p. 70.
when Congress was trying to fashion an insti-
tutional structure and a method of ownership
for the Communications Satellite Corporation
(COMSAT), there were serious reservations about
allowing the existing international communica-
tions carriers to invest in the corporation. It was
assumed that companies with large investments
in existing facilities would be reluctant to take
speedy action to implement new satellite systems
that would make their existing facilities obsolete.
To some extent, a similar concern may be raised
regarding companies that could benefit from
space-based manufacturing techniques. Even if
the product that could be produced in space is
better or more efficient than its Earth-man-
ufactured equivalent, a corporation’s prior in-
vestments may prohibit it from pursuing this new
technology.
Intellectual property. -Another potential bar-
rier to process innovation in space is the fact that
a large portion of the private sector has no expe-
rience in dealing with the Federal Government
other than as an occasional vendor of supplies
and materials. In the normal course of events, a
firm working for the Government is required to
submit periodic reports detailing the progress of
its work. Such requirements are at odds with the
usual desire of industry to protect its investments
in R&D by refusing to disclose details or results
of current research. Industry is also concerned
that a business relationship with the Government
could result in the loss of certain intellectual prop-
erty rights.
The Freedom of Information Act13 raises a num-
ber of problems concerning the protection of data
and proprietary rights. It requires the disclosure
of “Government records” upon request, unless
the records fit into one of the narrow exceptions
to the act. Information obtained under a guaran-
tee of confidentiality may be protected and
“trade secrets” are a recognized exception to the
act. A company working with NASA must careful-
ly screen that which may become a “Govern-
ment record” and be sure that if sensitive infor-
mation becomes “Government record” it qual-
ifies as one of the exceptions to the disclosure
requirements.
135 us. 552.
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Several legal issues may inhibit the private sec-
tor’s involvement in the innovative process in
space. The first concerns the question of owner-
ship of the patent rights to new products and
processes discovered during the course of a joint
endeavor with NASA. Section 305 of the 1958
NAS Act states that “whenever any invention is
made in the performance of any work under any
contract of [NASA], such invention becomes the
exclusive property of the United States unless
[NASA] waives rights thereto . . . "14 A strict
reading of this section would vest in NASA the
ownership of all inventions discovered while
working for, or in a joint venture with NASA.
Over the last two decades NASA has limited the
application of section 305 to activities performed
for NASA which have as their main purpose the
development of some new product or process.
With regard to joint ventures, it has been NASA’s
position that neither party assumes any obliga-
tion to perform inventive work for the other, and
accordingly each party retains the rights to any
invention that may be made in the course of the
venture. 15
International Law. –I n the area of international
law, the private sector seems to be troubled by
the growing use in international treaties of “com-
mon interest” clauses such as the Common Heri-
tage of Mankind principle which has been dis-
cussed at the Law of the Sea Convention and ap-
pears in the proposed Moon Treaty.l6 Simply
stated, these clauses assert that certain resources,
such as the minerals on the ocean floor and on
the Moon and the “slots” in geostationary orbit,
are presently under the jurisdiction and control
of no sovereign power; these resources, being
finite and exhaustible, should not be allocated
to the developed countries on a first-come, first-
served basis, but rather, should be made to bene-
fit all nations. Although these “common interest”
clauses have found their way into all the major
space treaties, there is considerable uncertainty
as to their status within the body of international
T 442 u .s, c. 2451, et. seq.
I Jspace  Industrializatio n Act of 1979: statement of Robert A.
Frosch at hearings on H.R. 2337, before the Subcommittee on Space
Science and Applications of the House Committee on Science and
Technology, 96 Cong.  1st sess., 1979.16Agreement coverning  the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, U.N.  doc. A1341664.
law. Some writers have suggested that these
clauses are merely pragmatic principles without
legal force.l7 Others regard them as binding prin-
ciples which obligate states to be responsive in
some form to the interests of developing coun-
tries. l8
The use of “common interest” clauses in inter-
national treaties has brought about strong opposi-
tion from the private sector. The most common
argument heard in this regard is that the concept
of equitable sharing is inconsistent with the con-
cept of profit, and in the absence of the profit
motive private enterprise cannot be expected to
risk capital on space investments. At this stage
of space industrialization such considerations
have had only a minimal effect on the private
decisions whether or not to invest in space.
INDUCEMENTS TO PROCESS INNOVATION
IN SPACE
Profit potential. –Though there are substantial
physical, economic, and psychological barriers
to process innovation in space, certain in-
ducements do exist which may encourage private
sector participation in this area. Probably the
most important incentive to the private sector is
the potential for making a profit. At the present
time only two product areas seem to offer the
combination of technical feasibility and market
potential that are necessary for a profitable ven-
ture. The first of these product areas is pharma-
ceuticals.
McDonnell Douglas together with Ortho Phar-
maceutical Corp. has investigated the commercial
cial potential of several pharmaceutical products,
which could be processed by electrophoresis in
space, and has entered into a joint agreement
with NASA to test this technology. This project
has been described by McDonnell Douglas as an
“aggressive, well-ordered commercial business
venture” in which the combined investment of
the pat-ties will be measured in terms of millions
of dollars. Clearly McDonnell Douglas and Ortho
1 ZC. Q. Christol, “The Legal Common Heritage of Mankind: Cap-
turing an Illusive Concept and Applying It to World Needs, ” XVIII,
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1976, p. 42.
15. Gorove, “Limitations on the Principle of Freedom of Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space,” X111,  Colloquium on the Law of Outer
Space, 1973, p. 74, et. seq.
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believe that there is a profit to be made in devel-
oping this technology.
Other potentially profitable products that can
be manufactured in space are the starting material
for electronic devices such as large-diameter crys-
tals. Like pharmaceuticals, these crystals have a
high market value per unit mass. The facilities
needed to manufacture the basic materials are
also small, so that the total orbital mass is low,
even for very high production rates. The econom-
ic advantage of manufacturing the starting mate-
rials for electronic devices in space is less sure
than for pharmaceuticals and no one has made
a major investment in this technology.l9 It should
be noted that the Earth-manufactured electronic
devices presently enjoy a sales level of about $16
billion per year with an estimated growth rate of
10 to 15 percent annually for the next 10 years.
Such a healthy market is conducive to innova-
tion and may eventually provide the incentive for
the private sector to invest in space-based manu-
facturing techniques.
In addition to products, it is possible that the
private sector may find it profitable to offer cer-
tain space-based services. The GTI Joint Endeavor
Agreement with NASA (discussed below) is based
on this assumption. GTI is developing a metal-
lurgical furnace which it hopes to rent to parties
interested in the effects of solidification in micro-
gravity. As experience is gained in MPS research,
it is likely that other space-based services will be
offered by the private sector.
Scientific knowdedge. –Another reason that the
private sector may wish to invest in process inno-
vation in space is to gain a better understanding
of present Earth-based manufacturing techniques.
For example, methods now used for the commer-
cial growth of large crystals have been developed
empirically with little theoretical understanding
of what occurs at the microlevel during growth.
It is possible that significant improvements in
Earth-based crystal growth could result if low-
gravity experiments were to provide a better the-
oretical understanding of the growth process. In
a similar vein, the John Deere Corp. has entered
lgMaterials processing in Space, report of the Committee on Scien-
tific and Technological Aspects of Materials Processing in Space,
National Research Council, 1978, p. 40.
into an agreement with NASA to study the solidi-
fication of cast iron. The purpose of this research
will be to gain a better understanding of how the
graphite formation of cast iron influences the
metal’s properties. It is expected that low-gravity
experiments will provide insights into this ques-
tion which, though obtained in space, will have
practical use on Earth.
Institutional incentives. — In order to encourage
private involvement, NASA has established the
Commercial Applications Office in its MPS pro-
gram. This office forms a bridge between NASA
and the private sector which provides assistance
to the industrial user and suggestions to NASA
on how the commercial growth of MPS might be
advanced. Joint projects between industry and
NASA are “no exchange of funds” agreements
to cooperate in a given area with each party
assigned specific tasks to accomplish. The Com-
mercial Applications Office has developed three
basic levels of working relationships with private
organ izations:
Technical exchange agreement (TEA) .–For
companies interested in applying microgravity
technology, but not ready to commit to a specific
space flight experiment or venture, NASA has
developed TEA. Under a TEA, NASA and a com-
pany agree to exchange technical information
and cooperate in the conduct and analysis of
ground-based research programs. In this agree-
ment, a firm can become familiar with micrograv-
ity technology and its applicability to the com-
pany product line at minimal expense. Under
TEA, the private company funds its own participa-
tion, and derives direct access to and results from
NASA facilities and research, with NASA gaining
the support and expertise of the private com-
pany’s industrial research capability.
Industrial guest investigators (lGl).–ln an IGI
agreement, NASA and industry share sufficient
mutual scientific interest that a company arranges
for one of its scientists to collaborate (at company
expense) with a NASA-sponsored principal inves-
tigator on a space flight MPS experiment. Once
the parties agree to the contribution to be made
to the objectives of the experiment, the IGI
becomes a member of the investigation team,
thus adding industrial expertise and insight to the
experiment.
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Joint endeavor agreement (JEA)-JEA is a co-
operative arrangement in which private partici-
pants and NASA share common program objec-
tives, program responsibilities, and financial risk.
The objective of a JEA is to encourage early space
ventures and demonstrate the usefulness of space
technology to meet marketplace needs. A JEA is
a legal agreement between equal partners, and
is not a procurement action; no funds are ex-
changed between NASA and the industrial part-
ner. A private participant selects an experiment
and/or technology demonstration for a joint
endeavor which complies with MPS program ob-
jectives, conducts the necessary ground investiga-
tion, and develops flight hardware at company
expense. As incentive for this investment, NASA
agrees to provide free shuttle flights for projects
which meet certain basic criteria, such as tech-
nical merit, contribution to innovation, and ac-
ceptable business arrangements. As further incen-
tive, the participant is allowed to retain certain
proprietary rights to the results, particularly the
non patentable information that yields a compet-
itive edge in marketing products based on MPS
results. However, NASA receives sufficient data
to evaluate the significance of the results, and re-
quires that any promising technologies be applied
commercially on a timely basis, or published.
NASA has developed these three types of work-
ing relationships in order to attract private-sector
interest at varying investment levels. It hopes that
firms with limited funds and cautious R&D pol-
icies may start out with a TEA or an IGI and, if
in-space experimentation appears valuable,
upgrade their cooperative efforts to a JEA.
Another interesting method for attracting and
maintaining the interest of private enterprise in
space-based manufacturing is the proposed Space
Industrialization Corporation (SIC) .20
The bill which proposed SIC declares that
it is a finding of Congress that “space activities
have matured to the point where the attributes
of space are generally understood” and a “num-
ber of potential uses of the properties of the space
environment are already known to have commer-
cial applications. ” In light of these findings, the
‘“’’ The Space Industrialization Act of 1979,” H.R. 2337.
bill proposed the creation of a mixed-ownership
corporation funded initially by Congress to “pro-
mote, encourage, and assist in the development
of new products, processes, services, and indus-
tries using the properties of the space environ-
merit. ”
As a mixed-ownership corporation, SIC would
be managed by a Board of Directors appointed
by the President, consisting of a chairman, three
qualified members of the executive branch, and
eight members from the private sector. The
financing of SIC would take the form of a “Space
Industrialization Trust Fund.” Congress would
provide this fund with $50 million per year for
the first 2 fiscal years and then additional sums
as might be necessary.
When the Board of Directors determined that
the corporation was operating “successfully, ef-
fectively, and profitably,” then it would take
steps to transfer SIC from a mixed-ownership cor-
poration to pure public ownership. As a public-
ly held corporation, the financing for SIC would
derive from issuing capital stock and selling non-
voting securities and bonds.
One would assume, in light of the financial diffi-
culties involved in private sector participation in
materials processing in space, that a proposal
such as SIC would meet with general approval.
This, however, has not been the case. Many have
hastened to point out that though the proposed
SIC is a step in the right direction, the idea in its
present form contains some serious problems.
The problems most often cited by those oppos-
ing SIC in its present form are: 1 ) that such a pro-
posal is premature in that the attributes of space
are not generally understood; and 2) that it may
interfere with the activities of NASA, particular-
ly its MPS program.21
Government Encouragement
of Innovation
Government involvement in the process of in-
novation raises important questions as to the ap-
propriate roles of the public and private sectors
21The  Space Industrialization Act of 1979, op. cit., P. 64.
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in the development and operation of new tech-
nology. Ordinarily, the private sector bears the
total responsibility for funding R&D intended to
be incorporated into commercial systems. How-
ever, over the past several decades the Govern-
ment has provided significant support, not only
for basic research but also for applied research,
technology and systems development, and even
demonstration projects in the aerospace industry.
In each of these instances, the Government role
in the process of innovation was determined by
the complex interaction of such variables as: the
sophistication of the technology involved, its
perceived importance to national goals, the struc-
ture of the market to which the technology is ad-
dressed, the level of industry interest, and the
ability of the private sector to develop the rele-
vant technology without Government support.
The following section presents three different
examples of how Government intervention has
been used to direct and encourage technological
innovation.
Aeronautics
An often-cited example of Government success
in moving new technology out of its own con-
trol and into the private sector, is NASA’s aero-
nautical research program. This effort began as
a direct outgrowth of the program of the National
Advisory Council on Aeronautics (NACA), in-
itiated in the mid-1920’s and formalized in March
1946 by the National Aeronautical Research Pol-
icy. This policy, promulgated to clarify the rela-
tionship of NACA with other R&D agencies,
charged NACA with the responsibility for con-
ducting “research in the aeronautical sciences.”
By comparison, the policy assigned to industry
the responsibility for the “application of research
results in the design and development of im-
proved aircraft equipment.” In other words, the
Government agreed to assume the responsibil-
ity of early applied research but product develop-
ment would remain the responsibility of the pri-
vate sector. This approach seems to have worked
rather well, inasmuch as the history of U.S. ci-
vilian aviation is crowded with examples of tech-
nology which found its way into commercial use
after initial, early research at government ex-
pense. For example, super critical airfoils, the
high bypass tubofan jet engine, the microwave
Landing system, the turboprop engine, and many
others were all introduced for commercial ex-
ploitation in the American market after years of
fundamental R&D work by NACA and later by
NASA.22
In its generally successful efforts to launch gov-
ernment-developed aviation technology into the
private sector, NASA exploys two concepts for
identifying at what point the development of a
given technology should become the responsibil-
ity of the private sector. These two concepts are
“technology validation” and its logical followup,
“technology readiness. "23 The former describes
the state of a technique, still under investigation,
when its essential performance characteristics
have been proved but before there is confidence
in the level of costs associated with fabrication
of that device or technique under investigation.
The latter term, “technology readiness” is em-
ployed to describe a technology that has been
demonstrated to have a reasonably high proba-
bility of resulting in a commercially manageable
fabrication process. Note that NASA does not ac-
tually design a fabrication process, but only “cer-
tifies” in an informal way that the road seems
clear for a private firm to do so. In this sense the
technology is “ready” for the private sector.
NASA has performed the generic R&D that is nec-
essary to prove the worth of a new application
of engineering science to aviation technology. It
does this both for the particular technology in
question and also, if the success of the first stages
warrants, for the fabrication or manufacturing
technology necessary to produce the innovation.
If at this point industry wishes to shoulder the risk
of further specific R&D (which is usually much
more expensive than the preliminary, generic
R&D) based on its judgment of level of expected
return on its investment, it may do so with a much
greater degree of confidence than if it were to
start a technology validating process from scratch.
Essentially, this process is one of lowering the
threshold of risk for private investment in a new
and promising technical development. Doing so
at public expense is justifiable so long as there
ZZNMW, The High Speed Frontier: Case Histories of Four NACA
Programs (1980).
20f%ce  of Technology Assessment, Impact of Advanced Air Trans-
port Tmhno/ogy, Part 1; pp. 10, 34, 1979.
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are significant public as well as private benefits
to be exploited in the innovative product, serv-
ice, or process. It should be pointed out, in
respect to this last notion, that in order for NASA
to be confident of the existence of a “significant
public benefit” to be had from its generic tech-
nology development efforts, a well-developed
market for civilian aviation services was an im-
portant given condition. The importance of a
well-developed market and its effect on Govern-
ment R&D is examined in greater detail in the
following discussion of communications satellites
and materials processing in space.
Communications Satellites
Communications satellite technology from its
inception was pursued with enthusiasm by the
private sector. The initial Government position
articulated during the Eisenhower administration
was that NASA should “take the lead within the
executive branch both to advance the needed re-
search and development and to encourage pri-
vate industry to apply its resources toward the
earliest practicable utilization of space technology
for commercial civil communications require-
ments . . . "24 At this time AT&T’s position as the
sole U.S. international telephone carrier and its
financial ability and willingness to commit funds
to the development of communication satellites
made it the obvious industry partner for NASA
efforts. By September 1960, AT&T was ready to
request that NASA clarify its policies concerning
aid to companies working to develop communi-
cations satellites25 and had already contacted the
Governments of France, Britain, and Germany
about plans for low-altitude satellites to provide
transatlantic telephone and television service.26
Hughes Aircraft had also contacted NASA to ex-
press its interest in, and ideas for, communica-
tions satellites.
Had the Eisenhower administration’s policy
been continued, it is almost certain that the pri-
vate sector would have undertaken the commer-
cialization of satellite communications. With
NASA supplying technical assistance and FCC
regulating such communication under traditional
Z4D.  Smith, p. 70.
Zslbid.  at 70.
Z61bid.
guidelines, it is probable that the development
of this technology would have proceeded without
the creation of an organization such as COMSAT.
COMSAT was the product of public policy con-
siderations and not of the marketplace. With the
Kennedy administration came a strong commit-
ment to the space program as a means to en-
hance U.S. prestige and security. It was felt that
satellite communications could be one area of
early U.S. competence. As a result an additional
$10 million was added to the 1961 NASA budget
for communications development.
The addition of these funds had several effects
on the communications satellite innovative proc-
ess. The most obvious effect was that NASA had
the funds and the mandate to “push” com-
munications technology to maintain U.S. leader-
ship in this field. A peripheral, though seeming-
ly intended result was a postponement of private
sector investment in this technology. This devel-
opment reflected the decision of the Kennedy ad-
ministration to assess the policy implications
before placing the development of communica-
tions satellites in private hands. It was also consist-
ent with the administration’s desire to keep satel-
lite communications responsive to Government
policy and its cautious approach to what seemed
an imminent AT&T monopoly in international
communications.
In a curious inversion of the normal chain of
events, the Government used its ability to sub-
sidize innovation to retard the process of com-
mercialization rather than to speed it. The Gov-
ernment wished to ensure that any transfer of
technology occurred under conditions that would
be responsive to foreign policy considerations.
This desire was accomplished by the statutory
creation of the unique public/private COMSAT.27
COMSAT is a private corporation with a mo-
nopoly in the business of international satellite
communications. The Communication Satellite
Act of 1962 provided that ownership and financ-
ing of the corporation would be accomplished
through the issuance of capital stock. The act orig-
inally reserved 50 percent of the stock for pur-
chase by communications common carriers au-
Zzcommunication  satellite  Act of 1962, 47 U.S. C. 721.
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thorized by FCC. The act also initially provided
that the Board of Directors was to be composed
of six members elected by the common carrier
stockholders, six elected by the rest of the stock-
holders, and three appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate. 28 In
this manner Congress sought to insure that the
Government retained some degree of internal
control over the organization.
The COMSAT Act also provides certain exter-
nal controls which allow the Government to reg-
ulate and direct COMSAT’S activities. Section
201 (a) of the act grants the President the author-
ity to undertake such activities as aiding the plan-
ning and development of the system, reviewing
all phases of development and operation, super-
vising the relationship of the corporation with for-
eign governments, and insuring foreign participa-
tion in the system. Further, the act gives FCC the
power, among other things, to ensure competi-
tion in the procurement of equipment and serv-
ice, to regulate technical compatibility between
satellites and ground stations, to set ratemaking
procedures, and to approve technical character-
istics of the system.
The Government’s support of innovation in
communications satellite technology benefited
COMSAT in two ways. First, the technology even-
tually transferred to the new corporation was
more advanced than that which would otherwise
have been available for commercialization in the
early 1960’s; second, this technology was devel-
oped at the public expense. The complicating fac-
tor is that because COMSAT was not solely a
commercial venture founded in response to mar-
ket demands but rather a hybrid organization
designed to implement public policy, the respon-
sibility for innovation in satellite technology has
never been clear. After COMSAT was established,
there was considerable disagreement as to what
role NASA should play in further communications
satellite research and development. Many felt that
COMSAT, as a private entity, should take the ini-
zeThe  Communication Satellite Act was amended in 1969. Sec.
303 (a) now states that if the shares of voting stock held by the com-
munications common carriers is less than 8 percent, the common
carriers are not allowed to elect directors separately (47 U.S.C. 73
3(a)), Presently, the common carriers hold less than one-fourth of
1 percent of the total shares outstanding.
tiative and the risks associated with the evolution
of the communications satellite. Others believed
that NASA should continue its R&D role because
the NAS Act of 1958 mandated it to ensure U.S.
leadership in space technology. NASA’s position
in the mid-1 960’s was that it should be allowed
to continue research in advanced technology,
whereas COMSAT’S R&D would be directed to
establishing the initial operating systems.
Using this and similar arguments, NASA con-
tinued to receive funding and to do communica-
tions satellite R&D until January 1973. At this
time, the combination of NASA budget limitations
and the success of commercial satellites for both
international and domestic service led NASA to
phase out its work on advanced communication
systems.
The Joint Endeavor Agreement
The primary method by which the Government
is seeking to encourage private sector participa-
tion in MPS research is through innovative NASA/
industry relationships such as the Technical Ex-
change Agreement (TEA), the Industrial Guest in-
vestigation Agreement (IGIA) and the joint En-
deavor Agreement (JEA). Since JEA requires the
greatest commitment on the part of NASA and
the private sector participant, it is useful to ex-
amine this arrangement, its problems, and its
potential for success.
As of January 31, 1982, there were two jEAs
in effect. The first of these agreements, referred
to earlier, was with McDonnell Douglas Astro-
nautics Co. (MDAC) and the second is with the
GTI Corp.
The subject matter of MDAC/JEA is a process
called continuous flow electrophoresis (C-F-E).
This process separates materials in solution by
subjecting them to an electrical field as they flow
continuously through a chamber. The McDon-
nell Douglas C-F-E experiment will use the shut-
tle, at NASA’s expense, to develop and demon-
strate the applicability of that process to the crea-
tion of marketable quantities of pharmaceutical
products. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. has been
selected by McDonnell Douglas as a partner in
its materials processing business venture. Ortho
has completed a detailed market analysis on the
first C-F-E candidate product to be produced in
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space. The corporation is now developing a de-
tailed animal test program for the product, to be
followed by a clinical test program. “Substantial
sums of money” (in the tens of millions of dollars)
have been and will continue to be invested by
both parties in the venture. According to MDAC,
optimization of C-F-E ground units has been com-
pleted, and fabrication of apparatus for space
flight demonstration onboard the shuttle in 1982
is now under way.
In addition, the conceptual design of a precom-
mercial space flight pilot plant has been initiated.
Present plans call for pilot plant demonstration
in 1985/1 986, and maintaining this schedule
should result in commercial operation by 1986
or 1987.
The subject of the JEA with GTI Corp. is a
metallurgical furnace. GTI’s furnace is a 200-lb
computer-controlled chamber that will be flown
in the cargo bay of the shuttle. The furnace will
have 37 compartments for the melting and reso-
lidification of some 220 alloy samples. Should this
JEA prove the technical and commercial feasibility
of this furnace, GTI will market its ability to
manage metallurgical experiments in microgravity
to interested public and private sector research
organizations.
The JEA requires GTI to develop this furnace
and NASA to test it on four shuttle flights. The
first flight is presently scheduled for the third
quarter of 1984.
Because MDAC/JEA has, and probably will con-
tinue to serve as a model for future JEAs, and
since the industry/Government relationship estab-
lished in this agreement differs drastically from
the Government’s relationship to COMSAT, it is
useful to scrutinize the structure and purpose of
this agreement.
To create a climate suitable for commercializa-
tion in the MDAC case, the first JEA had to ad-
dress the following issues:
 l ExcLusivity. — I n return for MDAC’s prom i se
to make results of the work available to the
U.S. public on reasonable terms and condi-
tions, NASA agrees to refrain from entering
into similar joint endeavors or international
cooperative agreements directly related to
l
l
l
It
the development of processes that would
compete with those resulting from the
MDAC endeavor. NASA is not precluded,
however, from selling flight time on the shut-
tle to any other organizations wanting to
conduct the same or similar experiments.
Patent and data rights.–NASA will not ac-
quire rights in inventions made by MDAC or
its associates in the course of the joint en-
deavor, unless MDAC fails to exploit the in-
ventions or terminates the agreement, or un-
less the NASA Administrator determines that
a national emergency exists involving a seri-
ous threat to the public health.
In the event that inventions or improve-
ments are made during the joint endeavor,
MDAC need not report these to the Govern-
ment. Records will be retained by MDAC
and, if requested by NASA, the company will
provide a brief description of the invention.
Such description is protected as data or a
trade secret if appropriate.
Confidentiality. –The JEA requires that data
supplied by MDAC shall not be related out-
side the Government, except after notice to
the originator and agreement by the recipi-
ent to protect it from unauthorized use and
disclosure.
Recoupment. —Lastly, to provide the finan-
cial incentive for MDAC’S investment, the
jEA explicitly recognizes MDAC’S right to a
“fair return on investment.” Coupled with
patent and data rights provisions of the JEA,
a “fair return on investment” is to be
measured by what is obtained in the appro-
priate industry, including such factors as the
high-risk, long-term nature of the invest-
ment.
is apparent from this brief review that the
Government role in MPS is significantly different
from its role in the development of aviation and
communications satellite technologies. In part
this can be attributed to the fact that the markets
and technology for MPS are still in an embryonic
stage. In addition, research in communications
satellites and civilian aviation can be conducted
with only minimal recourse to Government fa-
cilities and the commercial operation of these
technologies can be accomplished with little
—. .-—
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Government oversight. MPS research and prod- tions could proceed without close Government
uct development, on the other hand, are still cooperation. For the near future, the JEA appears
highly dependent on Government facilities. to bean important tool for continuing the unique
Should such research result in a marketable prod- Government/industry relationship which is essen-
uct, it is unclear how commercial MPS opera- tial to the development of a mature MPS industry.
OTHER SPACE-RELATED COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES
Although this chapter has focused primarily on
the private sector’s involvement in fields of com-
munications and materials processing, with a less
detailed look at remote sensing and space trans-
portation, it should be noted that the private sec-
tor has several other opportunities for space-ori-
ented, profitmaking activities. Some of the more
important of these activities are discussed below.
Financing Space Ventures
Private banking institutions may have a role to
play in the future financing of both governmen-
tal and nongovernmental space programs. Be-
cause the Government has played the lead role
in developing space systems, the involvement of
private financial institutions has been rather lim-
ited. This is particularly true in the United States,
and it seems unlikely that any significant changes
will occur in the near future. The situation in
Europe is slightly different, in that, though the
space projects are primarily funded by the gov-
ernments, European banks have been involved
in these projects as shareholders and as a source
of loan capital .29
Financial institutions have generally been reluc-
tant to invest large sums of money in high-risk,
long-term space projects of the private sector. As
new products are refined and their value as in-
vestments proved, financing of private space ac-
tivities will become more common. Recently, for
example, financial institutions have been willing
to fund the purchase of satellite transponders be-
cause communications satellites have come to be
regarded as relatively safe and attractive in-
vestments. The cost of transponders (approxi-
mately $10 million to $15 million) is a relatively
29G. Mazowita,  “Space Industrialization, Programs, Policy, and
Private Enterprise, ” Center for Research of Air and Space Law,
McGill University, June  1981, p. 60.
small part of the cost of the satellite, and in-
surance covering both interruption of service and
business loss can be purchased to protect this in-
vestment. In addition, by using sale/leaseback
arrangements, the tax benefits that accrue from
transponder ownership can be sold to a third
party.
Presumably, other space technologies will fol-
low the path that communications satellites have
followed over the last two decades. As these
technologies become more reliable and new fi-
nancial arrangements allow the burden of their
cost to be spread out among more investors, it
is certain that the role that private financial insti-
tutions play in the commercialization of these
technologies will increase.
Though private financial institutions have been
reluctant to participate in space ventures, it is
possible that innovative financial arrangements
such as the R&D limited partnership may provide
funds in this area.30 Basically stated, an R&D
limited partnership is a partnership formed for a
specific purpose, such as the development of a
new product. This arrangement provides impor-
tant tax advantages, in particular that participants
may offset their investment in the R&D limited
partnership against their current income, even if
the latter was derived from an unrelated source.
GTI intends to rely heavily on this mechanism to
finance its JEA with NASA. Should the GTI expe-
rience be favorable, there is no reason why the
R&D limited partnership could not be used to
finance other private space ventures.
.
30
’’ Limited Partnerships: Protits  and Danger, ” cornm~ities,  Vll
(March/April 1978), 46; “Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships,”
/-/arvarc/  Law Review XC (1975), 745-762; “Tax Classification of Lim-
ited Partnerships: The IRS Bombards the Tax Shelter, ” New York
University Law Review Lll,  2, May 1977, 408-441.
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Insurance
The industrialization of space will open up a
new market for the insurance industry. As the
number and variety of space activities increase,
new methods of insuring against unforeseen
losses will be needed. If such developments are
forthcoming, they will help to make investment
in space more predictable and therefore more at-
tractive to the private sector.31
Presently, there are four basic categories of sat-
ellite insurance available:
l
l
l
l
Ground insurance covers the satellite,
launch vehicle, and related launch equip-
ment until launch attempt or lift-off.
Launch failure insurance commences imme-
diately after lift-off and remains in effect un-
til the satellite achieves a successful orbit.
Satellite life insurance commences when
launch failure insurance coverage termi-
nates. Satellite life insurance protects against
financial damage caused by loss of orbit or
power, or by some technical malfunction.
This insurance can be used to cover the re-
placement costs of the satellite and for eco-
nomic losses arising from disruption of serv-
ice.
Liability insurance is used to compensate
third parties for bodily injury or property
damage caused by the satellite or the launch
vehicle.
The types of insurance mentioned above were
developed primarily with expendable launch
vehicles in mind. The introduction of the shuttle
as an operational launch vehicle will present
substantial challenges to the insurance industry.
On the one hand, the shuttle should increase the
number of insurable payloads launched per year,
thereby providing a wider base over which to
spread risk. This should result in lower insurance
costs and increased participation by U.S. and for-
eign underwriters. On the other hand, the fact
that the shuttle can carry several payloads on one
flight raises serious questions about the effect that
the loss of an entire shuttle might have on under-
writers and insurance premiums. Potential liability
3’Satellite  Communications, “Condo Satellites: Can We Insure
Them?” August 1981, p. 45.
in such a situation could be as high as $100 mil-
lion to payload owner and an additional $500 mil-
lion for third-party claimants.32 The shuttle, there-
fore, introduces costs at a level and of a complex-
ity unprecedented in the era of single payloads
flown on ELVs. Whether the relatively small
group of underwriters who insure ELVs will be
able to handle the entire liability for space shut-
tle operations is an open question.
Hardware sales
Aerospace Industry
The aerospace industry has been the principal
private sector participant in commercial space ac-
tivities. The reasons for this are rather simple. The
aerospace industry has the most complete under-
standing of the advantages and limitations of the
space environment and employs large numbers
of people who are knowledgeable in space-re-
lated technology. Industries that may profit con-
siderably from space technology, such as phar-
maceuticals, electronics, and metallurgy, are
reluctant to invest in R&D projects that require
knowledge, personnel, and support facilities that
they do not have.
Another major advantage held by the aero-
space industry is its traditionally close relation-
ship with Government. This relationship has had
two important consequences. The first, which
was mentioned above, is that the industry, often
working under Government contract, has been
able to develop the expertise to deal with the
space environment. The second is that the Gov-
ernment, particularly the military, and the aero-
space industry are accustomed to cooperating
and relying on one another. Most other indus-
tries, however, have little contact with the Gov-
ernment, except in its role as regulator and taxer.
Furthermore, normal Government procurement
practices, in which the aerospace industry is well-
versed, are complex and raise numerous prob-
lems regarding the retention of intellectual
property.
The structure of the aerospace industry also
provides some substantive advantages for devel-
qZAViatiOn  week and Space Technology, Apr. 30, 1979, P. 148;
Contact, “Insurance Coverage in Outer Space, ” December 1977,
p. 5.
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oping technologies such as MPS. This industry is
composed of a few large and essentially non-
diversified companies. This structure is a conse-
quence of an environment where competition is
limited and funds are available to engage in large
but uncertain research projects. The aerospace
industry has frequently been involved in long-
term projects starting with basic scientific research
and resulting ’in innovative new products. This
“long-range” perspective which will be necessary
for MPS development is not characteristic of
many other industries.
New Markets
Until recently, the efforts of the private sector
have been directed primarily to supplying the
Government’s needs for launch vehicles, satel-
lites, and related space hardware. As the user
community for such hardware gradually broad-
ens, it can be assumed that an increasingly greater
proportion of industry revenues will be derived
from nongovernment sales.
The first nongovernment aerospace market to
be developed was that of communications satel-
lites. The private sector revenues from this market
are on the order of billions of dollars, and esti-
mates for future demand suggest even greater re-
turns. Other opportunities for private sector aero-
space sales will flow from the development of the
Boeing inertial upper stage and the McDonnell
Douglas spinning solid upper stage. These two
upper stages will be used to transfer private-sector
payloads from the shuttle to the geostationary
orbit. Yet another area of potential private-sector
revenue will be the sale and lease of multiuser
instrumentation designed for MPS research on the
shuttle (discussed above in ch. 4). Examples of
such instrumentation include the materials exper-
iment assembly (MEA), developed by NASA, and
the metallurgical furnace being developed by GTI
Corp. in a JEA with NASA. This last type of pri-
vate-sector involvement may prove to be quite
significant. When NASA began the development
of the MEA, it anticipated that private institutions
might wish to lease this device to conduct their
own experiments. Similarly, GTI’s development
efforts are predicated on the assumption that a
substantial market exists for relatively inexpen-
sive space-based research facilities.
A recent marketing strategy report, written
under contract for NASA, found that most firms
are unwilling to undertake alone the substantial
expense involved in the product identification,
financing, hardware development and marketing
necessary to commercialize space technology .33
The report suggested that NASA should attempt
to disaggregate this process in order to facilitate
private sector participation in MPS. There is some
indication that this process of disaggregation will
occur as a matter of course, as experience with
MPS grows. The JEA entered into between NASA
and GTI tends to support this assumption. GTI’s
willingness to accept the financial responsibility
for one aspect of the commercialization process
(in this instance, the provision of a valuable
research tool), may provide the incentive for
other firms to invest research dollars in this area.
Small firms, universities, and research organiza-
tions generally do not have the capital necessary
to undertake independent research in space.
However, if the facilities were available at a
relatively low cost, then a broad range of other-
wise unaffordable research might be undertaken.
Ground Support Services
Space technology requires a rather elaborate
network of ground support services and facilities.
As this industry continues to expand, the private
sector will almost certainly play a dispropor-
tionately large part in the provision of such serv-
ices. A few early examples of this trend have al-
ready begun to appear.
The initial placement and subsequent mainte-
nance of a satellite in its proper orbit requires an
elaborate tracking, telemetry, and control net-
work. NASA has previously provided these serv-
ices, but as space activities become more com-
mon, commercial firms could provide them.
COMSAT has already begun to do so. In 1979,
COMSAT established the first commercial facil-
ity for satellite tracking, telemetry, and control
services. 34 The COMSAT Launch Control Center
(LCC) takes control of the spacecraft after lift-off
JJPrepared  by students  of the “Creative Marketing Strategy”
course, Harvard Business School, “Materials Processing in Space:
A Marketing Strategy,” June  1981.
Jdcommunications  Satellite Corp. Magazine, No. 1, 1980, PP. 26
and 33; No. 5, 1981, pp. 9 and 38.
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and injection into the transfer orbit, oversees the
insertion of the satellite into its proper orbital slot,
and then performs the functional checkout. Fol-
lowing verification of proper operation, control
of the satellite is then handed over to the owner/
operator for further verification, testing, and ulti-
mately, operations. The LCC was used for the first
time with the launch of SBS-1 in November 1980.
Another area in which the private sector will
certainly play an increasingly important role will
be in the provision of postflight processing of the
shuttle. Currently, NASA, using more than 25 in-
dividual contractors, is responsible for shuttle
processing; it has, however, recently invited in-
dustry to bid on a contract to perform this func-
tion.35 The company chosen would be responsi-
JSAViatlOn week ancf Space Technology, “Shuttle Contracts TO
Be Let to Industry,” Nov. 2, 1981, p. 51; Aviation Week and Space
Technology, “Processing Efficiencies of Shuttle Studied,” Nov. 30,
1981, p. 18.
ble for refurbishment of orbiters after flight for
subsequent missions, checkout and assembly of
the solid rocket boosters, external tanks, and
other shuttle elements, and for support opera-
tions and materials, including maintenance and
facilities operations.
The transfer of shuttle processing to the private
sector is an important step toward commercializ-
ing the entire space shuttle program. As has been
mentioned many times before, industry is reluc-
tant to invest in the shuttle, or any new space
technology, because it cannot accurately assess
the risks and the potential return. As industry
becomes familiar with the shuttle, or other new
space technologies, it will be in a better position
to make the kind of financial assessments which
must precede any major commercial investment.
Chapter 9
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Chapter 9
INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
National civilian space policy is implemented
in a specific institutional framework, one which
has evolved over the almost 25 years of U.S.
space activity. (The evolution of that framework
is described in app. A.) This framework is the
means for accomplishing policy objectives, and
it must be evaluated by how well it has done so
and, more importantly, can be expected to do
so in the future. Is the current institutional frame-
work, which was largely established in the early
years of the civilian space program, still appropri-
ate, given the options for future national space
policy? This chapter will examine this question
and suggest the characteristics of alternate institu-
tional frameworks for the U.S. space applications
effort.
Policy
policy formulation includes, first, the identifica-
tion and evaluation of alternative objectives and
ways of achieving them, and second, the choice
of a particular set of objectives and courses of
action (i.e., policies). Policy implementation is the
application of policies to achieve particular goals.
Although policy choice and policy execution are
closely intertwined, this chapter focuses on the
institutional framework for implementing pol-
icy, not on the mechanisms for policy formula-
tion and choice, which are discussed in chapter
10. What receives attention, rather, are the links
between policy objectives and institutions, and
the difficulties of establishing any one framework
to meet significantly differing or changing objec-
tives.
One qualification to this distinction is immedi-
ately necessary. If the activities of a particular in-
stitution are not tied to some set of externally
determined needs or goals, then the internal
needs and objectives of the institution itself—
growth, maintenance, or, at a minimum, survival
—can emerge as dominant influences on policy.
The U.S. space program has not been immune
to this tendency. For example, in 1969 the pro-
posals for a future space program built around
orbiting space stations and a space transporta-
tion system operating in the region between the
Earth and the Moon, with an eventual goal of
manned planetary exploration, emerged from
within the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration’s (NASA’S) manned space flight orga-
nization, not in response to some externally im-
posed goal or objective.
overall, this assessment explicitly recognizes
that the private sector can play an increasingly
important role in space. The present chapter, in
treating Government institutions and public pol-
icy mechanisms, provides some guidelines for
determining the appropriate division between
public and private sector roles in space, and it
considers various methods and incentives to stim-
ulate and support private sector activity, including
potential mechanisms for Government/industry
cooperation or collaboration in space applica-
tions.
In summary, this chapter analyzes issues related
to alternative institutional frameworks for orga-
nizing the Government’s share of the national
civilian space applications program. It does not
attempt to identify a single “best” framework; the
choice of an institutional arrangement is a deriv-
ative issue, one dependent
question, “Best for what?”
CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
—
on answering the
Before alternative institutions are examined, it ernment actor for civilian programs is still NASA,
is important to characterize the current structure although other Federal agencies are becoming
within the Federal Government. The major Gov- increasingly involved in space. Table 20 lists the
241
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Table 20.—Federal Agencies Active in the National Space Effortn
Budget for
space activities
(FY 1982 estimate Significant
Agency in millions) space-related work
Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . $5,916.3 Communications, command and
cent rol.
Navigation, environmental
forecasting.
Surveillance R&D related to
future military applications.
NASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $5,617.3 R&D related to science and
applications; transportation
Department of Commerce . . . . . . . . $126.3 Environmental monitoring.
Remote sensing (in 1983).
Weather satellites.
Department of Energy. . . . . . . . . . . . $38.0 Space nuclear power systems.
Department of Agriculture . . . . . . . . $17.2 Crop assessment.
Monitoring of soil, water, and
vegetation.
Department of the Interior . . . . . . . . $12.6 Surveillance and monitoring of
natural resources.
Mapping.
alt is not ~O~~ibla t. ~r~vlde a separate budget estimate for irltelllgence-related space activities, some of which are included
in DOD figures.
SOURCE: Office of Management and Budget.
Government agencies with significant space-re-
lated activities.
Current NASA Structure
The institution with primary responsibility for
the civilian space program is NASA, created in
1958 in response to Sputnik and mobilized in
1961 to achieve a goal of preeminence in all areas
of space activity, particularly the development of
the (large) technological systems required for the
Apollo program. It is essential to emphasize that
NASA was not designed to conduct routine
operation of space systems that provide services
to public and private users. Instead, operational
responsibilities have been assigned ad hoc:
1. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration’s (NOAA’s) National Environ-
mental Satellite Services (formerly the
Weather Bureau) operates meteorological
satellites, while NASA continues to do rele-
vant research and development (R&D);
NOAA is also scheduled to assume manage-
ment of the Landsat remote-sensing system
in early 1983.
2.
3.
COMSAT was chartered to be the initial op-
erator of communications satellites used for
international traffic; later, the domestic com-
munications satellite market was opened to
any firm that could meet regulatory require-
ments.
NASA operates space launch systems as well
as conducting R&D on space transportation.
NASA’s internal structure has remained basical-
ly unchanged during the past two decades. NASA
headquarters in Washington is responsible for
overall management and technical direction of
the various activities carried out by NASA field
centers (many of which were inherited from the
National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics),
and outside contractors. it is also the focal point
for relations with the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, Congress, and other Federal agencies. The
various NASA field centers are in charge of spe-
cific projects; most of the actual R&D work is per-
formed by private contractors. The Federal Gov-
ernment initiates programs and projects, monitors
technical performance of contractors, and (to
date) has been the primary user of the spacecraft
and launch systems incorporating the results of
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R&D. Some 80 to 90 percent of NASA’s annual
budget goes to external grants and contracts; this
pattern has remained relatively constant over the
years. Though NASA has maintained a substan-
tial in-house research capability, the bulk of its
expenditures have gone to establish an extensive
network of research organizations in industry,
universities, and nonprofit organizations. Table
21 shows the past and present size of NASA and
its support base.
The set of NASA field centers today is the same
as it was during the early 1960’s, except that a
recent reorganization has led to a reduction in
the number of centers reporting directly to NASA
headquarters. Table 22 gives information on the
current NASA field center structure. Because
NASA is responsible for different kinds of space
activities (as well as experimental aeronautical
work), including science, applications, and devel-
opment of technical capability, and because re-
sponsibility for each of those missions and its
associated projects is rather closely tied to one
or more field centers, one of NASA headquarters’
major responsibilities is allocating priorities and
resources. Decisions on policy and program pri-
orities thus directly affect the associated field
centers, and the current structure fosters com-
petition among the centers within NASA’s over-
all program. In this competition, for reasons to
be examined, technology development and
space science and exploration have traditional-
ly been more successful than space applications.
NASA’s institutional base constitutes an impres-
sive national resource for space R&D. NASA’s
personnel, facilities, and contractor support base
provide the means for carrying out challenging
and significant efforts, as Apollo, the space shut-
tle, and Voyager (among many other accomplish-
ments), have demonstrated. As Congress and the
Nation consider future objectives for the U.S.
space program, the resources NASA has already
developed must be considered. If these resources
are not used wisely and well, they will disperse
and will be difficult to reassemble.
Department of Commerce
Space Activities
The Department of Commerce’s (DOC’S) in-
volvement in space dates to 1961, when Congress
directed DOC to establish and operate a meteor-
ological satellite system to observe worldwide en-
vironmental conditions and to report, process,
and apply data obtained by this system. This
responsibility is now borne by NOAA. More spe-
cifically, NOAA’s meteorological satellite pro-
grams are lodged in the National Earth Satellite
Service (NESS) (until recently the National Envi-
ronmental Satellite Service). I n November 1979,
NOAA was also assigned responsibility for operat-
ing the U.S. land remote-sensing satellite systems,
beginning with Landsat-D, in 1983.
Through the years NASA and NOAA have
worked closely together to improve the Nation’s
ability to observe Earth from space: NASA con-
ducts R&D, and NOAA operates the satellite sys-
tems once they have been proved. This relation-
ship dates back to the initial TIROS weather sat-
ellites and will continue i n the Landsat program.
Table 21 .—NASA and Its Contractor Base
NASA Personnel Personnel at Funds provided to
budget at NASA NASA grantees and contractors,
in NASA field in millions
Year millions headquarters centers a Industry University and nonprofit
1962  $1 ,825 .3 1,641 26,938 $1,030 $50
1966 $5,175.0 2,152 35,903 $4,087 $178
1971 $3,312.6 1,894 31,805 $2,279 $162
1981 $5,537.2 1,658 25,755 $3,746 $361
aJet propulsion Laborato
~ 
is included, although formally it is part of the California Institute of Technology
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and SDace Administration.
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Table 22.—NASA Institutional Structure
FY 1980
R&D
funding
FY 1980
research and program
management funding
FY 1980
personnel
complement
1,658
Name of center
Headquarters (Washington, D. C.) . . . . . . . $ 133.8 $89.5
Johnson Space Center—manned flight
(Houston, Tex.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,347.3 164.1 3,616
Ames Research Center (Mountain View,
Calif.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159.7 87.8 2,212
Goddard Space Flight Center—remote
sensing (Greenbelt, Md.). . . . . . . . . . . . . 548.3 151.2 3,941
Kennedy Space Center—launch services
(Cocoa Beach, Fla.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277.1 133,2 2,291
Langley Research Center
(Hampton, Va.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169.8 114.0 3,094
Lewis Research Center—aeronautical
research (Cleveland, Ohio) . . . . . . . . . . . 168.1 94.8 2,901
Marshall Space Flight Center—space
propulsion (Huntsville, Ala.) ., . . . . . . . . 846.8 155.9 3,646
National Space Technologies Laboratory
(Bay St. Louis, Miss.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 4.9 111
Jet Propulsion Laboratorya-space
science (Pasadena, Calif.) . . . . . . . . . . . 276.5 —
— —
23,470$3,936.6 $995.4
aJpL is f~eraliy  funded but is operated by the California Institute  Of Technology.
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Technology Assessment.
Satellites currently operated by NOAA/NESS in-
clude: 1) polar orbiting satellites with day and
night global coverage and 2) geostationary satel-
lites that provide continuous viewing of cloud and
storm patterns in the Western Hemisphere. In ad-
dition, NOAA was to have been a participant,
together with NASA and the Department of the
Navy, in a proposed National Oceanic Satellite
System; (NOSS) the project, however, has been
indefinitely deferred.
NESS disseminates its data and products within
a few hours of acquisition to a wide variety of
users, the most prominent of which are the Na-
tional Weather Service and the Department of
Defense (DOD). The data are also recorded and
archived by NOAA’s Environmental Data and in-
formation Services. The data from the geosta-
tionary satellites are distributed in real-time to
seven satellite field services stations, which fur-
ther distribute them to a number of users. Mete-
orological data from NOAA satellites are also
widely disseminated and used by foreign coun-
tries.
NOAA integrates satellite-derived data with
data derived from other sources in preparing
weather forecasts and warnings about disturb-
ances on the Sun, in space, in the upper at-
mosphere, and in the Earth’s magnetic field; in-
tegrated data are used in various resource man-
agement tasks as well. In addition to using
satellite-derived data for operations, NOAA con-
ducts a variety of R&D programs which make use
of these data or directly support its space-related
activities.
Other DOC organizations involved in space-
related activities include the Maritime Administra-
tion, which uses satellites to improve the efficien-
cy of ship communication, navigation, and opera-
tions, and the National Telecommunications and
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Information Administration, which is the Federal
agency responsible for policy on the use of the
frequency spectrum and geostationary orbit and
for exploring new applications of telecommunica-
tions technology.
Other Federal Space Efforts
The largest Government space program, at least
as measured by budget outlays, is conducted by
DOD. This chapter focuses on civilian space ac-
tivities; for a description of DOD programs, see
chapter 6. The space programs of other agencies
are as follows:
1. The Department of Energy (DOE) carries out
technology development and production ef-
forts for nuclear-powered electric generators
to be used on long-duration spacecraft suit-
able for planetary missions. DOE has stud-
ied space systems to dispose of nuclear
waste, and makes use of remote sensing data
in support of its responsibilities to seek
energy sources and to site facilities for nu-
clear waste disposal. and other energy-related
needs.
2.
3.
The Department of the Interior (DOI) uses
space-derived data in executing its responsi-
bilities in resource management. The U.S.
Geological Survey, part of DOI, manages the
Earth Resources Observation Systems (EROS)
program, which develops, demonstrates,
and encourages applications of remotely
sensed data acquired from both aircraft and
spacecraft (see app. B on the Bureau of Land
Management).
Other agencies of the Government, particu-
larly the-Department of Agriculture, but also
organizations such as the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, make routine use of space-
derived data (particularly from Landsat) in
carrying out their missions. They do not,
however, participate in space-related hard-
ware development. The Department of Agri-
culture has been a major participant in such
R&D efforts as LACIE (large area crop inven-
tory experiment) and AgRISTARS, and inte-
grates Earth observation data in its crop as-
sessment and forecasting operations (see
app. C on Foreign Agricultural Service),
DIFFERING GOALS, DIFFERING STRUCTURES
There is no single institutional framework that
is “best” for the civilian space program. Rather,
different national objectives in space can best be
accomplished by different institutional structures;
goals and the means to achieve them should be
matched. The three scenarios below suggest the
wide variety of institutional frameworks possible,
and how they are related to various futures for
An Expanded National Space Program
One possibility for the national space effort is
setting another Apollo-like goal, i.e., a large and
challenging enterprise to be achieved on a press-
ing schedule. Several such enterprises have been
suggested over the past few years; most involve
the development of capabilities for routine
the civilian space program: manned operations in low-Earth orbit, now that
l
l
l
. -
an expanded program, focusing either on a
new goal comparable to Apollo or the shut-
tle, or on a variety of advanced applications
projects;
continuation of the status quo; and
further reductions in the Government share
of the civilian space program.
the shuttle has made this location more accessi-
ble for a variety of purposes. Other proposed ob-
jectives include: 1) a large structure in geosyn-
chronous orbit, and development of reusable
transportation to GSO, and 2) solar power satel-
lites. NASA’s current leadership has endorsed the
concept of some form of low-orbit, manned,
space operations center as NASA’s next major
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project, and congressional space committees
have, in general, supported such proposals.1 Like
the shuttle, an orbiting operations center would
be a means to carry out a variety of space appli-
cations and science missions, not an end in itself.
Such a high-technology development project
would require the kind of engineering effort
which current NASA development centers are
best able to provide. NASA’s present institutional
structure is largely a product of the 1961 commit-
ments to preeminence in space, particularly the
Apollo program. One consideration is that the
ability of NASA and its contractors to undertake
a substantial engineering effort will erode with-
out a commitment to such an enterprise. Scien-
tific and engineering talent of the highest quali-
ty is in short supply in the United States. Given
the current shortage of manpower available to
support military and private sector space ac-
tivities, NASA’s personnel will be lured away to
more challenging work elsewhere if NASA does
not soon undertake a major new effort. Some
have suggested that NASA and its technical and
managerial capabilities should be mobilized for
nonspace R&D projects, particularly in energy.
Whether NASA’s technical expertise, prob-
lem-solving approach, and institutional char-
acteristics are relevant to meeting other national
goals requires further analysis, and is outside the
scope of this assessment.
Another scenario would be based on a judg-
ment that the current and potential benefits of
applying space technology justify increased Gov-
ernment investment in applications R&D, particu-
larly in the face of international competition and
foreign government support for applications pro-
grams. Included in this scenario would be Federal
commitments: 1 ) to take the policy and institu-
tional initiatives needed to move from develop-
ment to operations in the public sector, and 2)
to introduce innovative methods to bring the pri-
vate sector into full partnership. There would be
no overriding Apollo-like project to key the na-
tional effort; rather, the program would become
‘Administrator lames Beggs has repeated Iy made this point, and
there is currently a top-level study underway within NASA related
to future space station plans. See, for example, Aviation Week and
Space Technology, July 27, 1981, pp. 23-25.
more pluralistic. Several mission agencies and pri-
vate firms could participate substantially.
Continuation of the Status Quo
Development and testing of the space shuttle
have been the major components of NASA’s
budget over the past few years, and they are likely
to dominate for the next three or four. Partly as
a consequence, there have been few “new
starts” in any program area—science, explora-
tion, applications, or technology development.
Continuation of this situation would reflect a
policy decision that NASA’s major role should be
developing space transportation capabilities for
other users, such as DOD, the private sector, and
other civilian agencies. Activities in space science
and applications would continue, but at relatively
low levels.
The United States probably could not afford to
maintain NASA’s entire institutional base under
this scenario. Although it may be in the national
interest to maintain NASA’s capacity to under-
take a major technology program, NASA as it cur-
rently exists would eventually become outdated.
Certain applications activities, and their associ-
ated centers, might be “spun-off” to the private
sector or the military.
A Tightly Constrained Program
A variation of the preceding scenario with
somewhat the same institutional implications is
one in which no compelling rationale for a large-
scale civilian space program gains acceptance.
In this case, NASA’s size, scope, and mission
would be reduced to a continued but restricted
investigation of potential space applications. Ag-
gressive pursuit of other promising opportunities
would be postponed until the potential payoffs
can justify investment of substantial public re-
sources. One possibility is the gradual retrench-
ment of NASA toward a research and early tech-
nology development organization with close links
to the users of R&D. This restricted range of
responsibilities would be similar to that of NASA’s
predecessor, the National Advisory Committee
on Aeronautics (NACA).2
IFOr a discussionof  NACA, see Arthur L. Levine, The future  of
U.S. Space Program (New York: Praeger, 1975), ch. 2.
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A key issue in all the above scenarios would
be the division of roles and responsibilities be-
tween public and private sectors, and between
NASA and other agencies within the Federal
structure. There are two possible basic alter-
natives, and the remainder of this chapter pro-
vides criteria for evaluating them. These alter-
natives are:
1. NASA could become the civilian space agen-
cy, not just the space R&D agency. In addi-
tion to continuing to do R&D, NASA would
operate space transportation services, the
space segment and initial data processing for
Earth observation systems (weather, land re-
mote sensing, ocean remote sensing), public
service communications satellites, and other
space systems pro bono publico. NASA
would also develop common “in-orbit infra-
structure, “ i.e., platforms, power supplies,
communications and telemetry systems,
construction and servicing capabilities, etc.,
which public and private organizations
could use on a reimbursable basis. In this
scheme, NASA would assist firms in trans-
forming new space applications into profit-
able commercial ventures.
2. NASA could remain limited to an R&D role,
and other Government agencies, such as
NOAA, or private or quasi-private sector en-
tities, such as COMSAT, would undertake
various operational activities. NASA, in this
option, could either: a) conduct an R&D ap-
plications program to advance technology
without regard for its immediate commer-
cial potential, b) concentrate on public good
applications of space technology, leaving it
to the private sector to invest in developing
commercial applications, or c) focus on sup-
porting public and private users. One issue
related to this scenario is the allocation of
responsibility for operating “space utilities”
such as transportation, power, communica-
tions, construction facilities, etc.
In either alternative, more effective instruments
would be required to link private and public sec-
tor users of space technology with NASA, the
central R&D space agency. A tradition of col-
laboration between NASA as an R&D agency,
operators of space systems, and the user com-
munities has not yet developed, but is a necessi-
ty if this alternative is to be viable. NACA, NASA’s
predecessor, had a mixed public-private govern-
ing board representing all interests involved in
aeronautics, both civilian and military. While not
necessarily a relevant model for a “new NASA, ”
this pattern of developer-user linkage proved very
successful in advancing the U.S. position in
aeronaut ics.3
Much of the remainder of this chapter is a
detailed analysis of the institutional issues in-
volved in operating space technologies and in
strengthening coordination between govern-
mental and nongovernmental developers, oper-
ators, and users of space technology.
As the issues relating to commercialization are
discussed in chapter 8, the following will concen-
trate on Government operations, though many
of the issues involved are similar. For the purpose
of this analysis, it is possible to separate the proc-
ess of applying space technology into five distinct
phases, each of which has different institutional
implications. The following sections discuss ge-
neric institutional implications.
1. research and development;
2. demonstration;
3. transition to operational status;
4. operational status; and
5. support of operational systems, including
continuing R&D in an applications area.
After this general discussion, and after analysis
of the international institutional aspects of space
applications in the next section, the last section
discusses the institutional issues specific to each
applications area,
Jlbid.
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INSTITUTIONS FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS R&D
NASA was assigned Government responsibili-
ty for civilian space R&D by the National
Aeronautics and Space (NAS) Act of 1958. How-
ever the act was not specific about NASA’s (or
anyone else’s) role in using or operating the
results of that R&D. In space applications, almost
by definition, R&D is conducted not as an end
in itself but as a necessary step in reducing uncer-
tainties and developing methods for the use of
space systems to provide public or private ben-
efits. Since applications are meant to be used,
the key institutional question is how to create a
productive relationship between performers of
R&D and the ultimate users.
There are crucial differences between R&D
conducted for systems to be operated by the
Government and R&D for those to be operated
by private firms. In particular, R&D for commer-
cial applications must be influenced by considera-
tions of eventual profitability.4 However, there
are also important common elements, particularly
with respect to the relationship between user and
developer. In the space sector, NASA has from
the start (with the exception of launch services)
been confined to R&D. This limitation, reinforced
by the fact that NASA attracted in its early years
engineers oriented towards advancing the fron-
tiers of knowledge and technological capability,
and the institutional culture derived from missions
such as Apollo and planetary exploration, have
certainly influenced NASA’s applications efforts.
NASA has developed an orientation towards
“technology push” efforts. This orientation
militates against being responsive to potential
operators and users of space technology, who ex-
ercise “demand pull” on the directions of space
applications development.
NASA, particularly in its early years, inevitably
put more stress on advancing the technological
frontier than on developing technology in re-
sponse to user demands (which were virtually
nonexistent) or in anticipation of the kinds of
demands likely to arise. As the practical uses of
the new technologies began to take shape, how-
4This distinction is well-made in Peter House and David Jones,
Geftirrg  It tithe  She/f (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1977), chs.
3-5.
ever, NASA continued to emphasize the develop-
ment of more sophisticated applications technol-
ogy rather than bringing adequate applications
systems into early operation. This is in part a
reflection of the reality that, once NASA com-
pletes R&D for an applications program, it must
transfer it to some user outside of the agency.
Consequently, the organization tends to hold on
to programs, even if that means prolonging the
R&D phase beyond the optimum point. The
Landsat program, which many users have been
treating as if it were already operational, is a case
in point.
In recent years, NASA has put a higher priori-
ty on developing closer relationships with poten-
tial operators and users of space technology, par-
ticularly in remote sensing and advanced satellite
communications. The management structure
which had been adopted for the now-canceled
NOSS gave NASA a central R&D role in bringing
the demonstration system into being, but in-
volved users, particularly from other Federal
agencies, in management committees at three dif-
ferent levels of program operation. Figure 15 il-
lustrates the NOSS management structure; it
seems that a similar structure might be ap-
propriate in other applications areas.
Such a structure links R&D managers with users
and provides a setting for resolving differences
in priorities, technical requirements, and budg-
etary commitments among involved participants.
Few space applications R&D projects serve a
single set of user requirements, and few will in-
volve only NASA in their conduct. Thus a man-
agement structure for future application programs
in which developers, operators, and users are
linked from the start appears an improvement
over past management practices in, for example,
the Landsat program.
There is an unavoidable tension between the
developers of a new technological capability and
those who hope to use it. The most frequent fail-
ure in Federal R&D programs is inadequate at-
tention to the realities and needs of eventual users
in the planning and earliest research phases of
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Figure 15.–Management Structure of NOSS
I
a programs Engineers prefer to work in an en-
vironment where the only constraints are tech-
nological. In addition, the resources provided for
planning an R&D project, as opposed to conduct-
ing it, are often inadequate. As R&D is being
planned, users should participate in identifying
specific applications, the environment in which
they must operate, and the economic factors that
will constrain an operational system. None of
these factors has been given priority in NASA’s
applications programs until recently; rather, new
technological opportunities have been the driv-
ing force in R&D planning.
Space activities are justified by a variety of ra-
tionales. But to the degree that space applications
are justified by their potential benefits, there
‘Norman McEachron,  et l l., Management of Federal R&D for
Commercialization, report from SRI International to Experimental
Technology Incentives Program, Department of Commerce, 1978,
p. IV-28.
should be careful attention to the costs of oper-
ating a system. R&D serves in large part as a
means of reducing uncertainty, but reducing cost
and performance uncertainties may be just as
crucial as reducing technical uncertainties. Cer-
tainly the benefit calculus will be different for
public and private applications, since Govern-
ment is not concerned with showing a profit. [f
a service can never be profitable, but society
needs it, then it is Government that propwly pro-
vides such a service. Even for public services,
however, operating costs must be a continuing
focus of concern throughout an R&D effort.
The LACIE program provides an example of
such problems in the space applications area.6
These problems can be avoided if developers
work closely with users in guiding an R&D proj-
Wt.
%eneral  Accounting Office, Crop Forecasting by Satellite: Prog-
ms and Pro6&ms, GAO Report, PSAD-78-52,  Apr. 7, 1978.
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If the R&D is in an area intended for eventual
commercialization, then market analysis needs
to be incorporated even at early stages in the R&D
effort. The total range of users, their current pat-
terns of operation, and the ways in which a new
application might modify those patterns need to
be identified. The likelihood that services or prod-
ucts can be produced at a cost acceptable to pri-
vate purchasers needs to be estimated, and these
estimates refined during the life history of the
R&D effort. In this way, R&D intended for com-
mercial application will be guided by private sec-
tor considerations from its inception.
In summary, then, the R&D phase of space ap-
plications activities needs to incorporate sub-
stantially more planning for eventual application
than has been the case with NASA’s past applica-
tions programs. Users must be significantly in-
volved, without stultifying the creativity of re-
searchers. Some means of resolving inconsisten-
cies among user needs is required. Cost perform-
ance as well as technical performance must be
borne in mind throughout the R&D process. In
areas of new applications, the R&D project
should be designed to give early and concrete
evidence of specific benefits and the ways in
which they will assist various classes of users. The
kind of management structure which had been
planned for the NOSS program might provide
many of these features for public sector uses;
commercial activities require market analysis and
private sector involvement.
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS
The primary goal of an R&D program is to re-
duce uncertainties about the technical charac-
teristics of an application opportunity. By con-
trast, a demonstration project is intended to il-
lustrate the performance of a new technological
capability in a realistic operating environment,
in order to provide the information which poten-
tial operators need to bring that new technology
on line. When an R&D program provides evi-
dence that a new technology is likely to be com-
mercially viable, potential private sector operators
can undertake their own demonstration. But
when the R&D program does not provide clear
evidence, or when the benefits have a mixed
public/private character, then the Government
must subsidize at least part of the demonstration
phase.
Failure to recognize and adjust to the dif-
ferences between the R&D and demonstration
stages is a likely source of difficulty in bringing
new applications into being; it is very difficult to
combine R&D and demonstration efforts in one
undertaking.
It is possible to specify characteristics linked to
the success of a demonstration project in pro-
viding the information to decide whether to take
a new technology to operational status.7 Those
characteristics include:
1. A technology we//in hand. Demonstration
projects are not laboratories for resolving
technological problems; rather, a successful
demonstration project concentrates on pro-
viding information on the nontechnology-re-
Iated characteristics of a new capability.
Thus, demonstration projects should not be
initiated prematurely, while major techno-
logical uncertainties remain.
2. Cost and risk sharing between developer and
potential operator. If the demonstration proj-
ect is a marketing tool to demonstrate to po-
tential users the operating characteristics of
a new technology, but these users are not
included in planning or, where feasible, in
sharing the costs and risks of the demonstra-
tion project, it is unlikely that the project will
be responsive to the users’ need for infor-
mation.
3. Congruence with technology delivery sys-
tem. In order to bring a new technology into
*
7Walter Baer, Leland Johnson, and Edward Merrow, Ana/ysis of
Federa//y-Funded Demonstration Projects, report from Rand Cor-
poration to Experimental Technology Incentives Program, Depart-
ment of Commerce, 1976, p. v,
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4.
5.
being there must exist some way to translate
a technological possibility into an operating
reality. The demonstration project should be
organized to reflect the specific character-
istics of such a “technology delivery sys-
tern. ” When the technological capability
does not match existing manufacturing or
utilization patterns, particular care is needed
to consider how those patterns might be
affected.
Inclusion of all elements needed for opera-
tion. Successful demonstration projects
should include in their planning and execu-
tion: potential operating organizations, po-
tential users of a new technological capabili-
ty, manufacturers of the systems in which the
R&D result will be embedded, potential reg-
ulators, and other target audiences.
Absence of tight time constraints. Demon-
stration projects which face tight time and
budget constraints are less likely to provide
the necessary information needed for an op-
eration decision.
The demonstration phase has proven to be a
crucial step in translating R&D work into suc-
cessful operating systems; experience in the
defense sector (“fly before you buy”), for exam-
ple, confirms this observation. The role of a sep-
arate demonstration phase is an area of both
policy and program uncertainty in recent space
applications efforts, and this uncertainty needs
INSTITUTIONS FOR SPACE
Properly speaking, the next topic should be the
institutional issues related to making the transi-
tion from demonstration of a new application to
its incorporation in operational systems. How-
ever, it makes little sense to discuss institutional
alternatives for this transition phase without some
prior discussion of “transition to what?” In ad-
dition, there are important differences between
a space application operated by Government,
and one in the private sector. Therefore, this sec-
to be resolved in order to make the Federal R&D
effort in applications more likely to pay off. In par-
ticular, NASA has not been able to secure the
budgetary resources or political support required
to conduct a demonstration, as defined here, of
remote-sensing systems; rather, NASA has at-
tempted to combine R&D and demonstration ef-
forts in the Landsat program. Earlier communica-
tions satellites such as the Syncom project in the
1960’s and the ATS applications technology sat-
ellite projects in the 1970’s approximated some
of the requirements of a successful demonstra-
tion project, although even in these cases R&D
and demonstration goals were combined. Ex-
perience suggests that operators and users,
whether private or public, are not willing to in-
vest in a demonstration effort because of the par-
ticular characteristics of space activity, such as
high front-end cost and technical uncertainties.
As is implied by the definition of demonstra-
tion project as concerned primarily with nontech-
nical aspects of a new technology, the design and
execution of a successful demonstration project
requires people trained in marketing, manufac-
turing processes, and other aspects of system op-
eration in addition to individuals concerned with
the technical aspects. Planning of a demonstra-
tion project should insure that these capabilities
are included in the project teams. Demonstra-
tion projects managed and staffed by engineers
alone are unlikely to be successful.
APPLICATIONS OPERATIONS
tion will discuss the institutional framework for
making space applications technologies opera-
tional.
Private Benefits, Private Operators,
Government Regulation
If the benefit to be delivered is primarily or
purely private in character, such as point-to-point
telephone or television relay, then private sec-
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tor operators are the appropriate entities for that
application. The Government role in this situa-
tion, once the transition from a Federal R&D pro-
gram is complete, is regulatory in character.
Public Benefits, Public Operators
When a service has an overwhelmingly public-
good character, it is often (though not always)
the case that Government itself operates the
system that provides that service. The social
security program, the census, and military forces
are examples of systems managed under public
auspices. In the space applications area, mete-
orological data closely approximates a pure
public good, and the national Government has
not only developed but operated weather satel-
lites through NOAA.
The major institutional issue related to Gov-
ernment operation of a space applications sys-
tem is whether NASA or some other Govern-
ment agency should operate space systems. The
NAS Act has been interpreted to limit NASA to
an R&D role, but reviews over the past decade
have noted that it is possible, even without leg-
islative revision, to assign more of an operational
responsibility to NASA. Certainly, it would be
possible to modify the 1958 act specifically to per-
mit or mandate NASA to assume an operational
responsibility.
The question of whether NASA or some other
agency should operate Government-owned
space systems depends on whether it is more
desirable to link development and operation in
a single organization, or to separate development
from operation so that each organization has its
own management structure. The major argument
for separating development and operation is the
likelihood that the conflicts between them will
interfere with the ultimate objective of estab-
lishing the optimum applications system. The
characteristics of a particular organization will
determine whether user requirements or engi-
neering desiderata predominate. Users tend to
be conservative, to prefer only incremental
changes from current practice, and to be driven
more by consideration of cost and ease of opera-
tion than by the potential of a new technology.
Alternatively, engineers tend to stress techno-
logical advancement and the development of
new equipment, which may yield an impractical
system.
New technological capabilities are, after all,
only means to accomplishing some set of broader
ends; in the organization of the Federal Govern-
ment, most agencies are assigned a specific mis-
sion, rather than being organized around the
means needed to provide the services they of-
fer. According to this model, space application
systems should not be managed by a “space”
agency but by those who make ultimate use of
the technology, i.e., the mission agencies. An ex-
ample is NOAA’s operation of weather satellites,
which are developed and built by NASA, accord-
ing to NOAA specifications. NOAA in effect
serves as a middleman between the developer,
NASA, and the end users, domestic and interna-
tional. A major problem arises when space sys-
tems, particularly remote sensing, serve a number
of functions and a variety of users. This diversity
makes it difficult to relate these applications to
a single mission agency such as Commerce, in-
terior, or Agriculture.
Arguments supporting a single organization for
development and operations are to a large degree
the converse of those just stated. R&D can best
be made responsible to the requirements of both
ultimate operators and users if a single chain of
command deals with both phases of a project.
Organizations with heavy investment in existing
systems are likely to be unresponsive to new tech-
nologies and associated ways of doing business
developed by “outsiders.” If a technology is
transferred from one organization to another, dif-
ficult problems of changes in organizational loyal-
ty, and disruption of prior relationships with sup-
pliers, contractors, and users, are likely to occur.
The management of applications systems on the
basis of their technological character rather than
the function they perform makes sense, it is
argued, because of the multiplicity of users with
different requirements, and because continuing
R&D can be more effectively incorporated into
existing systems if both are carried out in the same
organizational structure.
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The ideal framework for bringing a new ap-
plication into operation is an effective and
meaningful partnership between developing and
using organizations. In some cases, particularly
where the new technology provides a service that
is not presently provided by established agencies,
and where extensive technical and managerial
expertise is required to operate the system, it is
preferable to retain close ties between developer
and operator. This is clearly the case for launch
vehicles. In land remote sensing, too, it can be
argued that NASA is the appropriate agency both
to develop and to operate a Federal system,
rather than transferring operations either to
another Federal agency (i. e., NOAA) or to a
private firm. (Commercialization of remote sens-
ing would eliminate NASA’s operational role.)
Transferring responsibility to NOAA, as is present-
ly being done, may not be desirable. For manag-
ing weather satellites, on the other hand, NOAA
has the past experience, service orientation, and
close ties to users required for effective opera-
tion. NASA can be of service by acting as “prime
contractor” in meeting specifications set largely
by the user agency.
Organizational Alternatives When
the Benefits Are Mixed
When both Government and the private sec-
tor are major users of a new service, there is a
variety of institutional options. Which alternative
is preferred depends on the characteristics of the
application and of existing organizations, and on
the likelihood that the new application will be
integrated smoothly into the existing institutional
framework. Thus, general guidelines are difficult
to state. The organizational alternatives in this
situation are several. They include:
1. Government-owned and Government-oper-
ated system in which private users of the
system purchase services or products from
Government at a cost which is determined
by Federal policy rather than market forces;
2. Government-owned, but contractor-oper-
ated system in which the Government uses
a large portion of the system’s products but
where the contractor is also free, within
some set of Federal restrictions, to offer serv-
3.
4.
ice to nongovernmental users and to make
a profit on those services;
single privately owned and operated system
with guaranteed Government purchases and
some protection from competition. The
owners of such a system would have the
responsibility for developing and servicing
the private market for the system’s products;
and
privately owned and operated system or sys-
tems (depending on the demand) with open
competition for sales to both public and
private markets and with the prices of its pro-
duct or service determined by market forces.
The criteria for selecting among these alter-
natives are specific to particular applications areas
and thus are discussed in detail in section X11. In
general, the Government-owned alternatives
would be preferable if the Government were, at
least for the foreseeable future, the dominant
user, or if major noneconomic factors, such as
foreign policy or national security concerns, con-
strained the use of the application. Private sec-
tor operation would be preferable when it offers
greater efficiency, more flexibility, more effective
linkages to various user communities, and where
the economic incentives for a private operator
are strong enough to ensure that the new applica-
tion gets a fair test as an operational system, Any
choice among these alternatives is likely to be
controversial, and dependent in large part on po-
litical philosophy and the specifics of a particular
situation.
A comparison of prior efforts to establish opera-
tional systems is important in analyzing institu-
tional alternatives. (This comparison is limited to
domestic entities at this point; section Xl contains
analysis of the experience of international entities
such as INTELSAT and INMARSAT.) In the space
area, the most significant institution created so
far has been COMSAT; this experience is ana-
lyzed in some detail in chapter 8. What is rele-
vant here is to recognize that COMSAT was cre-
ated for a combination of political as well as
economic reasons. One strong motivation was
to avoid granting a monopoly in international
sateliite communications to AT&T. However,
there was a recognition that satellite communica-
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tions could be a private profit-making venture.
Thus, the majority of Congress in 1962 thought
it inappropriate to create a Government-owned
entry in the communications business, and pre-
ferred to establish a private alternative. COMSAT
originated out of a desire to move quickly to an
international communication system based on
satellites; it is only in the past decade that
COMSAT General, a subsidiary of the basic
COMSAT organization, has begun to seek domes-
tic market opportunities in other areas of space
applications. COMSAT General can be seen as
a typical private sector firm seeking to maximiz-
ing return on its investor’s funds, rather than an
organization with its origin in Government policy.
There was substantial organizational innovation
in establishing a private nuclear industry, and
some of this experience may be relevant to space
applications. A number of major facilities, requir-
ing large amounts of capital investment, were
created; an example is uranium enrichment
plants. These multibillion-dol lar facilities were de-
veloped by the Government, and now are Gov-
ernment-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO)
entities that sell enriched uranium to private
nuclear operators while also providing fuel for
the Government’s atomic programs. In addition,
a number of the major energy laboratories in the
United States, such as Oak Ridge National
Laboratory and Los Alamos Laboratory, are
operated under Government contract by private
entities as diverse as Union Carbide and the
University of California. This kind of organiza-
tional flexibility in the energy sector may be ap-
propriate in space applications as well.
A major argument for getting space applications
operations away from Government- owned and
operated structures is that the bureaucratic
rigidities of the public sector are a major hin-
drance to systems which are servicing both public
and private markets. In addition, the character
of the civil service system, the need for annual
or frequent authorizations and appropriations to
cover operating expenses, and the desire to keep
the direct Federal payroll as small as possible all
lead to the frequent selection of a private sector
operator to provide a service with mixed pub-
lic/private characteristics.
Apparently, other countries find that the flex-
ibility needed for developing markets for space
applications is likely to be found outside of the
formal government framework. For example, the
European Space Agency has created a quasi-
private entity called Arianespace to be the
marketer and operator of space Iaunch services
using the recently developed Ariane booster.
There are 50 investors, ranging from major banks
and aerospace firms to various European govern-
ments, particularly the French; formally, Ariane-
space is a French corporation. While Arianespace
is charged with operating and marketing space
launch services, the European Space Agency, an
intergovernmental organization, remains in
charge of further development of the Ariane
launch system. The French are organizing a sim-
ilar quasi-private organization called Spotimage
to market the products of the French remote-
sensing satellite SPOT. The major point is that the
Europeans perceive that the competitive activities
needed to make their launch vehicle and remote-
sensing programs successful are better performed
outside of government, though closely linked to
government programs. It should be noted that
both Arianespace and Spotimage will be heavily
subsidized by their government sponsors; thus
it will be very difficult to get an accurate evalua-
tion of their economic viability. (For detailed dis-
cussion see ch. 7.)
TRANSITION FROM DEVELOPMENT TO OPERATIONS:
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
The transition from R&D to operations is per- see immediate returns on the investment in space
haps the most difficult policy/institutional chal- technology which the United States has made
Ienge for space applications. Understandably, over the past two decades. Policy makers are
both Congress and the executive branch wish to aware of the extensive benefits predicted for
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space technology, and they exert pressure on the
Federal space community to accelerate the de-
livery of those benefits. NASA, desiring to con-
tinue its applications R&D program, is strongly
motivated to emphasize the great potential of
space applications and to suggest that continued
R&D is required to investigate current and future
applications fully. The impression that space ap-
plications benefits are “just around the corner”
is enhanced by the apparent (in retrospect) ease
with which the transition from R&D to operations
was made in satellite communications. The out-
look for other technologies is more complex,
however.
Communications satellites provided more ef-
ficient means of performing a well-established
function. Once the advantages of communica-
tions satellites were demonstrated for a few coun-
tries already linked by other means of long
distance communication, it was relatively straight-
forward to expand satellite communications to
other countries and to other related activities.
Other space applications, however, such as land
remote sensing, are not substitutes for existing
technological systems; rather they offer new op-
portunities for which established users and opera-
tional entities do not exist. Thus, a key to a suc-
cessful transition is to identify and aggregate
users; Government institutions to perform this
task are not well developed.
Another important consideration is to initiate
the operational system at a time when the user
community is ready for it, not prematurely. A will-
ingness to make investments with long-term pay-
backs and careful policy and program design is
crucial to a successful transition from develop-
ment to operations.
institutional issues are different when the op-
erator is to be a Government agency or an enti-
ty operating under Government contract, and
when the intended operator is a private-sector,
profit-oriented organization. Each of these cate-
gories will be treated separately in the discussion
which follows.
Transition to Government Operations
Ideally, the eventual operator would be iden-
tified when the R&D project aimed at investigat-
ing a particular application was initiated. In this
way a partnership between the developer and the
eventual operator could evolve throughout the
project. The developer should pay careful atten-
tion to operator and user concerns such as cost,
operating requirements, and reliability. An orga-
nization which is a candidate for operating a new
applications system should have the technical ca-
pabilities needed to understand technological op-
tions, to assist in translating user and operational
requirements into technical specifications, and
to consult with R&D project managers as prob-
lems arise.
These desirable characteristics are more likely
to emerge if the operating entity is identified early
on; if development and operation were com-
bined in a single organization, they would be
more likely to be present. in addition, early iden-
tification of the eventual operator could minimize
bureaucratic conflict over the assignment of re-
sponsibility for operations. Such has not been the
case in past applications efforts, particularly in
the remote-sensing area.
Though it would be desirable, in some respect,
to designate the eventual operator at the outset
of an applications R&D effort, it may not be possi-
ble to do so, particularly if the current policy of
limiting NASA to an R&D role is maintained. The
likelihood of choosing the appropriate operator
is diminished when the application produces
benefits of value to multiple users. In this situa-
tion, it is tempting to wait until the R&D project
is further along to assign responsibilities for opera-
tions, in the hope that the appropriate operator
will become more evident. The history of the
remote-sensing program suggests the problems
in deferring the designation of a lead agency (see
app. A).
By identifying an operating agency early on,
policy makers avoid the problem of having the
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transition plan developed totally within the
development organization; such a transition plan
is unlikely to reflect the concerns of a user-
oriented organization.
Transition From Government R&D to
Private Operation
An important issue in commercializing federally
sponsored research is what Federal actions
beyond R&D, if any, are required to make this
transition. Several Federal incentives are dis-
cussed in chapters 8 and 10 of this report. The
question regarding institutions centers around
whether NASA, or any other Federal agency, cur-
rently has the authority or capabilities to provide
such potentially desirable incentives. Though
there has been substantial cooperation between
NASA and the private sector, this has generally
taken the form of a contract specified by NASA
and bid on by private firms. The new Joint En-
deavor Agreement is a significant move in devel-
oping new patterns of partnership aimed at en-
couraging private sector investment. The Federal
Government, and particularly NASA, is still learn-
ing how to collaborate effectively with business
in fostering commercial opportunities based on
Government-developed technology in all sectors,
not just space. This has happened slowly, given
the traditional adversary relationship between
public and private sectors.
space-based innovation; these include a new in-
vestment authority called a Space Bank or a more
broadly chartered development organization
called a Space Industrialization Corporation. The
provision by Government of investment capital
or other substantial forms of quasi-commercial
support would represent a significant departure
from past Federal actions. Although other coun-
tries (most notably Japan and some European
countries) have provided this kind of support to
their private sectors, it seems likely that given the
strong U.S. tradition of separating the public and
private sectors, and the current trend towards
restricting the Federal Government, that there
would be strong opposition to creating new Gov-
ernment institutions of this sort. On the other
hand, concern for declining American industrial
productivity and the increasing threat of foreign
competition in advanced technology areas could
make such innovations politically attractive.
In bringing the first commercial application of
space technology, communications satellites, into
being, the Federal Government did take a sub-
stantial institutional initiative in creating a
semiprivate designated entity, COMSAT, to man-
age the satellite system. An important issue is
whether similar kinds of institutional innovations
are required in other applications areas. This
question is addressed later in this chapter, par-
ticularly in the following section, which deals with
providing broad-based infrastructure to support
space applications.
There have been a number of suggestions for
creating new Federal institutions to encourage
INSTITUTIONS FOR SUPPORTING SPACE OPERATIONS
An important institutional question concerns
the provision of routine support operations for
public and private industrial activities in space.
Such operations would include reliable and af-
fordable transportation from the surface of the
Earth to low-Earth orbit, and between low-Earth
orbit and other desired orbital locations; con-
struction and maintenance of orbital platforms;
and providing in-orbit power and communica-
tions. it is possible to conceive of some form of
“space utility” providing these common services
to a variety of users, not only industrial but also
scientific and perhaps military.
Should such space utilities be operated by a
private or public entity? Almost certainly, given
the multiple users of in-orbit facilities and of space
transportation, it will be Government that pro-
vides the initial investments to develop these
capabilities. NASA’s plans for a space platform
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or operations center are driven by the eventual
need for routine in-orbit capabilities such as those
just discussed.
The period during which this kind of “infra-
structure” for supporting space operations will
be required is a decade or more in the future.
Thus, it is somewhat premature to carry out a de-
tailed analysis of institutional alternatives. How-
ever, many of these issues will arise in the course
of arriving at an institutional framework for oper-
ating the space shuttle, and the approach taken
to shuttle operations is likely to set a precedent
for other forms of support services. Thus, the fol-
lowing analysis of institutional options for shut-
tle operations is also relevant to other support
systems for space.
There are essentially two ways an operational
space transportation service using the space shut-
tle might be organized. One is to create a desig-
nated private firm, or use an existing firm or con-
sortium, to own and operate space transporta-
tion services for all users (with the possible excep-
tion of the military and intelligence services). The
second is to have the Government operate the
shuttle fleet and sell launch services on a reim-
bursable basis to private sector users, as is the
current practice with expendable launch systems.
Of course, either alternative could face competi-
tion in providing launch services from a U.S. pri-
vate organization or Arianespace.
While routine launches of payloads into near-
Earth or high-Earth orbit now seems like an ex-
ceedingly complex and risky undertaking, there
is no technological reason why these services
could not be provided by a private operator with
sufficient resources and experience. The current
shuttle development and demonstration program
will provide information on costs and experience
with operating characteristics, allowing potential
private operators to evaluate the possibility of
profitable commercial operation. NASA is cur-
rently contracting out large segments of shuttle
management and maintenance to private firms,
and recently invited aerospace companies and
airlines to bid on the provision of a complete
package of services for processing the shuttle for
launch.
The argument that a Government entity should
provide space transportation services is based on
several beliefs. One is that the use of launch vehi-
cles for military and intelligence missions makes
it desirable to keep launch technology under
Government control. Others are that the principal
user of launch services in the foreseeable future
will continue to be Government, and that no pri-
vate sector firm without extensive Government
subsidy would be able to provide the launch serv-
ices Government will require. Another is that fur-
ther Federal development of space launch capa-
bility is desirable and R&D toward this capabil-
ity should be carried out in close conjunction
with current operations in space transportation.
Private ownership and operation of space sys-
tems would give rise to a need for Federal over-
sight and regulation. For a discussion of the issues
involved, see chapter 8.
Another option for providing space transporta-
tion services or orbital support services is inter-
national ownership and management of a space
utility or a common space platform. The analysis
below of international dimensions of space appli-
cations raises this subject briefly.
SPACE APPLICATIONS IN AN INTERNATIONAL
CONTEXT: INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
international cooperation in sharing data from of internationalization. A touchstone for any anal-
meteorological systems and in operating interna- ysis of such suggestions is the successful experi-
tional and communications satellites has proved ence of the International Telecommunications
successful for almost two decades, and thus it is Satellite Organization (I NTELSAT). The United
not surprising that other space applications are States took the lead in 1964 in helping to found
frequently suggested as candidates for some form a multinational entity for using communications
..
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satellites for video and voice transmissions among
various countries; the original 19 signatories of
the INTELSAT interim agreement have grown to
106 owners of a unique international organiza-
tion. The most striking feature of INTELSAT is
that it combines policy management by govern-
ment representatives (for the most part) with the
operation of a successful commercial enterprise
returning 14 percent annually on its owner’s in-
vestment. Thus, INTELSAT provides a seductive
model for other areas of space applications. The
question is whether this kind of international or-
ganization can, or should, be duplicated in other
applications areas.
A brief review of various applications areas sug-
gests the limitations of the INTELSAT model. Cer-
tainly materials processing is in much too early
a stage of development to consider any perma-
nent institutional arrangements, much less a pos-
sible multinational one. This is particularly so
since the most likely path for developing materials
processing applications is through private enter-
prises. Space transportation at this point is an area
of international competition, not collaboration,
and there is no indication that the current devel-
opers of space launch systems will want to oper-
ate them as anything but national public or pri-
vate enterprises. There are some potential new
international dimensions to advanced communi-
cations satellites, such as navigation and search
and rescue systems, but in general, most ad-
vances in communications satellites are likely to
be incorporated in INTELSAT or INMARSAT. It
is only in remote sensing that the issue of inter-
national institutions is currently relevant, and
most of this section devotes its attention to this
issue. There is also some discussion of the poten-
tial for internationalizing space support services,
particularly large orbital platforms in low or geo-
synchronous orbit.
it has been the policy of the United States since
1969 to make the benefits of the U.S. remote-
sensing program available to all peoples of the
world. At issue now is how best to implement
that policy: through a U.S.-owned and operated
system which makes its own arrangements for in-
ternational participation, or through some form
of internationally owned and operated system in
which ownership is proportional to investment
and/or usage.
The institutional choice is between some form
of international consortium, a la INTELSAT, or
continuation and expansion of the current U.S.
national system. A variation of this latter alterna-
tive would be if the U.S. system were privately
owned and operated, since foreign governments
have a number of concerns related to private con-
trol over remote-sensing operations. Any private
sector operator of remote-sensing systems would
have to operate, with respect to non-U.S. imag-
ing, under a specific set of Government policy
guidelines.
The most important benefit from a successful
international remote-sensing system may well be
political, rather than technical or economic. An
international system could allow participating
countries to have a say in system management;
this feature would be especially attractive to a na-
tion that receives substantial benefits from remote
sensing but cannot afford to carry out such activ-
ities by itself. Other benefits to the United States
of an internationally owned and operated system
would include some degree of cost sharing, some
ability to limit the development of other national
systems and the resultant competition for remote-
sensing markets, and less suspicion that the
United States was appropriating information for
its own purposes, It is also likely that limits on
resolution could be more easily agreed on if there
were a single international system rather than
competing national systems. Finally, effective in-
ternational cooperation for the common good is
desirable in itself, transcending the direct bene-
fits to be achieved from remote-sensing tech-
nology.
Creating this kind of international institution for
remote-sensing operations would not be straight-
forward. It is sometimes forgotten that it took
from 1964, when the interim INTELSAT agree-
ment was concluded, to 1971, when the defini-
tive INTELSAT agreements were signed, to make
the transition from a U.S.-dominated communica-
tions satellite system to a more equitable arrange-
ment.
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Because there are conflicting national interests
related to remote sensing activities, and because
there are private sector as well as public sector
concerns involved, negotiations preceding the
founding of an international institution would of
necessity be lengthy. In addition, the kinds of
problems which have arisen at the domestic level
in the process of establishing an operational struc-
ture for remote sensing are likely to be repeated
at the international level. For example, organiza-
tions as diverse as the Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization, the World Meteorological Organization,
and other, more politically motivated, U.N. or-
ganizations are likely to make a claim for some
share in the control of any new international or-
ganization for remote sensing.
The history of INTELSAT also suggests that the
ability of the United States to influence the direc-
tion and policies of a similar organization for
remote sensing would diminish over time, as the
organization itself matured. In addition, if the new
international organization is successful the eco-
nomic benefits will flow not only to the United
States but to other countries owning and using
the system; the U.S. aerospace industry could
lose its dominant position in remote-sensing tech-
nology as the institution awards contracts on the
basis of international competition. On the other
hand, competition for U.S. systems will arise even
in the absence of any INTELSAT-type organiza-
tion; such an institution could serve to regulate
or forestall the establishment of competitive
systems such as SPOT. Here again, the INTELSAT
experience is relevant; INTELSAT contracts have
been important in the development of non-U.S.
communications satellite technology and launch
system capabilities.
Unlike COMSAT, which is essentially a private
sector organization, most nation-states’ represen-
tatives in INTELSAT are publicly owned commu-
nications organizations. Thus, INTELSAT demon-
strates that it is possible to combine privately and
publicly owned organizations in the same institu-
tional framework. However, a number of issues
related to remote sensing did not arise in the case
of communications. In particular, if an interna-
tional entity were initially based on a U.S. system
owned and operated by a private firm, it is not
clear how the current policy of open access to
data could be maintained, while at the same time
the economic interests of the private entity were
protected. There are clearly tensions between the
current policy goal of commercializing U.S. re-
mote-sensing operations and the preceding argu-
ment that international institutions might well
operate a remote-sensing system.
Previously there was discussion of a possible
space utility to provide common services required
by a variety of operations in space. This space
utility would be an international entity, where in-
vestment and ownership would be distributed
among a set of regional, allied, or global partners.
Although internationalization of an emerging
space operations utility is not fully explored here,
this possibility deserves continued attention as ap-
plication programs and their supporting infra-
structure mature.
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS
The discussion of generic institutional issues Communications
previously discussed provides a basis for identify-
ing institutional concerns for each of the applica- The primary issue in communications satellites
tion areas treated in this assessment and for sug- is not institutional. As has been discussed in
gesting ways to deal with these concerns. Each chapters 3 and 8, NASA’s major thrust in this area
application area—communications, remote sens- is a proposed research, development, and dem-
ing, materials processing, and transportation-is onstration effort in the 30/20 GHz range. This
examined below from this perspective. assessment has suggested that it may not be nec-
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essary for the Government to provide most of the
funding for the flight demonstration of a satellite
embodying this technology; the private sector
could use the results of related R&D conducted
under the sponsorship of national security agen-
cies as a starting place to mount a demonstration
effort funded primarily from its own resources.
If, however, a decision to continue a NASA
communications R&D effort in the 30/20 GHz
region were made, then this program should be
conducted in close cooperation with both satel-
lite manufacturers and communications satellite
users. In both its R&D and its demonstration
phases, this program might be amenable to insti-
tutional experiments such as public-private cost-
sharing and risk-sharing and to joint planning and
management structures. It may be possible to
move quickly to a demonstration of a 30/20 GHz
system, but care should be taken not to under-
take such a demonstration if R&D is not essen-
tially complete. As has been discussed earlier in
this chapter, attempting to combine the R&D and
demonstration phases is not usually a successful
approach.
If the proposed NASA 30/20 GHz RD&D pro-
gram is initiated, and if it is planned and man-
aged according to the principles discussed pre-
viously, then no additional Federal actions should
be required in order to make the transition from
R&D to operations. If this new capability proves
to be technically and economically viable, pri-
vate firms will incorporate it in planning them for
the next generation of communications satellites.
Remote Sensing
Many of the problems related to the Nation’s
R&D program in land remote sensing result from
the different perspectives of developers and users.
NASA views this effort as one of developing a new
and experimental capability; the various users see
the results of the program as immediately bene-
ficial and have attempted to treat the system as
if it were already operational. NASA has been
caught between carrying out its R&D mission and
responding to users who want to make immedi-
ate operational use of the Landsat system. To
date, users of the remote-sensing system have not
participated significantly in decisions regarding
its status and future. The transfer of Landsat man-
agement to NOAA is designed to alleviate this
shortcoming.
The division of responsibilities between any
future R&D program in remote sensing and the
operations of a working land remote-sensing sys-
tem will have to be negotiated. If, as is suggested
below, NASA is assigned the operational role, this
issue becomes less problematic. If the operator
is another Government agency, or a private firm,
it may be desirable for NASA to perform some
or all of continuing R&D.
Though Landsat has succeeded in providing the
information needed to understand the kinds of
public and private benefits that can be gained
from remote-sensing technology, it has not been
able to provide sufficient information on costs
and on the potential market for remote-sensing
data. Again, this is largely because the program
has been run as an R&D, rather than a demonstra-
tion, effort. One heritage of the “Apollo-era”
NASA is a desire to control most or all of a system
development process, emphasizing its research
and engineering aspects, rather than to share con-
trol with other entities, including other Federal
agencies. This tendency has been noted for the
initial Landsat and Seasat programs, and it seems
characteristic of the Landsat-D effort as well.
Landsat-D involves the first use in orbit of an ad-
vanced sensor called the thematic mapper, the
characteristics of which are not well enough
known to consider it an operational system.
The prospects for successfully achieving the
quite different objectives of a NASA R&D pro-
gram and a NOAA demonstration program within
this single flight effort seem limited. Most of the
principles for a successful demonstration effort
presented previously have been violated in put-
ting together the plans for Landsat-D. Users have
not been closely involved in planning the pro-
gram; there is a poor match between the charac-
teristics of the advanced sensors to be flown on
Landsat-D and the needs of the existing or poten-
tial user community for remote-sensing data; and
a fair degree of tension exists between NASA and
NOAA on account of their differing objectives for
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the program. In addition, technical problems with
the thematic mapper have made the effort even
more of a development rather than demonstra-
tion undertaking.
Undoubtedly there is a tradeoff between sepa-
rating the development and demonstration
phases, and the high cost of flying a fully qualified
space system at least twice, but the increased
assurance of accomplishing program objectives
makes such an investment worthwhile. The Land-
sat program has not been planned with a clear
understanding of the requirements of bringing an
innovative new technology into operation. In ad-
dition to the problems of incorporating a new
way of doing things into existing patterns, Land-
sat has exacerbated rather than minimized institu-
tional conflicts and differences of perspective af-
fecting operator and user acceptance of the new
technology.
It is probably too late to remedy some of the
basic flaws in the design of the Landsat effort.
Rather, there should be an attempt to recognize
the institutional, funding, and programmatic con-
straints under which the Landsat-D effort now
operates, and to determine whether those con-
straints can be modified in order to reflect a more
balanced approach to development and demon-
stration of a new technology. The issue of the in-
stitutional framework for an operational remote-
sensing system has been controversial for almost
a decade now. There has been extensive analysis
both by the executive branch and by Congress;
the full range of that analysis will not be reviewed
here. This discussion will be limited to applying
general principles provided previously to current
proposals for operational remote-sensing systems.
The key policy issue in choosing an institutional
framework is whether the benefits derived from
remote sensing are primarily public or private;
the available evidence suggests that they are a
mixture of both. Because Landsat has been run
as an R&D program, and because the prices of
Landsat data have been heavily subsidized, the
market for data from an operational but more ex-
pensive system is not well defined.
The process of moving remote sensing from
R&D to commercial operations has been under-
way for 3 years now. The current transition plan-
ning has been plagued by external and internal
difficulties. NOAA, the Government agency re-
sponsible for the transition, has not been given
the resources to acquire the technical and eco-
nomic capabilities needed to deal effectively with
NASA, the present operator, or with eventual
operators and users, public and private. The lack
of budgetary and institutional commitment to the
commercialization of remote sensing has pre-
vented potential private sector operators from
taking the Government’s efforts very seriously.
Recently, COMSAT General proposed to as-
sume ownership and operation of NOAA’s mete-
orological and remote-sensing satellites.8 The
prospects for such takeover depend on the bai-
ance between public and private markets for
Earth observation data. Certainly the established
market for meteorological data is governmental
in character, and presumably the Government
would contract to buy those data from the pri-
vately operated system and to make it available
as a public good, if the COMSAT proposal were
adopted. There is also a large public sector mar-
ket for remote-sensing data at the Federal, State,
local, and international level, and presumably the
Federal Government would also purchase the
data needed to serve the public market from
COMSAT. If these two public markets turn out
to form an overwhelming share of the total de-
mand for Earth observation data, then the
COMSAT proposal should be approved if it
would provide significant efficiencies in operating
performance and cost. An alternative to the
COMSAT proposal would be that a Government
agency operate remote-sensing systems and
make their outputs available to the private sec-
tor at a cost reflecting, for example, the marginal
cost of obtaining and reproducing the data or
some attempt to recoup system development ex-
penses,
If, however, the Government market for mete-
orological and/or remote-sensing data were rela-
tively soon to become a minor share of the total
demand, then the COMSAT proposal would be
better understood as an innovative and aggressive
institutional initiative on the part of a private firm,
8Klaus  Heiss, “New Economic Structures for Space in the
Eighties,” Astronautics artd Aeronautics, january  1981, pp. 19-21.
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whose risks are minimized by guaranteed public
purchases, but not totally eliminated. A major
issue would be whether the Government should
attempt to recoup any of the R&D and system
development costs that made a private venture
in remote sensing possible. The alternative is to
view the sunk costs as an appropriate Federal
stimulus to private sector activity. Access to
remote-sensing products by non-U.S. users would
be another area of concern. Provision would
have to be made to ensure that private, profit-ori-
ented operation (whether by COMSAT or in some
other form) is compatible with the current U.S.
policy of unrestricted access to all available data.
In addition, a national remote-sensing system
which is privately operated may not be compati-
ble with eventual internationalization of remote-
sensing efforts.
If the current policy of early commercialization
of remote sensing were modified or reversed, it
might be preferable to have either NOAA or
NASA operate remote-sensing systems. The anal-
ysis in this chapter suggests that NASA would be
a better choice than NOAA as an operating agen-
cy, since remote-sensing technology is still evolv-
ing rapidly and the existing relationships between
the users and NASA form a basis for continua-
tion and expansion.
Materials Processing
The research effort that might lead to wide-
spread use of space for processing or manufac-
turing is still in its early stages. Much more basic
and applied science is required before a wide
range of specific applications can be tested. Thus
the materials processing program provides the
best opportunity within the current program of
space applications R&D for applying the princi-
ples identified above. Materials processing in
space is an example of a technological opportun-
ity where the conditions which call for Federal
involvement exist—high risk, high cost, long time
to pay back. It is clear that materials processing
makes sense only as a commercial activity, and
thus any federally funded R&D should be planned
with considerations of market and cost in mind.
Innovative policy instruments such as the joint
Endeavor Agreement (discussed in ch. 8) may be
appropriate ways of accomplishing this. What is
crucial is designing the materials processing R&D
effort in ways that consider the likely future oper-
ating environment of commercial activities, rather
than exploring exciting technological possibilities,
while paying no attention to the commercial
potential.
The demonstration phase for most kinds of
materials processing activity is still some years in
the future. However, the McDonnell Douglas/
Ortho Pharmaceutical joint venture experiment
is planning for a flight demonstration in the
mid-l 980’s. The basic technology will be tested
in orbit first; if successful, a separate effort will
to demonstrate that technology in an operating
environment.
This approach to developing and demonstrat-
ing materials processing capabilities seems ap-
propriate for other projects as well. Given that
materials processing must ultimately be commer-
cialized in order to be successful, there should
be continuing strong, emphasis on the involve-
ment of private industy in MPS activity, especial-
ly as the transition from R&D to the demonstra-
tion phase is planned. The kind of risk- and cost-
sharing that currently characterizes the joint En-
deavor Agreement (and is discussed above for
demonstration efforts in the communications sat-
ellite area) should also characterize any further
demonstration of materials processing tech-
nology.
A great deal of attention has been given to the
general question of possible Government initia-
tives to stimulate the transition from the demon-
stration phase to private operations. Two sets of
congressional hearings have been held, and a
proposal to establish a Space Industrialization
Corporation, as a source of investment and other
policy stimuli, has received extensive analysis.g
While this attention to transition planning for
materials processing is laudable, the relatively
early stage of the materials processing program
suggests that it would be premature to select any
particular form of government subsidy for the
post-demonstration transition phase. Much more
9House of Representatives, Committee on Science and
Technology, hearings on Space Industrialization Act, 1979 and 1980.
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needs to be learned from the experience of, for
example, the joint endeavor experiment before
an efficient and equitable mode of Government-
industry cooperation can be identified for materi-
als processing or other new space technologies.
Transportation
Continuing improvement and upgrading of the
space shuttle and development of a truly reusable
orbit-to-orbit transfer stage appear to be crucial
elements of the Federal R&D effort in space trans-
portation. Given its strong institutional capabilities
in space propulsion and vehicle design, NASA
is the appropriate focus for further R&D in this
field. Essential to an R&D effort that serves space
transportation users will be stability and predicta-
bility, so that users can expect to have new
launch capabilities available on schedule and at
predictable prices.
The initial flights of the space shuttle are billed,
correctly, as development rather than demonstra-
tion efforts. However, there is no separate dem-
onstration phase as part of the STS program; after
the initial four flights, the system will be declared
operational and begin to fly payloads regularly.
In reality, demonstration of the operating char-
acteristics of the space transportation system, and
particularly those of the shuttle, will come over
time as the costs of each incremental shuttle
flight, and the potentials and constraints of the
shuttle as a launch system become better known.
It should be recognized, therefore, that the ac-
tual demonstration phase of the shuttle program
is likely to extend beyond 1985, and the infor-
mation needed for private-sector operators to
make an accurate assessment of the potential re-
turns from shuttle operations is unlikely to result
from the early years of the shuttle effort.
The transition to an operational system will re-
quire that, whoever the eventual operator may
be, policies with respect to patent and proprie-
tary information protection, launch assurances,
Government preemption rights, and costs must
be developed. A variety of institutions will have
to evolve, especially those for marketing, insur-
ing, and financing operational launches. The
competition from potential privately developed
expendable launch systems with lower perform-
ance but also lower costs than the shuttle may
play an important role in future private sector
operations. The transition phase is particularly
complicated by the mixture of military, intelli-
gence, and civilian Government requirements,
together with private sector requirements for
space transportation services. Institutions for
resolving these conflicting demands will be
requ i red.
Providing routine space transportation services
is different from operating the three applications
discussed above: transportation services support
operations in space, rather than being integral to
a particular applications system. The issues re-
lated to the operational form for space transpor-
tation services have been discussed previously.
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Chapter 10
POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR ASSESSMENT
INTRODUCTION
This chapter brings together the background,
technologies, and specific issues that are needed
to formulate and analyze policy options. It estab-
lishes a range of policies that maybe considered
i n the light of the analysis in the earlier chapters
of this report and current congressional practice
and suggests a specific policy formulation. It also
assesses the policy options with respect to their
potential effect on existing and future programs.
Frequently, “space policy” is confused with
“space program, ” and a review of “space pol-
icy” might be expected to provide recommen-
dations for new projects. As understood in this
assessment, space policy is the set of guidelines
which establishes the goals and the institutional
framework for the civilian space applications pro-
gram and broadly defines its implementation. This
definition of space policy includes the types of
measures that are within the domain of legisla-
tive action. Specific program elements or space
systems are not, strictly speaking, “policy” and
are only treated to illustrate the options discussed.
POLICY GUIDANCE: CATEGORIES AND CRITERIA
A number of general categories and criteria
guide the process of formulating policy. This sec-
tion summarizes some of the policies that now
exist and from them develops the categories and
criteria to be employed in selecting possible
future policy options.
National Aeronautics and Space Act
(NAS Act)’
The principal guidance may be derived from
the 1958 NAS Act, the existing legislative authori-
ty for the civilian space program, where there is
a declaration of policy and purpose and where
the functions assigned to the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration (NASA) are speci-
fied. This legislation sets forth the following
general categories of policy guidance:
l Guiding principles or philosophy.—Such
phrases as “ . . . peaceful purposes for the
benefit of all mankind” and “ . . . a civilian
agency exercising control over aeronautical
and space activities sponsored by the United
States, except . . . defense . . . “ provide
broad philosophical guidelines for the con-
duct of the national space program.
INationa/ Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, and
related legislation. Public Law 85-568 (see app. i).
l
l
Goals or objectives. —The specific areas
defined in the NAS Act include a very gen-
eral guide to the scope of the U.S. space pro-
gram, e.g., “expansion of human knowl-
edge . . . , “ “improvement of . . . aeronau-
tical and space vehicles,” “development
and operation of vehicles capable of carry-
ing instruments . . . and living organisms
through space, “ “long-range studies of the
potential benefits of . . . aeronautical and
space activities, “ “preservation of the role
of the United States as a leader . . . ,“
“making available to agencies . . . con-
cerned with defense . . . discoveries (by
NASA, and vice versa),” “cooperation . . .
with other nations, ” “ground propulsion
systems R& D,” “ . . . development of ad-
vanced automobile propulsion systems, ”
and “ . . . research . . . to alleviate and
minimize the effects of disability. ”
Organization.–The act specified formation
of a new agency, NASA, and a new coordi-
nating body, the National Aeronautics and
Space Council (which no longer exists–see
ch. 3 and 9). It did not specify the internal
organization of NASA, but did name the
members of the Council. Several executive
level positions were specified for NASA, in-
cluding an Administrator, a Deputy Ad-
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ministrator, and seven Associate Adminis-
trators.
l Functions.—Both the Space Council and
NASA were given specific functional respon-
sibilities. The Council was charged with: de-
veloping a comprehensive program of aero-
nautical and space activities; responsibility
for the direction of major aeronautical and
space activities; providing for cooperation
between agencies; and resolving differences
on aeronautical and space matters. In ad-
dition, the act specified that NASA would
plan, direct and conduct aeronautical and
space activities, use the scientific communi-
ty, disseminate widely the knowledge it
gained, and conduct R&D in specific areas.
l Budgets or resources. —An annual authoriza-
tion and appropriations process was re-
quired, with no special multiyear features
for longer term programs and no guidance
about appropriate levels of support.
COMSAT Act and Related Legislation
The “Communications Satellite Act of 1962”
(Public Law 87-624)2 was an innovative policy
step that recognized the rapidly growing poten-
tial of space platforms for communications serv-
ices as well as the need to clarify the institutional
setting for providing these services. it created a
new, for-profit corporation, the Communications
Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), to act for the
United States in establishing an international,
commercial, communications satellite system. It
also clearly affirmed that NASA would cooperate
with COMSAT in research and development
(R&D) and provide reimbursable launch and asso-
ciated services.
The intent of the legislation, inter alia, was to
move rapidly toward establishing such a system
and to remove some of the ambiguities and un-
certainties about the possible role of other firms,
especially AT&T, that could have entered the in-
ternational satellite communications picture.
There was a clear intent to have a single global
system. This was largely for technical reasons: at
the time the most likely system involved large
‘Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Public Law 87-624, 87th
Cong., H.R. 11040, Aug. 31, 1962.
numbers of medium-altitude satellites that, as
they moved in their orbits, would periodically
enter and leave the fields of view of the many
ground antennas sending and receiving signals
through the system. The difficulties of managing
multiple systems, each involving many moving
satellite repeaters and the consequent high prob-
ability of overlapping and interfering signals,
made a single system appear a necessity. How-
ever, experiments with synchronous-orbit plat-
forms soon demonstrated the desirability of using
high-altitude repeaters for the system, making
multiple systems technically more feasible. There
were also strong political reasons to favor a single
multinational system dominated by the United
States. In addition, the financial and managerial
efficiencies of a single system were significant.
Hence, the momentum for a single global system
was sufficient to preserve the initial international
organization that was established, INTELSAT, and
more recently, to extend the concept to marine
communications via a similar structure,
INMARSAT. 3 Congress again acted to designate
COMSAT to act as the U.S. participant in the
INMARSAT system.
Other Legislative Measures
When the NAS Act was enacted in 1958, the
nature and scope of the Nation’s future space ac-
tivities were only dimly visible. In more recent
legislation, such as in the energy field (where the
technologies are better known and Congress is
very familiar with the institutions), the relevant
legislation has been significantly more detailed
and broader in scope. While the wisdom of a de-
tailed specification of internal agency structure
and specific programs is open to considerable de-
bate, this recent practice suggests that similar
measures may properly be considered in this
analysis. For example:
l Technology-specific goals or objectives. —
In the energy field, Congress has mandated
that certain particular technologies be de-
veloped:A electric vehicles, ocean thermal
acommunjcatjons Sate//jte Act of 1%2, Amendment: International
Maritime Satellite Communications Act, Title V, Public Law 95-564,
approved Nov. 1, 1978.
qExamples include: Solar Energy Research, Development and
Demonstration Act of 1974, Public Law 93-473, Oct. 26, 1974; Geo-
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electric Conversion (OTEC) systems, photo-
voltaic systems, and magnetic-confinement
fusion (using Tokamak devices). A compara-
ble action in the space field might be to
specify the development of a solar-electric
propulsion system or a synchronous-orbit
storm warning system. These examples of
congressional “policy” setting come very
close to being program definitions. At the
beginning of this chapter, it was stated that
such program definition would not be con-
sidered except as part of a larger policy
framework. It must be recognized, however,
that there may often be pressures to include
specific technological directions in new
space policy measures, and that such action
is not inconsistent with the pattern set in
other high-technology areas. At the very
least, it is essential to consider the policy im-
plications of mandating particular projects,
including the effects on institutional struc-
tures, public-private relations, and the bal-
ance between scientific and applications
programs.
Tax and other incentives; loan guarantees. –
Among the policy tools that have been used
to achieve specific goals by affecting the
behavior of individuals and private firms, the
economic incentive has been the most typ-
ical. Such incentives have been enacted by
various methods: 1 ) by adding a tax levy to
discourage, or reducing a tax to encourage,
specific activities; 2) through direct subsidy
(e.g., food stamps); or 3) through loans and
loan guarantees (to students, homebuyers,
etc.). A recent example of this practice in
the energy area combined all three of these
incentives in the Windfall Profits/Synfuels
Corp. packages
One additional example of an economic
incentive deserves further mention—i. e., a
guaranteed price for delivery of a product
at some future time. In some instances,
thermal Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act
of 1974, Public Law 93-410, Sept. 3, 1974; Electric and Hybrid Vehi-
cle Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1976, Public
Law 94-413, Sept. 17, 1976; and Magnetic Fusion Energy Engineer-
ing Act of 1980, Public Law 96-386, Oct. 7, 1980.
Scrude Oi/ Wjndfa// Profits Tax Act of 1979, Public Law 96-223;
approved Apr. 2, 1980 and Energy Security Act of 1979, Public Law
96-294, approved June 30, 1980.
l
where there are several potential strategies
for producing a desirable product, a policy
option is for the Government to guarantee
to purchase a given quantity of the product
at a set price, high enough to provide an at-
tractive rate of return to the risk-taker. In
such a case, the private supplier is respon-
sible for detailed management of the proj-
ect, for the technical choices that are made,
and for the ultimate delivery of the product.
There is limited experience with this ap-
proach, but it does appear to be applicable
to Earth observations, and possibly to other
space applications services.
Regulatory measures. –Economic regulation
(as contrasted with regulation to protect the
public health, interest and safety) has been
employed where the public interest requires
a mechanism to control pricing, entry into
a market, service delivery, and industry
structure. A typical example is the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) oper-
ating under the Communications Act of
1934.6 In addition to carrying out its regu-
latory functions, FCC has recently been in-
strumental in allowing limited multiple en-
try into certain parts of the telecommunica-
tions market. h is necessary to institute some
form of regulatory authority when the nature
of a service makes a monopoly supplier nec-
essary, as was originally true for the Nation’s
long-distance telephone system. In the early
years of the system, the technology that was
available required a single switched system
for long-distance service. As technology ad-
vanced, at first with broad-band microwave
repeater systems, and then with satellites
having broad-band capabilities, the necessi-
ty for maintaining a long-distance monopoly
largely disappeared. Consequently, akerna-
tive commercial systems have been allowed
to compete with AT&T; many of these rely
on satellites. Thus, an advancing technology
that brings about changes in the market
characteristics of the service system may ob-
viate the monopolistic entity. When such a
change does occur, there needs to be suffi-
6communjcatjons Act of 1934, as amended, 48 Stat.  1064, 47
USC 609.
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cient flexibility in the regulatory framework
to permit both open entry and movement
toward expanded competition.
Exemption from other /aws.—ln many cases,
the process of setting public policy requires
that a balance be struck between competing
constituencies, or that different incentives
be offered to achieve similar objectives.
When the circumstances do call for such a
balance, the measures available to the law-
maker include relief from provisions of com-
peting laws. For example, antitrust laws in-
tended to increase competition, and thereby
to provide better products and services at
lower prices to the consuming public, re-
strict monopolistic activities of corporations.
However, in some instances where the pub-
lic interest seemed better served by collec-
tive action than by competition, Congress
has granted statutory exemption from the
antitrust laws. Examples of such exemptions
include the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922,
which allows agricultural cooperatives to
market jointly and to set uniform prices for
their products; the Norris-LaGuardia Act of
1932, which allows collective bargaining by
organized labor; and the Defense Produc-
tion Act of 1950, which grants a limited ex-
emption to contractors who, at the request
of the President, enter cooperative agree-
ments related to national defense. It may be
desirable to grant a similar exemption to in-
dustries that would agree to combine their
resources to develop new space applications
technologies.
Reporting and other special requirements.–
Perhaps the most used policy requirement
that has been adopted by Congress in recent
times is the mandated report. One reason
for these often cumbersome reporting re-
quirements is to oblige the executive branch
to attend to planning in a way that does not
involve significant amounts of appropriated
funds. For example, construction of a spe-
cific system such as a new strategic bomber
is subject to extensive reporting and review
in connection with the large annual appro-
priation required. A more general issue,
such as the strategic posture of the United
States or the tradeoffs among various new
strategic weapons systems, would not nec-
essarily be given detailed attention if a man-
dated report were not required. No mandate
can ensure that the response will be of high
quality, that attention will be paid to the
issues specified, or that the deadline for the
report will be met. In fact, congressional
mandates have been increasingly ignored or
given such cursory attention that their orig-
inal intent has been negated. With the pres-
sures of the congressional calendar making
it difficult for members to oversee the tre-
mendous volume of laws already enacted,
there are many cases of missed deadlines,
inadequate responses, or complete lack of
attention which go without significant con-
gressional objection. This causes the process
to break down even further. Nevertheless,
a mandated report, if properly followed up
and if the necessary resources and time ex-
ist to complete it, can be a useful policy
tool—particularly if it is part of a larger policy
initiative, or if the leadership for ensuring its
preparation is clearly specified.
In addition to mandated reports, there are
several other requirements that may be in-
cluded to encourage greater attention to
overall policy: 1 ) establishing an advisory
mechanism that utilizes relevant expertise
outside of the particular agency or depart-
ment involved; 2) specifying project mile-
stones or “sunset” provisions to be met
before additional authority or budget is pro-
vided by Congress; 3) requiring coordina-
tion with other agencies or with specific in-
ternational bodies.
Additional Considerations
These general areas of policy development pro-
vide wide latitude for responding to the issues
facing the civilian space program today, and for
generating innovative approaches to emerging
questions and future problems. In evaluating spe-
cific options that fall within the general types of
policy, the following questions need to be consid-
ered:
l Is it feasible?—l n this assessment, the term
“feasibility” will be used to imply that pro-
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spective policies are consistent with an ac-
cepted understanding of the appropriate
roles of Government and the private sector,
the separation of powers between Congress
and the executive branch, etc.; in other
words, that the option does not require a
revolutionary change in current practice.
The assumption is that changes that are less
disruptive and evolutionary in character will
have a greater likelihood of serious consid-
eration and possible adoption than more
revolutionary measures, and that the bene-
fits of the civilian space program, however
great, do not justify radical changes in
American institutions and practices.
Is it in the public interest?—The motivation
for making changes to space policy is to
serve the public interest and not just to pro-
mote a particular constituency or industrial
sector. Hence, an additional test for accept-
able policy changes would be (among other
factors): does this change promise greater
public benefit, in lower net costs, better serv-
ices, more rapid introduction of new serv-
ices, a favorable distribution of expected
l
In
benefits, an improved competitive position
abroad, or enhanced national security?
Can it be implemented?–This again is large-
ly a question of judgment in determining (on
the basis of experience or other data) that
a desirable policy change may or may not
be capable of being implemented in the
“real world, ” given practical questions of
timing, cost, depth and extent of previous
commitments, institutional inertia, or an in-
ability to dictate a course of action to other
nations. In such judgments, there will always
be room for debate. Therefore, wherever it
is appropriate in the policy synthesis, ques-
tions of U.S. ability to implement a policy
will be highlighted.
summary, the foregoing discussion has fo-
cused on the major questions that should be con-
sidered in order to evaluate possible policy op-
tions. It has also identified the general classes of
policy initiatives that appear to be relevant to
space applications. The next section will review
the major issues and problems with our current
situation that prompt the search for new policies
and solutions.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
The search for new policy options is stimulated
by the belief that significant new services, and
consequent public and private benefits, could
result from a vigorous exploitation of current and
future innovations in space. The Government
may promote such new systems through policies
that will, inter alia, lower barriers that may exist;
provide new mechanisms for interested parties
to cooperate; and, in general, encourage public
and private investment in space applications
commensurate with the prospective benefits to
society.
In this analysis, we proceed from a basic prem-
ise—that the existing policy framework, which
has served to organize the Nation’s initial efforts
in space, should be reviewed for possible changes
in the light of current and emerging technology,
as well as the more than 20 years experience in
space operations that the Nation has acquired
since Explorer 1. The following factors make the
present a particularly appropriate time for review:
the advent of the shuttle and the conditions of
fiscal stringency that may lead to a reduced ef-
fort in large-scale engineering development for
NASA; the appearance for the first time of signifi-
cant economic competition from foreign coun-
tries; the rapid development of military space sys-
tems; and the prospect of new commercial op-
portunities in remote sensing and materials
processing.
The flaws in our existing policy cannot be attrib-
uted to a single overriding cause. In a number
of ways, it fails to provide the kind of stimulus
and guidance to our national space efforts to en-
sure that the country’s public and private re-
sources are used in the most beneficial fashion.
This shortcoming is highlighted by the fact that
several foreign countries intend to develop their
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own space applications systems, some of which
will be more advanced, and more suited for ap-
plications, than are comparable U.S. systems. The
growing domestic interest in space is evident in
industry initiatives and congressional hearings on
space policy,7 recently introduced legislation,8
the growing number of voluntary space associa-
tions (see ch. 5); and efforts by individual entre-
preneurs to develop private launch systems and
satellites. All of these varying developments
reflect the remarkable maturation of space tech-
nology over the past decade, as well as the great
but unfulfilled promise that further development
offers for delivering useful services, gaining inter-
national prestige, and satisfying the human spirit
of adventure.
Implicit in the concerns of the constituencies
mentioned above is the claim that, compared
with the potential benefits to be achieved, U.S.
investment in civilian space applications may be
misdirected or too low. This claim raises two im-
portant questions: 1) What is the relative impor-
tance of increased public or private investment
in space applications as compared with alter-
native investments (in defense, social programs,
new pIant and machinery, etc.)? 2) What are the
possible benefits or returns, and to what degree
can one ascertain their extent and magnitude?
These issues be will be implicit through the sec-
tions that follow; briefly, we can respond thus.
First, the claim that we are investing too little in
space applications does not imply that we are also
investing too much in other worthwhile areas.
Furthermore, opportunity costs in the public pol-
icy arena cannot be rigorously compared. The
resolution of the annual conflict among alterna-
tive allocations of public resources is necessarily
political, subject to all the vagaries of human judg-
ment, prejudice, and intuition. Much depends on
7Un@d States Civilian Space Poiicy,  hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. H. R., 96th Congress, 2d sess., July
23, 24, 1980, No, 152, USGPO,  Washington, 1980.
BFor example:  The Space /nciustriaiization Act of 1979; hearings
before the Subcommittee on Space, Science and Applications, of
the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. H. R., 96th Con-
gress, 1st Session, on H.R. 2337, May 22,23, and june 26,27, 1979,
No. 47.
9For example: Carl Sagan’s “planeta~  Society, ” which has an
active, informed and rapidly growing membership.
the overall resources available, and hence, on the
state of the national economy and the Federal
budget. To require that investments in space ap-
plications be explicitly compared with other alter-
natives is to apply a constraint that is inappropri-
ate to public policy issues. Nevertheless, in a pe-
riod of fiscal restraint and intense scrutiny of all
Government expenditures, the space program
can expect to have to defend its claim to a share
of Federal revenues, and to justify its programs
by arguing that they contribute to national goals
such as defense or increased industrial productiv-
ity.
This situation is made difficult insofar as many
of the societal benefits are not immediately realiz-
able or are difficult, if not impossible, to quanti-
fy. They include such abstract notions as interna-
tional prestige, national self-image, and incentives
to individual achievements; a single mission or
project is often not easily identified with a specific
set of benefits. For example, the successful flight
of a meteorological satellite does not generate
public attention in the United States. However,
not only do large segments of the U.S. economy
depend on the accurate data such satellites pro-
vide, but other nations around the world are
eager subscribers to this information and see the
United States in a more positive light because of
this service. It is the accumulation of many such
small but significant positive effects that con-
stitutes the sum of intangible benefits from the
national space effort.
Because of the effects of space investments are
derived primarily from many small, though by no
means insignificant programs, it is difficult to sus-
tain public investment at a level and scope appro-
priate to the potential of the consequent benefits.
Partly for this reason it is important to consider
public policy incentives for private sector space
investments that could complement or substitute
for direct public expenditures. Private investment
will occur only if the benefits (usually in the form
of direct profits) to the private investor are rela-
tively assured (i.e., low risk), and are of sufficient
magnitude to be attractive in comparison with
other alternatives. Policy incentives must promote
these conditions while ensuring that the public
and national interest are also served.
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The issues discussed in this chapter derive from,
among other sources, a series of workshops held
at OTA for the purpose of identifying the major
issues or concerns facing the U.S. space program
(table 1, in ch. 3) and suggesting policies that
might be adopted to resolve those issues.
Need for Consistent High-Level
Attention to Space Policy
Current space policy does not translate easily
into a set of specific goals, program areas, or mis-
sion opportunities. Hence, during periods when
there is a national preoccupation with social, de-
fense, or economic issues that bear no direct rela-
tion to the civilian space program, the process
of planning and budgeting for specific missions
may fall victim to lack of high-level attention and
focus. Because there is no current long-term com-
mitment to specific goals (after space shuttle de-
velopment is complete), and because the most
recent presidential statement on space program
goals (by President Carter in 1978)1° was vague
with respect to the content and timing of future
objectives (beyond “utilization of the shuttle”),
annual budget and program decisions have
tended to be made ad hoc. When decisions are
made in the context of annual budget prepara-
tions, they unfortunately are biased by the re-
stricted nature of the forum (primarily discussions
between the agencies with space allocations in
their budgets and the Office of Management and
Budget), and by the tendency to look for short-
term economies, to shrink or limit programs and
future-year costs, to refine and improve manage-
ment, and to fit the program into a budget target.
While these are necessary and important man-
agement considerations, they are not suited to
developing and identifying a creative program or
a national commitment to long-term space pro-
gram goals. For consistent, long-term policy ob-
jectives to be developed and carried out, the
budget process must necessarily follow policy
guidance, and not the reverse. Without such pol-
icy commitments, the annual budget process will
result in mission deferrals, stretched schedules,
and even cancellation of well-developed projects,
Io’’white House  Fact  sheet, U.S. Civil Space Policy, office of the
White House Press Secretary, ” Oct. 11, 1978.
adding up to a waste of scarce resources. All of
these have already occurred in recent NASA
budgets.
The Executive
In the Carter administration, several major in-
teragency reviews of space policy were carried
out under the aegis of the National Security
Council, and in the process a Policy Review Com-
mittee (PRC) for space was established with the
Director of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP) as the chairman. The issues re-
viewed during this period involved principally
space applications and the civilian/military inter-
face, and led to three (classified) Presidential di-
rectives and several public statements concern-
Figure 16.-Civilian Space Budget
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ing: 1 ) assignment of responsibility for operational
satellite Earth-sensing systems to NOAA; 2) transi-
tion to commercial operation for Landsat; and
3) general civilian space policy .11 In the Reagan
administration, the PRC (Space) has been aban-
doned and an independent review of the Carter
administration decisions and other space program
questions is underway (see ch. 6 for a descrip-
tion of the review). One of the principal partici-
pants in this review is the Director of OSTP. In
the 1976 legislation establishing OSTP, the Direc-
tor is given a broad assignment that includes pro-
viding the President with analyses of major pol-
icies, plans, and programs involving science and
technology. Among the priority goals delineated
for science and technology is “advancing the ex-
ploration and peaceful uses of outer space.”lz
OSTP can act as a focus for space policy develop-
ment, provided: 1 ) the President determines that
he wants OSTP to play such a role, and 2) there
are enough personnel and funds available for the
Office in addition to its other responsibilities for
science and technology policy. Currently, OSTP’S
limited budget and staff resources (approximately
$1.5 million in fiscal year 1982 and 11 perma-
nent positions) make it difficult for the Office to
assume a major continuing role in evaluating
space policy.
Despite the efforts of the Carter administration,
two major problems with Executive direction of
the space program have arisen in recent years:
1 ) failure to identify and commit to major new
goals, and 2) failure to implement programs to
accomplish goals already announced or identi-
fied. These problems suggest that the Executive
has been ineffective in focusing its attention on
the space program, because of pressure from the
external environment (such as budget constraints
and an emphasis on national issues that are not
clearly addressed by the civilian space program)
and because of internal difficulties (such as the
administrative structure of NASA, and the deter-
mination to complete current large programs
such as the shuttle). Better procedures are needed
periodically to focus high-level attention on space
program needs, procedures that will fix a con-
I I Ibid.
IZNationa/  Science  and Technology Policy, Organization and pri-
orities Act of 1976, Public Law 94-282, May 11, 1976.
tinuing defined responsibility for developing
space program goals and objectives, reviewing
the plans to achieve the objectives, and iden-
tifying the resources that may be required. This
responsibility would include periodic public pres-
entation of the goals and objectives developed
by the executive branch to Congress for debate
and ratification. A forum for implementing these
procedures could have a broad scope, defined
in detail by Congress, or its responsibilities might
be described by Congress in general terms, with
its detailed structure to be determined by the ex-
ecutive branch.
It should be noted that, in its original form, the
legislation establishing NASA also created a coor-
dinating mechanism, the National Aeronautics
and Space Council (NASC), whose responsibilities
included civilian/military coordination and, more
significantly, development of “a comprehensive
program of aeronautical and space activities to
be conducted by departments and agencies of
the United States. ” The Council was abolished
by President Nixon in 1973 at the same time that
the Science Adviser’s Office was removed from
the Executive Office of the President. The Presi-
dent’s Science Advisory Committee was also
abolished. This now defunct NASC is one exam-
ple of an executive branch mechanism that could
satisfy the needs identified above. NASC’S original
functions and composition should be reviewed
in the light of developments in current technol-
ogy and changes in agency relationships. The
scope of its responsibilities would have to be clar-
ified: would it be limited to civilian programs on-
ly? to the civilian/military relationship? or ex-
tended to include both civilian and military pro-
grams, and private sector activities?
The Legislative
Congress, insofar as it oversees and reviews ex-
ecutive branch agencies and programs and initi-
ates and passes on legislation, is an essential part
of the policy process. Committee hearings bring
forth critical issues for public airing and debate,
and staff papers, investigations and congressional
IJReorganization plan No. 1 of 1973, 38 Federal Register 9579,
Apr. 18, 1973, 87 Stat. 1089, abolished the National Aeronautics
and Space Council together with its functions, and the Office of
Science and Technology, efective July 1, 1973.
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agency reports all contribute to the review frame-
work. In addition, major policy initiatives fre-
quently originate in Congress. The COMSAT
Act,14 for instance, had its origins largely in Con-
gress, though it was well supported at the time
by the president and his advisers.
Congress’ watchdog role, primarily determined
by the yearly budget cycle, often leaves congres-
sional committees at a disadvantage with regard
to setting policy. They can be so caught up re-
sponding to initiatives from the president, that
they are unable to take the time to formulate pol-
icy or to form a long-term vision of national
programs.
In addition, the present committee structure,
in which several different committees have juris-
diction over different parts of the space program,
makes it difficult to consider the program as a
whole. In recent years, there has been no cen-
tral focus in Congress for space matters. The Con-
gressional Space Caucus recently formed in the
House of Representatives may provide an infor-
mal forum for discussion of space program prior-
ities and direction within Congress. Its formation
reflects the concern of some members about the
uncertain direction of the U.S. space program.
Neither it nor policy studies can substitute for a
broader, sustained debate on the place of the
space program in the totality of national objec-
tives, in which all the major actors are repre-
sented.
Institutional
In developing space telecommunications, the
U.S. founded new national entities and interna-
tional structures that would design and procure
satellites, operate the systems, and provide serv-
ices to international users. These measures en-
abled private capital to flow into the system,
resolved Government/private sector relation-
ships, and started the commercialization process
that led to a larger array of services. Many of the
national and international problems confronting
the united States at the time COMSAT and
INTELSAT were established have analogs in the
current situation in remote sensing and in other
140p. cit., Communications !%tellite Act of 1962.
applications areas. For example, there is no clear
guidance regarding the nature of commercial in-
volvement in operational systems, whether exist-
ing or new entities should play a role, whether
Government will purchase services or fly its own
systems, or whether the United States will favor
international competition or a cooperative frame-
work. It should also be noted that today’s circum-
stances have characteristics that are quite dif-
ferent from those encountered in the early 1960’s.
Then, there were no reliable vehicles to launch
competitive communications satellites beyond
those controlled by the United States and the
Soviet Union; there were no real alternatives to
cooperation. The character of the market was
also very different, International communications
was a well-developed business involving long-dis-
tance underwater and subsurface cables, high-fre-
quency radio, and microwave links for short dis-
tances. Government agencies or private concerns
were engaged in supplying services, so that add-
ing a satellite repeater was a relatively straight-
forward step in extending and improving this ex-
isting business base. Customers were identified
and demand was already established, factors
which provided a solid base for the rapid devel-
opment of the space segments—particularly with
the better quality service that was provided.
A major issue therefore is: Are there alternative
institutional frameworks that would facilitate de-
velopment of desirable new space applications
services and overcome barriers that exist, wheth-
er from lack of a clear national policy, under-
developed markets, or other uncertainties? An
associated issue is: Can the private and public sec-
tor roles be more clearly defined to assist in more
effective and timely exploitation of space applica-
tions opportunities? A further question of impor-
tance is: Should NASA be given responsibility to
operate space applications systems?
International
Space activities (outside of short-duration verti-
cal sounding rocket flights), unlike many other
areas of national endeavor, cannot be confined
to the region over a given nation’s territory. Or-
bital flight inevitably brings the space vehicle over
other nations. In the 1967 Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
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tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, “outer space” was
recognized as a nonappropriable area analogous
to the high seas, and hence open to use by all
nations. Policy regarding the well recognized in-
ternational character of space activities was estab-
lished in the NAS Act, where the guideline of
“peaceful purposes for the benefit of all man-
kind” was fundamental to the U.S. program. In
addition, U.S. activities were to be conducted so
as to contribute materially to the following objec-
tive (among others): “Cooperation by the United
States with other nations and groups of nations
in work done pursuant to this Act and in the
peaceful application of the results thereof.”ls
in applications, there are several national con-
cerns that may limit our ability to obtain inter-
national agreements on the development and use
of space systems. The United States has tradi-
tionally advocated open access to outer space
and free commercial competition, but this posi-
I soP+ cit., NatiOna/ Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.
tion has been increasingly challenged by Com-
munist and Third World countries which favor
restrictions on space activities. In pursuing new
opportunities for applying technology to space,
the United States must weigh the national benefits
accruing from aggressive competition against the
need for, and benefits from, broader cooperation
in the international arena.
The issues to be addressed include: 1) What
benefits has the United States received from its
cooperative programs? 2) How is the desire for
cooperation to be reconciled with maintaining
U.S. preeminence? 3) How should the United
States respond to the growth of competitive space
applications programs in Europe and japan?
4) Are there benefits to be gained by inter-
nationalizing civilian Earth observations satellite
systems? How can they be realized? 5) What
framework would enable systems to be estab-
lished which would gather global information on
topics of broad common interest, such as ozone
concentrations, carbon dioxide levels, and bio-
mass inventory?
POLICY SYNTHESIS
The kinds of legislative and policy options, the
categories and criteria for their evaluation, and
the major issues involved, have now been identi-
fied. This background enables us to outline a
number of specific policy options available to
Congress for more detailed consideration. In the
next section, we integrate selected options into
compatible and coherent packages. The various
options are organized by the issues which sug-
gest them.
Need for High-Level Attention to Space
Policy in the Executive Branch
The range of responses to deal with this issue
is very broad. Possible actions by Congress in-
clude the following:
Ž Reestablish the National Aeronautics and
Space Council (NASC).
l Form a Presidential or National Commission
l Establish a new department.
Reestablish the National Aeronautics
and Space Council (NASC)
The NASC was disbanded in 1973 together with
the Office of Science and Technology (OST) and
the President’s Science Advisory Committee
(PSAC), as part of a move to reduce the size of
the Executive Office and remove so-called “advo-
cacy” groups from immediate proximity to the
President. l6 OST was reestablished by legislation
(as OSTP) in 197617 but no strong constituency
emerged to press for the reestablishment of NASC
at that time. The original charter for NASC in the
1958 NAS Act implied a strong need for conflict
resolution and better coordination among agen-
cies engaged in space activities. At present, the
1 6 0 p .  Cit., Reorganization pbtl No. 1 o f  1973.
170p3  Cit., NatiOnd/ Science and Technology pdkY,  %an;z+
tion and Priorities Act of 1976.
Ch. 10–Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment .277
needs for high-level coordination as well as for
“a comprehensive program of aeronautical and
space activities . . . ,“ as stated in the original
NASC legislation are of critical importance.18 A
reestablished NASC might provide a suitable
forum to focus attention on space program goals
and objectives, problems of program coordina-
tion, competing claims of different interest
groups, and a variety of other matters. Whereas
the old NASC was composed of members from
NASA, the Departments of Defense, Transporta-
tion, State, and the Atomic Energy Commission,
membership in a new NASC should be broad-
ened to include Agriculture, Interior, and Com-
merce (NOAA). The original NASC was chaired
by the Vice President, who was considered a
neutral arbitrator with access to the President;
with the addition of observers from the Office of
Management and Budget and the President’s
Science and Technology Adviser, a new NASC
would bring together all the major Government
space interests. It could serve to generate the
needed commitment to specific program content,
aid in preparation of annual budget proposals,
and give the space program higher visibility with
the President. The Council probably should have
a central staff working for an Executive Secretary,
although the staff could be primarily composed
of detailees from the agencies involved. Only a
few professionals would be needed on the staff
in order to perform the basic Council tasks.
However, adding the requirement of an annual
report would increase staff size appreciably. Oc-
casional reports to the public on space program
goals, plans, or achievements could be part of
the output of a core staff.
The Reagan Administration does not appear to
favor new entities in the Executive Office, al-
though topical committees of the Cabinet have
been formed for specific policy areas. The NASA
Administrator does not have Cabinet status and
therefore is not represented at this level. An ex-
ception has been the appointment of vice Presi-
dent Bush as chairman of a committee for regula-
tory review, demonstrating that it is possible to
have the administration accept a new entity in
the Executive Office under the chairmanship of
lop.  cit., Nationa/ Aeronautics Space Act of /9S8, title 11, p. 4,
sec 201, d-2.
the Vice President; however, the space program
does not appear to have high enough priority in
the administration for this sort of treatment.
Therefore, it may be difficult for Congress to
establish any new mechanisms for defining and
coordinating space policy, whether it is a new
NASC or another option.
The existence of an NASC would enable agen-
cies to focus their policy concerns at a high level,
with the prospect of influencing critical decisions.
{t would remove overall program content and
strategy decisions from a strictly budget-oriented
setting, as is the case today. This would greatly
enhance the likelihood that long-term programs
and goals can be agreed upon and effectively pur-
sued. By having the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) represented as an observer on the
Council, deliberations would have the benefit of
a realistic view of the budget situation. It should
be understood that the deliberations of a reconsti-
tuted NASC would not receive adequate atten-
tion from either the agencies or OMB, unless
there were direct Vice Presidential interest and
involvement. This would carry with it the pros-
pect of direct contact with the President, and
would make the difference between a Council
with little or no power and a Council with an im-
portant role in the policy process.
Annual expenditures by the Federal Govern-
ment for civilian and military space activities ex-
ceed $10 billion, all of which is “discretionary,”
i.e., not subject to a mandated formula or spe-
cified service. A body such as the NASC would
enable these expenditures to receive the high-
level review and attention appropriate to their na-
tional significance.
Committee of the National Security Council
(NSC) or a Subset of a “Cabinet
Council’s” Responsibilities
Because it concerns the internal management
of the Executive Office, this option is not amen-
able to congressional action. It has been included
here for the sake of completeness.
In the Carter administration, the lack of a high-
Ievel policy focus in the executive branch was
recognized as a problem, and the solution was
the formation of a Policy Review Committee for
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Space (PRC-Space) within the structure of the
NSC. (In the Carter administration, there were
various PRC’S dealing with specific national secu-
rity areas). The chairman of the PRC-Space was
the Director of the Office of Science and Tech-
nology Policy (OSTP). By contrast, the Reagan ad-
ministration has favored routing space issues
through a new “Cabinet Council” managed by
White House staff, with advice from the Direc-
tor of OSTP and the Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (see ch. 6).
By using the NSC structure for space policy
review there is a rather strong orientation toward
national security and military affairs. The civilian
space program, while sometimes having a strong
international impact, has traditionally been sepa-
rated from specific military and national securi-
ty programs. NSC is managed by a foreign-policy
oriented staff with little of the necessary back-
ground in dealing with commercial or technologi-
cal concerns.
While the OSTP Director is a relatively neutral
figure, the stature of his office vis-a-vis the White
House has varied considerably and does not
compare with that of the Vice President. On the
positive side, NSC has typically been a very im-
portant focal point for setting policy in recent ad-
ministrations, so that issues raised in this forum
usually reach the President for decision. This pro-
vides a degree of access not easily matched ex-
cept by OMB and the key White House staff.
Whether this situation will continue in the Reagan
administration is not clear. In addition, NSC is
equipped to consider issues dealing with the high-
ly classified military and intelligence space pro-
grams, by individuals fully cleared for access to
the classified aspects. This is particularly impor-
tant for such common systems as the space shut-
tle and tracking and data relay systems, and in
connection with the transfer of technology from
the classified to the civilian programs.
Use of the new “Cabinet Council” method of
reviewing space policy forces these issues to com-
pete with a much larger array of other policy con-
cerns for the very limited staff time available to
support the councils. Without a dedicated staff,
adequate attention is not likely to be given to
understanding the issues and to the development
of viable options. On the positive side, the Cabi-
net Council may allow for significant high-level
attention to whatever proposals reach its agenda.
Presidential or National Commission
A device that is occasionally employed to inves-
tigate a broad area of national interest is a presi-
dential or National (implying congressional and
private involvement) commission, board, com-
mittee, or council. Examples are:
The Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions. A 26-member bipartisan permanent
body with State and National Government
representatives, from both the legislative and
executive branches, and members from the
general public whose purpose is to review
and recommend improvements in the Fed-
eral system.
Water Resources Council. Established to
maintain a continuing study of national water
requirements. The Council reviews plans of
river basin commissions, assembles these
plans and submits them to Congress via the
President. It also administers a program of
Federal grants for water and land resource
planning.
Procurement Commission. An ad hoc group
for reviewing Federal procurement policy,
with public and private membership and a
limited lifetime (it has completed its work).
It prepared a comprehensive set of policy
recommendations and procedural changes.
One possibility for space is to charter for a spe-
cified term, a “National Space Commission” with
membership from the general public, State and
local governments, industry (particularly aero-
space and electronics firms), academia, Congress,
and the executive branch—NASA, State, DOD,
Interior, Commerce, and Agriculture. The Com-
mission would be charged with reviewing and
assessing the civilian space program and its bene-
fits, and recommending long- and short-term ob-
jectives, and a time frame for their achievement.
The product of the Commission would be a major
report, recommending short- and long-term goals
for the U.S. space program. The Commission
would be publicly supported; following its report,
congressional hearings could be held on its
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recommendations, and legislation prepared for
consideration by congress.
Such a forum enables participation from a
broad set of interests in developing program
goals; it operates in a manner that is outside nor-
mal channels and hence would be less threaten-
ing to the annual budget preparation process; it
would be public and could solicit public input
as appropriate; and it would serve as an expres-
sion of broad national and bipartisan support for
the civilian space program. In order to provide
a specific objective for such a group, a major
report should probably be specified, with annual
updates for the life of the Commission.
A National Space Commission, because of its
public, short-term nature, could not substitute for
a means within the administration to resolve is-
sues, develop policy proposals, review goals, and
set strategy for the space program. The Commis-
sion therefore is complementary to the previous
two options, although it would deal with many
of the same issues. The Commission would have
the advantage of being able to evaluate public
response and support, and to focus that support
on specific goals. It also provides a device for full
discussion of congressional, executive branch,
and private sector views in a constructive setting.
Establish a New Department
This concept would place NASA in a larger
Cabinet-level structure, perhaps one that incorpo-
rated a group of science and technology agen-
cies. The principal focus for space policy would
be a Cabinet officer responsible for setting space
goals, as well as integrating these goals into a
larger science and technology policy framework.
The following choice of functions to be grouped
together is largely illustrative–a considerably
more detailed discussion would be required to
treat this subject adequately than is appropriate
to this report.19 If, for the purposes of this assess-
ment, we designated it the Department of Basic
and Applied Sciences, it might have a Research
Administration with components from the NSF,
NASA, and DOE; a Space Operations Administra-
tion with responsibility for launch vehicle
19FOr  example,  see reports of the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Science and Technology in 1967, 1972, and 1977.
development and operation, manned flight,
satellite integration, tracking and data acquisition;
an Environment and Natural Resources Adminis-
tration with land, atmosphere, and ocean activ-
ities from NASA, NOAA, DOE and possibly the
U.S. Geological Survey from Interior; an Industrial
Technology Administration with the National Bu-
reau of Standards, Patent Office, and applied
technology programs from NSF; and an Energy
R&D Administration with the core DOE programs
such as solar, conservation, fossil, nuclear, and
fusion. The department could have a special proj-
ects office for interdisciplinary issues that require
broad contributions such as communications and
information, science and technology, or for lim-
ited-life projects such as robotics development
(to assist in accelerating commercialization of this
new technology). In such a department, responsi-
bility for leadership in generating space program
goals and objectives would lie with an Adminis-
trator for Space Operations, assisted by others—
Research, Environment and National Resources,
Energy, Industrial Technology, and Special Proj-
ects. These components would be responsible for
generating programs in space science, weather
and meteorology, Earth observations, space man-
ufacturing, and telecommunications. Together,
they would constitute the civilian space program.
Coordination with DOD and national intelligence
space programs would still be required, and for
this purpose a Cabinet-level Space Council might
also be desirable to resolve issues that arise, to
provide a forum for program coordination and
to enable consideration of other aspects, such as
foreign policy considerations (which would be
supplied by the Secretary of State).
This option would be extremely difficult to im-
plement, since it would involve many congres-
sional jurisdictions and appear to threaten existing
agency constituencies. On the other hand, the
Reagan administration has indicated that it plans
to dismantle the Department of Energy, and this
could provide the stimulus for giving serious con-
sideration to formation of a new department by
grouping together high-technology agencies, in-
cluding the R&D elements from the present DOE.
Many foreign countries, including Japan and most
of Western Europe, have ministerial-level depart-
ments dealing with science and technology.
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A new, high-technology R&D department to
deal with space policy issues would facilitate ac-
cess to the President. It could also strengthen bar-
gaining with OMB in the budget process, and
might even (depending on the other agencies and
functions that were included in the new depart-
ment) result in economies in areas where com-
mon support functions can be combined (pro-
curement, administration, facilities, personnel,
etc.). It is also possible that better use of support-
ing laboratories would result from incorporating
them into a larger departmental structure.
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
In the future, Congress could take a much
stronger hand in formulating space policy and co-
ordinating the different national space programs.
Congress played a major role in the initial stages
of the U.S. space program by drawing up the NAS
Act, and Members of Congress were leaders in
helping to focus national attention on space ex-
ploration. Other critical policy decisions, such as
the COMSAT Act in 1962, were also initiated by
Congress. Both the House and Senate formed full
committees to oversee civilian space activities,
while assigning responsibility for military space
programs to their respective Armed Services
Committees.
During the Apollo years, Congress supported
major programs proposed by the executive
branch and voted increasing annual budgets for
NASA. However, in the late 1960’s and early
1970’s, NASA budgets and program proposals
came under increasing attack as being too ambi-
tious for a period when domestic social programs
and the Vietnam war required ever-larger na-
tional commitments. Despite a strong core of
congressional supporters, congressional critics on
the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on
HUD and Independent Agencies succeeded in
reducing NASA plans for major post-Apollo pro-
grams. NASA’s space budget reached a low of
$2,758.5 billion in 1974, down from a 1965 high
of $5,137.6 billion (in current dollars; if inflation
is taken into account, the differences are much
greater).
In the mid -l 970’s, both the House and Senate
restructured their authorizing committees for
space activities. In the House, responsibility for
most of the civilian space program authorization
and oversight shifted from several subcommittees
of the Committee on Science and Technology to
only one, the eight-member Subcommittee on
Space Science and Applications of the Commit-
tee on Science and Technology; in the Senate the
Committee on Space was disbanded and respon-
sibility for space matters was assumed by the
nine-member Subcommittee on Science, Tech-
nology, and Space of the Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Technology. In addition to,
the military responsibilities of the Armed Services
Committees, space activities in Commerce, Interi-
or, Agriculture, and Energy Departments are
overseen by different committees.
In recent years, Congress has addressed many
of the policy issues discussed in this report; in par-
ticular, it has dealt with the uses of the space shut-
tle, the transition to an operational remote-
sensing system, international competition, and
commercialization of space technology. The
absence of a coherent and comprehensive na-
tional civilian policy has surfaced as a recurrent
concern, and hearings on this subject were held
by both Houses in 1979z0 and 1980.21 In the Sen-
ate, S. 212, the “National Space and Aeronautics
Policy Act of 1979,” and S. 244 “to establish na-
tional space policy and program direction” were
introduced. Both bills proposed establishing long-
term programs in accord with explicit policy prin-
ciples, with S. 212 specifying particular projects
as well.
In the House, hearings were held in May and
June 1979 on H.R. 2337, the Space industrializa-
tion Act of 1979,22 which called for establishment
of a national Space Industrialization Corporation
to encourage public-private exploitation of com-
mercial opportunities in space. In both 1979 and
1980, the House passed H.R. 2335, the Solar
‘“’’U.S. Civilian Space Policy,” hearings before the Subcommit-
tee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, Jan. 25 and 31
and Feb. 1, 1979.
‘l’’ United States Civilian Space Policy,” hearings before the Sub-
committee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee
on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, july
23 and 24, 1980.
zz “The Space industrialization Act of 1979, ” hearings before the
Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Commit-
tee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives,
May 22 and 23; june 26 and 27, 1979.
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Power Satellite Research, Development, and Eval-
uation Program Act of 1979,23 which would have
authorized $25 million for R&D on solar power
satellites. In 1981, the Space Policy Act of 1981
was introduced (H. R. 371 2), and general hear-
ings on civilian space policy were held in
September.
The problems of coordinating policy and estab-
lishing long-term goals are mirrored in Congress’
own activities. To a much greater extent than in
the executive branch, Congress’ ability to deal
with these problems depends on informal and
personal responses, rather than institutional or
legislative changes. The problems facing sus-
tained and broad-based congressional attention
to space policy are:
l Not a high national or regional priority. —
Space programs and policy have not recently
been high on the national agenda as com-
pared with questions of social, economic,
and foreign policy. In addition, constituent
interests force relatively few Representatives
or Senators to consider space (a number of
Congressmen, including former astronauts,
have strong personal interests in this area and
have contributed to the increased attention
to space policy in recent years).
l Staff size and experience. —The change from
full committee to subcommittee oversight,
coupled with recent Senate staff cutbacks,
may make it more difficult for Congress to
deal with the many issues involved.
ZJ’’Solar Power Satellite,” hearings for the Subcommittee on Space
Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Tech-
nology, U.S. House of Representatives, Mar. 28, 29, and 30, 1979.
l Jurisdictional overlap and committee rela-
tions. –The different committees and sub-
committees with responsibilities for various
civilian programs create a need for coordina-
tion, if oversight of national programs and
integration of national policy is to be accom-
plished. Relations between civilian and mili-
tary programs are particularly sensitive. In
previous years, Congressmen sitting on both
the Space and Armed Services Committees
provided informal coordination. Today, only
one Senator and one Representative belong
to both the space subcommittees and Armed
Services Committees or Intelligence Commit-
tees.
Given strong enough leadership and sufficiently
widespread perception of the importance of the
issue, institutional or jurisdictional barriers to a
comprehensive consideration of space policy are
not insurmountable. joint hearings, multiple refer-
rals of legislation, and ad hoc committees or addi-
tions to committees are several ways to cut across
established territories.
In recent years both the House and the Senate
have criticized many specific administration ac-
tions as well as the lack of an overall policy. So
far, none of the proposed reforms of space policy
or initiatives for major program changes have
been adopted. However, the continued absence
of executive leadership guarantees that Congress
is more and more likely to take the initiative in
setting long-range goals for exploiting the shut-
tle, commercializing space technologies, and
meeting international competition.
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES—CLARIFYING
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR ROLES
In space applications, the services and products
involve both Government and private firms and
institutions. The multitude of interests and players
has raised questions concerning the appropriate
role of each in developing and operating applica-
tions systems. In one area, weather and atmos-
pheric observations, the Federal Government has
traditionally collected the data and made it free-
ly available as a public service. A similar pattern
has been established in oceanographic obser-
vations. In communications, Government per-
formed much of the early research and demon-
stration, but industry and regulated entities have
developed the platforms and supplied the serv-
ices—subject to regulation by FCC and consistent
with agreements under the International Tele-
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communication Union (ITU). In satellite Earth
observations the Government has performed
much of the research, developed and demon-
strated the platforms and distributed the data.
Private industry has supplied users with value-
-added services. (By contrast, aircraft surveys are
normally done by private industry without Gov-
ernment involvement in any phase of their work.)
in space manufacturing and space transportation,
Government has taken the lead, but private sec-
tor involvement is growing. An important issue
therefore ,is to clarify ways in which the private
and public sectors might work with one another.
Space Telecommunications
Initially, international satellite communications
were established as a Government-regulated mo-
nopoly through INTELSAT and the U.S. represen-
tative, COMSAT (see ch. 8). As the technology
has advanced and new customers for it have
been identified, domestic satellite services have
been established and competition for domestic
services has been allowed. Maritime communi-
cations are being developed along the lines of
INTELSAT, through the international maritime sat-
ellite organization (l NMARSAT), in which
COMSAT is also the designated U.S. participant.
INMARSAT came into existence in 1979 in rec-
ognition of the desirability of instituting a single
(monopoly) system for maritime services while
encouraging competition for certain other com-
munications satellite applications.
In the future, it appears that lower costs, more
demand for capacity, and greater diversity of serv-
ices will characterize the domestic communica-
tions industry. Direct broadcast satellites for
television signals to the home are likely in the
mid-l 980’s. Business services are expanding, es-
pecially for data communications and specialized
functions. The industrial firms that can act as sup-
pliers are available, and the existing service
markets provide an important revenue base for
future new ventures. The principal areas of con-
cern are the availability of the electromagnetic
frequency spectrum in the light of competing
demands for services, international control of
assigned orbital positions for satellites (through
ITU), and domestic regulation of technical and
commercial characteristics.
Clarifying the R&D Role of Government
in Space Communications.
An important policy option is to clarify and
make more explicit the role of NASA in support-
ing R&D needs for space communications. In
order to accomplish this, it may be desirable to
legislate NASA’s responsibilities in R&D for ad-
vanced communications satellites. The NASA
program in communications was cut back for
most of the decade of the 1970’s (despite the gen-
eral guidance of the NAS Act and COMSAT legis-
lation) (see fig. 16), However, NASA had earlier
contributed significantly to progress in space
telecommunications, providing much of the tech-
nology and systems in use today. NASA could
contribute to the solution of current and future
problems, such as utilization of the 30/20 GHz
frequency (see ch. 3). A continuing telecom-
munications technology program would include
fundamental work at higher frequencies and
demonstrations of technology and systems.
It will be very important for industry and NASA
to cooperate in defining the appropriate high-risk
areas for Government support and the boundary
between Government and industry for develop-
ment of specific systems. Industry can and should
work with NASA to sponsor cooperative commu-
nications technology demonstrations. To ensure
adequate consultation between NASA (as a lead
agency for this work) and industry, an industry-
Government consultative committee could be
Figure 17.—NASA Funding for Communications
Satellite Technology (In constant year 1983 dollars,
i.e., adjusted for inflation)
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specified that would consider space communicat-
ions research and technology needs. On such
a committee, in addition to NASA, Government
would be represented by DOD, NTIA (Com-
merce), State, and FCC, while the industry rep-
resentatives would include aerospace contrac-
tors, the common carriers, COMSAT and other
space services suppliers. The deliberations of this
committee could be submitted to the Congress
as part of the annual budget. A committee with
a similar function already exists in high-energy
physics, called the High Energy Physics Advisory
Panel (HEPAP). It includes all the interested par-
ties in the field and is sponsored by the principal
agency responsible, DOE. HEPAP serves to re-
solve the various independent views of what is
needed and periodically presents an integrated
plan for new facilities and research needs.
Open-ended assignment of a space communi-
cations R&D role to NASA might be difficult to
sustain for several reasons: 1 ) uncertain and pos-
sibly larger budget needs would be resisted by
OMB and the administration; 2) users might have
little role in NASA demonstrations, with the result
that unnecessary and uneconomic technologies
might be pursued (i.e., there is the danger that
it would become a technological “hobby shop”);
and 3) NASA might create unrealistic expecta-
tions by demonstrating sophisticated new tech-
nology not ready for commercial introduction.
On the other hand, remaining silent regarding the
NASA role invites the type of decision that was
made in the early 1970’s, when the NASA com-
munications satellite platform and technology
demonstration program were terminated. The
consequences of this decision are covered in
chapter 4.
By specifying that NASA should perform com-
munications satellite R&D, including demonstra-
tion of technologies and platforms, and also spe-
cifying that there will be formal user and indus-
try involvement in identifying the extent and
nature of the program, the open-ended nature
of the assignment can be modified. Such a con-
sultative process can serve as a forum for bring-
ing out independent views and ensuring the rele-
vance of the NASA program. One danger of such
a mechanism is that industry may press for too
large a role for NASA, since their incentive is to
minimize risk and to push NASA to carry out tasks
that industry might otherwise be expected to do.
Given NASA’s desire to maintain its budget and
institutional structure, it can be expected to
acquiesce. The example of the HEPAP is instruc-
tive in this regard. For it the incentives are very
similar: have the Government do more, expand,
press forward faster, etc. The counterbalance is
the competition and rivalry among the various
research groups, and the pressures of other agen-
cy demands, OMB, and eventually Congress.
Within a communications committee, such pres-
sures can be counterbalanced by competition be-
tween companies, Federal agencies, OMB and
Congress. DOD’s role would bean additional fac-
tor. By including DOD in the consultative group,
the technology base that is being supported for
military purposes would be represented direct-
ly. Not all of the developments could be dis-
cussed, but general knowledge of classified pro-
grams could be a valuable asset in discussions
of technology needs.
If in addition to acting as consultants, the in-
dustry also took a more active role in financially
supporting demonstrations of new satellite sys-
tems (see Communications Issue, ch. 3), its own
stake in the type and direction of work that is
done would be greater. Because industry had a
strong financial interest, the development work
done would be more likely to reflect the genuine
needs of industry. in sum, the above suggestions
could lead to a role for NASA that represents a
balance between technology push and demand
pull.
R&D to Support Regulatory Decisions
Regulation is always the product of balancing
among the affected interests. In the balancing
process, it is important that the regulatory
authorities have the best possible technical infor-
mation available. The ultimate decisions will re-
flect their grasp of the technology as well as po-
litical and economic constraints, the biases of the
people involved, and the effectiveness of the vari-
ous lobbying groups. The regulatory body for
communications, FCC, has an R&D section and
a technical staff to interpret the impact of new
technology on regulations, and vice versa. But
the exploding telecommunications and informa-
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tion technologies have created serious overload-
ing of this staff and their limited budget. It would
be unrealistic to consider space communications
experiments and demonstrations to be within
their capability. However, both nationally and in-
ternationally, regulations are being made that
control the numbers of satellites that will be per-
mitted (by controlling synchronous orbital slots),
their power levels and signal characteristics, the
frequencies used, and a variety of other technical
details. Information for these decisions comes
from a variety of sources–some private (like Bell
Labs and COMSAT Labs) and some Government
(e.g., DOD, NBS, NOAA, and NASA), but there
is no lead agency for space communications R&D
to support regulation. This suggests the follow-
ing policy option:
Modify NASA’s legislative charter to direct the
Agency to pursue communications R&D to sup-
port the needs of prospective regulatory actions,
both nationally and via ITU, internationally. in-
ternationally, the United States has much at stake
in the allocation of orbital slots for satellites, the
assignment of frequencies, and the technical
characteristics of allowable signals and signal
strengths. The United States should also be pre-
pared to take stronger action to ensure more real-
istic decisions in ITU. These decisions are often
driven by unwarranted fears of smaller nations,
based on poor technical information, and by
political objectives. Both of these aspects should
be addressed, the first by better dissemination of
technical information, perhaps by a traveling
team of experts with equipment capable of dem-
onstrating essential data, and the second through
stronger leverage from the State Department. A
high-level space policy mechanism such as the
NASC could provide the proper exposure at the
White House for these international political
measures, and a separate subgroup for interna-
tional space communications may be desirable.
Clarifying the NASA role would enable better
planning of space communications research and
demonstration programs by the agency and help
to provide a more competent and predictable set
of regulations for public and private users to deal
with. By giving more attention to the preparation
and technical backup for international negotia-
tions, the United States would be in a better posi-
tion to identify and defend its interests. In some
cases, better technical information is likely to
yield better international agreements, by remov-
ing misunderstandings about the effects of new
technologies.
Earth Observations From Space
Civilian Earth observations from space encom-
passes a variety of space platforms, sensors and
mission objectives, ranging from weather obser-
vations made by NOAA, to ocean observations
and Landsat-type systems. The technology for
weather observations via satellite has developed
from the limited capability of the early experi-
mental systems to a relatively mature technology.
The relationship between NASA as the R&D and
launching agency, and NOAA as the operational ~
authority has also developed and matured over
time. In general, this relationship now demon-
strates how NOAA, as a lead agency with a clear
mission to perform, can interact with an R&D
agency, NASA, to stimulate and take advantage
of advanced technology and adapt it to opera-
tional use (see ch. 9). The major areas of con-
cern today are the Landsat and future oceano-
graphic satellite programs.
For land remote sensing, the relationships be-
tween public and private interests are currently
perhaps the most difficult areas to treat. The
Carter administration, and now the Reagan ad-
ministration as well, favored turning over this ac-
tivity to private ownership and management,
while the private sector, for the most pat-t, does
not yet see a sufficient market to be able to re-
spond. Caught up in the present uncertainty are
the users of the data; a private industry of value-
-added companies that has grown up to process
and interpret the raw sensed data, and the aero-
space contractors capable of designing and build-
ing the satellites and other hardware. Complicat-
ing the scene are international pressures from a
large number of other countries interested in
using Landsat data (some with dedicated receiv-
ing stations); from a few countries planning the
development of competitive systems; and from
a number of countries with national concerns
about the collection and use of remotely sensed
data gathered about their territory.
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policy options to resolve some of these issues
include the folIowing:
FOR THE SPACE SEGMENT
Laissez-faire or open entry. The Government
would agree to operate space platforms through
Landsat D and possibly D’. Further satellite sys-
tems would then become the responsibility of pri-
vate industry. Government users would purchase
data from private suppliers under commercial
terms and conditions. Private suppliers would sell
data to international users on a nondiscriminatory
basis. Any private supplier or consortium (domes-
tic or foreign) could purchase launch services and
fly a land remote-sensing satellite. If the market
did not support the service, it would terminate
after Landsat D or D’, except for possible DOD
or foreign collection platforms.
With the current cost of launch services and
satellites, there is only a very limited prospect that
private sector suppliers would enter the field for
the space segment. An important indicator is the
nature of the current COMSAT suggestion that
it assume responsibility for all operational remote-
sensing systems.24 They feel that the market is suf-
ficiently marginal that transfer of all current opera-
tional remote sensing would (including meteoro-
logical satellites) be required, and the Govern-
ment would have to commit to purchase its data
from the COMSAT systems. Such marginal eco-
nomics indicate very strongly that competition
would not exist (beyond subsidized foreign sys-
tems) if COMSAT were allowed to proceed with
its proposal. This would create a de facto mo-
nopoly, although in principle the prospect of
open entry would be available. The de facto
monopoly would continue until technology ad-
vanced to the point that reliable, low-cost access
to space and low-cost platforms was available,
thus allowing competitors to enter without the
massive capital investments required today.
If the COMSAT initiative is not pursued, and
other approaches are entertained through open
solicitation of the industry, it is uncertain whether
Z4C;v;/ [and ~e~ote Sensing Systems, joint hearings before the
Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, House Com-
mittee on Science and Technology; Subcommittee on Science,
Technology, and Space of the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, July 22 and 23, 1981.
a single supplier (or even a consortium) would
come forward to propose a data collection system
without data purchase guarantees similar to those
proposed by COMSAT. Thus, the likelihood is
that a truly open entry policy would result in no
entry.
Single designated entity. Whenever the service
to be provided is such that the necessary capital
investments are very large in relation to the in-
dustry base, and the technology and character
of the system makes competitive suppliers either
impractical or highly wasteful of resources, the
conditions may warrant designating a monopo-
ly supplier. A typical example was the designa-
tion of AT&T as the long-distance carrier for
domestic telephone communications. With a
monopoly supplier, however, regulatory mecha-
nisms are required to control pricing and to in-
sure continued service by the supplier. FCC car-
ries out this function, as well as a variety of other
important roles in communications. An impor-
tant characteristic of the regulatory process must
be the ability to change the monopoly situation
to respond to new technological advances that
modify the monopoly characteristics of the sys-
tem. FCC has responded to such changes in the
domestic telecommunications industry, although
there has been criticism that it acted much too
slowly.
On the premise that conditions may exist in
land remote sensing for a monopoly supplier, one
policy option would be to give a single private
sector entity the role of developer and operator
of the space segment. Since the revenue base for
sale of the raw data does not appear adequate
to support a positive return on the investment,
the Government would also guarantee purchase
of a minimum amount of the output, perhaps at
subsidized prices, until costs and markets have
developed to permit Government to decrease its
role gradually. Because a monopoly position
implies some regulatory control in order to pro-
tect the public interest, a new institution would
probably be required to regulate prices, entry into
the field, quality of services, and to control the
amount and extent of Government subsidy.
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) is a good
example of such a regulatory agency. It original-
ly regulated entry, controlled routes, reviewed
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fares and revenues, and provided significant di-
rect cash subsidies to the airline operators while
the airline industry built its market and its ability
to sustain profitable operations. The Government
also guaranteed the purchase of services, in the
early days with subsidized airmail contracts to the
airlines, and later with Government cargo and
passenger traffic. The rationale for treating this
industry in such a special way is similar to the
rationale that applies to land remote sensing, viz.,
there is a service to be supplied which would be
highly beneficial to the public, and which could
eventually become an independent and profit-
able private enterprise given initial subsidy.
Because it is normal practice in our free enter-
prise system for the Government to use commer-
cial suppliers, the Government should be pre-
pared to act in a way that ensures continuation
of the services while building toward a self-
sustaining capability in industry. With the passage
of time and growing industry maturity, the
regulatory authority can decrease and eventual-
ly cease–as is the plan for the CAB.
This suggests establishing a new entity, which
for purposes of this analysis will be called the
Space Development Authority (SDA). SDA would
have a role for new and emerging space applica-
tions very similar to CAB in air transportation.
Since there are more opportunities than simply
land remote sensing, SDA could function in all
applications areas. It would control entry into
data collection operations, initially establishing
criteria for the monopoly supplier, and later per-
mit greater competition as the market develops.
It would review pricing of services and establish
a fair rate of return using guidelines derived from
other, similar regulatory situations. SDA might
support this rate of return by adding a direct sub-
sidy from appropriated funds. It would review
proposed satellite configurations and establish,
with the aid of the user community, minimum
desired performance characteristics for proposed
systems. The choice of technology, specific de-
sign characteristics, and award of contracts for
hardware would be the responsibility of the
monopoly supplier.
An important further consideration is the re-
sponsibility for advancing technology in order to
continue improving the services provided and to
improve the cost v. revenue relationship for these
services. Here, the analogy with civilian aviation
again illustrates a Government policy option. In
aviation, the Government established the Na-
tional Advisory Committee on Aeronautics
(NACA) and its supporting laboratory structure
over 65 years ago to improve aeronautic technol-
ogy in the United States. The Federal Govern-
ment still continues to support advances in aero-
nautics through NASA. The users of this technol-
ogy are the military and civilian aircraft manufac-
turers, and the beneficiaries are the American
public. Thus, a similar technology development
role by Government might be appropriate in sup-
port of SDA, and desirable in terms of long-term
benefits to the public.
Thus, the NASA role as a technology “push”
agency would continue, including definition and
development of new sensors, platforms and asso-
ciated subsystems, and supporting technologies
such as launch vehicles, on-orbit control, track-
ing and data recovery. This would be very close
to the current situation with respect to R&D for
meteorological satellites and the previous NASA
role in the communications satellite area.
Establishing a regulated monopoly in remote
sensing, although less desirable than true compe-
tition, can result in high-quality services and sig-
nificant public benefit (e.g., AT&T and long-dis-
tance telephone service). A key characteristic of
effective regulation is that it be as little as neces-
sary in order to protect the public interest. In ad-
dition, the boundary between regulated functions
and unregulated functions needs to be flexible
in order to respond to changing industry dynam-
ics and the effects of new technology. Therefore,
SDA should operate under guidelines that specify
minimal regulation and responsiveness to any
changes that would allow for more open compe-
tition.
Adoption of the COMSAT initiative or one sim-
ilar to it from another corporation or consortium
would appear to require establishing a mecha-
nism such as SDA. If not, the control over pric-
ing would be difficult, and quality of service
would be continually open to negotiation, with
little in the way of alternatives open to the Gov-
ernment except canceling the agreement. There
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are additional questions regarding responsibility
for performing R&D on advanced sensors (NASA
or COMSAT, or both?), distribution of data by pri-
vate companies and international access to the
data, that would need to be resolved. These are
not insurmountable, but they do raise doubts
about the ability to anticipate and spell out all
of the conditions for a transfer to a single desig-
nated entity that would protect the interests of
Government and the public. Creation of an over-
sight and regulatory authority such as SDA would
enable these issues to be addressed as they arise
and would appear to be a wise precaution to ac-
company a policy decision to establish a
monopoly supplier.
Government as the Operator. An alternative
approach to the space segment, (consistent with
the conclusion that a monopoly position is re-
quired, would be to retain the Government as
operator instead of a regulated, private sector en-
tity. In this alternative, procurement of the satel-
lites, their operation and control, and the initial
reception and distribution of the data stream
would remain a Government function. Selection
of system characteristics (sensors, orbits, number
of satellites, type of coverage, and other parame-
ters) should be done through consultation with
the user community, and for this a formal struc-
ture is probably desirable. A Remote Sensing
Users Group such as NOAA is now in the proc-
ess of setting up would help ensure that users
have an opportunity to participate in the plan-
ning of new systems and in the operation of exist-
ing platforms.
In this case the operator could be either the
R&D and launching agency, NASA; an agency
closer to a user community such as NOAA,
USDA, or Interior; or a new Government entity
established for this purpose that brought together
several existing roles. NOAA will be responsible
for overseeing the operation of the Landsat sys-
tem after Landsat D is launched.
However, if a new agency were set up, for ex-
ample, a Space Applications Services Administra-
tion (SASA) it could be responsible for defining,
procuring, and operating satellites and ground
stations and providing an assured flow of data
from space applications systems. This agency
would be independent of NASA and NOAA, but
probably would include a portion of the existing
space applications staff of both of these agencies.
While publicly funded and hence accountable
to Congress, it would collect user charges (like
the recently disestablished Panama Canal Co., a
former Government entity that was initially pub-
licly funded but eventually became self-support-
ing). It would not conduct R&D, but would identi-
fy targets for NASA attention, and serve to chan-
nel to concerns of data users such as NOAA,
USDA, and Interior in Governments; State and
local governments; and private users (including
private companies that process and interpret the
data) to NASA. SASA would be organized to pro-
vide a valuable service at the lowest cost. SASA
might assume responsibility for a variety of other
space-related applications functions, such as
meteorological and ocean-sensing data, storm
warning, emergency communications, search
and rescue identification and location, public
navigation, and other noncommercial services.
in this role it would be much like a private
monopoly supplier, except for: 1 ) its status as a
Government entity, 2) the fact that a separate
regulatory entity would not be required, and
3) the periodic review of its operation that would
occur through the annual budget process.
If NASA were given the role of space segment
operator, the advantages would be: good integra-
tion with the present launch authority, assured
technical competence, and substantial agency in-
terest in the technology and its successful employ-
ment. On the negative side, NASA is prone to
push the technology rather than its uses, and
tends to continue experimentation rather than
allow a system to become operational.
If it were a single established user agency, the
problems would be somewhat reversed. The
technical aspects become more difficult to man-
age and to integrate into the user’s normal way
of doing business; the format of satellite data is
likely to conflict with previous ways of obtain-
ing similar information, while the agency as a
whole will not have much stake in the successful
outcome of a satellite program that is only a small
part of their total mission. On the other hand,
there would be greater sensitivity to user needs
and better contact with the user community
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(though quite likely not with all of the users in
the case of multipurpose satellite systems). The
satellite system would more rapidly become
standardized and operational in this mode; once
accomplished, new technology would probably
be resisted unless “proven” and reliable.
In the case of a new Government entity created
to assume responsibility for satellite applications
systems, many of the above characteristics would
be favorably modified, but other problems would
be increased.
NASA would undoubtedly promote its mission
by looking for, and attempting to satisfy demand
for, new applications services. This would depend
in part on obtaining support from NASA for tech-
nology development. By operating meteorologi-
cal systems and Landsat, NASA might begin with
a sufficient base to provide a critical mass for con-
tinuing operations.
GROUND SEGMENT
There are three areas to consider: 1 ) operation
and control of the space segment; 2) reception
and processing of returned data; and 3) distribu-
tion and interpretative processing of returned
data. For the space segment it appears that use
of NASA facilities on a reimbursable basis would
be a sensible beginning. Independent control
centers would be established as the business
increased.
To receive and distribute satellite-derived infor-
mation, current technology requires an array of
unique and expensive equipment to convert raw
returned data to images or other coherent forms.
Since many users, such as agricultural analysts,
require quick distribution of recently acquired
data, there is a need for high throughput for the
processing center and redundant equipment to
allow for breakdowns or other system problems.
Thus, for this segment, the potential exists for hav-
ing a regulated monopoly supplier. This could
quite logically be the same entity that was respon-
sible for the space segment, in order to ensure
compatibility of equipment and processing capac-
ity as satellite designs and instruments change.
For the interpretive processing of returned data,
on the other hand, an embryonic industry is
already established, and continued open entry
seems appropriate. Access to the initial processed
data stream should remain open to all customers
but at a realistic fee schedule, reviewed and ap-
proved by SDA. In order to protect the initial posi-
tion of the monopoly supplier, it would probably
be necessary to restrict competitive entry into the
field of reception and initial processing of the sat-
ellite data stream.
As far as the space segment is concerned, a U.S.
monopoly supplier appears to be necessary, at
least for the foreseeable future. Competition is
likely to be provided by one or more international
systems capable of supplying similar data. (A
more detailed discussion of international aspects,
and policy options that respond to the growing
capabilities of other nations, is found later in this
chapter.)
The ground segment is as important to the total
effectiveness of a remote-sensing system as the
space platforms. The point is that providing ade-
quate capacity for data handling and processing,
compatible equipment, and common data for-
mats should receive the same careful attention
as the more glamorous and visible spacecraft. For
this reason, it is important that the processing
system be at least as responsive to user needs as
to the R&D agency. If NASA were to assume re-
sponsibility for an operational remote-sensing
system, there would need to be a stronger in-
volvement by the users in determining the char-
acteristics of the data processing system than is
presently the case.
Space Transportation
Throughout this analysis the implied assump-
tion has been that launch vehicles and their sup-
porting systems such as launch complexes, track-
ing, and control facilities would continue to be
available through customary channels. However,
space transportation systems themselves may also
be considered subject to possible new policy ini-
tiatives as defined in the beginning of this chapter.
For the most part, launching payloads into
space has been sufficiently costly and complex
that Government sponsorship has been required
to develop and operate all but the most limited
systems. As the cost and importance of payloads,
civilian and military, have increased, it has also
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become particularly important to ensure that
there is a high degree of reliability and a low prob-
ability of catastrophic failure. These concerns
reach a peak when manned vehicles are in-
volved; only the two space superpowers, the
United States and the U. S. S. R., have devoted the
resources and effort to carry out such operations.
In considering policy options for space trans-
portation, therefore, it is useful to distinguish be-
tween the type and scale of operations involved,
e.g., manned systems; large, unmanned systems
to synchronous, interplanetary or low-Earth tra-
jectories; small, low-altitude unmanned systems.
MANNED SYSTEMS
The presence of man in space has captured the
imagination of people throughout the world, and
has given national space efforts some of their
most memorable moments. When astronauts are
involved, there is always the possibility of a
catastrophic failure leading to death or injury;
such a disaster can have widespread effects on
public opinion and hence on the future of the
space program. The fire in the Apollo 204 cap-
sule in 1967, which killed three astronauts,
though it occurred on the ground, caused a
lengthy delay in the Apollo flight schedule. The
death of Soviet cosmonauts on reentry in 2
separate incidents in 1967 and 1971 had similar
consequences. The result is that great care is
given to the safety, reliability and resistance to
single-point failures of manned systems. This also
includes launch vehicles, which go through
special procedures in order to make them “man-
dated. ” These special procedures are reflected in
increased costs and in a sizeable support estab-
lishment for manned flight, both of which have
been sufficiently large that only government has
had the resources to conduct manned space op-
erations. Only the United States and the Soviet
Union have been willing to make the investments
required to engage in manned flight, and this has
resulted in a form of symbolic East-West competi-
tion, centered around such space endeavors, that
rarely applies to the popular perceptions of un-
manned space activities.
The development of the space shuttle has given
the United States a launch vehicle that is simul-
taneously a manned system and a form of trans-
portation for manned and unmanned payloads.
The presence of man has focused public atten-
tion on its operations; it is viewed as another step
in the continuing East-West competition in space,
Recently there has been considerable discussion
about the possibility of private ownership and
operation of the shuttle system. For a number of
reasons, this does not appear to be a likely pros-
pect for the near term. One reason is the special
political significance of manned spaceflight, as
mentioned above. Although the frequency of op-
erations envisioned for the shuttle—about one
launch every 10 days–will result in the public
devoting less attention to individual shuttle
launches, and accepting man in space as rela-
tively routine, it still appears likely that the loss
of astronauts in space would be a major blow to
national prestige. Given the cost of maintaining
adequate launch, recovery, and refurbishment
crews and facilities for the shuttle system, con-
tinued Government control and overall manage-
ment seems likely.
A second factor is that, although each shuttle
orbiter is projected to have a lifetime of about
100 launches, there will be a continuing need for
system modifications and rework that are part of
the standard experience associated with any new
and complex system such as the shuttle. For these
changes and continuing engineering support of
the system, the resources of the Federal Govern-
ment are likely to be needed—as well as the ex-
pertise of the major NASA Centers, Johnson (JSC)
and Marshall (MSFC).
Third, the shuttle is planned to be the “delivery
truck” for most low-altitude payloads, whether
manned or unmanned, including national secu-
rity as well as civilian or commercial payloads.
The contributions of space systems to national
security are significant and appear to be increas-
ing; so it is not likely that the Government will
wish to forego control over, and assurance of the
availability of, adequate transportation to orbit.
Direct Government operation of the shuttle and
technical support for the shuttle system would
be needed in order to provide the necessary
assurances to national security authorities.
Fourth, there is the question of liability. The
shuttle, in its launch configuration, represents a
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very high and concentrated amount of energy
which, if it were to crash in a populated area,
could have widespread detrimental economic
consequences. Other forms of system failure
could also be very costly from the standpoint of
liability. Government is the institution most
capable of handling such contingencies; although
private insurance may be available to private
shuttle operators, it would be another cost fac-
tor that would tend to limit private sector opera-
tion of the shuttle system.
There is currently a proposal by an investment
group25 for private-sector purchase of an addi-
tional shuttle orbiter. The proposal calls for this
orbiter to join the Government fleet of shuttle sys-
tems, in return for which the consortium provid-
ing the funds would act as the sole shuttle pay-
load marketing agents. The needs for continued
Government control outlined above would not
prevent such an arrangement, nor other innova-
tive mixes of public and private investment. Such
proposals should be viewed on their merits. It
does not seem profitable to attempt to construct
policies in advance that would adequately foresee
all of the nuances of such proposed arrange-
ments.
LARGE UNMANNED SYSTEMS
The transportation systems for a wide variety
of sizeable unmanned payloads either to low- or
high-Earth orbit or on trajectories beyond Earth
orbit comprise the bulk of space launch vehicles
for all nations and have been the source of great-
est interest by nations that wish to enter the space
business. As the basic technology that is needed
for such launch vehicles is now quite widespread,
the early near-monopoly by the United States and
the Soviet Union is rapidly breaking down. The
Japanese, the Europeans, the People’s Republic
of China, and India have all demonstrated their
abilities to develop launchers, and other nations
could produce launchers if they decided to make
such a commitment.
For reasons described earlier, the United States
has chosen to develop a manned system to
launch large unmanned payloads. In the interim,
25Craig Covault, “Firm Sets Down-Payment for Buy of Space Shut-
tle,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, Jan. 18, 1982.
work toward improvement of unmanned expend-
able launch vehicles has been minimal and there
has been no new unmanned launch vehicle de-
velopment. For a number of reasons, the cost of
shuttle launches will be higher, and their availa-
bility less frequent, than was originally an-
ticipated. All current U.S. expendable have also
risen sharply in price, in large part because of the
decision to develop the shuttle and phase out the
use of ELVs. This appears to leave several “win-
dows” in the potential marketplace for such
systems. The major gaps are in the area of low-
cost, relatively uncomplicated launches to low-
Earth orbit and low-cost synchronous orbit
emplacement of modest-sized payloads. It is to
the second of these that the Japanese and Euro-
pean developments seem particularly well suited.
In the United States, private investors are spon-
soring work toward the former “win dow" 26 Low-
cost space transportation, however, cannot at-
tract much of a market if it does not provide
reasonably high reliability, because the cost of
payloads continues to be high. Hence, the will-
ingness of a customer to entrust launch of a $30
million to $50 million communications satellite
to a low-cost launcher will depend more on
launcher reliability than on a small difference in
launch cost.
Given the trend in alternative unmanned sys-
tems the United States could consider, as an op-
tjon, developing a complementary, simple, reli-
able, and low-cost expendable booster that
would serve to test the state-of-the-art in such
systems and would act as a companion to the
shuttle. Such a development could be carried out
after a broadly based competition for the best
ideas that would contribute to the dual objectives
of low cost and adequate reliability. Such a pro-
gram would be far more amenable to private op-
eration, under appropriate safeguards, than
would the shuttle. The launch vehicle options for
the U.S. and international users would be ex-
panded, and the U.S. would keep a valuable part
of future space transportation alive and develop-
ing through this mechanism. “Competition” with
26see statement  of David Hannah in “Future Space programs:
1981, ” hearings before the Subcommittee on Space Science and
Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology, Sept.
21, 22, and 23, 1981.
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RCA Saturn launch aboard a Delta launcher
the shuttle would be allowed, recognizing that
the shuttle need not be used for all such launches.
SMALL UNMANNED SYSTEMS
There is a family of small sounding rockets and
derivative systems that provide invaluable access
to space for scientists with small-scale research
payloads. These may be extended in capability
for modest cost, and it would appear that open
entry into this field should be permitted. How-
ever, here, as in the case of private launchers for
low-Earth orbit, there is no policy in place for
regulating such launches. Nor is it clear which
Federal agency or agencies will be responsible
Photo credit: McDonald-Douglas Corp.
Payload Assist  Module for use in boosting shutt le
payloads to higher orbits
for generating and enforcing the necessary regula-
tions. In order to support industry’s efforts to de-
velop and launch its own vehicles it will be essen-
tial to designate a lead agency to coordinate these
efforts.
Applications R&D—Strengthening
the NASA Role
As pointed out earlier, existing space policy
identifies NASA as a performer of R&D for space
systems, while remaining silent on operational
responsibilities for the agency. The original NAS
legislation says nothing about specific applica-
tions, and beyond maintaining U.S. leadership
in space science and technology, there are few
indicators of the pace of programs that might be
generated. Thus, when the Nixon administration
decided that the communications R&D programs
of NASA were unnecessary and terminated the
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Applications Technology Satellite (ATS) series,
there was little basis for challenging that decision.
NASA does not lack the internal staff support
for a more vigorous role in space applications.
Such support could range from fundamental re-
search to demonstration of sensors and integrated
systems. However, there are other important in-
ternal claimants on NASA’s resources, particularly
the manned programs (shuttle, Spacelab) and
space science programs (including planetary ex-
ploration). Consequently, the annual budget re-
quest for NASA is a compromise among the var-
ious opportunities for new starts (if any), the
demands of each of the major agency programs
for continuing baseline support, and the costs of
prior-year commitments. The relative priority ac-
corded space applications R&D may vary con-
siderably in this setting, depending on NASA’s
management attitudes, the effectiveness of the
internal advocates for applications R&D, and the
urgency asociated with the applications areas in-
volved.
The policy responses to these situations involve
relatively minor adjustments to the existing frame-
work, but despite their limited nature, they may
be significant over time in generating additional
attention to space applications needs.
The first deals with NASA’s assigned responsi-
bilities for space applications. One option is that
space policy legislation recognize explicitly the
continuing need for a program of fundamental
research and demonstration activities in support
of space applications. This would include ad-
vancement of technology in areas where the ulti-
mate user is in the private sector as well as in
Government. The rationale for such a posture is
very similar to the argument used for Govern-
ment funding of basic research and demonstra-
tion in fields such as aeronautics. Specifically,
Government support may be appropriate when
the risk is high, many of the benefits are nonap-
propriable, the time for potential benefits to ac-
crue is long, and there are extensive potential
public benefits. As such technology becomes suit-
able for incorporation in an operational system,
the future operators should become responsible
for the planning and engineering to utilize the
new technology. judgments on where the bound-
ary between Government support and private or
user support lies must be made on a case-by-case
basis, for each technology is different in regard
to its operational adaptability and use. This issue,
i.e., what it is appropriate for NASA to support,
will therefore continue to be raised in the con-
text of the annual budget preparations. The ef-
fect of a policy statement clarifying the existence
of a NASA role will still result in debate on the
extent to which that role requires, for example,
a demonstration of a new technology on a satel-
lite platform. Such demonstrations may be specif-
ically allowed in the policy, but they would not
be required. There will continue to be a need for
considered judgment, discussion, and debate on
such questions. This suggests a second policy ini-
tiative.
One of the important aspects of any space ap-
plication is the user community. This communi-
ty may be small and poorly defined for a newly
identified or emerging application, or it may be
very large and amorphous as in the the case of
users of satellite weather data. Whatever its stage
of development, it should always be possible to
seek out and identify users and to have represent-
atives become involved in a review of the NASA
program in their area of interest (see ch. 9 for a
discussion). Approval of particular applications
demonstration systems could then be made with
the aid of informed advice from the community
affected by this work. NASA could be required
by legislation to convene and support such user
advisory groups and to include their reports as
part of the justifications for the applications ef-
forts proposed by the Agency. NASA has had
such groups, but their role has been primarily in-
ternal to NASA. What is suggested here is a re-
quirement that such groups report publicly to the
Congress as well as to OMB. It should be noted
that such user advisory groups would include
other Federal Government agencies and State
and local governments, as well as private mem-
bers.
One additional policy option may be consid-
ered. In order to highlight the stature and impor-
tance of NASA’s applications R&D efforts within
the agency, and their prominence in dealings
with OMB, it may be desirable to legislate an
. .
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organizational change within NASA. Specifically,
the applications programs could be made the
responsibility of a Deputy Administrator of Ap-
plications, who would be in parallel with a Depu-
ty Administrator of Operations and would have
overall responsibility for planning, coordinating
and implementing space applications research,
as well as selected satellite demonstrations. This
individual would support user advisory groups
and—given the appropriate policy changes—
could be responsible for operational systems
within NASA’s purview.
NASA’s role in support of space applications
R&D will continue to be uncertain, and funding
levels will remain unpredictable, without more
specific assignment of responsibility. NASA must
take care to solicit and respond to the views of
potential systems users; however, in cases where
prospective users fail to recognize the potential
of a new technology, or resist its introduction,
NASA may need to promote the new technology
actively.
International Aspects
part of the existing space policy of the United
States is that activities in space will be conducted
“for the benefit of all man kind,” and one of the
objectives of the U.S. space program is “Coopera-
tion . . . with other nations and groups of the na-
tions in work done . . . and in peaceful applica-
tion of the results thereof.” In international law,
outer space is recognized as a nonappropriable
area, analogous to the high seas, that is open to
use by any state. From its very beginning, the
space program has been directed toward foreign
policy concerns and has recognized the inherent-
ly global nature of much that is done in space.
This is particularly true for many space applica-
tions areas. Satellite systems that receive or trans-
mit information have the capacity to serve a wide
range of international users and to provide data
about any part of the globe. Other systems, such
as those for materials processing in space, depend
upon the uniqueness of the space environment
(e.g. microgravity) and are not inherently global
in nature; nevertheless, since they would take
place in space, outside the territory of any State,
they would be affected by international laws and
regulations. They have attracted the interest of
several users other than the United States.
In the international arena, two major forces are
at work—competition and cooperation (see ch.
7). In the early years of the development and evo-
lution of space technology, the virtual monopo-
ly on space technology of the two major powers
made it both desirable and necessary for other
nations to cooperate in order to gain access to
space for scientific and applications purposes. As
the technical sophistication of other nations has
increased, some have developed an independent
capability for designing and constructing satellites
and launchers.
Though the United States as a matter of national
policy has favored international competition as
a device for improving goods and services and
lowering their costs, there are circumstances
under which this policy is modified, e.g., when
a regulated monopoly supplier, such as
INTELSAT, is established as described in earlier
sections. Participants are required to plan national
and regional satellite communications systems so
as not to damage INTELSAT’S technical and finan-
cial integrity. The U.S. approach to international
competition has been subject to additional con-
straints. For example, national security considera-
tions would force the United States to restrict en-
try of foreign steel at the point where U.S. in-
dustrial capacity was being threatened. U.S. in-
dustry is also protected, in principle, against
predatory pricing, “dumping,” and other non-
competitive practices, in space, the U.S. policy
toward satellite and satellite subsystem develop-
ment, provision of services via space systems, and
development of space launching capability has
tended to favor, respectively, open competition,
single systems, and nonproliferation of launch
capability.
U.S. policy must recognize the competitive
capabilities that already exist overseas, and the
plans of several nations to initiate and continue
the development of competitive systems. Where
conditions warrant (such as when there are lim-
ited markets or problems with signal interference
from competitive systems), U.S. policy may favor
limiting competition by fostering a single global
system, In other circumstances, such as meteoro-
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logical observations, the united States has coop-
erated with other nations in the use of satellites
for data collection, and the coordination of sep-
arately funded national systems. The exchange
of information permits all participants to derive
benefits that exceed the returns from a solely na-
tional system and at much less cost for each indi-
vidual participant.
Telecommunications Services
In telecommunications, the United States sup-
ported single cooperative global systems for spe-
cific services and helped to establish INTELSAT
and later INMARSAT. The U.S. position is based
on the fact that economies of scale, the size of
the international market, and the requirement for
compatible reception and transmission of signals
favor a highly integrated network with a single
management structure. The situation becomes
more complex, however, for proposed direct
broadcast satellite (DBS) systems, in which the
satellite distributes signals directly to individual
receivers. The technical and political feasibility
of such a system was demonstrated almost a dec-
ade ago with the United States- India experimental
program (SITE) for providing educational televi-
sion materials to remote villages using one of the
U.S. ATS series. Such systems, which have been
proposed by a number of U.S. and European en-
tities, may threaten the existing structure of ter-
restrial broadcast stations and cable television
distribution, and hence have been approached
with great caution by the United States and
foreign regulatory and communications au-
thorities.
Direct broadcasting raises both domestic and
international concerns about regulation of pro-
gram content and competition with local pro-
grams. One of the principal worries is the trans-
mission of signals beyond national boundaries,
either because of unintentional “spillover” or in-
tentional beaming of signals across international
borders. These concerns have been debated at
the U.N. and other international bodies for many
years, without agreement on regulations for DBS
systems. The United States has opposed restric-
tions on the international flow of information in-
cluding those proposed for DBS. Severe limita-
tions on spillover could create serious problems
for the satellite system designer, for the shaping
of ground patterns for signals broadcast from
satellites is not a mature technology. Restrictions
on transmitting across borders could affect the
economic prospects for proposed DBS networks,
especially in Europe.
For direct broadcast systems, many of these po-
litical and economic concerns are reflected in
discussions of technical requirements, limitations
on orbital spacing for geosynchronous satellites,
and the allocation of frequencies. The major
forum has been the International Telecommuni-
cations Union (ITU) and its periodic global and
regional Administrative Radio Conferences. As in
many other international bodies, the majority of
the participating countries are not highly devel-
oped technologically, and this fact often makes
it difficult to gain acceptance for new space serv-
ices. It is also often the case that the technology
associated with such services is ahead of the other
necessary infrastructure to make use of the sys-
tem, particularly trained technical and managerial
personnel. Often, the resolution of ostensibly
technical issues revolves around political conflicts
between developed and less developed coun-
tries, Soviet bloc and Western states, and other
such divisions. in such situations, the inter-
national regulatory process may require consid-
erable clarification and debate about the industry
structure, the sociological impacts, economics,
and other key features of new service.
All nations, especially in the third world, share
legitimate concerns about the availability of ade-
quate electromagnetic spectrum for current and
future services and, as pointed out earlier, infor-
mation content and use of the spectrum for DBS
systems. The space applications policy options
that are to be considered should reflect these con-
cerns, as well as U.S. public interest as a leading
user and producer of telecommunications tech-
nology. The options tend to fall into two general
categories, aggressive competition and broad-
ened cooperation.
AGGRESSIVE COMPETITION
Many of the possible initiatives have been pio-
neered in this area by the long-standing practices
that the united States has followed in helping to
Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment • 295
organize and extend the role of INTELSAT. Ag-
gressive competition by the United States in this
growing marketplace has been tempered by the
necessity of gaining broad acceptance of and
adherence to the INTELSAT agreements, and by
the fact that, until now, the United States has
been the sole supplier of most of INTELSAT’S
hardware and managerial expertise. Political
forces have necessitated more sharing of procure-
ments and technology than might be the case in
a highly competitive environment. Future devel-
opments under the broad umbrellas of INTELSAT
and INMARSAT can be expected to be similarly
constrained; competition for I NTELSAT contracts
is likely to be more intense than in the past. How-
ever, there are new services that do not fall under
these umbrellas and are being pursued by U.S.
suppliers. These services involve purchases of
ground or space hardware that are needed for
a foreign system, via a solicitation that is open
to any qualified supplier.
One principal area of concern has been the dif-
ference between U.S. practice–which calls for
the rigorous application of antitrust provisions to
any U.S. firms intending to bid—and that of our
overseas competitors, where there is often a high
degree of collaboration among Government and
various industry suppliers. Hence, if we were to
adopt a policy of “aggressive competition” in this
area, it would imply that U.S. policy on antitrust
restrictions and restrictions on other forms of in-
formation exchange for space communications
would be relaxed in order to encourage joint ven-
tures by industry the better to exploit the U.S.
technology base. This plan could be accom-
plished by encouraging industry to take advan-
tage of a procedure already available in the
Justice Department Antitrust Division to render
prompt advisory opinions in response to industry
requests to work together on such projects. This
would have the effect of strengthening the U.S.
position vis-a-vis our overseas competitors.
Another possibility is expanded collaboration
with overseas firms. One issue that results from
such collaboration is: How to guard against the
possibility that technology transfer between the
United States and foreign partners may enable
them to become more competitive on subse-
quent contracts? U.S. suppliers have a great deal
of technological know-how as a result of a broad
set of space and telecommunications develop-
ments, both publicly and privately funded, over
the past 20 to 40 years. Other nations have highly
skilled scientists and engineers similarly engaged,
although generally not with the same level of
space systems experience. For specific technol-
ogies, e.g., reliable, long-life, high-power travel-
ing wave tubes, U.S. suppliers may find that they
can benefit from technology that exists overseas.
[n other areas, such as total systems design, the
reverse may be true. In some cases, cooperative
ventures with overseas firms may be desirable for
political reasons; for instance, in negotiating the
contracts for the recent sale of equipment and
services to Arabsat, a communications satellite
consortium consisting of a number of Middle East-
ern countries, Ford Aerospace could not be the
prime contractor because of its position on the
“Arab blacklist” for having dealt with Israel. Ford
then became a subcontractor (although receiv-
ing a majority of the value of the contract) to a
French firm, Aerospatiale, which took the lead
in negotiations.
For a number of reasons, U.S. policy has fa-
vored limited duplicative launch vehicle develop-
ments, but this policy has not been strongly pur-
sued. Both technology transfer from the United
States, as in the case of the sale of Thor-Delta
technology to Japan, and indigenous develop-
ments such as the European Ariane vehicle, have
resulted in the imminent availability of capable,
yet relatively low-cost foreign launch vehicles for
applications payloads that are competitive with
United States and Soviet systems. Thus, we are
at the threshold of a period in which “aggressive
competition’ will probably be practiced by
others, whether or not the U.S. policy favors such
a posture.
BROADENED COOPERATION
The growth in foreign technical capabilities,
their aspirations for a greater market share for
their industry, and their desire to have more inde-
pendent control over development and deploy-
ment of space systems for their own use have
changed the space applications outlook. The ex-
istence of an independent launch capability is
particularly significant in this regard, because it
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permits a great deal of flexibility in placing
competitive national or regional systems into orbit
and in providing a variety of specialized services.
In the communications realm there would ap-
pear to be little prospect of a near-term threat to
INTELSAT’S long-distance and overseas markets
from independent launch of satellites for general
purpose communications because of the size and
sophistication of the INTELSAT system and its ex-
pected ability to keep pace with technology. For
INTELSAT and also for INMARSAT, it appears that
no U.S. policy change is needed. With regard to
a foreign nation’s internal communications sys-
tems, current U.S. policy recognizes that this is
an internal question for the specific nation, and—
given that it constitutes no violation of other inter-
national agreements—would launch or otherwise
support such a system in accord with established
principles regarding foreign cooperation.
A possible future problem for INTELSAT may
come from the proliferation of regional systems
such as Arabsat, Nordsat, and others. A policy
of “broadened cooperation” would entail a
strong U.S. effort to bring such systems under a
cooperative umbrella. The basis for this policy
would be both economic and technical. Econom-
ically, it would be advantageous to use the
larger-scale requirements already embodied in
INTELSAT to provide additional service exten-
sions for those nations able to use the large-
capacity ground stations currently needed for
system compatibility. For nations with limited in-
ternal communications infrastructure, satellite
systems designed to operate with smaller and
much less costly ground stations are attractive.
The technology for these systems has been dem-
onstrated and several such systems are planned
or in operation, and U.S. policy might be to help
extend this type of service to a much wider
number of potential users. The mechanism for
this could be a separate subdivision within
INTELSAT (for specialized services) or a new
cooperative international/ enterprise. In both
cases, the basic objective would be to provide
multiple small users access to high-quality com-
munications services that are more compatible
with a limited local infrastructure, and with a
limited ability to invest in ground station capac-
ity. The system would be optimized for low-ca-
pacity ground stations and would make maxi-
mum use of the spectrum through multiple spot
beams, “on-call” service, and other techniques
appropriate for low-volume users. In principle,
any nation should be able to obtain satellite com-
munications that are matched to its particular
stage of development, economic needs, and the
density of local communications infrastructure.
By providing leadership in identifying the spe-
cialized needs of smaller nations and translating
these into technical specifications for communi-
cations services, the United States can accelerate
the process whereby space communications can
be readily provided to all nations. By bringing
these multiple small users together, the aggre-
gated market should be capable of supporting ap-
propriate satellites. This would tend to reduce or
eliminate the need for ad hoc groups of nations
to organize independent regional systems. Conse-
quently, greater technical compatibility would be
ensured, and there would be greater likelihood
of continuing technological advances to improve
and broaden the services provided. The proposed
entity would be analogous to a local telephone
system, connected through a switching system
to a larger network, but providing individual lines
to many small subscribers at the local level.
Land Remote Sensing
Remote sensing from space has inherent inter-
national ramifications because the vantage point
provided by the orbiting space platform provides
broad synoptic coverage that is not limited to na-
tional boundaries. In contrast to the international
cooperation that is essential for a successful global
communications system, remote sensing does not
require direct cooperation to be successfully pur-
sued—although cooperation in providing
“ground truth” information is very useful, and
foreign ground stations collect data that would
otherwise be unavailable. The fact that coopera-
tion is not essential has allowed Earth remote
sensing to develop without a clear, international
framework that would deal with such questions
as rights to data, maximum resolution limits, tech-
nical characteristics of the sensors and platforms,
data format, orbits and repetition rates, and a host
of other policy and operational questions.
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In approaching the international aspects of
remote sensing, the United States has been
guided by several principles: 1) overflight of a na-
tion by an orbiting satellite should not be prohib-
ited, assuming other treaty obligations are ful-
filled; 2) the civilian remote-sensing program
should not give rise to negative reactions that
might constrain military and intelligence uses of
space platforms; 3) cooperation with other na-
tions is encouraged; and 4) data collected are to
be made available to any interested party on a
nondiscriminatory basis, for a fee. The early flights
of the Landsat series of satellites resulted from
unilateral decisions of the United States; interna-
tional aspects were incorporated largely as by-
products of the effort to generate users and
develop a better understanding of user re-
quirements. Consistent with the principles listed
above, the data have been been made available
widely on a nondiscriminatory basis, Earth sta-
tions have been sold to enable other nations to
collect data directly, and careful choice of resolu-
tion limits and sensor performance characteristics
has caused many of the early concerns about
Landsat as a spy in the sky to dissipate. in the in-
terim, the United States officially revealed its
military reconnaissance satellite program—con-
firming what most observers already believed–so
that, at least publicly, the role of Landsat and its
follow-on systems could be more clearly ad-
dressed in the international arena.
The United States clearly had a significant lead
in civilian remote sensing—almost a decade
ahead of Soviet and emerging European and Jap-
anese systems. With the passage of time and the
lack of a clear U.S. commitment to maintaining
an operational Landsat, the development of com-
petitive systems such as the French SPOT was a
logical consequence. Some policy options avail-
able to the United States before the French de-
cided to proceed with SPOT may now be fore-
closed by its existence; they will at least be
significantly modified. In general, the policy op-
tions fall into three categories: aggressive compe-
tition, laissez faire, and expanded cooperation.
AGGRESSIVE COMPETITION
It may be assumed that U.S. technology, in-
cluding what is available from national security
systems, would permit significant improvements
in ground resolution, and that multispectral sens-
ing could be provided at adequate resolutions
and at appropriate wave lengths, on a timely
basis, for international as well as national use.
Therefore, it is likely that anything other nations
may choose to provide via an Earth-sensing sys-
tem, could be matched or improved upon by the
United States if there were adequate budget sup-
port and commitment. It should be kept in mind
that any U.S. system will have to compete with
SPOT and its derivatives, whose products are not
likely to be priced to reflect their true cost. Polit-
ical considerations of national prestige and ad-
vancement of high-technology enterprises may
transcend questions of cost recovery. In short,
aggressive competition is not likely to cause sys-
tems like SPOT to be discontinued, although it
may make such investments less profitable.
The implications of aggressive competition ap-
pear to favor a continued role for Government
as the operator of the space segment, but with
a clear commitment to operational status for the
system. This commitment would assure continui-
ty of data, adequate processing capacity to in-
sure timely availability of data to international as
well as national users, and an active R&D pro-
gram to support system improvements.
Pricing of products would be competitive with
alternative systems. The premise would be that
the overall global and national benefits, particu-
larly the nonmonetary ones, would justify the
subsidy to this system. Examples of the latter in-
clude the goodwill that would accrue to the
United States from use of data forewarning crop
failures, severe storms, or other hazards; post-
disaster monitoring; monitoring the global bio-
mass inventory; monitoring the status of the
ozone layer and other worldwide environmen-
tal phenomena.
LAISSEZ FAIRE
As an alternative, the united States could also
turn over responsibility for operational systems,
if any, to the private sector and buy the data it
needs from whatever source was most appropri-
ate—including foreign systems. Government
users might be able to obtain appropriately
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screened data from classified systems, but the
principal sources of remotely sensed data would
be commercial suppliers. The market would de-
termine pricing and availability, and Government
would be precluded from direct competition with
the private sector. This posture would not fore-
close a continuing R&D role for NASA, but would
require that any operational system be developed
in the private sector. Satellites that serve to dem-
onstrate a sensor or system could be Government
funded or might be jointly supported. Pricing of
products would be set by the private supplier,
perhaps with Government participation. Because
it can be expected that foreign systems will be
subsidized, a private U.S. operator may have dif-
ficulty competing unless the Federal Government
provides equivalent support. if industry did not
see an adequate market for remotely sensed
products and did not purchase a satellite, there
would be no operational U.S. system, and U.S.
users would have to seek other means of obtain-
ing their data.
BROADENED COOPERATION
Alternatively, the United States could seek to
extend the arena of formal cooperative arrange-
ments to include ocean and land remote sens-
ing. Under such broadened cooperation, the pat-
tern established under INTELSAT would be
adapted to the remote-sensing field, For exam-
ple, it should be possible to define a single man-
agement authority that would assume responsibil-
ity for global operational systems, establish tech-
nical specifications, procure satellites, and oper-
ate the satellites and the initial data reception and
processing facilities.
In order to make such a new international en-
tity possible, participating nations would be ex-
pected to forego launch and operation of national
systems for civilian purposes. This would not pre-
clude national R&D on sensors or platforms; but
such systems could not substitute for commit-
ments to the global consortium. Successful R&D
could be integrated into the global system under
a negotiated arrangement. Basically, the United
States would be proposing to join together with
other nations in launching and operating a com-
mon set of data collection platforms, with reve-
nue to be obtained from the sale of raw or proc-
essed data. The returned data stream from the
common operational platforms would be en-
coded so that only consortium members would
have direct access to the data. Others would be
able to purchase data from the central organiza-
tion at established prices. The rationale for this
approach is based on the following.
l
l
l
l
l
l
Market. -the current limited and uncertain
market for these data makes competitive sys-
tems redundant, and is not adequate to sup-
port a commercial operator.
Interest.—There is broad international inter-
est in such systems.
Competition. –It is too late for the United
States successfully to preempt foreign com-
petition by offering greater or more favorable
access to future Landsat data.
Cooperation.— By joining together, large and
small nations can participate in the benefits
from a common global system with less fear
of exploitation by particular nations or pri-
vate firms.
Globa/ systems. –This approach would facil-
itate global monitoring systems for critical en-
vironmental factors such as forest inventory,
biomass, carbon dioxide and ozone concen-
trations, which could be operated as joint
projects by the consortium.
Economies of sca/e.–Economies of scale
could be achieved by common use of Earth
facilities and data processing facilities to
serve multiple customers, and lower cost sat-
ellites. These advantages are similar to those
that INTELSAT enjoys in its multiple-satellite
purchases.
The initial startup period for the consortium
could be handled in a way very similar to the
INTELSAT model, with interim agreements in
force for a fixed period during which the detailed
operating practices would be negotiated. Some
of the current practices that are followed in the
communications area could be expected to carry
over to the global satellite consortium, including
procedures for procuring operational satellites,
contracting for launch services, and establishing
satellite control facilities. The ground processing
of data is sufficiently complex and sensitive (par-
ticularly control of decoding) that the initial stages
should probably be a consortium responsibility,
Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment l 299
rather than being handled by individual govern-
ments, with subsequent interpretation made by
other entities, either government or private sec-
tor. For the purposes of this assessment, such a
consortium will be called “Globesat.”
The differences between communications and
remote sensing need additional comment. Com-
munications requires active cooperation, remote
sensing does not. Any alternatives to a global co-
operative entity such as INTELSAT still require
agreement and compatibility between separate
states. The alternative to Globesat, however, is
completely independent national collection plat-
forms. Communications involves a shared benefit
between the linked points, while the sensed data
from an observation satellite are primarily of value
to the controlling authority or to entities who use
the data for specific purposes.
Privately owned international communications
have, for the most part, minimal national securi-
ty implications. Conversely, increasing resolution
for satellite observations leads inevitably to na-
tional sensitivities regarding the detection of mil-
itary installations, troop or equipment deploy-
ment, and other sensitive information. Globesat
would provide a forum for reaching common
agreement on system specifications and could
serve to alleviate sensitivities on the part of par-
ticipating nations regarding the nature of civilian
remote-sensing data that would be available re-
garding their country. Using encoded data
streams would allow selective processing so that
it would be possible to limit access to high-resolu-
tion data from a particular nation if that nation
required imposition of such limitations. It can be
expected that most nations would avail them-
selves of this privilege, charging a fee for foreign
or private sector access to high-resolution data.
Alternatively, it could be Globesat policy that a
nation could restrict access to high-resolution
data for a fixed maximum period of time, say 6
or 12 months. This would reduce sensitivity about
military movements and would enable national
interests to have the first opportunity to use the
data. As pointed out earlier, U.S. policy has been
to gain acceptance of “open skies” and “open
data” policies; restrictive actions carried out
under Globesat might appear to undermine these
positions. However, the basic concern of U.S.
policy, that is, the principle that there shall be
open access via satellite systems to co//ect such
data, is not infringed by the Globesat practices
suggested above. It is simply the civilian use that
is being controlled, if specified by a participating
country, and this use would reflect legitimate eco-
nomic interests that the United States also shares.
Thus, it appears that Globesat could operate in
a fashion that is both consistent with longstand-
ing principles of U.S. policy and yet respect the
valid concerns of other participating nations.
Is it possible for Globesat to function under the
auspices of the United Nations? There are organi-
zations, such as the World Health Organization
(WHO) and World Meteorological Organization
(WMO), that have successfully overcome some
of the inhibiting characteristics of such broad
sponsorship. However, it would appear that
Globesat is not suitable to a U.N. format, at least
in its formative stages. The large number of com-
peting interests, coupled with fears of exploita-
tion, would likely make reaching agreement on
a system very difficult. The overwhelming dif-
ficulties that the Law of the Sea Treaty has faced
are a case in point. Transition to a U .N. relation-
ship would be an issue for consideration at some
future time. In 1978 France proposed, at the
U. N., that a remote-sensing agency be estab-
lished to monitor worldwide military activities
and disseminate information to all countries,
thereby forestalling aggression. If such a plan
were agreed upon, Globesat could be the ap-
propriate entity to operate the system.
A major concern in a system with multiple
owners and users is the adequacy of data collec-
tion to serve user needs. Telephone, television,
and digital data are the principal components of
international communications traffic, and com-
mon systems can be designed to fit a variety of
such users. For Earth observations, however, satis-
fying user needs is not as simple; the users are
not well organized, and their data needs are not
standardized or well understood. In addition, the
most desirable observation times, frequency of
observation, and spectral bands differ from user
to user. Hence a difficult set of compromises
would be required to establish the satellite system
specifications. Combining several sensors on a
single platform would be traded off against the
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advantages of multiple platforms with fewer sen-
sors. Presumably sensors such as those planned
for SPOT and Landsat would be candidates, as
well as others that may originate elsewhere. In
Globesat, the united States would have no guar-
antee that the compromises would satisfy U.S.
needs; however, because the united States
would be a major user and source of revenue,
it is likely that these needs would be given some
priority. There is also no guarantee of continuity
of data, but there is no guarantee of data con-
tinuity for strictly national systems, either. It seems
probable that an international consortium such
as Globesat, with broad user and national sup-
port, would have a greater commitment to con-
tinuity than would be the case for a single U.S.
supplier.
The adoption of the Globesat option would im-
ply that several policy options defined earlier
would become impractical. For example, crea-
tion of a single national regulated satellite
operator for U.S. remote sensing would be coun-
ter to the principles upon which Globesat would
be based; Globesat would substitute for the U.S.
operating entity. However, there would be a
need for a U.S. representative to Globesat that
would reflect the views of various U.S. users. This
representative could be a designated Govern-
ment agency, and existing group, or a new enti-
ty that would have responsibility for distribution
of U.S. data, as well as coordination of the various
user community needs.
An important unknown in considering Globesat
would be the position of the Soviet Union. The
Soviet Union has operated remote-sensing satel-
lites for many years, and recently announced its
intention to provide a “continuous-look” system
similar to Western satellites. The Soviets could use
such a system to compete with Globesat; alterna-
tively, if they were to join, the difficulties of agree-
ing on system specifications and operating details
might be much greater.
In summary, many of the international con-
cerns about remote sensing could be suitably ac-
commodated within a global consortium that
could also fulfill U.S. needs. At this point, it may
not be possible to obtain international agreement
on such a structure because of the prolonged pe-
riod of U.S. indecision regarding remote sensing
and the resulting efforts by other nations to satis-
fy their needs through independent systems. It
would take a strong U.S. commitment to Globe-
sat for such an entity to be initiated and estab-
lished.
Economic Measures
One of the common characteristics of space
applications systems is the high entry cost asso-
ciated with the development and institution of
new systems. The principal hurdle has been the
high cost and difficulty of transporting the satellite
to its proper orbit. A large additional cost results
from the absolute necessity for extremely high
reliability for the payload, which must function
for long periods of time without maintenance or
repairs. Complicating factors are the environmen-
tal stresses: the shock and vibration of launch,
and the vacuum, low gravity, alternating heat and
cold, electromagnetic radiation, and solar wind
of space. The net result, given the small numbers
of satellites actually flown, has been that virtual-
ly each satellite has been a new and delicate
design requiring its own set of tests.
[t is possible that routine and reliable access
to space via the shuttle and the availability of
astronauts to perform tasks such as replacement
of wornout parts, repairs, or fueling could lead
to an era of less costly satellite platforms. As part
of the shuttle program, many of these concepts
will be explored, including developing a common
spacecraft bus that would provide standardized
housekeeping functions needed for all satellites,
such as command and data links, power, attitude
control and station keeping. In addition, NASA
has offered small amounts of shuttle payload bay
space at very low cost, the so-called getaway
specials, for small experimental packages. But
these are only the first steps along the road to-
ward lower cost access to space, and it is not like-
ly that significant change will occur, at least in
the next decade or so. Satellite maintenance is
severely limited by our inability (even with the
shuttle) to transport men into geosynchronous
orbit, where most communications satellites are
located. Thus, although steps are being taken that
could lower the high cost of satellites, this will
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remain a significant barrier to commercial entry
into space applications service areas.
Beyond the direct cost of the satellite, there are
additional costs for the construction and opera-
tion of ground facilities to link with the satellite.
Communications and remote sensing require ex-
tensive satellite control facilities, ground receiv-
ing stations, and data processing systems. Materi-
als processing in space is relatively free of such
costs.
With such significant entry costs, private sec-
tor involvement in space applications has been
limited (see ch. 8). Government policy has served
as a primary stimulus for such involvement, pri-
marily in communications, through regulation,
joint Endeavor Agreements, and congressional
actions such as the COMSAT Act, the National
Aeronautics and Space Act (for R&D), and
INMARSAT legislation. If there is to be a new
thrust to open space applications for commer-
cial exploitation, the economic barriers to entry
need to be addressed. Several approaches appear
feasible.
Space Development Bank
Government has used the device of a develop-
ment bank or system of loan guarantees to
finance socially desirable objectives in a wide
variety of settings, from international develop-
ment (World Bank, Interamerican Development
Bank) to sale of U.S. products (Export-import
Bank) and U.S. housing (Federal Housing Admin-
istration and Veterans Administration loans, Fed-
eral National Mortgage Association, Farm Credit
Administration, Federal Home Loan Bank Sys-
tem). More recently, loans or loan guarantees
have been used to make a college education
more accessible, to prevent the collapse of major
corporations (Lockheed and Chrysler), and to
provide incentives to small business. Thus, a
determination by the Congress that the growth
of space applications was socially and national-
ly desirable and that the preferred approach was
to keep such growth as much as possible in the
private commercial sector, would open the possi-
bility of establishing a Space Development Bank
(SDB). A similar concept, the Space industrializa-
tion Corporation (H. R. 2337), has been the sub-
ject of recent congressional hearings. (A more
detailed discussion of this specific piece of legisla-
tion can be found in chapter 8.)
The role of SDB would be to: 1 ) receive pro-
posals for space applications investments;
2) evaluate these applications; 3) if acceptable,
provide funds at preferential loan rates and
establish a deferred payback schedule; and
4) monitor the progress of the business plans on
the basis of which loans have been made. SDB
would require initial authority for drawing rights
upon Treasury funds appropriated for this pur-
pose, but in the long term the SDB would be self-
sustaining and pay back the initial appropriations.
SDB would provide an initial subsidy to qualified
entrepreneurs, with the amounts and areas to be
determined by negotiation and the developing
marketplace.
SDB could also provide incentives for private
entities to form joint ventures for specific serv-
ices for which a single supplier was not available
or appropriate. As such, SDB could act as a quasi-
regulatory body, controlling entry into space ap-
plications fields to maximize social benefit. (It
should be recognized that there are limitations
to this role. For corporations like COMSAT, with
a continuing statutory role in space applications
and a large and growing revenue base, entry into
new space applications services would not de-
pend on incentives such as SDB would provide.
An expansion of COMSAT into other areas, par-
ticularly remote sensing, would create—de-
facto–a commercial space applications monopo-
ly. As explained earlier, the public interest would
likely require that such a monopoly be accom-
panied by a Federal regulatory authority.)
SDB, on the other hand, would be associated
with more open entry. The provision of capital
at low rates would serve to attract a broad array
of potential suppliers, and a separate regulatory
body may, therefore, not be needed.
Tax Incentives
The tax incentive is another governmental
device used to promote socially beneficial ac-
tions. It is currently being employed to encourage
R&D generally, to stimulate energy conservation
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and use of solar energy, and to encourage invest- is almost completely free from Government man-
ment in new plant and equipment. The advan- agement and, therefore, more nearly reflects the
tage of the tax incentive is that very little addi- realities of the marketplace as it is understood by
tional Government manpower is needed to ad- the private firms.
minister its provisions—and the decision making
INTEGRATED POLICY OPTIONS FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS
The previous section outlined a number of indi-
vidual policy options to address specific issues.
In this section, the policy options will be grouped
into larger patterns or themes to give a more inte-
grated picture of the range of options available.
It should be recognized that the grouping of
policy options presented in the following material
is illustrative and may be modified by the addi-
tion or deletion of specific elements. The options
are not necessarily exclusive of one another. They
are presented in this integrated fashion to give
a better understanding of the types of actions that
may be contemplated and the relationships
among the various policy elements.
Continuing the Current
Policy Framework
Current policy, as expressed by the existing leg-
islation, permits a great deal of flexibility to orga-
nize and conduct a strong space applications pro-
gram and gives implicit authority to Government,
not only to conduct R&D but also to operate sys-
tems. There is, in addition, wide latitude to assign
specific tasks to agencies and to permit private-
sector participation in essentially any phase of ac-
tivity. Thus, the role of the private sector in re-
mote sensing could be expanded to include oper-
ation of space and ground segments simply by
Administrative action. (Transfer of ownership of
existing satellites systems, which are Government
property, would require separate congressional
action. ) The policy framework for space commu-
nications is also flexible and permits both Govern-
ment and private sector roles in a wide range of
services, subject to FCC and ITU regulations. The
specialized position of COMSAT is defined in leg-
islation and therefore restricts the choices in this
area. In transportation and materials processing,
there is similar flexibility with respect to the insti-
tutional structure and the extent of the private
role.
Continuation of the current legislative frame-
work permits policies ranging from strong Gov-
ernment leadership and participation to a laissez
faire approach in which Government stands aside
and explicitly invites private groups to assume a
larger role, without emphasizing or requiring any
one approach.
While there is a wide latitude permitted by the
current policies, there are no clear goals, no
timetable and no overall direction for space ap-
plications. As a result, it is difficult for the Govern-
ment to identify and pursue the benefits of space
applications.
If nothing is proposed beyond current policy
and practice, neither the U.S. private sector, the
Government, nor the public at large will benefit
fully from the country’s large space investments
over the past 24 years. U.S. leadership in many
areas will be lost. Viewed in an historical perspec-
tive, such a course would raise serious questions
about our ability as a nation to pursue long-term
objectives when faced with short-term problems.
Increasing the International Emphasis
A number of policy options hinge upon the ap-
proach that is adopted toward international com-
petition and cooperation. This approach suggests
a strategy that may be termed “international em-
phasis.” Under this approach, the United States
could adopt a general guideline; i.e., “all in-
herently international civilian space applications
should be carried out on a cooperative interna-
tional basis, and be the subject of an agreed in-
stitutional framework. ” If this approach were
followed, we would pursue the establishment of
an entity like Globesat for remote sensing and
Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment l 303
a new communications satellite structure that
would vigorously develop the market for small,
low-volume users. U.S. needs would be met by
these entities, as appropriate; as a consequence,
questions of private-sector entry and foreign com-
petition would become moot–given that the nec-
essary international entities were successfully
established. The United States could designate
COMSAT and/or other entities to represent it in
these new international bodies. Other applica-
tions such as transportation and materials proc-
essing are not inherently international and would
therefore be treated separately. NASA would con-
tinue to do R&D on new technology, but on a
much more limited basis. It might also do some
development work under contract with interna-
tional organizations. The requirements of U.S.
users would need to be identified systematically
and formally in order to provide adequate, timely
specifications for Globesat and other entities.
Responsibility for convening such groups and in-
corporating their needs into U.S. positions in the
appropriate international bodies would reside
with the chosen U.S. representative.
A policy with an international empahsis is at-
tractive because it tends to clarify so many other
related aspects of the policy picture. It has the
effect of moving operational responsibilities out
of the U.S. Government, via an international
quasi-private entity, and thereby reducing direct
Government expenditures for such systems. It is
consistent with U.S. policy in communications,
in which we have strongly supported a single
global system via INTELSAT and INMARSAT. [t
clarifies the issue of international competition in
remote sensing by creating a strong incentive to
participate in the common, i.e., Globesat, system.
This option also carries with it a number of risks
or limitations. The outcome of such a U.S. initia-
tive on the international front is problematic.
Sovereign nations will tend to protect their inter-
ests and seek advantages in this area as in many
others. It would therefore require considerable
care in outlining the advantages of a common sys-
tem (or systems, e.g., using SPOT as well as Land-
sat technology) and in creating strong incentives
for the principal initial partners to join with the
United States. Though the optimal moment for
this proposal has probably passed, there is still
an opportunity to create a common entity—if the
United States moves promptly and decisively.
Another aspect of this approach is that it implies
some loss of independent action on the part of
the United States. We would be (as in INTELSAT)
foregoing our own independent systems in favor
of a cooperative international effort. Arriving at
an agreement among the international partici-
pants regarding the number of satellites, their sen-
sors, data formats, and other operating charac-
teristics, as well as the procurement guidelines
for equipment and services, may be a difficult and
prolonged task. The procurement guidelines can
be expected to result in mandatory sharing of the
development and production tasks among the
participants and, hence, a possible reduction in
U.S. contracts as well as sharing of U.S.-devel-
oped technology with overseas firms.
Finally, the reality of the growing independent
space capabilities of other nations means that
they will eventually be able to carry out such a
plan without U.S. participation, if they choose.
Although such a prospect is not likely in the near
future, other data collection systems will be
launched, if Globesat is not established, each of
which will compete for a limited market. The
alternative of a common system has strong eco-
nomic and political advantages.
Increasing the National
Private Sector Role
The approach here would be to extend the cur-
rent U.S. practice of maintaining an independent
data collection system, but one that gives the pri-
vate sector a stronger role in specifying the system
and the method of operation on. The basic prin-
ciple would be: “/t is U.S. policy that the private
sector own and operate space systems. ” There
are several basic approaches:
l Open entry. —This would involve encourag-
ing multiple suppliers to provide services. In-
centives would be offered via tax breaks,
loans, and other financial aid via an SDB; in
addition there might be guarantees of Gov-
ernment data purchase, no Government
competition, and measures to preclude a
monopoly supplier. In communications, the
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conditions for regulated, open entry have al-
ready been established.
Private monopoly. —This alternative applies
principally to remote sensing. In this case,
the entity could be an already established
corporation, or a new public-private com-
pany. Ground-segment ownership would
follow the choice for ownership of the space
segment, as explained in an earlier section.
The choice of a private-sector monopoly
supplier would be accompanied by estab-
lishing a regulatory body.
Government rnonopoly. -Continuation of
the current Government monopoly for the
space segment would be possible, with in-
creased private-sector participation in the
ownership and operation of all the ground
data reception and processing stations. This
recognizes the currently limited marketplace
and the need for continued Government
support of operations to ensure maximum
public benefit from space applications, par-
ticularly remote-sensing systems.
Because this approach is principally an exten-
sion of current policies, though increased em-
phasis is given to the role of the private sector—a
point of view strongly supported by the Reagan
administration—it probably would be the easiest
on which to develop a consensus between Con-
gress and the executive branch. But a national
consensus does not necessarily lead to a satisfac-
tory resolution of all the issues, particularly in
view of the degree of sophistication and in-
dependence found in other nations today. The
United States can attempt to meet this competi-
tion and continue its own independent develop-
ments, including increased private-sector involve-
ment, or it can seek a collaborative and cooper-
ative framework as outlined in the previous sec-
tion. If we choose an independent course, addi-
tional policy questions arise, such as whether U.S.
private firms and/or the Government will buy
data from foreign systems. The approach outlined
here is consistent with a policy that would per-
mit purchase of data from a foreign system by pri-
vate users without restriction, but subject Govern-
ment users to whatever purchase agreements had
been negotiated with a private U.S. supplier (or
suppliers).
Increased High-Level Policy Focus
Spanning the range of all of the above ap-
proaches, there is the suggestion that both cur-
rent and continuing developments in space policy
would profit from increased high-level attention
in the executive branch and Congress. There are
several approaches that may be taken to accom-
plish this increased high-level review and deci-
sion on national space policy. They are all com-
patible with the various policy options discussed
in the preceding sections. The premise on which
they are based is that space policy is sufficiently
important to warrant greater attention from both
the executive and legislative branches of the Gov-
ernment.
The policy directions set by the different ap-
proaches above would require attention by the
administration and Congress in the form of imple-
menting guidelines, program direction, and budg-
et decisions—in short, of continuing followup
over a number of years. International initiatives,
if adopted, must receive high-level endorsement
and be integrated into the overall foreign policy
stance of the United States: the responsibility to
implement such initiatives cannot be left to a
single agency. Thus, whatever new approaches
are taken, they should be matched by suitable
steps to strengthen the process of developing
space policy. Without such a step, the other
measures are likely to be less than adequate in
meeting the many needs identified in this assess-
ment.
APPENDIXES
Appendix A
INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF
THE U.S. SPACE PROGRAM
Introduction
This section focuses on the relationship between
space policy and the institutions of the space program.
It traces the origin and evolution of the institutional
structure of the U.S. Government for civilian space
activities, and it asks whether that structure, as it ex-
ists today, is appropriate to the kind of civilian space
program the United States has today and will have in
the near future. Institutional effectiveness is a means
to the success of certain policies, not an end in itself.
On the other hand, a mismatch between policy and
structure is likely to be a major barrier to such suc-
cess, and thus an issue deserving of detailed attention.
Not infrequently in Government programs, particu-
lar policies reflect the requirements of a particular in-
stitutional structure. As the subsequent discussion will
suggest, there is not much evidence of this being the
case with respect to the civilian space effort. It seems,
rather, that for space, the relationship is as most
students of public administration would have it: that
is, structure follows strategy. In the U.S. space pro-
grams, institutions to a large degree have been based
on and designed to implement agreed-on policies and
carry out particular programs, rather than the reverse
relationship.
What follow attempts to demonstrate how the basic
policy principles were translated into a particular in-
stitutional structure, and how that structure has
evolved since its inception. It does not purport to be
a definitive description of the institutional structure
of the U.S. space program or of its evolution over the
last two decades. Rather, it highlights those charac-
teristics of and relationships among structures that ap-
pear relevant to any evaluation of the current and
future organization of the national space effort.
Separate Programs, Separate Structures
The policy decision with the most direct impact on
the structure of the U.S. space program was that call-
ing for the institutional separation within the Govern-
ment of the civilian and military space activities (see
ch. 6). In the immediate post-Sputnik period, when
it was evident that some accelerated response to the
Soviet space accomplishments by the United States
was required, there were a number of contenders for
the job of managing the national space effort. they
included:
a single agency for all Government space pro-
grams managed by the military, either at the level
of the Secretary of Defense or by one of the
armed services, most likely the Air Force;
a new Cabinet-level Department of Science and
Technology which, among its other responsibil-
ities, would have charge of the civilian space
effort;
adding space to the responsibilities of the Atomic
Energy Commission;
expanding the responsibility of the National Ad-
visory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) to in-
clude a substantial component of space activities;
and
creating a new civilian agency with a responsibili-
ty for Government space activities, except those
primarily associated with defense applications
(which would be managed by the Department of
Defense (DOD)).
Once the decision to separate civil and military
space activities was made, the claims by DOD and
by the armed services that they were the appropriate
managers of the national space program found limited
political support either within Congress or in the
public (outside of those constituencies with close con-
nections to the military). The idea that the U.S. space
program in its civilian aspects should be an open,
unclassified effort was widely accepted among those
concerned with shaping national space policy.
As the Government agency concerned with aero-
nautics research, NACA mounted a campaign to have
space added to its activities. However, NACA was an
introspective, research-oriented agency with little
orientation toward major technological enterprises.
Further, it was an agency managed by a committee,
not by a single executive; this was an administrative
arrangement strongly preferred by the scientific com-
munity as a means of insulating Government activities
with strong scientific components from “politics. ” A
similar form of organization had been accepted for
the Atomic Energy Commission and had been pro-
posed, but vetoed by President Truman, for the Na-
tional Science Foundation. What Eisenhower’s admin-
istrative, budgetary, and policy advisers wanted was
an agency responsive to the policy directions of the
President, headed by a single individual responsible
for implementing those policy directives, and with the
capabilities for carrying out potentially major research
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and development (R&D) activities. Those activities, it
was thought, would be pursued within the aerospace
industry under Government contract rather than “in-
house” with Federal laboratories. They thus con-
cluded that the creation of an essentially new Federal
structure for space, but one built around the NACA
core of technical capability and research institutions,
was the appropriate route to go.
In the National Aeronautics and Space (NAS) Act
of 1958, the primacy of civilian objectives in space
was stated: “it is the policy of the United States that
activities in space should be devoted to peaceful pur-
poses for the benefit of all mankind;” and the respon-
sibility for those activities was given to a civilian agen-
cy: “Such activities shall “be the responsibility of and
shall be directed by a civilian agency exercising con-
trol over aeronautical and space activities sponsored
by the United States.”
One area of controversy in the development of the
1958 NAS Act was whether the new space agency
should be responsible for all space R&D, including that
ultimately to be used by the military for defense ap-
plications. The decision was to make explicit from the
start the total separation of these two major categories
of space activities, with the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) having no direct involve-
ment in military work. Thus, the NAS Act also declared
that DOD should have responsibility for “activities
peculiar to or primarily associated with the develop-
ment of weapons systems, military operations, or the
defense of the United States (including the research
and development necessary to make effective provi-
sions for the defense of the United States).”
The formal separation of the civilian and military
space activities into different institutional frameworks
meant transferring to the new civilian space agency
functions related to its mission but under military con-
trol and, particularly after NASA had been assigned
the lunar landing mission, developing new capabil-
ities required to carry out an active space R&D effort.
Within DOD there was a desire to develop a space
R&D and a space operations structure, and to deter-
mine the division of responsibility at the Secretary of
Defense level between the various military services.
Both the NASA buildup and the development of the
initial military structure for space were accomplished
by the early 1960’s.
Within the first 2 years of its existence, NASA had
transferred to it a number of facilities, programs, and
personnel that had formerly been operating under
military auspices. These included, from the Army, the
Von Braun rocket development team at Huntsville,
Ala. (which became the core of the Marshall Space
Flight Center), and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at
the California Institute of Technology. NASA was au-
thorized to develop several new field centers related
to its mission, including the Goddard Space Flight
Center for science and applications programs and the
Manned Spacecraft Center (later the Johnson Space
Center) for manned programs, and to develop a civil-
ian launch facility at Cape Canaveral, Fla. (later the
Kennedy Space Center).1 These were added to the
three former NACA centers: Langley, Lewis, and
Ames; in addition smaller NACA facilities at Wallops
Island, Va., and Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., came
under NASA control. By 1962, NASA had in place an
impressive institutional capability, one fully mobilized
for meeting a broad set of national objectives in space.
This Government institutional base for civilian space
programs was reinforced by the development of an
elaborate external network of organizations—indus-
tries, universities, and nonprofits—involved in carry-
ing out the civilian space program under NASA con-
tracts or grants. In addition, as space activities
matured, other Government agencies, including the
Departments of Agriculture; Commerce; Energy;
Health, Education, and Welfare; and Interior also
became involved in space-related activities. At the
peak of the Apollo program in fiscal year 1965, fully
94 percent of NASA’s budget obligations went to ex-
ternal grants and contracts, and NASA’s prime con-
tractors in turn created a wide base of more special-
ized subcontractors. Of direct NASA procurements in
that year, 79 percent went to business firms, 8 per-
cent to educational institutions, 12 percent to other
Government agencies, and 1 percent to nonprofit
organizations. This pattern has remained consistent
over the years; in fiscal 1978, the same percentage
(94 percent) of NASA’s budget went to extramural pro-
curement, and the distribution among performers was
rather similiar—business (81 percent); educational in-
stitutions (12 percent); nonprofits (1 percent); and
other Government agencies (6 percent).
As the development of Government space activities
during the 1960’s and 1970’s continued, the separa-
tion between the civilian and military (including in-
telligence) communities became quite pronounced.
The Government developed and maintained separate
and distinct institutional structures for both functions,
not only in terms of line agencies within the executive
branch, but also in terms of policy review, budget de-
velopment and review, and congressional oversight.
The elements of the Government space program coor-
dinated their work but in a limited way compared to
the separate efforts developed by each element of the
Government space effort.
I There was already a military launch facility at the Cape.
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The NASA structure created under the direction of
its first two administrators, Keith Glennan and James
Webb, has remained basically unchanged during the
past two decades. NASA headquarters in Washington
is responsible for policy development and overall
management and technical direction of the various
components of the civilian space research program.
Technical management of those specific projects is
assigned to one of the various NASA field centers.
NASA has adopted the “Air Force model” of agency-
contractor relationships, in which most R&D work is
performed outside the Government by the aerospace
industry. The Government role is that of program and
project initiator, technical monitor of contractor per-
formance, and user of the results of the R&D efforts.
The set of field centers under NASA authority to-
day is the same as it was during the early 1960’s.2
Because NASA is responsible for civilian space activ-
ities aimed at a number of different purposes, includ-
ing science, applications, and development of tech-
nological capability, and because the responsibility for
each of those missions is lodged in a different field
center, one of NASA headquarters’ major responsi-
bilities is allocating priorities and resources across the
NASA institutional complex. The vitality of various
field centers is closely related to the priority assigned
to particular types of space activities under that
center’s control, and thus there is strong institutional
motivation to compete for particular emphases within
the overall NASA program.
Congress dealt with the need to establish a firm pol-
icy foundation for space by creating two temporary
select committees in early 1958. Later that year it
established two new standing committees to deal with
civilian space matters. In the Senate this responsibili-
ty was given to the Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences; in the House, to the Committee on
Science and Astronautics. Both of these committees
derived their visibility and status within Congress from
the importance of program oversight and their author-
ization authority over those programs. As long as the
civilian space program was a matter of high national
priority with major budgetary support there was a cor-
responding degree of status in being involved with
these two congressional committees. However, as the
resources allocated to civilian space activity declined
after Apollo, Congress viewed space activities as just
one among various science and technology programs
of Government, and during the 1970’s committee ju-
risdictions and names were modified to reflect this
reality. Now the programs of NASA and the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration are
reviewed in the Senate by the Subcommittee on Sci-
ence, Technology, and Space of the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation; there is no
separate Senate Space Committee. In the House, the
Committee on Science and Astronautics in 1974 was
renamed the Committee on Science and Technology
and its jurisdiction was broadened to cover most ci-
vilian science and technology activities, rather than
being focused primarily on NASA efforts.
This institutional base offers the potential for rapid
mobilization if the Nation decided to accelerate the
pace of its civilian space effort; the consequences of
allowing the NASA and contractor institutional bases
to shrink are unclear. It may be a sound national in-
vestment to maintain a strong institutional capability
within the Government for civilian space develop-
ment, even though that capability is not always be-
ing fully utilized. On the other hand, as this report has
argued throughout, it may also be appropriate, as U.S.
activities in space mature, to shift more of the respon-
sibility for program and project planning and develop-
ment for space applications and transportation to the
private sector, with a parallel diminution of Govern-
ment’s institutional involvement.
In 1977-78, a National Security Council Policy
Review Committee reviewed the structure of the na-
tional space program. The report validated the fun-
damental principle of separating civilian and military
space activities. It concluded that “our current direc-
tion set forth in the Space Act in 1958 is well-founded”
and that “the United States will maintain current
responsibility and management among the various
space programs. ”3
Policy and Program Coordination
The decision to separate civilian and military space
activities led naturally to the requirement for policy
and program coordination between the programs. The
type of policy coordination needed and mechanisms
for coordination have been, and continue to be, con-
troversial issues (see ch. 6). The nature of coordina-
tion at the program level has been less problematic
and working-level cooperation between civilian and
military space efforts has been the rule. However, oc-
casional disputes have arisen over, for example, pro-
posed civilian uses of technology developed for na-
tional security purposes.
During the 1958 debate on space policy, a major
congressional concern was the relationship between
military and civilian objectives in space and some
broader set of national interests. Senate Majority
2Except for the brief period during which NASA also had an Electronics
Research Center in Cambridge, Mass.
3The  only public announcement of the results of this review was in the
form of a June 20, 1978,  press release from the White House,
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Leader Lyndon Johnson, in particular, was convinced
that space policy ought to be the subject of Presiden-
tial attention; the Eisenhower administration was far
less convinced that space policy deserved such high
priority. Johnson wanted to coordinate policy at a high
level by creating an Executive Office group modeled
on the National Security Council but dedicated spe-
cifically to aeronautical and space activities. The
Eisenhower adminstration reluctantly accepted John-
son’s notion as a price of getting the space legislation
through Congress, and a National Aeronautics and
Space Council was established by the NAS Act. The
Space Council was to be a high-level advisory body,
chaired by the President and consiting of the heads
of other agencies concerned with space activities and
several nongovernmental members.4 It was to assist
and advise the President in developing a comprehen-
sive program of aeronautical and space activities, in
assigning specific space missions to various agencies,
and i n resolving differences among agencies over
space policy and program.
Although the Eisenhower adminstration agreed to
the inclusion of the Space Council in the legislation
setting up the national space effort, it never used the
Council. Rather, space policy under Eisenhower was
developed through the channels of the National Se-
curity Council and Bureau of the Budget. Eisenhower
believed that civilian and military functions in space
development were “separate responsibilities requir-
ing no coordinating body. ” Thus, in 1960 he asked
Congress to abolish the Space Council.
This proposal was sidetracked by Lyndon Johnson.
When Kennedy won the 1960 election, with Johnson
as his Vice President, the new President was con-
vinced to keep the Space Council but to change the
legislation so it would be chaired by the Vice Presi-
dent. During the Kennedy administration, the Space
Council hired its first staff members and played an ac-
tive role in developing the national policies that led
to the Apollo project and to the administration’s posi-
tion on communications satellites. In the rest of the
1960’s, under the Johnson and Nixon administration,
the Space Council continued to exist, but stood at the
margins of most space policy debates. it developed
a relatively large (for the Executive Office) staff under
the leadership of Vice Presidents Hubert Humphrey
and Spiro Agnew. However, as the priority assigned
to the civilian space program continued to decrease
in the President’s agenda and as the separate space
activities of the Government became governed in-
creasingly from within the separate agencies, the
Space Council became rather a moribund institution,
4These nongovernmental members were never appointed and the posi-
tions were eliminated when the space  council was reorganized in 1961.
and in 1973 President Nixon proposed its dissolution.
Congress raised no objection and the Space Council
went out of existence.
Without a central policy coordinating structure dur-
ing the 1970’s, stresses among various Government
space activities developed. Several of these were the
results of disagreements between NASA and DOD
over the appropriate national security constraints to
be applied to civilian space efforts, particularly for
Earth observations. NASA-DOD relationships with
respect to the space shuttle program have been
another area of controversy. It was these stresses that
were the primary cause of the Carter administration
review of national space policy that began in 1977.
A major result of that review was the reestablish-
ment of a Presidential-level policy review process for
space. The process existed in the form of a Policy
Review Committee (Space), operating under National
Security Council auspices but chaired by the Direc-
tor of the Office of Science and Technology Policy.
This committee provided a forum for all involved Fed-
eral agencies (including Departments such as Interior
and Agriculture) to air their views on space policy, to
advise the President on proposed changes in national
space policy, to resolve disputes among agencies, and
to provide for rapid referral of space policy issues to
the President for decision when required. Unlike the
Space Council, the Policy Review Committee (Space)
did not have a standing professional staff structure.
Rather, it served as recognition of the need to for-
malize the channels of interaction among the various
components of Government space activity rather than
have policy and program disputes settled through the
budgetary review process or other means of interagen-
cy coordination.
The structures for coordination among military and
civilian space efforts at the program level have had
a rather different history than those for policy-level
coordination. The 1958 NAS Act created an institu-
tion for coordination at this level, the Civilian Military
Liaison Committee (CMLC), but that statutory com-
mittee, like the Space Council, was a congressionally
imposed structure and was seldom used. Rather,
NASA and DOD set up a number of working-level
groups on issues of interest to both agencies as the
early years of the space program passed. CMLC was
eventually abolished and replaced by a nonstatutory
Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board
(AACB), which formalized the contacts between
NASA and DOD at the working level. AACB was es-
tablished by NASA-DOD agreement in 1960 and was
given responsibility for coordinating NASA and DOD
activities so as to “avoid undesirable duplication . . .
achieve efficient utilization of available resources” and
undertake” the coordination of activities in areas of
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common interest. The early years of AACB were quite
productive in terms of data exchanges and creating
an awareness of what the other agency’s plans were;
AACB continues to exist today as the primary mecha-
nism for addressing major program issues of interest
to DOD and NASA in space. However, as the separate
NASA and defense programs became more institution-
alized in the 1960’s and 1970’s there has been a
tendency for coordination between the programs to
be defensive in character, i.e., aimed at protecting
each agency’s own programs and “turf.”
From Research to Operation
In the 1958 debate over space activities the notion
of operating civilian space systems did not receive
much attention. The NAS Act gave NASA the respon-
sibility for most aeronautical and space activities but
defined those activities as: 1 ) research into problems
of flight within and outside the Earth’s atmosphere;
2) the development, the construction, testing and op-
eration for research purposes of aeronautical and
space vehicles; and 3) such other activities as may be
required for the exploration of space. This language
seemed to limit NASA to R&D activities, and that was
the general understanding of the agency’s mission at
the time.
By providing launch services to a variety of cus-
tomers, including other Government agencies, the
Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) and
other private sector firms, and other countries, NASA
has gone beyond R&D to a clearly operational role
in one area. Restriction to R&D has had little impact
on NASA’s efforts in space science and exploration
or technology development, but it has had a definite
impact for space applications.
Limiting NASA to the R&D part of the job of bring-
ing space applications into being means that other
users of space technology are necessarily involved in
the total applications effort. NASA has developed an
orientation toward “technology push” efforts rather
than a tradition of close coupling with potential users
of space technology who would exercise “demand
pull” on the development of space applications.
While NASA has almost from its start included “tech-
nology transfer” functions in its organization, many
observers think that NASA has so far done an inade-
quate job of marketing its technological capabilities
to potential users of space application systems.
While an emphasis on developing and demonstrat-
ing new technical capabilities is often necessary to
convince potential users of their value, especially in
situations where no preexisting user community ex-
ists, most observers believe that NASA, particularly in
its early years, put more stress on pushing the tech-
nological frontier in space applications than on de-
veloping technology either in response to user de-
mand or in anticipation of the kinds of demands likely
to arise as new capabilities became known. In addi-
tion, NASA has developed a history of emphasizing
the development of constantly more sophisticated
technology in its application programs rather than
concentrating on bringing an adequate application
system into early operation. This is at least in some
measure a reflection of the institutional reality that,
once NASA completes R&D for an applications pro-
gram, it must transfer that program to some user out-
side of the agency. There is an organizational tenden-
cy to attempt to hold onto programs, even if that
means prolonging the R&D phase beyond the social-
ly optimum points Since the early 1970’s, NASA has
placed a high priority on developing closer relation-
ships with potential users of space technology, particu-
larly in remote sensing and advanced satellite commu-
nications.
The first test of NASA’s bias toward continuing R&D
in applications was in weather satellites. in the early
1960’s NASA’s initial meteorological satellite program,
which had been transferred from DOD, was called
TIROS. As the agency in charge of space R&D, NASA
regarded TIROS as only the first step in weather satel-
lite development and wanted to go immediately to the
creation of an advanced meteorological satellite called
NIMBUS. The Weather Bureau within the Department
of Commerce, a potential user agency, had another
point of view. TIROS would markedly improve its serv-
ices, and the Weather Bureau wanted NASA to focus
on it rather than initiate a new weather satellite pro-
gram. However, it took several years and substantial
bureaucratic conflict before NASA was willing to shift
its emphasis away from the advanced NIMBUS devel-
opment program back to completing TIROS and bring-
ing it to an operational state.6 Eventually, NASA
worked out an effective agreement with the Weather
Bureau both to support on-going meteorological satel-
lite activities and to continue R&D on advanced sen-
sors relevant to meteorological applications.
The complex history of the use of satellites for
remote sensing of land and ocean areas demonstrates
the institutional problems stemming from, among
other sources, NASA’s focus on R&D and its lack of
close links with potential users of operational space
systems. The debate over the appropriate develop-
5There may be technical and managerial as well as I nstltutlonal  reasons
why the development of a space application may take longer than onglnally
hoped for. Some also suggest that there have been instances of premature
shdts  from R&D to operational status In space applications.
bFor  a detailed account of the NASA/Weather Bureau dispute, see Richard
Chapman, TIROS-NIMBUS:  Administrative, Political,  and Technological Prob-
/ems of Developing Weather Sate//ites  (Syracuse, N. Y,: Interuniverslty  Case
Program, Inc., 1972).
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ment pace and management structure for the Land-
sat system has extended over a decade.
A major issue as arrangements for operational land
remote sensing have been debated is whether NASA’s
charter ought to be revised to extend its authority to
the operation of space applications sytems. The Pres-
idential directive of November 1979 ended this debate
with the decision to keep NASA as an R&D agency
in remote sensing and to assign civilian Earth obser-
vation operations within the Government to NOAA,
even though there were other claimants to a share of
the operational remote-sensing role such as the De-
partment of the Interior and the Department of Agri-
culture. Throughout the Landsat program, NASA has
emphasized the experimental nature of the early
remote-sensing satelites. While it has worked with
potential users to make them aware of possible appli-
cations of Landsat data to their programs, it has also
proposed more advanced sensors for orbital evalua-
tion in later Landsat satellites, but it has not given
priority attention to developing the ground segment,
including associated data management and informa-
tion processing and dissemination systems, required
for early deployment of a first generation operational
remote-sensing system.
Public-Private Sector Relations
NASA’s relationships as an R&D agency for space
with other potential users of space applications are
relatively underdeveloped; this is particularly the case
when those users are not other Government agencies,
but rather private sector, profit-oriented firms. The ap-
propriate division of responsibility between public and
private organizations for research and development
oriented toward commercial applications for space
technology has been problematic since the start of the
space age.7
This issue initially surfaced in communications sat-
ellite research. The Eisenhower adminsitration recog-
nized that communication via satellite was an area of
potential major economic payoff and decided, in
keeping with its general pro-business orientation, that
communication satellite research should be left to
those interested in making a profit in it. Others, how-
ever, feared that allowing only private entitites to de-
velop the technology of space communications meant
in effect giving a virtual monopoly in that area to the
corporation with the most resources available to in-
vest in communications satellite research, American
Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T). From the perspective
of those interested in preventing monopoly power in
new areas of human activity, such a development was
not desirable. The situation was further clouded by
the recognition that, even if AT&T or another private
entity developed a communications satellite using its
own funds, it would have to depend on launchers
developed with public money to place that satellite
into orbit. Thus the Kennedy administration reversed
the Eisenhower policy of leaving communications sat-
ellite research to the private sector; Kennedy author-
ized NASA to conduct a vigorous program of research
in the communications satellite area.
There were some in 1961 and 1962, as space com-
munications approached reality, who thought that the
Government should not only be involved in commu-
nications satellite R&D and make the results of that
research available to a variety of potential private sec-
tor firms for commercialization, but also that the Gov-
ernment itself should take advantage of that research
and undertake the operational satellite communica-
tions role, returning the eventual profits to the Treas-
ury. The advocates of this position were not able to
gather majority support in the 1962 debate over com-
munications satellite policy. With the creation of a
new institution, COMSAT, which had some aspects
of public control but was fundamentally a new private
enterprise, the notion that the Government should go
into the communications satellite business itself dis-
appeared.s
The precedent established during the communica-
tions satellite debate was that developing new applica-
tions of space technology with commercial potential
and nurturing them to operational status is a mixed
private sector-public sector responsibility, with the ap-
propriate division of roles to be determined on an ad
hoc basis for each area of applications; the goal, how-
ever, is eventual private sector operation of civilian
space application systems. In each area in which a
space application has reached or approached maturi-
ty, such as point-to-point communications and some
applications of satellite remote sensing, business struc-
tures have emerged that operate as commercial enter-
prises related to that application. The Government has
continued to fund research in other areas of space ap-
plications with potential commercial utility, including
space transportation, materials processing, and other
aspects of remote sensing, with the hope of discover-
ing whether there are indeed profitable opportunities
for private sector involvement in those areas, and
demonstrating to potential operators what those op-
portunities are. It maybe that continued Government
This problem is not limited to the space sector. The issue of Federal pol-
icies affecting private sector innovation, including direct support of civilian
R&D, has been a subject of much recent discussion within both the executive
branch and Congress.
‘For  a full discussion, see Jonathan F. Galloway, The Po/itics  arrd
Technology of Sate//ite  Communications (Lexington, Mass.: D.C.  Heath &
Co.,  1972).
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willingness to push the applications of space technol-
ogy and to bear the costs and risks of the research,
development, and demonstration phases of commer-
cializing those applications is the only way for some
of them to become reality, at least in the short to
midterm.
Advanced communications was one area of policy
and institutional controversy during the Nixon and
Ford administrations. NASA was ordered in 1973 to
end its communications R&D efforts, on the grounds
that the space communications business was far
enough advanced so that it should be totally a private
sector responsibility. The consequence of this deci-
sion was that the U.S. private sector concentrated on
only those aspects of space communications which
had the promise of early commercial payoff; other
governments, most notably France and Japan, have
provided R&D support for advanced space commu-
nications development, leading to increasing interna-
tional competition with U.S. firms for sales of ad-
vanced communications satellites. This situation led
the Carter administration in 1978 to decide that the
potential economic and social benefits of communica-
tions satellites were not being adequately tended to
by private sector R&D. The Carter administration rees-
tablished a NASA research effort in advanced space
communications and Information Administration of
the Department of Commerce with assisting in market
aggregation and possible development of domestic
and international public satellite communication
services.
From “Preeminence” to “Leadership”
President Kennedy in 1961 committed the United
States to a policy of “preeminence” in all areas of
space activity. The notion that the United States
should maintain a position of “leadership” in space
activity has been repeated by each Chief Executive
since Kennedy,
As other countries in Europe, Asia, and South Amer-
ica develop independent space capabilities and as the
Soviet Union continues an extremely active space ef-
fort, how the United States will continue policies of
“leadership” and “preeminence” is unclear (see chs.
3, 9, and 10). One possibility is for the United States
to compete across the board with other nations in all
areas of space activity, from the development of large,
permanent manned structures in orbit, through vari-
ous types of space applications, to exploration of the
cosmos. Another option is to focus U.S. space prior-
ities in areas of high national payoff (which would in-
clude international leadership in those areas). Another
option is to view application activities in space as com-
petitors with Earth-bound enterprises, and to under-
take them only when they are the most efficient means
of meeting broader national objectives.
The initial result of the commitment to across-the-
board preeminence was to create in NASA an agen-
cy with the structure, institutional relationships, and
organizational culture needed to carry out a high-pri-
ority, nationally mobilized effort to developing a large-
scale technology. NASA, at least in formal terms, re-
mains today an organization designed for such pur-
poses, but the terms of a national commitment to Lead-
ership in space activities are much less clear than they
were during the peak of the Apollo program in the
mid-l 960’s. As space activities have matured, and as
they promise to grow and become even more routine
over the coming decade, a major institutional issue
is whether a single central space agency with the
desire and structure for carrying out an integrated,
high-priority national space effort in the civilian sec-
tor is an anomaly.
The International Context:
Cooperation and Competition
During the 1960’s, NASA developed international
cooperative programs that were clearly secondary in
priority to using space technology as a demonstration
of national technical resources. Almost all of NASA’s
international activities were scientific in character and
were carried out under policy guidelines that kept
them limited in scope, including the restrictions that
cooperation had to be based on mutual scientific ben-
efit and that there would be no exchange of funds be-
tween the United States and its partners in interna-
tional space activities. This limited concept of inter-
national cooperation was broadened during the
1970’s to the applications area, as a number of na-
tions become interested in the Landsat program, build-
ing their own ground stations or otherwise receiving
Landsat data, and for the first time paying NASA a fee
for access to the remote-sensing satellites. Other appli-
cation efforts also had international dimensions; for
example, the Application Technology Satellite and
Communications Technology Satellite programs dem-
onstrated some of the uses of communications satel-
lites for education and health care in both develop-
ing and industrialized countries (see ch. 7).
Also during the 1970’s, there was limited use of in-
ternational cooperation in space technology to serve
what were explicitly foreign policy goals. The leading
9A major exception was the set of international agreements required to
establish a global tracking network,
IOFor  the fou ndatlons  of U.S. policy toward intern atlona(  cooperation,  see
Arnold Frutkin, /nternationa/ Space Cooperation (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Pren-
ttce Hall, 1965); for criticism,  see Don Kash,  The Po/itics  of Space Coopera-
tion (West Lafayette, Ind,: Purdue University Studies, 1967),
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example was U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation in the Apollo-
Soyuz test project. Increasingly, the potential of space
as a tool of our foreign assistance program and as a
means of demonstrating our concern for the develop-
ing countries has led to assistance programs in a vari-
ety of third- and fourth-world countries that use Land-
sat data.
Cooperation with our major industrial partners and
potential competitors in space technology develop-
ment began during the same time period. The Euro-
pean Space Agency assumed the responsibility for de-
veloping the Spacelab, which is to be flown on the
shuttle as a base for orbital scientific experiments re-
quiring the presence of human experimenters. The
U.S. stance toward cooperative programs that would
develop commercially useful space technology is
however, somewhat ambivalent, because of possible
economic returns from these activities and because
of the desire of the United States either to maintain
or establish a competitive advantage.
‘As other major nations develop advanced space
technology, the mixture between international com-
petition and international collaboration in space
should be a dynamic one. Competition between U.S.
and European launch vehicles for payloads in the
1980’s is just one example. A number of issues being
debated in international forums could affect U.S. ci-
vilian space activities in the coming decades. Examples
are the actions of the World Adminsitrative Radio Con-
ferences in allocating frequencies (and potentially slots
in geosynchronous orbit) and the debate in the United
Nations on a Moon treaty. The United Nations has
also scheduled a Conference on Space Applications
for 1982.
The Soviet Union, West Germany, France, Japan,
Brazil—and indeed a number of other countries—are
allocating significant resources to space R&D. In com-
ing years, the U.S. civilian space program will func-
tion in an international context quite different than has
been the case. The institutional implications of this
changed context—for example, how to relate space
activities to foreign policy objectives and how to carry
out the diplomacy required to support our space
objectives— require examination.
.
Appendix B
USE OF LANDSAT DATA BY THE BUREAU OF
LAND MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR
Introduction tion range from very basic and efficient visual interpre-
tations of Landsat photographs to highly technical and
This case study was prepared by the Bureau of Land complex digital image processing of digital tapes.
Management (BLM) of the Department of the Interior Table B-1 lists some examples of past and current pro-
to illustrate its use of Landsat data. It shows that Land- grams conducted in BLM that have made use of Land-
sat data have become an integral part of BLM’s strat- sat data. BLM views Landsat and any other remote-
egy for managing the land and resources under its sensing technologies as basic tools. The products of
care. these tools are integrated and are then used within
BLM utilizes Landsat data in numerous programs. the frameworks of various programs to improve their
These programs use both photographs and digital tape quality and efficiency as well as to reduce program
products. Interpreted Landsat data are used to assist costs. Thus, Landsat data aid BLM in inventory and
in mapping basic vegetation, soils, geology, and ener- planning primarily by streamlining and structuring
gy and mineral resources. The processes of interpreta- these activities.
Table 6.1 .—Examples of Past and Current Programs Utilizing Landsat Data
Size
(acres in Status
f_andsat-aided program Location millions) Complete Current Task/purpose
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Denali Project
AVRI Project
IVRI Project
California Desert Plan
Northwest Tier Pipeline
Taos Project
Havasu Project
Jarbidge Project
Mining Disturbance
Fuels Mapping
Phoenix Project
Coeur d’Alene
Alaska 3.5 x
Arizona 2.1 x
Idaho 3.7 x
California
Oregon
New Mexico
Arizona
Idaho
Missouri
Alaska
Arizona
Idaho
25 x
3.0 x
5.8
1.0
1.3
3.0
5.0
6.3
1.0
Test and evaluate Landsat aided
resource mapping in northern spruce
tundra biome.
Test and evaluate Landsat.aided
resource mapping in the Southwest
desert community.
Test and evaluate Landsat-aided
resource mapping in sagebrush
grassland community.
Fulfill requirements of Federal Land
Policy and Management Act.
Provide information for environmental
statement.
x Provide information for Planning
System.
x Provide basic soils prestratification.
x Provide information for Planning
System.
x Detect and map mining trespass.
x Map fuels loading in areas in high
wildfire potential.
x Provide information for Planning
System.
x Update existing forest inventory.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.
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Two Activities of Importance to BLM
For the purpose of this report, two activities in BLM
have been selected for detailed analysis. Both are en-
countered daily in BLM State and district offices and
both share the common thread of requiring inventory
information for application to resource management.
The first application is known as the planning system
and requires a more generalized level of inventory
data than the second program. This second program,
the soil vegetation inventory method (SVIM), is a field-
intensive effort that requires a detailed inventory data
set. These data are used for such tasks as allocating
grazing lands. For the details of the programs, the
reader is referred to the manuals that are listed in the
bibliography at the end of this report.
The Planning System
The BLM planning system provides a systematic ap-
proach to gathering, analyzing, and integrating multi-
ple resource data into an overall management plan.
The system permits informed and objective multiple-
use decisions through identifying and reconciling con-
flicting land and resource uses. It is an internal man-
agement tool that helps blend diverse authorities and
land use opportunities. It is also a managerial system
through which the BLM Director, State directors, and
district managers develop and manage the various
BLM program activities. Each of these activities has
a primary mission or purpose for which objectives and
standards are defined. This system provides for a multi-
ple resource program consisting of: lands, minerals,
recreation, wildlife, watershed, forestry, and range.
The system consists of three basic steps. These–unit
resource analysis (URA), managment framework plan
(MFP), activity plan–are briefly described below.
Components of the Planning System
l Unit resource analysis (URA).—URA provides a
comprehensive analysis of inventory data,
resource problems, conditions, users, production,
quality, capabilities, and management potential
for use in preparing a management framework
plan. In other words, URA provides resource in-
formation pertinent to decisions about land use
resources management in a unit of land. It also
provides continuity in retaining and maintaining
resource data. URA supports the multiple-use
concept and is prepared by individual resource
specialists.
l Management framework plan (MFP). —M FP rec-
onciles conflicts in land and resource use. Plan-
ning decisions are made for specific areas so that
the unique characteristics of each area are fully
considered. MFP indicates what is to be done
with each resource within each unit.
Activity plan.–The activity plan is prepared for
each individual resource unit to define the man-
ner in which the resultant activities shall achieve
the objective and constraints of the MFP. The ac-
tivity plan is specific to the users and special inter-
ests involved. An allotment management plan is
an example of an activity plan.
Since its development and adoption by the entire
BLM in 1969, the planning system has been a major
factor in BLM program activities. All BLM offices, in-
cluding the Outer Continental Shelf Program, employ
the technique. Its primary strength is that it has system-
atized the planning process, and enhanced the qual-
ity of BLM management. However, it is labor inten-
sive. During the last 5 years, approximately $60 million
have been budgeted for planning system applications,
with an estimated workforce of 450 positions.
A variety of products are required in the planning
system. Figure B-1 is an example of the basic unit
resource analysis map depicting current vegetation.
Figure B-2 is an example of a wildlife habitat overlay
showing areas of Desert Tortoise habitat. Table B-2
is an example of tabular data utilized within the proc-
ess. Although BLM is the primary user of the informa-
tion, numerous other individuals, organizations, and
private concerns have access to the data, e.g., local
ranchers, environmental societies, and Federal and
State Government agencies.
Soil Vegetation Inventory Method
SVIM is the BLM method for conducting basic soil
and vegetation inventories. SVIM supports the plan-
ning system as well as other activities such as environ-
mental statements. The process provides a uniform
and systematic method of detailed inventory. It does
not inventory all renewable resources. However, it
does provide a framework for inventories of the num-
bers and kinds of wildlife species, and also gathers
basic data for use in other resource inventories.
SVIM evolved from a number of requirements, but
the primary catalyst was the need to acquire high-qual-
ity resource data for use in developing environmen-
tal statements concerning grazing. Since its inception
in 1978, it has been applied in a variety of forms
throughout BLM. The major strengths of this proce-
dure are: 1) the high-quality data that are available as
a result of data collection in the field; 2) ability to
integrate soils and vegetation information in the map-
ping process; and 3) the vast wealth of data that are
available for use once the inventory is completed. The
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Figure B-f .—Vegetation and Soii Associations
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Table B-2.—Tabular Data Used in the Planning Process
Vegetation composition cornposition Full stocking condition No action Elimination
Wolf hole Lake
Wolf hole Canyon
Mine Valley
SOURCE: Bureau of Land Management
process also has a few weak points. For example, the
detail that is listed as a strength is also a weakness
because of the labor-intensive nature of detailed field
work. Similarly, without a means of automatically han-
dling the data, the voluminous amount of data avail-
able are not readily usable. Another related weakness
is the cost of these inventories. Recently programs
have been developed on the mainframe computer sys-
tem at Denver Service Center to store and manipulate
the tabular data collected in SVIM. In addition, a linear
optimization model has been developed to allocate
vegetation production among the competing uses. To
date, this tabular data has not been tied to a digitized
mapping process.
In the 3 years since the SVIM inventories were estab-
lished, an estimated $14 million have been spent on
them. They have covered about 32 million acres and
have required 7,200 work-months. A skill mix of vege-
tation, soil, forestry, wildlife, and range conservation
Same as current species composition
T
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38
42
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14
9
23
23
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56
16
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14
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64
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12
13
64
49
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39
specialists, wildlife specialists, etc. have been involved
in these inventories.
Transition to the Use of Landsat Data
BLM has followed an organized approach in the test,
evaluation, and implementation of Landsat data. A
complete description of that approach can be found
in several reports (see bibliography). In 1977, BLM,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), and the U.S. Geological Survey EROS Pro-
gram agreed on a phased program to implement this
technology in BLM. The program was designed to pro-
vide BLM an opportunity to test the technology in an
operational manner, to evaluate the results of the tests,
and finally to implement those aspects of the technol-
ogy most suited to assist BLM data collection and re-
source management needs. During this transfer of re-
mote-sensing technology to BLM, BLM assimilated the
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procedures and equipment into a small core staff
housed within an existing research and development
(R&D) organization at the Denver Service Center.
From this core staff of three persons, the present
Branch of Remote Sensing (BRS) grew. A continuing
process of reporting and reviewing the status of the
program was followed that resulted in many changes
to the program. These changes were implemented on
a test site basis. Since the project was structured to
test the technology in three diverse areas, changes in
program orientation were made at the onset of activ-
ities in each subsequent test site. This procedure pro-
vided BLM: 1 ) time to plan carefully and implement
the changes, 2) ability to build upon each test site in
a systematic fashion, and 3) prevention of unnecessary
and costly changes within each phase of the program.
At this time, the program has been incorporated in
the operations of BLM; and Landsat-assisted programs
are currently being conducted in several areas.
In addition to the program just described, a number
of other factors have caused the BLM to use Landsat
data. For example, the congressionally mandated Cali-
fornia Desert Plan (CDP) utilized Landsat imagery
because of tight schedules and funding. in this study
Landsat data were used to view the unit at a broad
scale from which areas for intensive study were cho-
sen. These areas were then sampled with finer scale
methods appropriate to the resource requirement,
e.g., aerial photography. Vegetation, soil geology,
energy, and mineral resources were included in the
effort. Without Landsat, it is questionable that CDP
would have been accomplished within the time and
cost constraints. In addition, there is the natural proc-
ess whereby technology is used by personnel in the
field because of the acute needs for data that exist at
the working level. That is, if a technology can be uti-
lized to acquire information needed at the field level
then it is often used without prior knowledge of man-
agement. There is no doubt that the methodology
would have gained use and acceptance in BLM, but
the major program described in the preceding para-
graph caused a more organized and Bureau-wide
adoption.
Transition to Space Data
It is of paramount importance that the reader keep
in mind the closing words of the first paragraph of this
report: “Landsat data aid the BLM in inventory and
planning by streamlining and structuring these activ-
ities.” Landsat data are used to improve inventory
quality, to enhance data retention and renewal, and
to reduce inventory costs. The use of Landsat data has
not led to replacing programs. Thus, Landsat is primar-
ily a new tool that is available to the resource specialist
to enhance his product. BLM is currently developing
guidelines to the field offices for the use of this new
tool and is becoming increasingly dependent on it to
effect required operating economics.
USER ACCEPTANCE
Whether field people will accept and utilize new
approaches and whether management will believe
results obtained through these new concepts, are ma-
jor factors in the transition, In any organization, the
“field type” is notoriously concerned that any change
may adversely affect his ability to do the field work
that is so necessary for good management practices.
Similarly, management personnel are reluctant to
change something that heretofore has worked well.
These are valid concerns that were recognized in the
project planning stages of this program. In order to
combat these fears an extensive educational program
was incorporated as an integral part of the study. Since
the beginning of the program, training courses in
remote sensing have been a mainstay of each phase
of the project. The sessions have covered basic photo
interpretation procedures as well as advanced digital
image processing. In addition, they have addressed
a variety of subjects—vegetation, geology, soils, etc.
To date, over 750 BLM resource specialists have re-
ceived training through these programs. This training
is continuing on an annual basis, and in the near
future, special sessions specifically oriented to man-
agers are planned.
Program Continuity
In the last 5 years BLM has made a substantial com-
mitment to the use of Landsat data. This commitment
represents a major investment of labor and equip-
ment. Thus, the continuation and improvement of the
Landsat system is of vital interest to BLM. At this time,
it is understood that Landsat D’ is the last satellite
authorized for the program. The prospect of terminat-
ing the Landsat program will greatly affect the future
decisions of BLM toward continued use of Landsat
data. Reluctance to adopt a full-scale program can be
expected. Managers must have a guarantee that data
will continue to be available before they can be asked
to embrace the technology. BLM is willing to consider
other alternatives, such as using data from the pro-
posed Japanese and European satellites. However,
these satellites are not in orbit and can only be con-
sidered as potential alternatives. In addition, there
doesn’t appear to be any assurance that the desired
private sector takeover of Landsat is likely. Thus, to
a user organization like BLM, the picture is confusing
and bleak. In the face of continued increasing costs
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for all services, BLM shall seek to make its limited in-
ventory dollars stretch even further. Present policies
do not seem to guarantee the continuity of Landsat/
Earth Resource Satellite data needed for BLM to make
a complete switch to reliance on satellite data.
For the immediate future, the continuing availabil-
ity of Landsat MSS data is required for programs that
are under way or planned. In addition, BLM has a
longer term requirement for data of greater spectral
and spatial resolution. At present, the available Land-
sat data barely meet some BLM requirements. In order
to realize the full potential of such capability, data of
increased resolution are mandatory. At present, we
can only streamline and economize by utilizing Land-
sat as a sampling frame. in the future, we must pro-
vide increasingly detailed data or face a stagnation of
the program and a consequent halt in transition to
these powerful tools. Thus, both the current multispec-
tral scanner and the future thematic mapper data are
of great interest to BLM.
Acquisition of Hardware and Software
As an integral part of the joint BLM-NASA-EROS
program, BLM acquired and installed a digital image
processing system at the Denver Service Center. This
system is currently being used to support inventory
projects in BLM. The system includes a complete
Earth resources data processing software package.
It is projected to have a lo-year lifespan, but is modu-
lar in nature to allow for both software and hardware
improvements. As the need for Landsat data increase,
additional processing capability in terms of other
systems or approaches must be considered. For ex-
ample, BLM anticipates inventorying 30 million acres
annually on the single system currently in operation
at the Denver Service Center. Depending upon sup-
port requirements for BLM inventories this figure will
fall far short of the total requirements of BLM. Thus,
further acquisition of hardware and software may be
necessitated by the transition to Landsat-aided inven-
tories.
Applications of Landsat in
the Planning System
The BLM-NASA-EROS wildland vegetation resource
inventory project was specifically designed to test and
evaluate the use of Landsat data for application in the
planning system. BLM conducted a test program in
three test sites in Alaska, Arizona, and Idaho, which
are representative of the lands managed by BLM. The
program was conducted in phases, in which each
phase had increasing complexity. In this manner, it
was possible to answer basic questions concerning the
technology prior to expending funds on subsequent
phases, The results of this program were extremely
successful, and portions of the technology have been
used in BLM. Table B-3 illustrates some of the manage-
ment opportunity map overlays that are currently
being used in the planning system. These particular
overlays resulted from the Landsat-aided analysis in
the Arizona project and are typical of the requirements
of the planning system. Table B-4 illustrates the tabular
data that are available as a result of this program. This
information is also applicable to the planning system.
The true utility of this technology lies in the flexibility
of the data base that is developed as part of the analy-
sis. Joining Landsat data with ancillary data in a
geographic data base provides a previously unheard-
of dimension to the planning system. A typical data-
base may consiste of the following elements.
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
computer classes representing land cover from
Landsat data;
slope, aspect, elevation;
photo interpretation data;
sources of water;
road net;
production for forest, woodland, and rangeland
resources;
ground data;
administrative units; and
soil information.
Although Landsat is only one aspect of this broad
data base, it is in fact the foundation underpinning
other data. From this data base, the types of products
listed in table B-3 can be produced. Figure B-3 illus-
trates a basic map of current vegetation produced
from this technology for use in URA. An example of
another product of the data base is shown in figure
B-4. Depicted here is its use to delineate areas of high
potential for Desert Big Horn Sheep habitation. The
digital nature of this data base provides a great deal
of flexibility. Products can be made at extremely low
cost, and they can also be revised in an economical
and efficient manner. The data base is also very easi-
ly revised as new information becomes available,
Benefits, Budget, and Personnel
The costs of developing the data base from Landsat
data are very attractive. By contrast, the process of pro-
ducing necessary map overlays by hand is labor inten- -
sive, time consuming, and is by nature subjective. The
study project maintained detailed records of costs,
both recurring and nonrecurring. The costs associated
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Table B-3.—Management Opportunity (Arizona Strip District)
Management products Scale Management parameters Current use Potential use
Potential juniper—pinyon
cutting/burning areas
Potential blackbrush treatment
areas
Potential antelope habitat
ESL overlay sagebrush
treatment areas
ESL overlay rangeland
suitability
Potential mule deer summer
range
Potential mule deer
intermediate range
Potential mule deer winter
range
Potential burning areas
1 :126,720
1 :126,710
1:126,720
.
1:126,720
1 :126,720
1 :126,710
1 :126,720
1 :126,720
1 :126,720
. , . . . -- Two areas identified “” ‘ ‘ -- - “”-
for tree use permits
vegetallon: ua percent
juniper—pinyon
Elevation: 5,000-6,000 ft
Slope: 0-15 percent
Aspect: within % mile
of a road.
Vegetation: high
component blackbrush
with grass understory
Elevation: 4,500-5,000 ft
Slope: variable
Aspect: north, northeast.
Vegetation: Great Basin
desert shrub, plains
grassland
Elevation: 4,000-6,000 ft
Slope: 0-20 percent
Aspect: variable.
Vegetation: 50 percent
sagebrush with
perennial grass
understory
Elevation: variable
Slope: less than 15
percent
Aspect: variable
10-acre minimum.
Current production of
usable forage above
20 lbs/acre
Located within 4 miles
of water
Elevation: variable
Slope: less than 51
percent
Aspect: variable.
Vegetation: juniper-
pinyon, ponderosa
pine
Elevation: above 6,000 ft
Slope: variable
Aspect: variable.
Vegetation: variable
Elevation: 5,000-6,000 ft
Slope: 0-100 percent
Aspect: variable.
Vegetation: variable
Elevation: 3,000-5,000 ft
Slope: 0-100 percent
Aspect: variable.
Vegetation: sufficient
grass understory for
natural reseeding
Elevation: 4,250-6,240 ft
Slope: variable
Aspect: variable.
Used in programmatic
blackbrush -
sagebrush
burning EA
Being used for HMP
Available for office
use
Available for office
use
Available for office
use
Available for office
use
Available for office
use
Available for office
use
H l g n  l o r t A , A M P ,
HMP.
High for EA, AMP,
HMP, EIS.
High for HMP, URA,
and MFP.
High for EIS
implementation
EA’s, and AMP’s,
HMP.
To prove suitability
of allotment.
High for HMP, URA,
and MFP.
High for HMP, URA,
and MFP.
High for HMP, URA,
and MFP.
High for EA, AMP,
HMP.
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Table B“3.—Management Opportunity (Arizona Strip District) (Continued)
Management products Scale Management parameters Current use Potential use
Potential juniper. pinyon 1:126,710 Vegetation: juniper- Available for office High for EA, AMP,
burning areas pinyon, 35 to 50 use HMP.
percent, mountain
shrub, 7 percent,
Mojave Desert shrub,
7 percent
Elevation: 5,000-6,000 ft
Slope: 0-15 percent
Aspect: variable.
Potential burning areas 1:126,710 Vegetation: sufficient Available for office High for EA, AMP,
grass understory for use HMP.
natural reseeding
Elevation: 3,250-5,750 ft
Slope: variable
Aspect: variable.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment,
Table B-4.-Grand Planning Unit
Area: 31,688 acres; 12,777 hectares; 2 percent of planning unit
Elevation Slope Aspecty
Class (ft.) Acres Percent area Class percent Acres Percent area Class Acres Percent area
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
5,500
6,000
6,500
402
771
3,101
3,975
11,487
11,249
681
22
1
2
10
13
36
35
2
1
0-5 22,759 72 NW
6-10 3,443 11 N
11-20 2,650 8 NE
21-50 2,364 7 E
51-100 439 1 SE
100 33 1 s
S w
w
2,646
4,510
5,857
7,406
2,434
2,703
3,420
2,712
8
14
18
23
:
11
9
Cover type description based on photo data, 212 photo plots
Evergreen Mohave Great Basin Mountain Plains
woodland desert shrub desert shrub shrub grassland
Juniper-pinyon Mixed desert Big sagebrush . . . . . . . . . ........1 Mixed chaparral .. ..1 Grama-galleta-shrub-
shrub. .. .22 shrub. . . . .1 Big sagebrush-perennial grass. ...7 Turbinella oak .. ...3 steppe . . . ........1
Big sagebrush-mixed shrub .. ...17 Cheatgrass shrub. ...1
Big sagebrush-tree. . . . . . ........8
Fourwing saltbush . . . . . . ........1
Blackbrush . . . . . . . . . . . . ........3
Blackbrush-tree . . . . . . . . ........2
Blackbrush-other desert shrub. ..14
Snakeweed . . . . . . . . . . . . .......14
Little rabbitbrush . . . . . . . ........4
Total,
percent 22 1 71 4 2
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.
———-
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Figure B-3.–Current Vegetation Map
with producing the detailed maps in the project were
$0.07 per acre. This includes establishing the data
base, which includes Landsat classification results, dig-
ital terrain data (elevation, slope, and aspect), photo
interpretation results, ground data collection results,
and digitized ownership boundaries. The geographic-
ally referenced data base allows extraction of subse-
quent information by coordinates of any scale and in
any practical form. The cost associated with this sec-
ondary data extraction is $0.0006 per acre. These costs
are in 1980 dollars and are subject to a number of con-
siderations. For example, it is possible to study larger
areas without increase in the unit cost per acre. Simi-
larly, the complexity of the
crease in the unit cost.
area could cause an in-
Potential Applications of Landsat to SVIM
The BLM-NASA-EROS wildland vegetation resource
inventory project concluded that using Landsat data
has the potential to reduce the cost of SVIM inven-
tories. Consequently, a program was conducted in fis-
cal year 1981 to test and evaluate the feasibility of this
concept. The objective of the study was to determine
the utility of Landsat and ancillary data when com-
bined with soils data in generating site writeup area
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Figure B.4.—Potential Desert Bighorn Sheep Habitat
240000 Mocao
\
A
ARIZONA STRIP DISTRICT, ARIZONA
SOURCE DATA AUGUST 26, 1977
SCENE I.D. 2947-17074
MAPPING UNIT 10 ACRES (4 HECTARES)
r
I
I
20%
t
(WA) maps for SVIM inventories. A test site in Wyom- in two phases. Part one tested and evaluated the hy-
ing where SVIM data collected by traditional means pothesis on a site that is covered by a SVIM inven-
is available for quality and cost comparison has been tory. The results of this test are not yet available. How-
identified for this program. The project was conducted ever, once feasibility is demonstrated, the process will
— —  — —  — —
— —
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be defined in detail and implemented in a new area.
Careful cost records will be maintained so that a def-
inite conclusion can be reached on cost savings.
Initial studies indicate a potential for significant sav-
ings in field work and product preparation. Savings
in personnel in the form of time and work efficiency
are possible. Once again, a new mix of personnel
(technologists/resource specialists) will be required,
but these will be persons already involved in these
programs. The budget appropriated for the test phase
of this program is approximately $100,000.
Technical
The
Effects of Programs
Utilizing Landsat Data
I m p a c t s
ost substantial technical byproduct of this pro-
gram has been the acquisition by BLM of a complete
off-the-shelf remote-sensing digital image processing
system and associated software. The acquisition of this
equipment at a cost of approximately $500,000 (cost
of equipment and facilities) represented a sharp depar-
ture from previous philosophies in the organization,
It was a recognition by management of the need to
bring space age technology to bear upon the problems
associated with resources management.
As the program has evolved, it has also become ob-
vious that there is a growing potential requirement for
a distributed system. BLM field offices will also need
to be capable of conducting routine analysis of Land-
sat data. This will be a function of schedules, availabili-
ty of resources, and the individual field office techno-
logical capabilities. In addition, the field offices will
need to reach and revise their Landsat data base, It
may also be useful for BLM offices to use the process-
ing capability at the EROS Data Center (EDC). Similar-
ly, BLM Alaska will use the EDC Field Office system
in Anchorage.
Preliminary tests of the system have been very posi-
tive. Its products have been determined to have direct
application in management activities. They have also
been found to be as accurate, and in some instances
more accurate, than those that are produced by more
conventional means. Furthermore, the products are
more easily produced and, as a result, more readily
available to field personnel. The geographically
referenced digital data base containing Landsat data
and anciIlary information has proved to be an ex-
tremely valuable management tool.
The importance of the geographically referenced
data base that results from this technology is just begin-
ning to be realized. The accuracy of the information,
the timeliness with which products can be produced
and revised, the ease with which the data base can
be revised, and the low cost to use the data base as
well as its low initial cost are all factors which will
generate increased use of this technology.
Different Personnel Requirements
As a result of this program, BLM has experienced
an influx of technical specialists who have comple-
mented the existing BLM expertise. These individuals
consist of foresters, botanists, range conservationists,
geologists, systems analysts, physicists, etc., who by
virture of formal education or work-related experience
have become specialists in the field of remote sens-
ing. Table B-5 provides a list of individual technical
skills now found in BRS (new organization resulting
from this program) at the Denver Service Center
(DSC). Table B-6 is a list of individual skills support-
ing the BLM remote-sensing R&D programs. An
unusual skill mix exists in these groups. Such a skill
mix is mandatory in order to: 1 ) be responsive to BLM
resource management requirements, and 2) imple-
ment successfully a technical program at the field
level. The advent of this technology has also affected
operations and personnel at the field level. Most BLM
offices that become involved in the program appoint
remote-sensing coordinators who are normally per-
sons within the existing organization such as soil scien-
tists, foresters, and range conservationists. Once
selected, these persons receive intensive training in
the technology and then work in concert with their
BLM counterparts at DSC for the duration of the proj-
ect.
Economic Effects
To compare overall planning system costs with
Landsat costs is not realistic. Since Landsat data are
Table B=5.—lndividual Skills Supporting
BLM Remote-Sensing R&D Programs
Remote Sensing Skills—Branch of Remote Sensing
.
Forestry
Geology
Wildlife Biology
Botany
Remote-Sensing Skills—TGS Contractor
Forestry
Earth Resources
Biometrics
Range Science
Environmental Monitoring
Wildlife Biology
System Analyst
Programing
SOURCE: Bureau of Land Management.
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Table B-6.—Remote-Sensing Skills—Division of
Scientific Systems Development
Remote-Sensing Skills—Division of Scientific Systems Development
Geology
Remote-Sensing Science
Statistics
Cartography
Computer Systems
Physics
SOURCE: Bureau of Land Management
utilized to support the planning system, only those
parts of the latter which are replaced by methods using
Landsat data may be considered. A small example that
illustrates potential savings is the generation of a habi-
tat map involving vegetation, slope, aspect, elevation,
disturbance corridors, and sources of water at a scale
of 1:1 26,720 (1/2 inch = 1 mile) for a 2 million acre
area. This would cost on the order of $500, if the Land-
sat geographic data base were used, The same prod-
uct produced by hand in the traditional manner would
typically cost at least $2,500. To produce the map by
traditional means would take a matter of weeks, while
the Landsat-derived map could be produced in a mat-
ter of hours (from an established data base). The for-
mer would be subject to the bias of the analyst, while
the latter would be objective within the criteria speci-
fied. In addition, the traditional map would be difficult,
costly, and time consuming to revise, but the Landsat
map could be quickly modified and regenerated, The
Landsat map would also be inherently more accurate
and could be legally defended if required.
In another example, BLM proposes to streamline the
process of SVIM inventory by incorporating Landsat
data with SVIM. Such action is expected to reduce
costs by approximately 20 percent.
Institutional Effects
BLM Landsat remote-sensing program has produced
some institutional benefits, It has caused exchange of
information and cooperative projects that are still in
progress between BLM and other Federal, State, and
local governments. Such exchanges are also occur-
ring between BLM and industry and BLM and the aca-
demic community. Examples of some of these are:
Geological Survey, National Park Service, NASA,
Forest Service, Corps of Engineers, Soil Conser-
vation Service, and Bureau of Indian Affairs.
University of California–Berkeley, Riverside;
University of Arizona, and University of Alaska.
Raytheon, IBM, Geospectra Corp., ESL, Inc., and
Technicolor Graphic Services.
It is estimated that 3 work years have been dedi-
cated to coordinating and managing these efforts in
the last 5 years.
International Effects
The current programs have not affected world trade,
prices, or the competitive position of the United States.
Nor have they affected the current system on inter-
national land use policy formulation. However, they
have led to some international cooperation between
BLM and Mexico and BLM and Australia. In a recent
project, BLM provided extensive support and coopera-
tion to Australia. An Australian scientist worked at the
BLM facility in Denver to do a Landsat analysis on the
BLM image processing system. BLM is also supporting
a project between the United States and Mexico to
map desertification indicators in two test sites i n Mex-
ico and one in the United States.
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Appendix C
FOREIGN AGRICULTURE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, CROP CONDITION ASSESSMENT*
Introduction
The Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS) is one of two
Federal agencies that can be said to be utilizing re-
mote-sensing satellite data in a daily operational for-
mat. Its unique qualities as an operational program
have been and are that, although like many other Gov-
ernment users, it acquires, processes, and analyzes
repetitive Landsat data, FAS is the only agency routine-
ly having a requirement to produce a product in near
real time.
FAS has been notably successful in managing the
transition from limited use of data derived from a
research and development (R&D) system to full inte-
gration of data from an operational system. If the R&D
system is built and tested by one agency, but the oper-
ational system is to be managed by another, then ap-
propriate cross-agency responsibilities for managing
the transition must be devised. In addition, the hard-
ware and software incorporated in the R&D system
are usually more advanced than what the user agen-
cy requires or can even use. The success of FAS in
effecting this transition provides a model that the Fed-
eral Government, as well as State and municipal gov-
ernments, might follow.
The FAS Mission
The primary FAS mission is to develop, maintain,
and expand foreign markets for U.S. agricultural com-
modities. To accomplish this mission, FAS maintains
a worldwide agricultural intelligence and reporting
system to provide timely and accurate information on
world agricultural production and trade. The informa-
tion provided by FAS enables U.S. farmers and traders
to adjust to changes in world demand for U.S.
agricultural products. The information is also used by
the Department of Agriculture (USDA), other Federal
agencies, the Congress, and others in the formulation
of foreign market development and export sales pol-
icies, and in developing strategies for negotiating inter-
national trade agreements.
Product
Current information covering principal agricultural
commodities that has been developed by USDA ana-
*This report is a condensation of a larger report submitted to OTA
as a case study. The aid of FAS in contributing to this assessment
is gratefully acknowledged.
Iysts is made available to the public through the fol-
lowing kinds of publications:
FAS circulars for major commodities (scheduled
and unscheduled). These circulars contain as a
minimum the current official USDA acreage,
yield, and production estimates.
Weekly roundups that provide interim updates
between the release of the scheduled circulars,
particularly with regard to unusual or unexpected
events which may impact production.
Foreign Agriculture Magazine (monthly) that pub-
lishes articles on foreign agricultural matters of
general interest.
The scheduled “circulars” and the “Weekly Round-
up” reports are released on a predetermined schedule
to provide equal access by all users. The current FAS
remote-sensing program was initiated in 1973 with the
conception of the large area crop inventory experi-
ment (LACIE). LACIE was a joint cooperative effort
among USDA, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The goal of
LACIE was to develop, test, and evaluate a system for
predicting foreign wheat production through the use
of Landsat satellite data, weather and agricultural data,
and advanced data processing technology. LACIE
began with the signing of an interagency memoran-
dum of understanding in 1974, and ended in 1978.
Each participating agency contributed funds and per-
sonnel to the project.
The project was directed by a three-agency, high-
level, executive steering group, with LACIE project
management assigned to a project management team
(PMT) made up of senior technical managers from
each of the agencies. The NASA technical manager
was responsible for day-to-day operations, but man-
agement decisions were made by the joint PMT.
The LACIE approach was to: 1 ) develop wheat area
measurements from analysis of randomly selected
Landsat sample segments; 2) estimate yield through
use of weather-related regression yield models; and
3) multiply area by yield to develop regional and coun-
try production estimates.
The USDA LACIE project team developed a set of
USDA user requirements based on 1 ) interviews with
FAS commodity analysts, embassy attaches and man-
agement, 2) reviews of the FAS operational forecasting
systems, and 3) discussion with users of FAS global
crop information. These requirements were evaluated
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for accuracy and timeliness and presented to the exec-
utive steering group. However, because the then-
current Landsat technology (ERTS 1 ) would not fully
meet USDA user requirements, the requirements were
modified, at the insistence of one of the technical
agencies, to a level thought to be achievable.
Results
During its lifetime, LACIE produced wheat produc-
tion estimates as follows: U.S. Great Plains in 1975,
1976, and 1977; Canada in 1976; two Soviet Union
indicator regions in 1976; and the entire Soviet Union
in 1977 and 1978. Generally, all of the winter wheat
and the Soviet spring wheat estimates were acceptably
close to official USDA figures. However, the U.S. and
Canada spring wheat estimates failed to meet the
LACIE accuracy objectives. The poor performance on
spring wheat was largely due to the compressed grow-
ing season for spring wheat and the presence of other
“confusion crops.” The results of LACIE were reported
at a symposium that was held at the Johnson Space
Center in October 1978.
Hardware and Software Considerations
Technology transfer in any environment carries a
certain element of risk. The relative novelty of space
data collection and analysis for foreign agricultural ap-
plications significantly increased this risk factor.
Therefore, a policy was adopted that was calculated
to minimize financial risk to USDA while retaining
maximum flexibility to deal with technological contin-
gencies. The three major elements of this policy were:
1.
2.
3.
All hardware and software procured to support
the design would be commercially available “off-
the-shelf” and vendor-maintained.
Discrete functions were designed to operate on
a single mini computer, yet retain the capability
for interfunction communications.
All application programing was to be modular
and would conform-to Federal and Department
standards for information processing.
Management Approach
FAS applied management by objective and struc-
tured decisionmaking to the transition from R&D to
a user test and subsequently to full operation. The pro-
fessional staff was involved in the technology transfer
process, starting with the initial planning process.
Without this involvement, successful transfer of tech-
nology would not have occurred.
Long-Range Planning
The long-range (5-year) management plan guided
all activities in the transition to operational applica-
tion of space-acquired data. Commencing in 1978, a
series of yearly management plans were initiated.
These plans contain, on a year-by-year basis, the next
level of resource detail and task description.
Major problerns.-The problems encountered in the
transition to space-aided data collection were not just
technical in nature, but encompassed the entire scope
of institutional reactions toward implementing a new
technology:
External:
. timely receipt of Landsat data from NASA
l timely receipt of meteorological data from the Air
Force; and
. lack of R&D assistance to transfer activities
Internal:
l education of end user; and
l establishment of means to provide FAS
meteorological data from the World Food and
Agricultural Situation Board within 24 hours.
Continuing problems. –R&D support to technology
transfer activities, and physical separation of analytical
functions from the end user of a product. The data
base generally available to the FAS analysts is:
. Landsat—3 days to 3 weeks after acquisition;
. weather station reports-24 hours after receipt by
NOAA; and
l environmental satellites—34/48 hours after acqui-
sition.
These data are further supplemented, where and
when available, from on-ground observations (ground
truth) for areas of interest, but these inputs are limited
and in some cases unavailable, Examples of the analyt-
ical products derived from this variety data sources
are:
Narrative assessments of:
l crop and pasture conditions and probable im-
pacts on production;
Ž outlook for water for irrigation; and
• planting and/or harvest conditions.
Maps that show:
l crop stress lines;
l plots of vegetative index numbers, including com-
parison to baseline years;
l snow cover, temperature, and potential winterkill
lines; and
l precipitation and soil moisture, and deviation
from baseline years.
Color displays:
These use several media, including photographs,
color graphics terminals, video tape recorders, and
overhead projectors. Examples of color products are:
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l analyzed Landsat data;
l current and historical soil moisture;
l current and average crop calendars;
• soiIs information; and
Ž daily precipitation for selected 10-day periods,
FAS management by objective requires the develop-
ment of long-range objectives as a basis for defining
longer term goals, which in turn form the basis for the
planning documents described.
Management Planning
This activity builds on the long-range planning for
the transition from R&D to an operational system. The
5-year management plan, originally developed to
guide the transition, is reviewed annually in light of
FAS objectives and requirements, revised as neces-
sary, and presented to management for approval.
Short-term. -An annual management plan translates
the appropriate portions of the 5-year plan into a plan
for the coming fiscal year that contains tasking
schedules and resource requirements.
Contingency Planning
This process identifies potential barriers to the order-
ly progress of crop estimation and estimates the prob-
ability of their occurrence. Plans are then developed
to avert or minimize the consequences.
An appropriate example of such a situation is the
anticipated lack of multispectral scanner (MSS) data
between the demise of Landsat-3 and the operational
readiness of Landsat-D. In anticipation of such an
event, a contingency plan was developed which in-
volves the use of the NOAA-6 and NOAA-7 satellite
sensors as alternate data sources. Correlations be-
tween the Landsat and NOAA-6 data, and a hardware
system to accept, process, and analyze the data are
currently under development.
Budget Planning
In addition to management and operations plan-
ning, the Crop Condition Assessment Division (CCAD)
had developed a long-range financial plan that pro-
jects CCAD’S operations and systems replacement
costs for the next 5 years. This 5-year financial plan
is updated annually. The plan is used to prepare realis-
tic CCAD cost estimates as input to the FAS and USDA
budget process, and to develop procurement strat-
egies for replacing computer systems as they become
obsolete.
Problems
The problems encountered in developing and im-
plementing the operational system are essentially the
same as those encountered during the transition from
R&D to operational status. However, their effect is
even greater, given the requirement to provide short
turnaround data analysis and reporting. Again, prob-
lems can be divided into those internal to FAS and
those that are external:
Negotiating arrangements with NASA to:
• Furnish Landsat data within 48 hours after collec-
tion. (To date, NASA has been unable to meet
FAS timing requirements.)
l Accept and process FAS orders for repetitive and
one-time Landsat data collection.
Unanticipated changes in Landsat data format. Orig-
inally, NASA announced that the data would be deliv-
ered in a high-density digital product tape (HDDT),
on which radiometric and geometric corrections and
resampling had already been accomplished. Then,
NASA and the U.S. Department of the Interior (USDI)
jointly announced that the standard tape format would
be changed to HDDT archival tape, on which only
the radiometric corrections had been made. As a
result, FAS was forced to divert approximately
$250,000 from its planned system enhancement to
modify the scene processing unit to accommodate the
new format.
Inability of Landsat-D to provide full geographic cov-
erage. The proposed Landsat- D, with its dependence
on the tracking and data relay satellite system (TDRSS)
will not provide timely (24-hour) coverage for India,
Pakistan, and a major portion of the U.S.S.R. spring
wheat region. These areas are critical to FAS. USDA
repeatedly requested installation of wide-band tape
recorders on Landsat-D and D’ to ensure full geo-
graphic coverage. However, the tape recorders are
not included in the planned system configuration.
Strong probability of a lengthy Landsat MSS data gap
between the end of Landsat-3 and the operational
readiness of Landsat-D (this has already occurred). FAS
and USDA were unable to alter NASA’s schedule,
which seemed to be dictated more by a preoccupa-
tion with technical problems with the Thematic Map-
per than by the pressing need of users for continuity
of MSS data.
The uncertainty about MSS data continuity required
the diversion of analytical resources to development
of techniques to use NOAA’s environmental satellites
as an alternative data source.
Lack of rapid turnaround R&D assistance in develop-
ing, testing, and implementing techniques to processs
and analyze environmental satellite data. This slow-
ness seemed to stem from the R&D community’s per-
ception that its role was to carry out basic and long-
term research as opposed to applied research to solve
pressing problems.
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Internal:
l establishing system credibility with FAS commodi-
ty analysts and others.
issues outstanding:
delays in delivery of Landsat data;
probability of an extended break in Landsat data
continuity;
lack of timely data for India, Pakistan, and part
of Soviet Union through the 1980’s; and
lack of R&D support to resolve near-term opera-
tional problems.
Improvement in Information
For the past 2 years, the project has been analyzing
space-acquired meteorological data and providing
condition assessments to FAS commodity analysts.
These reports are not used by the agency as “stand
alone” reports, but are used as additional input in for-
mulating the agency’s country-by-country production
and demand forecasts. Because the reports have only
been available for 2 years and because they are inte-
grated into multisource reports, it is impossible at this
time to quantify improvements to the FAS information
system. However, qualitative improvements through
enhancements to the FAS analytical process are evi-
dent. Examples of services that improve the analysis
and
l
l
l
increase confidence are as follows:
early warnings of situations that may affect agri-
cultural commodity production and assessments
of probable impact;
continuous monitoring of conditions in foreign
high-risk/high-priority regions throughout the en-
tire crop production cycle, and issuance of peri-
odic assessment reports; and
confirmation (or denial) of reported situations af-
fect ing  fo re ign  c rops .
Availability to analysts and embassy attaches of in-
formation in gridded data base relative to:
moisture available to plants at planting time and
throughout the growth cycle and deviation from
baseline years;
crop growth stage at any specified time, and devi-
ations from baseline;
daily temperature/precipitation, and deviations;
soils/climate information for areas of interest; and
agricultural acreage, yield and production statis-
tics at subcountry/province level.
Landsat and Successor Systems Requirements
Ground Data Handling.-This function is the corner-
stone of any operational use of data acquired from
space. The FAS technical requirements relative to this
function were first stated in the Department’s user re-
quirements document, which was developed during
LACIE and subsequently reaffirmed in informal corre-
spondence between USDA and NASA/NOAA. Addi-
tionally, the requirements were also documented as
input to the recent Integrated Remote Sensing Systems
Study (IRS3), These requirements are as follows:
Data Delivery
Data delivery requirements in support of FAS opera-
tions are as follows:
HDDT in Product (“P”) format with radiometric
and geometric corrections applied. Nearest
neighbor resampling is preferred.;
delivery systems should not introduce data errors
over and above those inherent in the collector;
and
pass-to-pass registration of frame data is a
minimum requirement. Header data for registra-
tion to a given cartographic base is also con-
sidered a requirement.
Data Timeliness
Timeliness of data is a critical technical requirement
for FAS. The quantification of this requirement is speci-
fied below:
Ž All data collected by the 4-band MSS are to be
made available for processing by FAS within 48
hours after acquisition by the satellite.
All special FAS requests to activate the collector over
areas routinely scheduled for coverge must be sched-
uled within 24 hours after receipt of the request.
Data retransmission required because of errors or
omissions must occur within a 12-hour period regard-
less of error source.
Data Continuity
The requirement for data continuity has two discrete
elements: day-by-day processing and delivery to the
user; and data coverage comparability between space
platforms, with no gap in time between operational
readiness of successive collection platforms. Each of
these FAS requirements is summarized as follows:
Day-by-Day Data Receipt (reliability)
l total daily data collection must be processed and
delivered to FAS within the timeliness criterion;
and
l data backlogs cannot be tolerated within the
scheduled operations and resource base of FAS.
Data Gap
The data gap potential is the most worrisome situa-
tion a user of satellite data can face. In this context
FAS has initiated and supported the following require-
ments:
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A space platform with fully operational MSS to
be in orbit at all times;
the 4-band MSS with on-board wide-band tape
recorders to be continuously operated through
the 1980’s;
a single satellite (collector) operational with a
backup available for launch to assure data conti-
nuity; and
total world coverage capability with no “black
holes,” or data gaps due to other priorities as are
expected to occur with Landsat-D and TDRSS.
Experience during the past 2 years of operation have
reinforced these technical requirements. Current FAS
analytical capabiIities are facing serious degradation
because the minimum requirements defined in this
section have not been satisfied, and apparently will
not be satisfied during the Landsat-D system lifetime.
Personnel Impact
No FAS functions or positions will be eliminated as
a result of the current system. However, automation
and the integration of new data sources into the ana-
lytical and decisionmaking process will relieve senior
analysts to concentrate on additional tasks that have
been levied upon commodity programs by Congress
and the executive branch without a compensating in-
crease in personnel.
International Impact
It is not possible at this time accurately to determine
the dollar value that changes in the system will have
on the dollar value of U.S. exports, world prices, U.S.
competitive position and economic policy. However,
over the next 4 to 6 years, given a “free market” envi-
ronment, the real value to the United States of cur-
rent foreign crop information will increase dramatical-
ly. The magnitude of this value will depend in a large
measure upon the U.S. policy concerning export of
space-related technology to nations who compete for
U.S. foreign markets. A policy of open and equal ac-
cess to agricultural data collected by U.S. space plat-
form and related technology could tend to reduce the
U.S. competitive advantage in the world market and
perhaps “stagnate” our level of exports. It could also
permit other nations to compete in markets that have
been traditionally dominated by the United States.
This situation may not be acceptable given the need
for expanded U.S. markets to offset the increasing
dollar flow for oil imports. This is a national policy
question that FAS and USDA cannot resolve. How-
ever, national policy on the international availability
of U.S. space technology and/or data collected from
space will have a significant impact on the value to
the United States of improved agricultural information.
International Cooperation
The current system and the preceding R&D have
stimulated interest in bilateral cooperation in the ex-
change of technology. The following will serve as an
example:
In early 1977, the President of Mexico received an
in-depth briefing by FAS of LACIE results and USDA
application of remote-sensing technology. This brief-
ing led to agreements in principle between the Secre-
tary of Agriculture and the Mexican Minister of Agri-
culture later to exchange mutually beneficial technol-
ogy. FAS and Mexican technical managers developed
a plan for an exchange of technical staff between the
Ministry of Agriculture and FAS (CCAD).
NASA’s International Affairs office was represented
at all meetings in Washington and Mexico City. One
problem encountered in these planning sessions was
NASA’s insistence that Mexico purchase a ground re-
ceiving station even though all areas of interest to the
Mexican Government were routinely collected to
meet U.S. data requirements and processed through
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. This problem
could have been resolved, but factors external to
USDA and NASA halted further communications to-
ward negotiations of a working bilateral agreement.
Given the increasing awareness of the need for
closer ties between the United States and Mexico, it
would seem to be in the U.S. interest to reopen nego-
tiations that would lead to a bilateral agreement re-
garding agricultural applications of space technology.
Appendix D
MATERIALS SCIENCE AND
ENGINEERING IN MICROGRAVITY*
Introduction
Two hundred miles above Earth, unfiltered solar
radiation, a near-perfect vacuum, and temperature ex-
tremes ranging from –200° to +200° F exist in an
environment almost free of gravitational force. The re-
cent interest in materials processing in space (MPS)
has its origin in the belief that the unique attributes
of this environment may have important scientific and
commercial applications.
With the exception of microgravity, the attributes
of the space environment can be duplicated on Earth
in sufficient quantities and duration to investigate their
extended effect on processes and materials. Though
microgravity can be simulated by using airplanes,
sounding rockets, and in some instances magnetic
fields, such simulations are generally of short duration,
involve only limited quantities of test material, and
often introduce complicating factors such as vibration
and impurities. The long-term microgravity environ-
ment of space introduces a new dimension in control-
ling process variables such as temperature, composi-
tion, and fluid flow. Through this experimentation,
new opportunities for understanding and improving
ground-based production methods will be created,
and, where practical and economical, select materials
may be produced in space.
Scientific Status of Materials
Processing in Space
Microgravity Alterations of
Processing Phenomena
By using the long-duration, microgravity environ-
ment of an orbiting spacecraft, new manufacturing
processes can be designed. On Earth the theoretical
performance characteristics of materials are inhibited
by such gravity-induced phenomena as convection,
segregation, buoyancy, and sedimentation. These
phenomena function in the following manner:1
Convection. The spontaneous stirring and mixing
that occurs as currents flow between temperature gra-
*McDonnell Douglas, the Materials Processing in Space Projects Office
of NASA, and TRW each provided a case study for this appendix. Their aid
is gratefully acknowledged.
‘See generally: L. K. Zoner, “Materials Science and Engineering in Space, ”
in Commercial Operations in Space, 1980-2MXI,  18th Goddard Symposium,
AAS, vol. 51, Science and Technology Series, 1981, pp. 20-26; K. Moritz,
“In the Realm of ZercG,”  T/WSystems and Energy, winter 1978, pp. 16-24.
clients in a liquid or gas are unpredictable and chaotic,
and can lead to unwanted structural and composition-
al differences in solid material. Both crystal growth and
solidification processes are enhanced if convective dis-
turbances are suppressed. The microgravity of space
should provide a means to suppress convective phe-
nomena.
Sedimentation/Buoyancy. On Earth, gravity causes
heavier components to settle in a mixture while less-
dense materials rise. Sedimentation and buoyancy
complicate manufacturing techniques for alloys of dif-
ferent density elements and for composite materials.
In microgravity, lighter density materials will remain
in suspension for indefinite periods of time, thereby
allowing the processing of homogeneous composites
and alloys where the constituents have large density
differences.
Hydrostatic Pressure. Hydrostatic pressure puts a
strain on materials during solidification. Certain crys-
tals are sufficiently dense and delicate that they are
susceptible to strain under their own weight at growth
temperatures. Such strain-induced deformations in
crystals degrade their electro-optical performance. In
microgravity, heat-treated, melted, or resolidified
alloys might be developed free of deformation by coat-
ing the machined shape with a thin oxide skin, serv-
ing as a mold.
Container Effects. Containerless processing elimi-
nates problems of container contamination and wall
effects, often the greatest source of impurities and im-
perfections while forming molten material. In micro-
gravity, a material may be melted, manipulated, and
shaped, free of contact with a container or crucible
by using acoustic, electromagnetic, or electrostatic
fields. Surface tension would hold the material togeth-
er in mass, a force overpowered hereon Earth by grav-
ity.
MPS Product Applications
In general, the MPS program is interested in studies
of process parameters to enhance control and produc-
tivity in Earth manufacturing, to prepare limited quan-
tities of precursor materials to provide baseline or ref-
erence data, and to develop methods unique to the
space environment by which materials can be pre-
pared. All these research tasks rely upon the range of
process parameters being extended through the re-
duction of gravity.
334
Appendix D—Materials Science and Engineering in Microgravity . 335
Examples of potential applications derived from MPS
research are as follows.
Crystal Growth 2
Melt growth is the most widely exploited technique
to produce high-technology, single-crystal materials
for semiconductor chips used in large-scale integrated
circuits for communications and computers. Chemical
homogeneity, which will maximize electrical perform-
ance, is believed possible through microgravity proc-
essing. Commercially valuable crystals for sensitive in-
frared sensors, most difficult to grow on Earth, may
be enhanced by melt growth in a microgravity envi-
ronment.
As a variation of melt growth, float-zone growth
techniques are widely used to produce crystals such
as doped silicon for semiconductors and solar cells.
Although large, efficient crystals are grown commer-
cially with this process on Earth, gravity does limit the
size and type of crystals that can be produced and
introduces growth rate fluctuations that cause chem-
ical inhomogeneities that necessitate cutting the
crystal into smalI chips for high-performance applica-
tions.
Solution growth of crystals in the MPS program em-
phasizes creation of room-temperature, infrared detec-
tor materials, and gallium-arsenide (GaAs) semi-con-
ductors for a wide range of applications from micro-
wave devices to computers and solid-state lasers. Infra-
red defectivity of current available material is con-
strained to about 20 percent of the theoretical limit
because of gravity-influenced growth defects. GaAs
semiconductors can be readily grown on Earth, but
with considerable imperfections,
The absence of gravity opens new possibilities for
the growth of large, flat, pure crystals by vapor tech-
nique; therefore, the MPS program includes the inves-
tigation of Hg12 nuclear detector crystals that can be
used at ambient temperature. Because the crystal has
a layered structure, self-deformation during growth in
sizes under 1 g is believed to be an important factor
i n producing dislocations that degrade the perform-
ance of the crystal as a nuclear-energy detector. The
growth of such a crystal in microgravity could elimi-
nate such strains at the growth temperature.
Solidification3
Control of the solidification of metals and alloys is
the key element in the field of metallurgy. Gravita-
tional effects, such as buoyancy-driven convection of
2S. Waters, ‘‘Tapping the Resources of a New Continent, ” Part 1—Materials
Processing, Mechanical Engineering, June  1981, pp. 26-39.
3S. Solomon, “Factories in Space,” Science Digest Special, September/
C)ctober  1980, pp. 58-61, 114,
the melt or sedimentation, can greatly influence the
structure of metals and alloys. Directional solidifica-
tion in microgravity allows complicated shapes, such
as turbine blades, to be melted and directionally reso-
lidified to increase axial strength while using a thin
oxide skin to maintain the shape. Additional interest
is based on the potential of approaching the theoreti-
cal maximum magnetic strength of materials that are
10 times higher than currently realized on Earth.
Another group of potential candidates for in-space
production is that of miscibility gap alloys. These alloys
defy preparation on Earth in bulk quantities because
of gravity-driven effects that cause the materials to
segregate upon solidification. There are some 500
such combinations of materials that have a liquid-
phase miscibility gap. Processed in microgravity, these
materials might have such diverse applications as elec-
trical contacts (as replacements for silver and gold) and
self-lubricating bearings.
Solidification kinetics in the casting of alloys under
nonterrestrial conditions can produce fine-grained
structure in the interior of a casting. This phenomenon
could have application in common products such as
iron engine castings.
Undercooked solidification is the rapid quenching
of molten materials at temperatures well below their
freezing points. By containedess processing in micro-
gravity, a vast array of materials is expected to be proc-
essed in the amorphous state, thus extending the
materials properties available to mechanical and opti-
cal designers. Enhanced glasses manufactured by
means of this process could improve their energy-
transfer efficiency for applications such as laser hosts.
In addition, such studies may shed light on methods
for obtaining superconductors that work at higher
temperatures.
Containerless Processing
Containerless processing may permit the creation
of amorphous (glass) materials that cannot be made
on Earth, and may allow the analysis of molten materi-
als at temperatures that would exceed the melting
point of crucibles on Earth. By elimination of nuclea-
tion associated with container walls, it should be possi-
ble to extend the glass-forming range of many materi-
als, including some metals, resulting in new and
unique glasses with exotic properties. An application
of this process is in the production of ultrapure glass
used in optical waveguides for high-frequency com-
munications. Other possible applications are fusion-
energy lasers, fiber optics communications, cable net-
works, and self-focusing lenses.
4N. j. B a r t e r , “Materials Processing in Space, ” Impact for the
1980’s–Conference on Selected Technology for Business and Industry, May
14-15, 1980, pp. 11-16,
——.
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Fluids and Chemical Processess
On Earth, fluid and chemical processes are affected
by gravity-driven convection or sedimentation. Micro-
gravity eliminates these effects, thereby allowing com-
ponents to be isolated for study with a degree of free-
dom not otherwise possible.
A potential application of this technique would be
the production of monodisperse latex spheres in
space. These spheres are too large to be grown by
polymerization and too small to be sized by microsiev-
ing on Earth. Because of the absence of sedimenta-
tion in microgravity, these latex spheres might be mass
produced from a polymerization process while in sus-
pension. These spheres, available only in research
quantities, are used in calibrating electron micro-
scopes, light-scattering devices and filters, in the
measurement of pore size in membranes, and in sero-
logical tests for a multitude of diseases.
The biomedical applications of microgravity such
as electrophoresis, isoelectric focusing, phase parti-
tioning, suspension cell culturing, crystallization of
macromolecules, and blood flow (rheology) processes
will also be evaluated in the MPS program. Applica-
tion of these techniques in biomedical sciences could
lead to production of human insulin; purification of
hemopoietic stem cells for treatment of certain types
of leukemia; or production of collagen, used for arti-
ficial corneas, artificial skin for wound and burn treat-
ments, and for membranes to aid i n cardiovascular
and orthopedic surgery.
Status of MPS Technology
History of the MPS Program
The space processing program presently sponsored
by the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA) germinated in the mid-to-late 1960’s,6 fos-
tered by the need to master propellant characteristics,
fire control, and the assembly of structures in space–
elements all essential to manned spaceflight. Propel-
lant requirements of the Apollo lunar landing program
stimulated research on the effects of surface tensions
and inertia in partially filled containers. Similarly, inter-
est in on-orbit repair and assembly required engineer-
5N. j. Barter and D. M. Waltz, Materials Processing in Space: A Weightless
Proposition, AIAA-80-0878,  presented at AlAA International Annual Meeting
and Technical Display, Baltimore, Md., May 6-11, 1980, pp. 3-4; E. C.
McKannan, Survey of U.S. Materials Processing and Manufacturing in Space
Programs, NASA TM-82427, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center,
Alabama, July 1981,  p. 1.
‘j.  H. Bredt, “Status of NASA Space-Processing Research,” in Processing
and Manufacturing in Space, proceedings of a symposium held at Frascati,
Italy, by European Space Research Organization, Mar, 25-27, 1974., p. 76;
Op. Cit., L.K.  Zoner, 1981, pp. 19-20.
ing studies of brazing and welding phenomena under
microgravity conditions.
In the course of these investigations, it was found
that unrestrained liquid masses would form large free-
flying globules, that vapor bubbles could grow virtual-
ly without limit in boiling liquids, and that flames
quickly become blanketed with their own combus-
tion products. These effects of weightlessness were first
treated as problems in the engineering of spacecraft
systems, only later to be recognized as exploitable
phenomena useful in creating novel processes and
products in space.
In 1966, personnel from NASA’s Marshall Space
Flight Center embarked on a series of visits to manu-
facturing companies to explore possible industrial in-
terest in space applications. In 1969, NASA initiated
its first formal space processing activities under the
program title: “Materials Science and Manufacturing
in Space.” This program was jointly sponsored by the
agency’s Office of Manned Spaceflight and Office of
Aeronautics and Space Technology. To date, in-space
MPS research has been pursued on the Apollo, Skylab,
and Apollo/Soyuz manned spaceflight programs.
Apollo 7
An MPS flight experiment program was inaugurated
in 1971 when three “demonstration” experiments
were performed on the Apollo 14 lunar mission. These
simple science demonstrations consisted of heat flow
and convection, electrophoretic separation, and com-
posite casting experiments. On Apollo 16 in early
1972, a more ambitious electrophoresis experiment
was conducted, and in 1972 Apollo 17 carried a heat-
flow and convection demonstration.
Skylab8
The 100-ton Skylab space laboratory station, flown
1973-74, offered the first opportunity for extensive ex-
perimentation in the microgravity environment of
space. A total of 15 MPS experiments and nine science
demonstrations were conducted on Skylab. The com-
plement of MPS experiments included: crystal growth,
metal composites, eutectics (a combination of two
materials that has a lower melting point than either
material alone), welding and brazing, fluid effects, and
combustion processes.
A materials processing facility (MPF) was an integral
part of Skylab and was designed to accommodate all
7j. H. Bredt, op. cit., 1974, p. 77.
5kylab, Our First Space Station, Leland F. Belew  (cd.), NASA SP-400, Wash-
ington, D.C.  1977, pp. 148-1 51; Sky/ab  Experiments, Materia/s  Science, Vo/.
3, NASA EP-1 12, May 1973; Proceedings of Third Space Processing Sympo-
sium—Sky/ab  Resu/ts,  vol. 1 and 2, Alabama, june  1974.
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Skylab space processing experiments involving the
melting and resolidification of materials. This facility
was capable of venting into space, thus providing an
evacuated environment for the experiments desired.
A multipurpose electric furnace, capable of reaching
1,000° C, was fitted within MPF allowing eight metals
experiments to be conducted.
A pO llO/ SOyU Zg
The joint Soviet-American Apollo/Soyuz Test Proj-
ect (ASTP), which flew in 1975, carried 12 space proc-
essing experiments and three demonstrations. Among
them: crystal growth of semiconductors, zero-gravity
processing of magnets, surface tension-induced con-
vection, density separation during solidification of two
alloys, and halide eutectic growth, In addition, two
electrophoresis experiments were conducted on
ASTP, one of which was developed and funded by
the Federal Republic of Germany.
A modified Skylab furnace, capable of reaching
1,150°C with increased control of temperature
ranges, was carried aboard the ASTP. ASTP allowed
several investigators to confirm Skylab results and
make additional tests of previously observed phenom-
ena.
The Apollo, Skylab, and ASTP experiments were
conceptually simple and limited in scope. The hard-
ware was designed on the basis of equipment used
on the ground and the experiments were supported
by limited Earth-based research. Consequently, the ex-
periments were basically reproductions of current
techniques of processing materials carried out under
low gravity conditions. With the close of the Apollo
program in 1975, no further MPS spaceflight oppor-
tunities were available.
The STAMPS Report
A special study to provide guidance for NASA’s pro-
gram for materials processing space was published in
1978 by the Committee on Scientific and Techno-
logical Aspects of Materials Processing in Space
(STAMPS), 10 an ad hoc committee of the Space Appli-
cations Board under the National Academy of Sci-
ences (NAS). Drawing on comments and advice from
more than 100 experts in materials science and tech-
nology, the NAS study concluded that the prospects
for economical space manufacturing are limited and
need to be better defined on a case-by-case basis. Fur-
ther, the STAMPS report stated that no examples of
9Apollo-Soyuz Pamphlet No, 8: Zero-G Technology, NASA EP-140, Wash-
ington, D.C.  October 1977.
IOMater/a/s  prWe55;ng  in Space,  report of the Committee on Scientific and
Technological Aspects of Materials Processing Space, National Academy of
Sciences, Washington, D. C,. 1978.
economically justifiable processes for producing mate-
rials in space could be found.
The STAMPS committee stressed two points that
emerged from the testimony of its advisors and from
previous materials experimentation in space:11
First, the space environment usually contributes at
least as many problems as it solves. In sophistication,
rel iabi l i ty ,  convenience, and cost ,  terrestr ia l  exper i -
mentat ion is general ly super ior to what can be ex-
pected in space. Second, space experimentation will
have little value unless its planning is founded on sub-
stantial Earth-based information and unless the results
are coupled to those of complementary terrestrial pro-
grams. ”
The STAMPS report indicated that some space envi-
ronment parameters, such as the level of vacuum,
temperature, or high-energy radiation can be better
realized on Earth. Even long periods of low gravity,
achieved only through orbital flight, may be jeopard-
ized by several factors. Among these are: gas venting,
fluid dumps, use of evaporators, crew motions, and
perturbations of the shuttle orbit itself. These factors
could induce accelerations, creating small forces of
gravity (G-jitter), which in turn might affect the low-
gravity requirement of space processing.
Singled out in the report were commercial space
processing of vaccines using electrophoresis (the sepa-
ration of particles of different mass/charge ratios in an
electric field) and growing silicon crystals for use in
electronics. The STAMPS study found no clearcut ad-
vantage in either case over terrestrial processes, In the
case of electrophoresis, use of the technique on Earth
has not yet been optimized.
The study group commented that low gravity ap-
pears to offer certain capabilities in studying the prop-
erties of boiling, combustion and melting, processes
that are not now well understood. It was also felt that
the ability of containerless processing to avoid con-
tamination and increase purity may hold great prom-
ise. But even these possibilities must be subject to
critical evaluation of comparative costs and likelihood
of success. The NAS study group indicated that the
commercial utilization of such understanding lacks
promise.
The STAMPS committee suggested that the organi-
zation and management of future space processing
should include the use of the space shuttle as a na-
tional facility. This would include use of the Spacelab
by scientists and engineers working in universities,
government laboratories, or industrial concerns. User
rates should be established, but not designed to cover
the total real cost of operating the facility.
1 I Ibid.
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In concluding its findings, the STAMPS study sug-
gested the demonstration and development of signifi-
cant materials processing in space techniques should
be paid for by NASA. To this end, the committee sug-
gested certain technical and management changes to
improve the effectiveness of the NASA MPS effort. The
STAMPS report noted that NASA’s MPS efforts had
“suffered from poorly conceived and designed experi-
ments, often done in crude apparatus, from which
weak conclusions were drawn and, in some cases,
overpublicized.”
In consonance with the recommendations of the
STAMPS committee, a scientific advisory committee
has been formed, responsive to the MPS Division Di-
rector, to aid in future program planning and policy-
making relative to scientific aspects of the program.
Peer groups have been empaneled to assist in the
selection and periodic review of scientific experimen-
tation and the periodic review of plans and policies. 12
Terrestrial Facilities
In the absence of spaceflight opportunities for MPS
experiment, NASA began using drop tubes and drop
towers, aircraft, and sounding rockets to simulate the
microgravity environmental J Using such ground-based
research technologies, prospective MPS investigators
could acquire microgravity test data to: 1) establish
experiment parameters, 2) establish proof of concept,
and 3) provide specimens for laboratory research.
Drop tubes and towers
To provide a low-cost, flexible and readily available
low-g test facility, the Marshall Space Flight Center
operates two drop tubes (one of 100-ft length and one
of 300-ft length). These drop tubes provide 2 to 4 sec-
onds of microgravity.
In drop tubes, molten droplets are released into a
column of vacuum and are solidified during 2.6 sec-
onds of vertical free fall, thus experiencing an effec-
tive force of 10-7 g. Typical experiments utilizing this
facility include studies in high-temperature calorime-
try, and in liquid densities, surface tensions, and
volume changes due to solidification,
In using the drop tower, an experiment package is
placed in a canister thrusted by small rocket motors
to overcome air resistance and guide-rail friction. Ex-
periment-laden canisters as heavy as 204 kg can ex-
perience an effective force of as little as 10-5 g dur-
ing a 4-second drop tower test. Drop towers proved
invaluable in verifying apparatus and experimental
12E, c, Mc~annan,  op. cit. ,  July  1981,  P. 18.
I lMaterla15  processing  in Space Program: Handbook for Participants, Pre-
pared for NASA by ORI, Inc., February 1980, pp. III-5 to III-19.
concepts flown on Skylab. Typical experiments are
similar to those performed in a drop tube.
Research aircraft
NASA employs KC-1 35 and F-1046 aircraft, flying
on parabolic trajectories, to provide 10 to 60 seconds
of microgravity. Experiment packages flown in the
KC-1 35, because of the size of the aircraft, can be
larger in size than in the small F-104B, although
approximately twice the microgravity environment
can be obtained (30 to 60 seconds) by the jet fighter.
Minimum gravity level obtainable is approximately
10-2 g. However, this value is unsteady, and therefore
these means are unsuitable for precise experiments.
Although the data obtained from research aircraft are
limited, such flights do allow for valuable crew train-
ing, experiment hardware development, and verifi-
cation tests.
Sounding rockets
The space-processing application rocket (SPAR) pro-
gram has been instituted to provide some continuity
in flight experimentation between the ASTP flight and
the space shuttle MPS opportunities.14 The SPAR
rocket is a Black Brant sounding rocket equipped with
recoverable payload system. SPAR was introduced in
1975 and has accomplished nine flights to date. Typ-
ically, SPAR can attain between 4 to 7 minutes of low-
gravity phenomena, providing levels of 1O-5 to 10-6g
for payloads up to 300 kg. Because of the severe
launch environment as measured by acceleration,
vibration and spin rate of SPAR at liftoff, and later spin
down, MPS experiment design is an arduous under-
taking. The short flight times of SPAR are not con-
ducive to crystal growth or biological separation.
However, they can be used for certain fluid and so-
lidification experiments. The SPAR program has led
to an inventory of low-cost hardware, suitable for
longer duration experimentation during shuttle opera-
tion. A materials experiment assembly (MEA) designed
to be compatible with the shuttle/Spacelab has been
developed by using SPAR technology.
Shuttle/Spacelab Programs
An operational space shuttle will further the evolu-
tion of materials processing in space. MPS experimen-
tation on planned shuttle flights of up to 1 month will
make use of the following shuttle facilities:15
14j.  H. Bredt, “NASA Plans for Space Processing Experiments on Sounding
Rockets,” in Processing and Manufacturing in Space, proceedings of a sym-
posium held at Frascati, Italy, Mar. 25-27, 1974, pp. 71-73; R. j. Naumann
and H. W. Herring, op. cit., 1980, pp. 99-103.
ISE,  C. McKannan, op. cit., jUly 1981, P. 41.
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Small Self-Contained Payloads
These containers are available for rent by compa-
nies, universities, and private citizens for a cost de-
pendent upon the size and weight of the experiment
package. Containers with a maximum weight of 200
lb and measuring 5 ft3 can be rented for $10,000 (in
1975 dollars). They are accommodated on a space-
available basis and must contain their own power and
internal data recording systems. Though limited by
size and the absence of in-space manipulation, the
small self-contained payloads may provide data useful
in larger Spacelab experimentation or in joint en-
deavors between industry and NASA.
Materials Experiment Assembly
The first article of new materials processing hard-
ware to be flown i n the shuttle is the MEA, a self-con-
tained package attached to a Spacelab pallet. MEA has
been developed to be compatible with SPAR technol-
ogy and reconditioned SPAR equipment. MEA oper-
ates under its own power, containing a control com-
puter, heat rejection system, and data recorders, and
can accommodate up to four experiments in its sepa-
rately sealed subenclosures. It is anticipated that pri-
vate institutions may wish to lease MEA from NASA
to conduct experiments of a proprietary nature, al-
though legal and financial aspects of this possibility
have yet to be clarified.16
Spacelab Modules and Pallets
Shuttle MPS systems can be divided into two groups:
1 ) those located in the pressurized Spacelab module,
and 2) those positioned on the Spacelab pallet. ’
Spacelab is a habitable module providing a shirt-sleeve
laboratory for scientists and engineers to work in
space. Carried into orbit in the shuttle cargo bay,
Spacelab remains attached to the orbiter for flight
durations of up to 1 month. The interior of the module
is fitted with racks arranged in single and double as-
semblies to house experiments.
Unpressurized, u-shapted segmented pallets can
also be attached in the orbiter cargo bay. These pallets
form an open porch, exposing instruments directly to
space and accommodating experiments controlled
from Spacelab, the orbiter flight deck, or the Earth.
Up to five pallets can be fitted in the cargo bay and
combinations of moducles and pallets can be flown.
The major “facility-class, multiuser instruments”
presently under development in the shuttle/MPS pro-
gram consist of:18
160P, Clt note 17, pp. I II-52-III-53.
17J. R. Carruthers  and L. K. Zoner, “Materials Processing Studies in Space, ”
NASA (unnumbered) Apr. 10, 1979, pp.  20-23.
IBN, ). Bafler  and D, M,  Waltz, op. cit., May  1980, PP. 4-5.
Fluid Experiment System (FES): Mounted in a dou-
ble rack aboard Spacelab, the FES experiment
uses Schlieren photography and holography to
study fluid behavior under microgravity.
Vapor Crystal Growth (VCG) System: Crystals are
to be grown from fluids, vapors, or from melts
of solid materials, recorded by holographic and
video recording in common use with the FES.
Acoustic Contain Containerless Positioning Module
(ACPM): The ACPM is located on a pallet and
uses 3-axis acoustic positioning to control the
position and rotation of a sample heated radi-
antly to temperatures up to 1,600° C.
Solidification Experiment System (SES): A modular
furnace facility ”that can accommodate up to 16
samples per flight that are automatically loaded
and unloaded on command. These samples can
be processed with uniform heating and cooling
or with a temperature gradient and directionally
solidified. SES is to be located on a Spacelab pal-
let.
As funding permits, additional MPS/shuttle activity
is expected to include the following systems:19
Floating Zone System: Used to determine how far
the zone refining technique can be carried in
space, and to what degree crystal size and purity
can be increased. Attached to a pallet.
Electromagnetic Containerless Processing System:
A processing module for heating and cooling con-
trol independent of positioning control. Attached
to a pallet.
Bioseparation System: Designed to enhance un-
derstanding of electrophoresis and its variations.
Contained in Spacelab.
Electrostatic Contain Processing System:
Used for processing and shaping larger, complex
materials. Contained in Spacelab.
Future MPS Efforts
Three types of materials processing experiments
have been selected for future shuttle missions. These
are:
Group 1. Experiments that take advantage of the great-
ly reduced convective flow to provide quiescent
growth or solidification conditions with precise con-
trol of temperature, growth rate and composition.
Experiments in this category include:
Ž growth of solid-solution single crystals;
. semiconductor materials growth in low-g environ-
ment;
19D.  Dooling,  “The Space Factory” in the ///ustrated  Encyclopedia of Space
Techrro/ogy,  pp. 21 9-220; R. ). Naumann, “U.S. National Report on Materials
Processing in Space, ” presentation to Working Group 8, Materials Science
in Space, COSPAR meeting (No. 78-1 15), Innsbruck, Austria, june  1978, pp.
20-22.
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vapor growth of alloy-type semiconductor crys-
tals;
Hgl2 crystal growth for nuclear detectors;
solution growth of crystals in zero gravity; and
alined magnetic composites.
Group 2. Experiments involving glasses or glass proc-
esses. These experiments take advantage of the con-
tainerless aspects of space processing as well as the
absence of Stokes bubble rise to investigate
phenomena that cannot be unambiguously studied
on Earth. Experiments in this category include:
l refining of glasses in space;
Ž physical phenomena in containerless glass proc-
essing; and
• containerless preparation of advanced optical
glasses.
Group 3. The remaining experiments depend primar-
ily on the absence of sedimentation to keep a
material of different density in suspension during
a process. Experiments in this category include:
Ž solid electrolytes containing dispersed particles;
• liquid miscibility gap materials; and
l production of large particle size monodisperse
latexes in microgravity.
It is anticipated that the projected needs of MPS,
as measured by numbers of samples, processing time,
and power required to support sustained, systematic
MPS activity, will surpass present shuttle capabilities.
Use of a 2S-kW power system has been advocated
to extend shuttle stay-time in orbit (from a maximum
30 days to 90 days) and to provide greater levels of
power supportive of MPS payloads. Longer duration
shuttle flights, coupled with increased power to con-
duct experiments, would reduce the net cost of ex-
perimentation.
Eventually, a materials experiment carrier (MEC)
could serve as a transition between exploratory MPS
research and prepilot manufacturing plants. MEC
would carry several second-generation MPS modules
and, attached to the 25-kW power system, would con-
tain its own heat-rejection equipment, control and
data systems. As a total unit, MEC and power system
would fly freely, utilizing the shuttle only to deliver
raw materials and to extract finished products for
return to Earth, 2o
It is conceivable that the MEC activity will require
increased human attention, necessitating habitable,
Spacelab-type modules, which could lead to a
manned space station. This station may well serve as
a national space facility for large-scale, commercial
space processing.21
Conclusions
The scientific basis for manufacturing commercial
products in space is limited, resting on a total of 8
hours of in-space research. The economic rationale
for fabricating materials in space, therefore, can be
assessed only when a suitable reservoir of knowledge
has been established. The result from sounding
rockets, aircraft, and ground facilities as well as from
the limited experimentation aboard spacecraft suggest,
however, that space processing techniques which
yield products of high value and low volume may be
commercially feasible.
It must be recognized that even if a material is iden-
tified that is sufficiently unique, useful, and valuable
to be manufactured or processed in space, the high
inherent cost of space processing will be a strong in-
centive for industry to find means of duplicating the
process on the ground or to find a cheaper substitute
for the material. For this reason it may be desirable
for the Government to subsidize the initial phases of
MPS research and product development. The contin-
ued and orderly development of space-based manu-
facturing techniques will depend heavily upon the
establishment of a firm national commitment to main-
tain and enhance U.S. space capabilities.
ZOR,  j. NaUnlarlrl  and  H. W. Herring, op. cit., 1980, pp. 107-108.
21 D. M. Waltz  and R. L. Hammel, “Space Factories, ” (77-56), presented
to the 28th International Astronautical Federation (IAF),  Prague, Sept. 25-Oct.
1, 1977.
Appendix E
World Climate, the Oceans, and
Early Indications of Climatic Change
Definition. -’’Climate” is how one characterizes
the weather at a particular place as it occurs over peri-
ods of weeks, years, centuries, or millenia. The mod-
ern notion of climate includes its variation and ex-
treme occurrences as well as its average conditions.
At the present time, there is accuracy in the detailed
3-to 5-day weather forecasts. For periods longer than
that, one begins to speak in less detailed terms, to
describe more general features such as mean condi-
tions and the likelihood of various departures from the
mean. Over these longer periods of time (weeks,
months, seasons), the climate at a particular place
seems to be influenced by progressively more distant
forces, such as ocean conditions, solar radiation, and
polar ice variations. Thus, we speak of an interactive
climate system which includes atmospheric, oceanic,
cryospheric and solar influences among other factors.
Historical Perspective
Recent dramatic advances in meteorology and cli-
matology are due to three concurrent streams of
development. First, the basic scientific understanding
of atmospheric (and oceanic) behavior has grown.
Physical and mathematical models have been con-
structed which duplicate rather well the overall
behavior of the atmosphere. Detailed numerical
models as used in weather forecasts show reasonable
predictive skill. Climate models, though much less
precise in time and space resolution, successfully
duplicate the large features of the observed climate.
Second, and more recently, electronic computers
have enabled the development of more detailed and
complex models and the solution of their associated
mathematical equations. The large computing ma-
chines also enable the inclusion and effective treat-
ment of vast amounts of actual data rather than sum-
marized data or proxy parameters.
Third, and most recent, observations from space
provide truly global data to describe global-scale
climate. A pair of polar-orbiting satellites can view
each point on Earth four times a day. A satellite in
geosynchronous orbit can continuously monitor con-
ditions over almost a whole hemisphere.
These advances Ied to the Global Atmosphere Re-
search Program (CARP) conducted during the last dec-
ade. The objective of this program was to observe the
atmosphere and produce the most comprehensive set
of data ever compiled. These data were then to be
used to increase understanding of the behavior of the
atmosphere, to improve models, and to assess our
ability to predict future behavior of the atmosphere.
A second major objective was to improve our under-
standing of the Earth’s climate.
The data from the Global Weather Experiment
(GWE)–the ultimate phase of GARP–are still being
analyzed, but already dramatic results are coming to
light. For instance, through a combination of surface
drifting buoys and satellite-borne data collection sys-
tems, measurements taken during the GWE revealed
a previously unobserved complexity in the atmospher-
ic conditions over the Southern oceans. These vast,
remote areas had been largely unmonitored prior to
the GWE. In addition, satellite-acquired cloud image
data have revealed important interhemispheric flows
which influence atmospheric conditions in the North-
ern Hemisphere. These findings are important
because the large-scale aspects of climate are truly
global in nature. This has become progressively clear
over the years, as scientists such as Hadley, Rossby,
Walker, Bjerknes, and many others, have described
the overall features of the planetary atmospheric flow
about the Earth. Now means are becoming available
that demonstrate directly, through observations, the
global nature of climate.
Over the last decade, we have become increasing-
ly aware of our vulnerability to extreme climate
events. The “Dust Bowl” conditions of the 1930’s and
their attendant impacts on agriculture and the
economy have been well documented. During 1972,
unanticipated drought and adverse growing condi-
tions led to severe shortages in the world-wide sup-
ply of grains. This led to adverse domestic economic
impacts including the U.S. sale of wheat to the Soviet
Union at prices lower than the world prices. The ef-
fect of the 1973 Middle East oil embargo was height-
ened when fuel shortages occurred while there was
very cold weather in New England and the Midwest.
The California drought of 1976 and 1977 would have
had very adverse effects had it persisted any longer.
Because modern society is vulnerable to climate oc-
currences, important benefits could also result from
knowing climate variations in advance. jack Thom-
son, a noted meteorologist, has estimated that the total .
annual monetary loss due to poor weather conditions
was approximately $13 billion (in 1971 ). Of that
amount, about $418 million could have been saved
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if reliable 30- and 90-day forecasts had been available.
The larger part of the “protectable” loss required
shorter forecasts, 5 days or less. Thompson found the
sectors most benefiting from climate forecasts to be:
agriculture, energy, public safety, construction, com-
munications, and electric power. Given the large in-
crease in energy costs since 1972, the potential sav-
ings from reliable climate forecasts should today be
much greater than estimated by Thompson.
Just as the value of reliable climate forecasts is being
defined, the research community is developing prom-
ising techniques for providing reliable seasonal
forecasts as much as 6 months in advance. These
results have come from diagnostic studies of the
“Southern Oscillation.” This phenomenon involves
a family of climate fluctuations around the globe—
including links between atmosphere and ocean con-
ditions in the tropical Pacific and subsequent climate
behavior over North America. Warming of central
equatorial Pacific water typically leads to displacement
of the North American jet stream northward over the
West and southward over the East. This causes below
normal surface temperatures in the populous eastern
United States and warm temperature in the West. The
severe winter of 1976-77 (following the 1976 El Nino
ocean warming) was typical of this pattern.
The hope for seasonal forecasts lies in the recogni-
tion that ocean conditions oflen persist for several
months. Thus, when appropriate ocean conditions de-
velop (usually during our spring and summer) they will
indicate the likelihood of subsequent anomalous
winter conditions occurring in the United States.
In a more recent study, Brown-Weiss confirmed that
3-to 4-month forecasts would be very useful to public
utilities for planning natural gas purchases and in plan-
ning the mix of petroleum products (e.g., the relative
amounts of gasoline versus heating oil).
In addition to forecasts, there are many important
uses of climate information falling under the general
heading “Applied Climatology.” This refers to the sta-
tistical characterization of the climate based on the
data record. Examples are: the estimation of fuel and
electric power demand based upon heating and cool-
ing degree days; planting crops based on the latest
data of a killing frost; designing dams based on max-
imum probable precipitation. Many of these statistical
application techniques have been developed because
reliable forecasts have not been possible. others, for
instance those associated with the design of structures,
would probably continue even if forecasts were avail-
able because the life of the structure is so long.
Finally, there are important applications which re-
quire “current climate” information. For example, in
monitoring growing conditions in areas important to
worldwide commodity trading, it is important to ana-
lyze current conditions in relation to the climate norm.
Crop yield models require not only the current
weather data but also the climatology for the regions.
To be useful, these data must be gathered, processed
and disseminated to users very quickly.
Mindful of our vulnerability to climate, our oppor-
tunities to improve our knowledge of climate, and the
opportunities to make beneficial use of improved
climate information, the Congress passed and the
President enacted the National Climate Program Act
(Public Law 95-367, dated Sept. 17, 1978).
The National Climate Program
The purpose of the National Climate Program is “to
understand and respond to natural and man-induced
climate processes. ” In establishing the national pro-
gram, the act set up mechanisms for coordinating and
integrating the climate activities of the Federal agen-
cies. In particular, the act established a National
Climate Program Office as lead entity for administer-
ing the program and required the preparation of a
5-year plan to state the goals and priorities of the pro-
gram and the roles of the Federal agencies in conduct-
ing the program.
The current (and first) 5-year plan emphasizes the
production of useful climate information based on ex-
isting knowledge while simultaneously expanding our
understanding of climate and its impact on society.
The priority programs (and associated lead agencies)
in each of these activity areas are as follows:
Activity category
1. Providing climate
products
Il. Responding to
impacts and policy
implications of
climate
III. Understanding climate
Principal thrust Lead agency
Generation and N O A A
dissemination of
climate information
Climate prediction N O A A
Carbon dioxide, DOE
environment, and
society
Climate and world USDA
food production
Solar and Earth NASA
radiation
Ocean heat transport NSF
and storage
Potential Contributions From
Space Capabilities
Direct satellite measurements and satellite relay of
data will make important contributions to all of the
above tasks. Considering the continuing elements of
the National Climate Program, space contributions
Appendix E—World Climate, the Oceans, and Early Indications of Climatic Change Ž 343
—
and requirements on space systems are likely to be
as follows:
Impact Assessment: Effects of climate on processes
and natural resources. —This area of the program con-
cerns direct climate effects such as the development
of crop yield models and energy demand models in
terms of climate variables. Demonstration programs
such as the Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment
(LACIE), and the snowmelt runoff project in Califor-
nia have provided important tests of the uses of space-
acquired data. It is recommended that such activities
continue with even greater end-user involvement.
These demonstration projects provide for develop-
ment of effective user application models.
Climate System Research: a) Developrnent of cli-
mate simulation and prediction models.—The main
contribution to this area is likely to be from improved
computer power and computation techniques. Space
systems will provide better global data both as input
to the models and as a check on model outputs. This
will remove input data as a source for model errors
and permit selection of the best modeling approaches.
b) Studies of physical climate processes.–ln order
progressively to extend our knowledge of the overall
climate system, certain key processes are selected for
detailed study. There is, for instance, a good deal of
interest currently in ocean-heat transport, air-sea in-
teractions, the oceans’ role in the global carbon cycle,
and stratospheric processes. Space systems, in con-
junction with other measurement techniques, will
contribute significantly to these process studies.
Data, Information, and Services: a) Observation.–
The object here is to compile an accurate, objective
record of climate behavior for both applications and
research. It is in this area that space capabilities will
make the most important contributions to climate ac-
tivities. The observation programs are subdivided
along climate regimes: atmosphere, oceans, cryo-
sphere, stratosphere, and solar. The contributions are
likely to be as follows:
1 ) Atmosphere: Data from the operational weather
satellites are first used for weather purposes. These
data are then archived and become a major contribu-
tion to the climate record. They include atmospheric
temperature, moisture, cloud imagery, and sea-surface
temperature.
2) Oceans: As the oceans cover three-fourths of the
Earth’s surface, they have a profound effect on the
climate. Because the areas are so vast, satellites, in
combination with in situ devices, provide an effective
approach to measurements. Plans are now being for-
mulated for progams extending into the next decade
to understand the oceans’ role in climate. A key aspect
is how the oceans store, transport, and redistribute
heat globally. These problems will be addressed
through a progressive series of studies culminating in
a global ocean circulation experiment. A typical in-
terim experiment is the CAGE experiment to measure
the fluxes of heat, mass, and momentum through
“fixed” ocean and atmospheric boundaries. Satellites
will be needed to give the heat balance at the top of
the atmosphere and provide other supporting data
(e.g., data collected from drifting buoys).
A key satellite experiment in ocean climate studies
will be the TOPEX mission. As currently planned, the
mission will use a satellite altimeter and radar scat-
terometer to measure sea-surface topography and
wind fields. The aim is to provide information on sur-
face currents and wind stress, The mission may in-
clude a microwave radiometer to provide improved
sea-surface temperature data. These data, especially
on a global scale, are very important to the under-
standing of the transport of energy from lower to
higher latitudes and the exchange of energy between
the ocean and the atmosphere. The TOPEX mission
derives from the GOES, SEASAT family of altimetric
satellites. It is planned for flight in the mid- 1980’s.
3) Cryosphere; The expansion and recession of the
polar ice packs are thought to be important indicators
of climate. The annual variations in the extent of con-
tinental snow packs may also be an indicator. Certain-
ly the extent of continental and polar ice cover in-
fluences the radiation balance of the planet. The ICES
satellite mission is an experiment to give detailed data
on the great Greenland and Antarctic ice packs.
One recent study indicates that the rise in sea level
since 1940 may be related to the melting of the polar
ice caps as a result of atmospheric warming due to
increased CO2 in the atmosphere. The melted ice
would tend to cool the oceans and thereby the at-
mosphere, masking a direct thermal signal of in-
creased C02. Satellite data on the oceans, polar
regions and the stratosphere will be needed to gain
conclusive data on these questions.
4) Stratosphere: Important progress has been made
in developing satellite-borne stratospheric composi-
tion measurement techniques. Much of this effort has
been stimulated by concern over changes in the strat-
ospheric ozone layer. An ozone monitoring sensor is
being developed for incorporation onto the opera-
tional weather satellite system to enable ozone
monitoring.
At the present time, the precision in satellite ozone
measurements is about that of Earth-based measure-
ments. But satellite data provide a global view difficult
(if not impossible) to infer from the sparse ground
measurement network.
94-915 0 - 82 - 23
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5) Solar: The Sun provides the energy which gives
rise to atmospheric and oceanic movements. There
are attempts under way to measure variations in solar
energy arriving at and leaving the Earth (the radiation
budget) and to relate such variations to climate
variability. The Earth radiation budget experiment is
part of this effort. Because of the complex nature of
atmospheric absorption, it is necessary to monitor the
radiation above the atmosphere. Spacecraft provide
the only means for continuous solar and Earth radia-
tion monitoring.
6) Diagnosis and Projection: Climate diagnosis is
the detailed analytical and statistical study of climatic
events to try to relate climate observations (temper-
ature, pressure, winds, etc.) with the inner workings
of the climate system. Diagnostic studies associated
with the Southern Oscillation (SO) and other at-
mospheric and oceanic phenomena hold potential for
developing new techniques for seasonal climate
prediction.
Because ocean conditions tend to persist over sev-
eral months, it may be possible to predict several
months in advance when certain abnormally cold win-
ters are likely to occur over the populous eastern
United States.
However, in order to verify these hypotheses and
assess the reliability of resulting predictions, much bet-
ter sea-surface temperature (SST) data will be needed.
The most reliable data are probably provided by ocean
buoys. But these data leave wide ocean areas un-
covered. Reliable satellite-acquired data, because of
wide area coverage, will be a great improvement. Ex-
isting satellite-measured SST data are not sufficiently
precise to meet climate requirements; improved SST
sensors are required.
Requirements From the National
Climate Program
Now that the program components have been in-
troduced, it is of interest to discuss certain re-
quirements inherent to climate monitoring. The over-
riding requirement is for a continuous, intercom-
parable data record for a span of time that is
climatologically significant. In most instances, this is
several years. More generally, the longer the record
the more valuable it is in determining the likelihood
of “extreme” occurrences. Yet, even a period of few
years exceeds the life of most satellite sensors. Thus,
in the planning for monitoring from space, account
must be taken of the need for continuity of data, re-
quiring intercalibration of instruments, documentation
of data handling techniques, and so forth. This is re-
ferred to as the development of climatically significant
data sets.
Secondly, because of the nature of the climate sys-
tem and the resulting central tendencies of the data,
monitoring for climate is likely to require greater preci-
iion than short-term monitoring (e.g., weather). That
is, where one is measuring diurnal variations in tem-
perature there are likely to be greater fluctuations
than, say, in the annual mean temperature from year
to year.
Thirdly, there must be a commitment to acquire and
prepare new and existing data for climate uses. This
may involve some risk. At this stage, one is not always
certain that the “best” parameters are being meas-
ured. Nevertheless, in order to make useful tests,
analyzable data sets covering significant time periods
must be available, For example, it was planned that
the Earth radiation budget should be monitored over
at least one solar activity cycle (1 1 years). Yet, because
of severe budget constraints, there is no activity under
way to sustain the measurements beyond the initial
system to be launched in 1984.
Because of the vast and remote areas involved, and
because of the general hostility of the environment
for measurement equipment, satellite systems (in con-
junction with in-situ platforms) offer a reliable, cost-
effective way to collect important ocean-climate data.
This was demonstrated during the global weather ex-
periment. During this and the next decade, efforts
must be made to gain further knowledge of the proc-
esses by which the oceans transport and store heat.
New satellite techniques (for measuring surface cur-
rents, wind stress, and surface temperature, interalia)
have promise for playing major roles in those efforts.
Stratospheric monitoring and polar ice monitoring will
also contribute to early detection of climate change.
The Climate Program Impact Upon
National Space Policy
OTA has outlined six principles and associated
issues underlying U.S. civil space activities. The im-
pact of the National Climate Program is analyzed in
relation to each of these principles quoted below:
1. “Space activities maybe justified by political,
as well as by social, economic, scientific, techno-
logical, or other benefits.”
In the early years of the space program, national
space goals were primarily engineering-oriented. The
cutting edge of space technology was in learning how
to successfully launch and recover space vehicles, to
“put a man on the Moon by 1970.” Now that much
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of the engineering capability is secured, it would ap-
pear that any new national space goals are more like-
ly to be oriented toward application of space technol-
ogy. Indeed, the national governmental policy chal-
lenge for the 1980’s seems to be shaping up to be to
make the economy stronger, in which case all pro-
grams, including space activities, will be evaluated in
terms of their economic contribution.
The long-term goals of the national climate program
are primarily economic—to be able to routinely pre-
dict climatic variations (weekly to seasonal) for
economic payoffs in energy conservation, agricultural
productivity, water resources management, and resort
management as well as long-term climatic change
potentially associated with, say, atmospheric COZ
buildup. The near-term objectives of the climate pro-
grams are primarily in research aimed at improved
understanding of climate on which to build climate
prediction skills. Therefore, the climate program ap-
plications of space technology can be seen as eco-
nomic in the long run and mainly research or scien-
tific in the short term.
There are certain characteristics of the climate pro-
gram’s space requirements that must be taken into ac-
count i n the formulation of any comprehensive na-
tional space policy:
a) Remote sensing from space is essential to
climate research and forecasting, For obtaining cer-
tain climatic parameters, e.g., measuring the Earth
radiation budget, there are no alternatives to space-
borne sensors.
b) Climate studies require long periods (often
measurable in decades) of data continuity. This is
different from most other space applications (e.g.,
weather). Consequently, the accuracy and precision
of data useful for short-term purposes may be wholly
inadequate for climate.
c) Climate studies require truly global coverage.
Present coverage is inadequate because data from
the tropical oceans and the Southern Hemisphere,
which are crucial to climate forecasts, are most
sparse. Future coverage may be even less complete
if the number of meteorological satellites is reduced
in response to fiscal constraints.
d) Overall, U.S. climate program activities are
more reliant upon multipurpose satellites, especially
meteorological satellites, than on climate satellites.
There is an open question whether this trend will
be continued into the future because climate re-
search requirements and the evolving climate fore-
casting skill will necessitate:
—monitoring climate-unique parameters potential-
ly requiring unique satellite orbits or unique
sensors;
—improved long-term data continuity; and
—increased data volume, possibly demanding the
total payload of a given satellite.
On the other hand, if these capabilities can be ob-
tained through reliance upon multipurpose satel-
lites, it would seem potentially more efficient. A
system of multipurpose Earth remote-sensing satel-
lites could result in fewer space platforms carrying
the same same sensing capacity.
2. “The United States should be ‘a leader’ (cf.
Space Act of 1958) in ‘aeronautical and space sci-
ence and technology and in the application there-
of to the conduct of peaceful activities . . . “
Climate research and climate forecasting are in-
herently global, Climate activities, following the prece-
dent set in meteorology, are characterized by a high
degree of international cooperation and sharing, e.g.,
GARP. However, in practice most of the remote sens-
ing in support of climate studies around the world has
been done by U.S. satellites.
While the U.S. commitment to climate studies and
forecasting will serve to maintain U.S. visibility in
world climate activities, the objectives of U.S. climate
activities are primarily economic and scientific. It is
in the best interest of the U.S. climate program to
maintain an atmosphere of international cooperation
and participation so as to gain scientific and engineer-
ing support from other nations in the interests of effi-
cient and rapid cooperative progress in climatology.
3. “Civilian and military space activities will be
conducted in separate (and independent) institu-
tional structures. ”
Since the climate program will, for the foreseeable
future, procure much data from space platforms jus-
tified primarily for other purposes, ownership of those
platforms whether by military or civilian institutions
will make no difference so long as data quality, quan-
tity, and timeliness are adequate. Conversely, if the
climate program requirements evolve in such a way
as to necessitate dedicated climate satellites, the in-
tegration of U.S. military and civilian satellite systems
under a common institutional structure could affect
climate data acquisition, but that effect cannot now
be projected.
4. “The National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration, established by the Space Act of 1958,
is authorized to conduct research, development,
construction, testing, and operation for research
purposes of (aeronautical and) space vehicles. It
is not authorized to have operational responsibil-
ity for space systems. ”
The national climate program, as a user of multipur-
pose satellites owned and operated by nonclimate
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program entities, would be neutral on the question
of the identity of the U.S. civil space system operator.
However, to the degree that the climate program’s
data requirements necessitate a dedicated climate
satellite system, the operational responsibility ques-
tion will be acute.
5. “Commercialization of space technology and
applications should be promoted. ”
From the point of view of the potential commercial
supplier of climate remote-sensing data, the climate
program with its requirement for long-term data con-
tinuity would appear a promising market.
From the point of view of Government climate pro-
gram managers, commercialization of the satellites
that supply climate observations is of concern primar-
ily in terms of cost but also in terms of data quality
and timeliness. If a large, diversified (many firms)
satellite remote-sensing industry were to develop,
inter-firm competition could be expected to work in
the interests of the climate programs to keep data
prices low and data quality, quantity and timeliness
high. If, on the other hand, the private remote sens-
ing industry were to be essentially monopolistic, the
climate program managers’ concerns would be justi-
fied.
On a broader commercialization question, if the en-
tire climate program were to be commercialized, it
seems obvious that the satellites supplying the climate
data would also be commercial. Commercialization
of the entire climate program is a possibility only in
the long run after climate forecasting has been proven,
and even then total commercialization seems im-
probable.
The evidence is strong that the core of the climate
program will remain a public function for the foresee-
able future and that no more than the value-added
components will be commercialized. Climate fore-
casts, the long-term objective of the climate program,
are certain to be, in part, public goods. Certain major
public policy decisions, such as those potentially
associated with CO1, acid rain, or ozone, will be
heavily dependent upon climate forecasts. The fore-
casts themselves and the capability to produce them
will almost certainly be a government responsibility
because the market for such global climate predictions
will not be commercially viable. Hence, a core climate
program capability will be governmental for the fore-
seeable future.
6. “The United States will engage in coopera-
tive, international activities involving peaceful
uses of outer space. ”
As discussed under issue B, climatology is global in
nature, U.S. climate activities are rooted in interna-
tional cooperation, and remotely sensed climate data
are openly shared in the international community.
Nonetheless, it is an open question whether the U.S.
would feel comfortable being reliant upon foreign
owned/operated satelites for our core climate observa-
tions.
Appendix
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIM
F
E
OF OUTER SPACE
Introduction
Few human endeavors have occasioned the degree
of international legal scrutiny given to the develop-
ment of space technology. Because space activities
generally involve technologies that do not respect na-
tional boundaries, new stresses have been placed on
traditional international legal principles. These princi-
ples, based on the rights and powers of territorial sov-
ereignty, are often in conflict with the most efficient
utilization of new space systems. In order to resolve
the complex legal problems that have arisen in the
space age, nations, both technologically advanced
and developing, have been forced to rely increasing-
ly on international cooperation.
The purpose of this appendix is to discuss the im-
portant legal principles and international organizations
that have been developed to regulate the use of outer
space. Additionally, it describes the possible effects
that these principles and organizations may have on
private sector interest and investment in specific space
systems. It should be noted that since this discussion
focuses exclusively on the international legal regime
of outer space, the many complex issues involved in
the domestic regulation of private investment in space
technology are not discussed.
International Organizations
This appendix only discusses the activities of the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS), the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU), and the United Nations Education, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Though
there are numerous other international organizations
whose activites involve outer space to some degree,
most are not involved in formulating of international
law and policy.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
COPUOS has been, and continues to be, the chief
architect of the international legal regime of outer
space. COPUOS was established by resolution of the
General Assembly of the United Nations (U. N.) in
1958 to study the problems brought into existence by
the advent of the space age,l COPUOS is composed
‘ U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1348 (X111)  “QuestIon of the Peaceful
Use of Outer Space, ” Dec. 13, 1958.
of two subcommittees, one of which studies the scien-
tific and technical, and the other the legal aspects of
space activities. Since its inception, the Legal Subcom-
mittee has been responsible for the formulation of five
major treaties:
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
(1 967)2
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the
Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space (1968)3
Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects (1 972)4
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched
into Outer Space (1 974)5
.
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on
the Moon and Other-Celestial Bodies (1979)6
With the exception of the 1979 Moon agreement, the
United States has signed and ratified each of these in-
ternational agreements.
COPOUS is currently conducting negotiations in the
following areas:
l
l
Remote sensing. COPUOS has been negotiating
a statement of principles on remote sensing since
1979. Considerable disagreement still exists be-
tween states on this subject and it is unlikely that
a consensus will be reached in the near future.
Direct broadcast satellites. COPUOS has been in-
volved in trying to reach agreement on a set of
principles for direct broadcast satellites since
1968. However, there seems to be no easy solu-
tion to the debate betweeen states advocating
218 UST 241 O; TIAS 6347; Senate Report No.  8, 90th Cong.  1 st sess., April
17, 1967; Senate CommKtee  on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 90th Cong.,
1st sess., staff report on “Treaty on Prlnclpies  Governing the Actlwtles  of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, ” committee print, 1967.
‘19  UST 7570; TIAS 6599; “Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the
Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects  Launched Into Space: Analy-
sis and Background Data;”  Senate Committee on Aeronautics and Space Sci-
ence, 90th Cong.  2d sess., committee print, July 16, 1968.
424 UST 2389; TIAS 7762; Senate Committee on Aeronautics and Space
Sciences, 92d Cong.,  2d sess., staff report on “Convention on international
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob)ects,  ” committee print, 1972.
5TIAS  848(I;  Senate  Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences; 94th
Cong.,  1st sess,, staff report on “ConventIon on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, ” committee print, 1975.
6U. N. General Assembly Resolution A/34/68, Dec. 14, 1979; Senate Com-
mittee on Commerce, Science, and Technology, 96th Cong., 2d sess.,  “Agree-
ment Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestlal
Bodies, ” committee print, 1980
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free flow of information and those advocating a
regime of prior consent.
Ž Nuclear power sources in space. Since the Cos-
mos 954 accident in 1978, in which radioactive
debris from a Soviet satellite fell on northern
Canada, there has been increased international
concern over use of nuclear energy to power sat-
ellites. COPUOS has focused its attention on four
major issues: safety, prior notification, emergen-
cy assistance, and liability for damages. To date,
no international consensus has been reached.
Ž Delimitation of outer space. The question of
where air space ends and outer space begins has
troubled international legal theorists since the
beginning of the space age. The Soviets have
recently proposed that outer space should be
considered to begin in the area of 100 to 110 km
above sea level, The United States has consistent-
ly maintained that no decision should be taken
until a more complete understanding of the scien-
tific and technical characteristics of low-orbit sat-
ellites is obtained.
l Military activities in space. COPUOS has period-
ically addressed issues relating to militarization;
current treaties ban nuclear weapons and other
weapons of “mass destruction. ” Discussions of
military activities have increased lately, now that
both the United States and the Soviet Union are
developing anti-satellite devices and other weap-
ons. A number of developing countries have ob-
jected to militarization, and in 1981 the Soviet
Union proposed that the General Assembly dis-
cuss a draft treaty prohibiting the stationing of all
weapons in outer space, with special reference
to the U.S. space shuttle. The U.S. has objected
to attempts by COPUOS to take up this issue.
International Telecommunication Union
ITU is an international, intergovernmental organiza-
tion and the U.N.S’ specialized agency for telecom-
munications.7 The purpose of ITU is to coordinate and
regulate international activities in the field of com-
munications. Since radio communication is essential
to all outer space activities, it was logical that ITU be
charged with the task of allocating radiofrequencies
for space as well as terrestrial communications. To this
end, a World Administrative Radio Conference
(WARC) was held in 1959 that resulted in the first in-
ternational agreements applicable to space activities.
The basic governing documents of ITU are its Con-
stitution and its Administrative Regulations. The Con-
7For a detailed look at ITU,  see, Radiofrequerrcy  Use and Management:
Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979, Office
of Technolorw  Assessment, 1982..
stitution is revised by the Plenipotentiary Conference
when technological (and recently, political) changes
reduce the effectiveness of existing provisions. The Ad-
ministrative Regulations are updated more frequently
through WARCS and Regional Administrative Radio
Conferences (RARCS) and are the means by which the
technical coordination and regulation of international
communications is actually accomplished. Member-
ship is open to all countries and currently ITU has 154
members. The formal results of RARCS and WARCS
are reached by each country exercising one vote and,
when ratified by the member states, they have the
force of international treaties.
The primary function of ITU is to allocate the
radiofrequency spectrum among competing services
(e.g., fixed, mobile, aeronautical, maritime, and space)
and to register the frequency assignments of its mem-
ber states in order to avoid interference. The interna-
tional Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) of ITU per-
forms many of these important technical functions.
IFRB records the frequency assignments made by dif-
ferent countries in accordance with WARC and RARC
regulations and furnishes advice to ITU members on
technical matters (e.g., the maximim practicable
number of radio channels in those portions of the
spectrum where harmful interference may occur). In
1973, the duties of ITU were enlarged by a modifica-
tion of its Convention. This modification provided that
IFRB was “to effect . . . an orderly recording of the
positions assigned by countries to geostationary sat-
ellites. ”9
ITU has been the major forum in the recent debates
regarding the a priori grant of portions of the radio
spectrum and the geostationary orbit to countries pres-
ently lacking space technology. This subject is dis-
cussed in greater detail in section IV.
UNESCO
Though UNESCO does not have a technical or reg-
ulatory role such as ITU nor a broad mandate similar
to that of COPUOS to address international space
issues, it has been active in the discussion of space-
related problems. Some of its more important activities
include:
l Convention on satellite signal piracy. UNESCO,
together with the World Intellectual Property
Organization, sponsored an international con-
ference in 1974 which adopted the “Convention r
Relating to the Distribution of Program me-Carry-
ing Signals Transmitted by Satellite’’.l O States party
‘International Telecommunications Convention (Geneva), Dec. 21, 1959;
TIAS 4892, 12 UST 1761.
glnternational  Telecommunication Convention, 1973, article 10(3); TIAS
8572.
10N .M. Matte, Aerospace Law, 1977,  PP. 39-40.
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to the Convention agree to “take adequate meas-
ures” to prevent the distribution of “program e-
carrying signals” by unauthorized personnel.
l Satellite broadcasting and the free flow of infor-
mation. UNESCO has also been working on a
“Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of
Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of Infor-
mation, the Spread of Education and Greater Cul-
tural Exchange”. ’ 11 Strong objections have been
voiced against this declaration on the grounds
that instead of encouraging the free-flow of in-
formation, it encourages censorship. Many be-
lieve that this Declaration of Principles was used
by its authors as a means to attract international
attention to the “New World Information Order”
(discussed infra, sec. Ill (c)(3)).
l Technical assistance to member states. UNESCO
has worked with a number of African, Asian, and
Latin American states, helping them to assess their
general communication needs. UNESCO is pres-
ently conducting several long-range studies to
determine the practicality of using regional sat-
ellite systems to supply educational and cultural
development programs to certain developing
countries.
The Status of Nongovernmental Entities
As the role of private industry varies within each of
the nations of the world, and as it is those nations and
not their private industries that enter into international
space agreements, it is understandable that some con-
fusion exists as to the legal status of private industry
in outer space. This section will examine some of the
practical and theoretical problems that arise when try-
ing to fit the activities of private enterprise into a
framework designed primarily to regulate the actions
of states.
In the United States, it has been consistent govern-
ment policy to encourage the involvement of private
enterprise in its space programs. When President
Eisenhower announced his administration’s space pol-
icy in 1960, he stated:
(T)o achieve the early establishment of a communica-
tion satellite system which can be used on a commer-
cial basis is a national objective which will require the
concerted capabilities and funds of both Government
and private enterprise . . . With regard to communica-
tion satellites, I have directed the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration to take the lead within the
Executive Branch both to advance the needed research
and development and to encourage private enterprise
to apply its resources toward the earliest practical
11 u ,N, Document  A/AC, 105/1 04, Jllly  2S, 1972.
utilization of space technology for commercial civil
communications requirements (emphasis added).
This enthusiasm for private enterprise was not
shared by all nations. In 1962, the Soviet Union sub-
mitted to COPUOS a “Draft Declaration of the Basic
Principles Governing the Activities of States Pertain-
ing to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. ” It was
suggested in the draft that, “All activities of any kind
pertaining to the exploration of outer space shall be
carried out solely and exclusively by States . . . “13 The
United States responded to this position by pointing
out that pursuant to U.S. policy, as reflected in the
Communications Satellite Act of 1962, private firms
had already been given the right to engage in space
activity. In order to reconcile this conflict, the United
States proposed that states bear the responsibility for
the launching of space vehicles, whether such vehicles
be the property of the state or its nationals.14 In this
manner, the United States hoped to reassure other
states that private activity could be controlled, albeit
indirectly, through international regulation.
The principle of state responsibility for the actions
of its nationals is incorporated in both articles Vi and
IX of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.15 Although the
1967 Principles Treaty does not specifically grant
private industry the right to undertake activities in
outer space, the U.N. debates on this subject make
it clear that such activities were contemplated by the
drafters.
A few authors have suggested that though the 1967
Principles Treaty may sanction the presence of
nongovernmental entities in space, article I can be
read to prevent the commercial use of outer space. ’ 16
Article I states, in relevant part:
The exploration and use of outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out
for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, ir-
respective of their degree of economic or scientific
development, and shall be the province of all mankind.
It is argued that commercial use would be contradic-
tory to article 1, in that its drafters intended the benefits
of outer space exploration and use to flow to all man-
kind, and not to private investors. This somewhat tech-
nical argument finds little support in either the specific
language of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty or its legis-
lative history.
1 ZWhite  House Press Release, Dec. 30, 1960; see also, D. D, Smi[h,  Com-
munication wa Satellite, 1976, p. 72.
I JU N. Document A/AC.  105/L.2;  U. N. Document A/5/81 Annex 3.
14u  “N , DOcu  ment A/AC.  105/L.5  U, N. Document A/5/81, Annex 3.
I Ssee Aflicle  VI of the Outer Space Treaty.
16see, for example,  Marcuff,  Traite’  de Droit International Public de 1’
Espace,  1973, p. 671.
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State Responsibility for Nongovernment Entities
Given that private enterprise may conduct activities
in space for profit if the appropriate state will take
responsibility for such actions, it becomes necessary
to examine the nature of this responsibility. Some
authors, in analyzing article VI of the 1967 Principles
Treaty, have suggested that a state’s responsibilities
are extensive:
(While no one would doubt the need for government
control over space activity at its present stage, the sec-
ond sentence of article VI would prohibit, as a matter
of treaty obligation, strictly private, unregulated activi-
ty in space or on celestial bodies even at a time when
such private activity becomes most commonplace. Al-
though the terms “authorization” and “continuing
supervision” are open to different interpretations, it
would appear that Article VI requires a certain mini-
mum of licensing and enforced adherence to govern-
ment-imposed regulations. ’ 7
In addition to article Vi’s general statement of re-
sponsibility, article IX of the Principles Treaty requires
that if a state or its nationals are going to undertake
any activity in space which “would cause potentially
harmful interference with activities of other states,”
then the state planning the activity “shall undertake
appropriate international consultation before pro-
ceeding with any such activity. ”18 Article IX’S require-
ment that the international consultation shall precede
the proposed activity is quite significant, in that it im-
poses an active duty to regulate rather than a merely
passive duty to supervise. Under article IX a state has
a duty to interfere with or prohibit altogether poten-
tially harmful activities by its nationals at least until
such time as the effects of the proposed activity are
made known to the international community.
The Outer Space Treaty does not attempt to direct
states as to how these responsibilities should be car-
ried out. This is appropriate since a state’s control over
its nationals involves complex questions of domestic
law. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, on the other hand,
was not written to supply an exhaustive set of rules
to regulate the conduct of states, but rather to sketch
the rough outline of a new international regime.
One of the more important attempts to delineate the
responsibilities of states in outer space occurred in
1972 with the adoption by COPUOS of the “Conven-
tion on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects.” This treaty extends the concept of
state responsibility to include the concept of liability
for damage caused by space objects. Article II of the
Liability Treaty establishes the principle that a launch-
ing state is absolutely liable for “damage caused by
1 Zjaserltuleyarla  and Lee, Manual Of Space Law, VOI. 1, 1‘379,  P. 17.
lasee  Article  IX of the Outer Space Treaty.
its space object on the surface of the Earth or to air-
craft in flight. ”19
Two points should be mentioned here. First, the
1972 Liability Convention does not grant either rights
or responsibilities to nongovernmental entities. If the
nationals of a launching state cause damage, it is the
state damaged, under article Vlll, which “may pre-
sent to a launching state a claim for compensation. ”20
This somewhat formalistic approach to compensation
is sufficient at this time since states exercise almost
complete control over launch and tracking facilities
and there is no “pure” private enterprise in outer
space. However, as the activities of private enterprise
increase in frequency and scope, new and more effi-
cient procedures will have to be developed to han-
dle the claims for compensation which are certain to
arise.
A second point of interest concerning the Liability
Convention is the fact that it applies, by its terms, only
to “launching states” which are defined in article I as:
l a state that launches or procures the launching
of a space object; and
l a state from whose territory or facility a space ob-
ject is launched.
Under this scheme, if state A launches a space ob-
ject for the nationals of state B, both states are con-
sidered launching states and have joint liability for
damage under article V of the Liability Convention.
This is the case even though under the language of
article IX of the 1967 Principles Treaty it is state B that
bears the international responsibility for the “poten-
tially harmful” activities of its nationals. This problem
is somewhat alleviated by article V of the Liability Con-
vention that allows a state that has paid compensa-
tion for damages “to present a claim for indemnifica-
tion to other participants in the joint launching. ”
These rather complex international remedies are
presently workable only because it is the activity of
states and not individuals that predominates in space.
As this situation changes a new legal regime, which
more fully comprehends the role of the individual in
space activities, will have to be developed.
Limitations on Nongovernmental Entities
Having discussed the status of private activity in
space and the methods of control over such activity,
it is important now to examine the limitations that the
present legal regime of outer space places on the ac-
tivities of the private sector. To answer this question
requires an analysis of several recently articulated prin-
ciples. These are the Principle of Nonappropriation
Igsee Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.
%ee Article Vlll  of the Outer Space Treaty.
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of Space Resources, the Principle of the Common Her-
itage of Mankind (CHM), and the New World Infor-
mation Order.
PRINCIPLE OF NONAPPROPRIATION
The 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles included
the statement that, “Outer space and celestial bodies
are not subject to national appropriation by claim of
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means. ”2l With minor changes, this language
is repeated in article II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty
and article Xl (2) of the proposed Moon Treaty. The
legislative history of these instruments and the subse-
quent activities of states has revealed little controver-
sy concerning the prohibition against appropriation
by claim of sovereignty. However, this harmony of
opinion has not recently been shared with regard to
the prohibition against appropriation by means of use
or occupation.
The issue of appropriation by “use and occupation”
involves a number of complex considerations. Most
ventures into space involve some degree of appro-
priation, since the placement of a satellite into orbit
precludes the use by other states of that same orbit,
Any alteration of the present “first come, first served”
use of the geostationary orbit or in the rights of priority
now recognized as applying to currently operating sys-
tems could have serious repercussions on the U.S.
communications industry. Some third world countries
have suggested that radiofrequency assignments and
the incidental use of the geostationary orbit should
be limited to the life of the satellite. This suggestion
is contrary to the current practice in the United States.
In the United States, the Federal Communications
Commission licenses communication common car-
riers to provide a continuous service to the public.
Some third world countries have argued that this
method of continuous use is tantamount to an ap-
propriation. As a result they advocate the a priori
allocation of radiofrequencies and orbit positions (see
sec. IV infra).
The proposed Moon Treaty recognizes the problems
inherent in a “first come, first served” method of
allocating resources and attempts to limit the effects
of de facto appropriation on the exploration and ex-
ploitation of the Moon and other celestial bodies.22
The recognition of the problem appears in article Vlll
where it is stated that states parties “shall not interfere
with the activities of other states parties, ” This sec-
tion clearly grants an important right to “first users”
of Moon resources. This right is then qualified by ar-
ZI u ,fQ.  General Assembly Resolution 1962, article  XVIII, par. 3.
22LJ ,N. General Assembly Resolution 34/68, “Agreement Governing the
Actlvltles  of States on the Moon and Other Celestlal  Bodies, ” Dec. 14, 1979.
ticle IX’S statement that a “station shall use only that
area which is required for the needs of the station”
and article Xl (3)’s statement that such stations “shall
not create a right of ownership over the surface or sub-
surface of the Moon or any areas thereof. ”
THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND (CHM)
Though the CHM principle is complex in its applica-
tion, in theory it is quite simple. Basically stated, the
principle maintains that there are certain resources,
such as the minerals on the ocean floor and on the
Moon, that are presently under the jurisdiction and
control of no sovereign power. These resources, being
finite and exhaustible, should not be allocated to the
developed countries on a first come, first served basis,
but rather, should be used for the benefit of all na-
tions. Though this principle has recently received its
greatest attention in relation to the Law of the Sea Con-
vention, it has frequently appeared in discussions con-
cerning the exploration and use of outer space.23
In 1958, when President Eisenhower announced his
administration’s space policy, he called upon states
“to promote the peaceful use of space and to utilize
the new knowledge obtained from space science and
technology for the benefit of mankind.”24 Subsequent
to this statement, the concept that space activities
should be undertaken for the benefit of mankind ap-
peared in the NAS Act of 1958,25 in important General
Assembly resolutions on space and as article I of the
1967 Principles Treaty. Although these “common in-
terest” clauses found their way into the major space
treaties, there was considerable uncertainty as to their
status within the body of international law. Some
authors have suggested that these “common interest”
clauses were merely pragmatic principles without legal
force. Others believe that the placement of the “com-
mon interest” clauses within the operational part of
treaties, as opposed to a mere statement of intentions
in the preamble, indicated that such provisions must
be regarded as binding.2G As a binding principle it
ZJR.  B, Owens,  statement at hearings on the Moon Treaty, “Agreement
Govern~ng the Activkies of States on the Moon and Other Celestlal  Bodies, ”
before the Subcommittee on Science,  Technology, and Space of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 2d sess.,
1980. Ambassador M C. W. Pinto of Srl  Lanka has Interpreted the CHM prin-
ciple to apply to the law of the sea In this manner: “Thts (Common Heritage
of Mankind) means that those (seabed) minerals cannot be freely mined. They
are not there, so to speak, for the taking.  The common heritage of mankind
is the common property of mankind. . If you touch the nodules at the
bottom of the sea, you touch my propefly.  If you take them away, you take
away my property. ”
Z4’’lntroductton  to Outer Space,” an explanatory statement by the Presi-
dent’s Science Adwsory  Commmee,  1958, p. 1.
25C. Q. Christol,  “The Legal Common Heritage of Mankind: Capturing an
Illusive Concept and Applylng  it to World Needs, ” XVIII the Co//oqutum on
the Law of Outer Space, 1976, p. 42.
2bN.  M. Matte, “Aerospace Law: Telecommunications SatellNes, ” Center
for Research of Air and Space Law, McGIII  University, p. 38.
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created an obligation among states “to be in some
form responsive to the interest of developing coun-
tries, and to provide for some form of distribution of
benefits derived from such (space) activities.”27
The principle of CHM has generally been opposed
by the private sector. The most common argument
heard in this regard is that any attempt at international
regulation of the profits derived from space will in-
hibit private enterprise from making the necessary in-
vestments in space technology. Advocates of this posi-
tion often point to article Xl (7) of the proposed Moon
Treaty’s statement that one of the purposes of the in-
ternational regime is to assure “an equitable sharing”
of resources.28 It is argued that the concept of
equitable sharing is inconsistent with the concept of
profit, and in the absence of the profit motive private
enterprise cannot be expected to risk capital on space
investments.
The most repeated criticism of the CHM principle
is that it lacks proper definition. It is argued that its
“novelty, generality, philosophical underpinnings—
as opposed to legal—and uncertain historical pedi-
gree” render it far too vague to act as a tool in the
regulation of international conduct.29 These criticisms
are valid at least to the extent that they regard the prin-
ciple’s uncertainty, for except for article Xl of the
Moon Treaty’s suggestion of an international regime,
nowhere are a state’s duties under the CHM princi-
ple defined.
THE NEW WORLD INFORMATION ORDER
The New World Information Order is a principle es-
poused by the Soviet Union and certain third world
countries that maintains that there is an imbalance in
both the amount and kind of news emanating from
the information and communication systems con-
trolled by the Western industrialized nations. These
countries allege that as a result of this imbalance the
third world and communist countries have been por-
trayed in a distorted manner to the populations of the
developed countries, while the populations of the de-
ZTlbid.,  p. 39.
Z8Article  XI (7) of the Moon Treaty states: “7. The main purposes of the
international regime to be established shall include:
(a) The orderly and safe development of the natural resources of the
Moon;
(b) The rational management of those resources;
(c) The expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources;
(d) An equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived from
those resources, whereby the interests and needs of the develop-
ing countires  as well as the efforts of those countries which have
contributed either directly or indirectly to the exploration of the
Moon shall be given special consideration.
%. Q. Christol,  “The Common Heritage of Mankind in the Moon Treaty,”
paper submitted to symposium on “Space Activities and Implications, ”
Center for Research of Air and Space Law, McGill University, Oct. 16-17,
1980.
veloping countries have been subjected to the “cul-
tural imperialism” of a capitalist, consumer-oriented
society. The New World Information Order seeks to
remedy this situation by: 1 ) encouraging the develop-
ment of a third world information infrastructure; 2)
controlling the West’s access to developing countries;
and 3) limiting the Western media’s ability to dissemi-
nate information in developing countries. so
The long-term effects of this principle on the free
flow of information throughout the world are, for the
most part, beyond the scope of this report. However,
the continued adherence to the New World informa-
tion Order by a substantial number of Communist and
third world countries could have important near-term
effects in the field of satellite communications. Most
notably, the Western developed nations can expect
to encounter strong opposition to the previously used
“first come, first served” method of allocating the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum and the orbital positions in the
geostationary arc (discussed in greater detail below).
In addition, private communications firms may en-
counter new tariffs and regulations designed to slow
the flow of information and communications services
to the third world. New tax laws have also been pro-
posed which would require the payment of a portion
of the assessed value of information flowing into or
through a country. Future restrictions can also be ex-
pected on the establishment of ground stations and
on access to the foreign transmission lines necessary
for the terrestrial transmission of satellite data.
Communications Satellites
Not long after ITU began to regulate satellite com-
munications certain international tensions arose con-
cerning its methods of allocating what many believed
to be scarce space resources.Jl Radiofrequencies that
have been duly registered with ITU receive interna-
tional recognition and protection. Therefore, early
registration of a radiofrequency is given priority over
later requests for the registration of the same frequen-
cy. Many developing nations have voiced opposition
to this principle of priority on the basis that future
access to the radio spectrum and positions in geosta-
tionary orbit, which are necessary for effective sat-
ellite communication, will be limited by the present
activities of the developed nations.
Reflecting this concern, the ITU convention was
modified in 1973 to state:
‘OB. Cowlan, “internationally Organizing for Space, ” paper submitted to
International Conference on Doing Business in Space, Nov. 12-14, 1981,
reprinted in ALI-ABA  Conference Materials.
31 rd. M. Matte, op. cit.
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In using frequency bands for space radio services,
Members shall bear in mind that radio frequencies and
the geostat ionary satel l i te orbi t  are l imited natural
resources, that they must be used efficiently and eco-
nomically so that countries may have equitable access
to both in conformity with the provisions of the Radio
Regulations according to their needs and the technical
facilities at their disposal .32
There is considerable confusion in the international
community as to what is meant by the “efficient and
economical” use of radiofrequencies and the geosta-
tionary orbit. The developing states have argued that
because these resources are limited, an a priori alloca-
tion should be made to assure that countries which
presently do not utilize space may be able to do so
in the future. The states with substantial space
resources have generally taken the position that at-
tempts to reduce space to an “international con-
dominium” are neither efficient and economical nor
sanctioned by international law.
It has been argued by the United States that the
allocation of space resources on any basis other than
use is inefficient because it reduces the incentive to
adopt spectrum and orbit conserving technologies and
patterns of use.33 The United States and other devel-
oped countries maintain that through the creative use
of the frequency spectrum, as seen in the adoption
of 30/20 G Hz for communications, and the develop-
ment of new space systems, such as large space plat-
forms, the future needs of the developing countries
can be easily met. However, some third world coun-
tries feel that it is not in their best interest to continue
to rely on the developed countries to supply their
communication needs. Several of these countries,
notably India and Brazil, are in the process of develop-
ing an indigenous satellite communication capability.
In the near future, the communication systems devel-
oped by these countries will be less sophisticated and
therefore less efficient than those designed by nations
already well versed in space technology. A priori al-
location plans are attractive because the satellites they
will be developing may require the type of orbital
spacing presently utilized. The developing countries
may argue that it is in their best interest to resist an
international regime predicated on the development
of advanced, resource-efficient technology because
such a regime would render their indigenous technol-
ogy obsolete.
There is some question as to whether a priori alloca-
tion plans might not be contrary to the letter and the
spirit of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Article 2 of the
treaty states:
J~lnternat(ona/ Te[ecornmuntcation COflveflttOfl,  OP. c;t
]Qffice of Technology Assessment, Op. cit., P. 30
Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial
bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by
any other means.
The developed countries have taken the position that
the assignment of orbital positions to states would con-
stitute an appropriation and therefore is forbidden by
the Outer Space Treaty. The third world has general-
ly argued that since the geostationary orbit is only
useful in connection with communication satellites,
and since ITU regulates the latter, it should also have
jurisdiction over the former. The United States has op-
posed this extension of the power of ITU.
The subject of a priori allocation of radiofrequen-
cies and geostationary orbit positions was addressed
but not resolved at the latest WARC in 1979. This sub-
ject will be debated again at the 1983 RARC and the
1984 WARC where, it is hoped, a reasoned and prac-
tical solution can be found that will accommodate the
needs of both the developing and the developed
nations.
Direct Broadcast Satellites (DBS)
DBS are a new generation of communications satel-
lites capable of transmitting signals strong enough to
be picked up by individuals utilizing small (less than
1 m in diameter), home receiving dishes.J4 This is to
be contrasted with the currently operating communi-
cations satellites that transmit weak signals to large,
fixed Earth stations that must then rebroadcast the
signal to the public using terrestrial facilities.
The major advantage of DBS technology is that it
does away with the need for an elaborate terrestrial
distribution system, thereby making possible the trans-
mission of programs to widely dispersed populations,
remote areas, or to countries without a sophisticated
communications infrastructure. The research and de-
velopment necessary to realize DBS technology was
undertaken by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and proven in both the U.S. ATS-6 and
the Canadian/U. S. CTS satellites. Presently, France,
Germany, Luxembourg, and groupings of Arab and
Scandinavian countries are planning for DBS systems
or for multipurpose communications satellites able to
directly broadcast.Js Some of these systems are plan-
ned for operational status by the mid-] 980’s.
Though DBS technology offers the potential for
large-scale educational, health and public service
programing–a fact that was amply proven by the
Wee generally: “Policies for Regulation of Direct Broadcast Satellites,”
Federal Communication Commission staff report, September 1980.
JSBarbara Luxenberg, “Preliminary OK for Direct Broadcast Satellites, ”
Aeronautics and Astronautics, September 1981, p. 20.
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U.S./India ATS-6 experiments–some have raised
serious questions concerning the international regula-
tion of this technology. The Soviet Union has ex-
pressed concern that DBS maybe used to spread pro-
paganda or misinformation designed to create social
unrest. Several third world countries have expressed
the fear that this technology will be used by the
Western, developed nations as a tool of cultural or
economic imperialism. It is feared that commercial
advertising by the developed countries might disrupt
the social fabric of developing nations by creating a
demand for consumer goods that is not consonant
with national plans for social and economic develop-
ment.
The Soviet Union, France, and numerous Third
World countries have argued that the sovereign rights
of a country prohibit broadcasting across national
boundaries in the absence of a prior agreement with
the receiving state. The United States has opposed this
view and has advocated a policy of free flow of infor-
mation. The opposition of the United States to the doc-
trine of prior consent has centered around four major
themes that can be summarized as follows:qb
1.
2.
There has been insufficient experience with
broadcast satellites to determine what, if any,
political constraints should be placed on their
use. In the DBS debates of the early 1970’s the
United States argued that it was unwise to fashion
regulations without knowing the specific prob-
lems that would be caused by this technology.
The ATS-6 experiments in India were frequently
used as an example of the fact that the control
over programing and distribution of DBS services
could remain firmly within the local government
of the receiving country, thereby obviating the
need for international regulation. The United
States still maintains that as experience with
transborder DBS service grows, the fears of
“cultural imperialism” presently harbored by
many nations will diminish.
Enactment of a set of political principles for D B S
could inhibit the development of technology
valuable to the third world countries. Most of the
technical problems with DBS have been, or are
in the process of being solved. The two major
questions from a domestic U.S. perspective are
how to configure DBS satellites to respond to
specific markets and whether DBS offers a signifi-
cant economic advantage over conventional
means of broadcasting. Restrictive international
regulations may make economically unjustifiable
JbThe  following four themes derived from: Wilson P. Dizard, ‘‘The U.S.
Position: DBS and Free Flow,” )ourna/ of Communication, vol. 30, spring
1980, pp. 157-168.
3.
4.
the expenditures necessary to adapt DBS tech-
nology to the particular needs of developing
countries. This is particularly true if the private
sector is to play a significant role in this develop-
ment.
ITU regulations constitute a sufficient safeguard
against unauthorized DBS transmissions. Some
U.S. experts argue that the need for technical co-
ordination has obviated the need for political reg-
ulation. In addition to providing working defini-
tions for the various types of DBS service and allo-
cating frequencies to DBS, the ITU, in 1971,
adopted Radio Regulation 428 A which provides:
In devising the characteristics of a space station
in the broadcasting-satellite service, all technical
means available shall be used to reduce, to the
maximum extent practicable, the radiation over
the territory of other countries unless an agree-
ment has been previously reached with such
countries.
In the view of the United States, the ITU pro-
cedures are a sufficient safeguard against the mis-
use of DBS technology and are, in fact, a form
of prior consent. The countries that do not ac-
cept this position argue that the ITU decisions
deal only with the physical transmission of a sat-
ellite signal and do not address the right of coun-
tries to regulate the message content of foreign
broadcasts.
The prior consent principle undermines the con-
cept of international free flow of information. The
United States has taken the position that the free
exchange of ideas and information, as affirmed
in article 19 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and other U.N. resolutions, should
not be inhibited.q7 Many U.S. experts believe that
acquiescence in a prior consent regime for DBS
would be an undesirable precedent that could
be applied to other means of communication or
dissemination of information. The DBS issue can
be viewed as one aspect of a growing pattern of
restraints being promoted under the umbrella of
the New World Information Order.
In addition to the positions held by those advocating
prior consent and the United States, a third, com-
promise position has been put forward in a joint pro-
posal by the Canadian and Swedish Governments.38
This proposal suggests that advance agreement would
be necessary concerning the basic issue of broadcasts
by the satellites of one country into the territory of
another country. However, the content of the trans-
37U, N. General  Assembly Resolution 217 (Ill), Dec. 10, 1948.
Js’’Draft Principles Governing Direct Television Broadcasting by Satellite,”
U.N. Document A/AC, 105/1 17, 1973.
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missions would be left to the discretion of the broad-
casting country. To date, this proposal has not gained
substantial support of either the United States or the
countries which advocate a prior consent regime.
Remote Sensing
The term remote sensing refers to the use of satellites
capable of detecting reflected or emitted electromag-
netic radiation for the purpose of gathering informa-
tion about the Earth .39 Presently, the only civilian
remote-sensing system is the Landsat system of the
United States. Though this system is operated by the
Government, there is considerable indication that the
private sector may have a significant role to play in
remote sensing in the near future. (For a more com-
plete discussion of the private sector’s role in remote
sensing, see ch. 2) If the policy decision is made in
the United States to encourage the private sector to
take as active a role in remote sensing as it has taken
in communications satellites, the Government must
ensure the existence of a receptive economic and legal
environment. The existence of a restrictive interna-
tional regime could limit the private sector’s ability
to invest in this new technology.
There has been considerable discussion in the in-
ternational community concerning what restrictions,
if any, should be placed on the use and distribution
of remotely sensed data. Some of the major principles
being discussed are:
Prior consent. Some states have argued that coun-
tries planning to engage in remote-sensing activities
should be required first to obtain the permission of
the countries they intend to sense.
Restricted data dissemination. A recent joint pro-
posal by the French and the Soviets has suggested that
information gathered by remote sensing should not
be transferred to third-party states without the prior
consent of the state sensed.
Limited resolution. Some states have evinced con-
cern regarding advances in remote-sensing technology
that will allow extremely detailed observation. They
feel that if such data were freely available from a
civilian commercial system it might threaten the
security and economic interests of the sensed state.
Unrestricted sensing. The United States has general-
ly opposed the placing of restrictions on remote-sens-
ing activities and data dissemination. The United States
presently maintains a policy of free data dissemina-
Jqs ee generally: National Academy of Sciences, Resource Serwng From
Outer Space,  1977;  N. M. Mat te ,  H .  DeSaussure,  Lega/  /mp/ications of
Remote Sensing From Outer Space, 1976,
tion and regularly supplies Landsat data to other
governments, international organizations, private sec-
tor businesses and individuals.
It is helpful to analyze some of the legal arguments
used to defend the positions that were articulated
above. Basically, arguments that favor limiting remote-
sensing activities are premised on the assumption that
the rights of territorial sovereignty allow a state to pro-
tect itself from information gathering activities directed
toward its own natural resources. There is very little
in either traditional international law or i n the treaties
which deal specifically with space that substantiates
this assumption.
It is generally accepted that a sovereign nation may
protect itself from information gathering activities
within its borders, either on the ground or from the
air. The legal basis for each of these manifestations
of sovereignty is not necessarily applicable to outer
space activities. Because traditional international law
recognizes that the laws of a sovereign state apply to
all within its borders, activities of foreign nationals may
be controlled while they are physically within that
state. Likewise, traditional international law, and arti-
cle 2 of the Chicago Convention of 1944, recognize
that a state has absolute sovereignty over the air space
above its national boundaries,40 Control over the ac-
tivities of foreign nationals in both cases is predicated
on the fact that such activities are accomplished within
the sovereign territory of a state.
Remote sensing is problematic from a legal perspec-
tive because, on the one hand, it is an activity under-
taken in space, and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty guar-
antees that space shall be “free for exploration and
use by all States;” yet, on the other hand, the activity
is directed toward the observation of territories under
the control of separate sovereign states.
For this reason, many nations have argued that some
form of international control is necessary to protect
the interests of the sensed states and to prevent abuses
that may result from the dissemination of remotely
sensed data. The United States takes the position that
restrictions on remote sensing would result in data be-
ing available to only those states having the financial
and technical ability to provide their own space and
ground systems. Furthermore, even if a country had
the technology to fly a remote-sensing system, it would
not be inclined to do so if it knew in advance that it
would have to undertake the financially prohibitive
and scientifically disadvantageous exercise of sep-
arating the billions of bits of remotely sensed data
along political boundaries.
’61 Statistics 1180, 15 U .N.T.  S. 295.
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OUTER SPACE TREATY
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967;
Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States of America
April 25, 1967; .
Ratified by the President of the United States of America May 24,
1967;
Ratification of the United States of America deposited at Washing-
ton, London, and Moscow October 10, 1967;
Proclaimed by the President of the United States of America Octo-
ber 10, 1967;
Entered into force October 10,1967.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE U NITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
WHEREAS the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, was signed at Washington, London, and
Moscow on January 27, 1967 in behalf of the United States of America,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and was signed at one or more of
the three capitals in behalf of a number of other States;
WHERE.AS the text of the Treaty, in the English, Russian, French,
Spanish, and Chinese languages, as certified by the Department of
Stab of the United States of America, is word for word as follows:
(23)
ANNEX XIX
Article Z
Article 111
45s ANNEX XIX THE OUTER SPACE TREATY 459
Article IV . .
Article V
Article VI
Article VII
Article 1X
Article X
.4rtic/2 XI
Article Xll
Article X111
.4rticle XIV
Article XV
Article XV1
Article XV1l
I
Appendix G
BACKGROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS
Early United States/Soviet Competition
Prior to world War II, the leading centers of rocket
research had been Germany and the Soviet Union.
In both cases the primary impetus for research was
military, supported by extensive amateur and civilian
activities. The United States, by contrast, lacked a co-
ordinated rocket program, though the work of isolated
individuals, notably Robert Goddard, helped give the
United States an important experimental base.
During the war many nations developed rockets for
various military uses, particularly tactical battlefield
support (the Soviets relied heavily on massed rocket
barrages); but by far the most advanced work was
done by the Germans. This culminated, late in the
war, in the first long-range unmanned vehicles: the
V-1, an air-breathing “cruise missile” used for short-
range attack on population centers such as London,
and the much more advanced and dangerous V-2, the
first operational ballistic missile.
At the end of the war two of the rival victors, the
United States and Soviet Union, divided up the major-
ity of the German rocket assets. The Soviets, having
occupied the main German testing center at Peene-
munde on the Baltic Sea, seized the bulk of the hard-
ware, while the Americans (along with the British and
French) succeeded in capturing and employing many
of the most talented scientists and engineers, including
the most important, Wernher von Braun. In both the
United States and U. S. S. R., these resources formed
the basis for each country’s succeeding rocket pro-
grams.
The direction and pace of these programs were de-
termined above all by the differing military require-
ments of the two nations. During the decade follow-
ing World War 11, the United States relied for its secu-
rity (and that of its allies) on its large fleet of long-range
bombers equipped with nuclear weapons. Stationed
in Europe and the Far East, these forces were capable
of directly attacking the Soviet Union and hence of
deterring any hypothetical Soviet conventional attack
in Europe. The Soviets, on the other hand, had no
comparable delivery system, for they lacked both the
bombers and, even more importantly, forward bases
within range of the continental United States. The
Soviets therefore saw long-range ballistic missiles as
the only way to counter U.S. nuclear superiority, and
placed a correspondingly high priority on their devel-
opment. The type of missile they proceeded to build
was determined first of all by the extreme heaviness
of the first generations of Soviet weapons, as well as
by the inaccuracies of the missiles themselves. To be
effective at long ranges, even against large unpro-
tected targets (i.e., cities), these missiles had to carry
very heavy, high-yield (multi megaton) warheads.
Hence, the missiles themselves had to be, above all,
large. The result was a series of large, inexpensive, in-
efficient (relatively low thrust) boosters capable of car-
rying thousands of pounds halfway around the world
—or into orbit. It is these early designs, first perfected
in the mid-l 9s0’s, that still today serve as the back-
bone of the Soviet missile fleet, both for intercontinen-
tal ballistic missiles (ICBMS) and for orbital launchers.
The United States, in contrast, did not at first feel
a similar urgency to develop ICBMS, especially the
very heavy variety favored by the Soviets. However,
by the mid-l 950’s the United States had several rocket
development programs under way: the Army’s Jupiter
booster; the Thor and Atlas missiles (developed by the
Air Force); and a civilian booster, Vanguard, which
was, however, essentially managed by the Navy.
Contrary to popular belief, the Soviets were not reti-
cent about their intention to launch an artificial satel-
lite; as early as 19.ss, Soviet scientists were predicting
success within a few years, and the October 4, 19s7,
orbiting of Sputnik was foreshadowed by numerous
public statements. Nevertheless, the public and inter-
national surprise was intense, and there were wide-
spread demands for the United States to match or sur-
pass the Soviet challenge. There were several reasons.
The Soviet Union and United States each had grown
accustomed to seeing the other as rivals across a
whole range of political, economic, and cultural activ-
ities. Both saw themselves as representing social and
economic systems whose superiority would be dem-
onstrated by whether they could outperform their
competitors. At stake for e,ach was the legitimacy of
its system in the eyes not only of its current adherents
but of billions of potential adherents throughout the
world. The United States was acknowledged to be the
leader in economic and scientific affairs, and although
the Soviets took pains to publicize the ever-growing
amounts of steel, concrete, oil, and foodstuffs pro-
duced annually, it was increasingly clear that competi-
tion in the nuclear age was more a matter of quality
than quantity. In no technical area had the Soviets
been able to outperform the West; Sputnik was a blow
to the West’s confidence in the superior quality of its
science and technology, and hence in the superiority
of the political/economic system that produced it.
With hindsight we can see that Sputnik represented
an exceptional case of temporary leadership brought
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about by the special emphasis on heavy missiles de-
scribed above. The sophistication of the Soviet pay-
loads and instrumentation, including their manned
capsules, was well below that of even the first U.S.
satellites. It did not indicate a comprehensive capabil-
ity in advanced technologies on a par with the United
States; it did not even indicate, as many thought it
must, that the Soviets enjoyed a dangerous lead in mil-
itary ICBMS. The “missile-gap” controversy, which
played an important role in the 1960 Presidential elec-
tion, and which prompted a major commitment by
the United States to the deployment of U.S.-based
ICBMS and foreign-based MRBMs, as well as to civil
defense, was a chimera. There is no doubt that the
Soviets, upon seeing Sputnik’s effect on world opin-
ion, did their best to foster the notion of across-the-
board Soviet technical and military equivalence, if not
superiority, and that this effort, abetted by the extreme
secrecy with which the Soviet program was con-
ducted, was largely successful, especially in the third
world. In particular, Premier Khrushchev asserted that
the Soviets, with their ICBMS, which could supposedly
“hit a fly in outer space,” had achieved strategic
nuclear parity with the United States.
That these claims were exaggerated became clear
in 1962 when Khrushchev, lacking the credible Soviet-
based ICBM force he had earlier claimed, attempted
to redress the balance by placing MRBMs in Cuba,
with disastrous results. Soviet space successes, and the
Western reaction, played an important role in public
estimates of comparative military strength. The above
shows why it was the United States and the U.S.S.R.
that were the first to develop boosters capable of
launching substantial payloads into orbit. Other coun-
tries, lacking these military/competitive needs, did not
at first choose to expend the resources needed to de-
velop an independent booster capability. It is instruc-
tive to note that France, the European nation historic-
ally most eager to have its own launcher, and the one
that has already built its own MRBM deterrent, is also
Western Europe’s largest nuclear power and the one
most determined to remain independent of the super-
powers. Similarly, China’s launcher development pro-
gram has been motivated by its determination to field
a nuclear delivery system.
Having developed missiles capable of launching
payloads into orbit, both the United States and the
U.S.S.R. began to construct a number of different sat-
ellites. Scientific instruments, remote-sensing cameras,
satellites for weather observation and military surveil-
lance, communications satellites, and manned space-
craft were all flown within a few years of Sputnik. The
type and pace of development were determined by
a combination of scientific and technical curiosity, mil-
itary requirements, prospective social and economic
benefit, and, especially for the manned programs,
prestige and competition. By the end of the decade,
the United States had developed manned and un-
manned civilian systems demonstrably superior to
those of the Soviet Union. During the 1970’s, com-
petition was reduced, due partly to d~tente and a gen-
eral lowering of tensions between the two countries,
and also to the differing emphases of the respective
programs, While the United States focused on the
space shuttle, the Soviets orbited the Salyut series of
manned, resupplyable orbiting laboratories. increas-
ingly, competition with the Soviets has changed from
open and highly publicized civilian space spectacu-
lars, to secret military and intelligence systems. (For
further details see ch. 7.)1
Joint European Efforts
In 1960-61, three separate European agencies were
created to deal with different aspects of space. The
European Launcher Development Organization
(ELDO) aimed at creating a jointly funded launcher,
eventually named the “Europa. ” ELDO was basically
a coordinating body for separate national projects; the
eventual plans for Europa called for a British first stage
(the Blue Streak military IRBM), a French second stage,
a West German third stage, Italian test satellites, Bel-
gian downrange guidance systems, and Dutch tele-
metry links. By 1968, the cost estimates for the Europa
had climbed from an initial $190 million to $71o mil-
lion to $77o million, causing intense disagreements
among the participants. The military implications of
possessing a long-range missile complicated agree-
ments even further.2 As a result of the problems
caused by inadequate coordination, none of the 11
test launches of the Europa, the last of which took
place in 1971, succeeded in placing a payload in
orbit.J Along the way the British, dismayed by rising
costs for what they saw as obsolescent technology,
decided in 1968 to reduce their financial commitment
and eventually withdrew altogether. This left France
as the project’s strongest backer. In 1973, the Europa
was finally cancel led in favor of a new project, the
Frenchdominated Ariane, which was eventually taken
up by the European Space Agency (ESA).
1 For information on the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet
Union, see Soviet Space Programs 1971-75,  2 VOIS.,  Congressional Research
Service Staff Repofi  for Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sci-
ences, Aug. 30, 1976; Jerry Grey, Enterprise (New York: William Morrow
& Co., 1979); and James  Oberg,  Red  Star in Orbit, (New York:  Random
House, 1981).
‘Mihiel  Schwarz,  “European Policies on Space Science and Technology
1960-1978,” Research Policy 8, 1979, p. 208.
3See World-Wide Space Activities, CRS Science Polic Research Division,
Kreport done for House Committee on Science and Tec nology,  September
1977, pp. 265-273.
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The second major agency was the European Space
Research Organization (ESRO) which was formally es-
tablished in 1962. Loosely modeled on CERN, the co-
operative European Nuclear Research Center, ESRO
intended to develop satellites and instruments for con-
ducting scientific experiments in space, including
tracking and relay stations, and to procure launch serv-
ices.4 ESRO (unlike ELDO) achieved a high degree of
credibility, and was able to cooperate successfully
with NASA and other countries. A major difficulty
ESRO faced, one which it shared with ELDO, was the
principle of “juste retour” (fair return). Participating
countries contributed to the agencies a certain assess-
ment (for ESRO, an amount roughly in proportion to
their gross national product), and the agency contracts
were supposed to be let in the same ratios; i.e., if
France provided 20 percent of the budget, 20 percent
of the amount of ESRO’S contracts were supposed to
be with French firms (in fact, France’s share of the con-
tracts was consistently higher than its budget contribu-
tion).s This resulted in many contracts being let on
political and partisan grounds rather than to the low-
est or most qualified bidder.6 Eventually, to circum-
vent the destructive and time-consuming quarreling
over contracts, European aerospace and electronics
firms formed themselves into three formal multina-
tional consortia-called COSMOS, MESH, and STAR–
to bid on European projects.
From 1967 to 1975 (when it merged into the ESA),
ESRO launched nine scientific satellites and 168
sounding rockets7 The most important development
over time was a growing interest in applications satel-
lites; in 1968, ESRO was first given a mandate to study
applications, especially in communications and mete-
orology. By 1975, ESRO was engaged in four major
applications projects: 1 ) a maritime navigation satel-
lite, Marots; 2) an experimental communications satel-
lite, OTS; 3) Aerosat, a joint venture with the United
States for aeronautical communications; and 4) Meteo-
sat, a regional meteorological satellite.
A third organization, the Conference Europeéne de
Telecommunications par Satellites (CETS), was formed
to discuss European participation in INTELSAT. It was
made up of national Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph
(PTT) agencies and played little role in formulating
space policy or programs.
In 1966, the members of ELDO, concerned about
lack of harmony between countries and programs,
established the 12-nation European Space Conference
41 bid., p. 237.
‘See Walter McDougall, “Space Age Europe 1957-1 980,” paper presented
at the Conference on the History of Space Activity, Yale University, Feb. 7
1981, p. 6.
%chwarz,  op. cit., p. 211.
TWorld-Wide Space Activities, op. cit., pp. 254-256.
(ESC), which met for the next 9 years and provided
the forum for the founding of ESA in 1975.
There was first of alla consensus within the ESC that
there should be a single coordinated European pro-
gram, but there was disagreement about the relative
weight to give the three program areas: science, appli-
cations, and launch vehicles. Basic science and
launcher development were already the province of
ESRO and ELDO, respectively, but applications activ-
ities were seen as increasingly important. For one
thing, U.S. and Soviet successes with communications
and weather satellites had shown the usefulness of
space applications. For another, there was increased
European awareness of the importance of advanced
technology in maintaining a competitive position in
international trade and influence vis-à-vis the super-
powers, especially the United States. In 1967, J.
Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s book, “The American
Challenge, ” in which he predicted the decline of Euro-
pean industry faced with American technical and
managerial superiority, “polemicized the United
States economic invasion of Europe and aroused a
popular interest in technology comparable to the Sput-
nik aftermath in the United States.”8 At the same time,
however, there was increasing concern in both Europe
and the United States about reaping useful economic
and social benefits from space technologies; by the
end of the 1960’s, there was little enthusiasm on either
continent for large prestige projects such as Apollo.
To be publicly acceptable, investments had to be jus-
tified by concrete and relatively short-term payoffs,
The British skepticism about continuing the Europa
project, mentioned previously, reflected this shift; the
British saw Europa as an unnecessary and expensive
item being pursued to the detriment of more useful
and technically advanced applications satellites. The
British, along with the Italians and a few others,
thought U.S. launchers were perfectly adequate and
likely to be considerably cheaper than the inefficient
Europa. The prolauncher countries, however, led by
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, thought that
the United States could not be counted on to launch
European applications satellites that might compete
with U.S. systems, especially in telecommunications.
The United States had launched ESRO’S scientific sat-
ellites without any problems, but there were no guar-
antees as to other types of payloads.
In 1969, the question of the American relationship
became a key issue. In making plans for the post-
Apollo space program, U.S. policy makers placed
strong emphasis on soliciting European participation,
‘JHenry Nau, Nationa/ Po/ltm and /nternationa/ Technology (Baltimore:
Johns  Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 55.
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partly to strengthen political and economic ties and
partly to lessen the costs. In October 1969, the United
States proposed that Europe undertake to build a
major segment of the proposed space transportation
system. Emphasis was placed on the “space tug, ” an
expendable orbit-to-orbit rocket, because the exper-
tise accumulated in developing the Europa could be
used to develop the tug. The Europeans concurred,
and began extensive planning for eventual construc-
tion. However, in 1972 the United States withdrew
its offer, partly because the entire post-Apollo program
was being scaled back, because of doubts about Euro-
pean technical capabilities; and also because the Air
Force thought the military potential of the tug was too
great to permit dependence on outside sources.9 In-
stead, the United States “offered” the Europeans the
sortie lab (later known as Spacelab) or a number of
constituent parts of the space shuttle. Withdrawal of
the tug proposal angered the Europeans, not only
because of the considerable time and expense in-
vested, but because some countries, particularly
France, were suspicious that the United States did not
want the Europeans to develop their own space
transportation capability, and wished instead to retain
a U.S. monopoly on launchers. One result was re-
newed commitment to a European rocket; another
was French consultation with the Soviet Union about
possible future use of Soviet launchers.
The question of U.S. guarantees to launch European
applications satellites was related to U.S.-European
collaboration, in that many Europeans were con-
vinced that such guarantees were contingent on Euro-
pean willingness to build and fund part of the U.S.
post-Apollo program. In 1971, the United States prom-
ised to assist with Iaunches, provided they were “for
peaceful purposes and consistent with obligations
under relevant international arrangements’’.10 Similar
assurances were later granted to all “other countries
and international organizations on a nondiscrimina-
tory, reimbursable basis.”11 The United States insisted
that this policy would be honored regardless of Euro-
pean participation: the qualification of consistency
with “relevant international arrangements” was, how-
ever, a potential stumbling block, especially to launch-
ing European communications satellites. The relevant
agreement was the “International Telecommunica-
tions Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) Agreement, ”
signed August 20, 1971, which, in article XIV, required
9Schwarz,  op. cit., p. 22o.
10Le~er  from u, A, Johnson, U ,S. Under  Secretary of State for PO[itica[  Af-
fairs, to Mlntster  Theo Lefevre, Cha~rrnan of the European Space Conference,
Sept. 1, 1971.
I I See ‘ ‘Launch ASSU rances pOllcy,  ” White House Press Release of Oct. 9,
1972; in Space Law:  Se/ectecf  Basic Documents, 2d cd., committee print for
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, December
1978, p. 557.
signatories to consult with INTELSAT to ensure the
“technical compatibility” of any proposed operational
international telecommunications satellites, as well as
to avoid “significant economic harm” caused by re-
gional competition. In fact, this issue did affect plans
to launch the French-German Symphonic communi-
cations satellite, which the United States agreed to do
(in 1971) only after it was declared an experimental
rather than an operational system, in part to avoid the
issue of whether the United States would launch an
operational satellite.12 This experience strengthened
French determination to develop an autonomous
launch capability.
Resolution of these issues made the negotiations in
ESC over establishing ESA prolonged and compli-
cated.13 Essentially, the successful outcome involved
compromise among the three largest participants,
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, with each
agreeing to back the others’ preferred projects i n ex-
change for reciprocal support.
The French wanted to build a launcher, specifical-
ly the L3S or Ariane, which was first conceived in 1972
as a unilateral French project. In order to get ESA sup-
port, the French agreed to provide the bulk of the
funding for research and testing (approximately 60
percent), with Germany providing some 20 percent,
Belgium 5 percent, and various other participants the
remainder. The British reluctantly agreed to a 1 to 2
percent contribution. The Ariane would be launched
from France’s spaceport at Kourou in French Guiana,
and the main contractor would be a French firm,
Aerospatiale.
West Germany had been a strong backer of a Euro-
pean launcher and also of the proposed space tug.
When the tug offer was withdrawn, the Germans’ pre-
ferred project became Spacelab, which they saw as
a vehicle for conducting scientific and commercial ex-
periments as well as for improving German industrial
and technical skills. More so than the French, the Ger-
mans believed that U.S. launch guarantees could be
trusted. Following high-level talks between President
Pompidou of France and Chancellor Brandt of Ger-
many in 1973, the two countries agreed to a quid pro
quo: the Germans would fund approximately 60 per-
cent of Spacelab, and the French 20 percent, in return
for similar but reversed support for Ariane.14
The United Kingdom had less enthusiasm for sup-
porting a wide range of major space projects than
either France or Germany, preferring to concentrate
on applications satellites and on cooperative scientific
12wor/d. wjc/e Space Activities, Op. Cit., P. 1961.
I ~For  detail discussion see W o r l d - W i d e  S p a c e  Activities, Op. cit., PP.
293-303.
)aWor/d.  W;de  Space  Act ivi t ies,  o p .  Cit.,  P. 286.
9 4 - 9 :  5 n - B 2 - 25
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programs. Though Britain strongly favored the estab-
lishment of a single European space agency, British
support for ESA hinged on the potential competition
between its Geostationary Technology Satellite (GTS)
and ESRO’S proposed Marots maritime communica-
tions satellite. Eventually, Britain agreed to drop its
GTS in favor of becoming the Marots project leader
and providing some 56 percent of the funding. It also
agreed to support the Ariane and Spacelab programs,
though at fairly low levels. These compromises (the
so-called “Second Package Deal”) were essentially
worked out by July 1973, paving the way for the draft-
ing of an ESA charter and the founding of ESA in May
1975.
France
In 1960, France announced plans to build an IRBM
designed to carry nuclear weapons, and an industrial
consortium called SEREB was formed to build military
missiles. SEREB eventually became active in civilian
developments as well. In 1961, a civilian agency, the
Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES), was
formed under the Ministry of State for Scientific
Research, Atomic and Space Affairs.
At first the French hoped for close cooperation with
the United States, but the United States was reluctant
to transfer its newly acquired missile technology
abroad.15 After considerable effort, the first operational
French IRBM, the S-2, was deployed in 1971, and the
first submarine-launched missile in 1972.
Meanwhile, CNES began work on a series of civilian
launchers, the so-called “precious stones” series. The
only successful launcher was the Diamant version,
which in November 1965 orbited the first French satel-
lite, the 42-kg Asterix, from the French testing grounds
in Saharan Algeria. France was also a major partici-
pant in ELDO, whose ill-fated Europa was to have used
a Diamant as its second stage. The Diamant in various
versions made successful orbital flights from Algeria
and later from the Kourou spaceport in French Guiana
~Swor\d.wide  s~ce  Activities, op. cit., p. 148.
until 1973, A large number of the satellites launched
were used for military-related geodetic work; others
were for experiments in communications and atmo-
spheric research.
The French also built satellites for launch on U.S.
and Soviet vehicles; the first U.S.-launched French
satellite went upon December 6, 1965 (oniy 10 days
after the Asterix, suggesting that the French were
understandably eager to have the first French satellite
placed in orbit by a national launcher). In 1971, the
Soviet Union launched a French scientific satellite,
Aureole. Talks with the Soviets began in 1965 and a
number of cooperative projects, including the train-
ing of two French astronauts for an upcoming Salyut
mission, have taken place.
Great Britain
The British initiated a two-stage military rocket pro-
gram in 1956. In 1960, the program was canceled due
to a conviction that it was militarily obsolete; the “Blue
Streak” first stage was then proposed as part of ELDO’S
Europa launcher, of which Great Britain was initially
a strong supporter.
During the 1960’s Great Britain developed a num-
ber of scientific satellites known as the Ariel series,
the first of which was launched by the United States
in 1964. Great Britain was an active supporter of both
ELDO and ESRO; in addition, it embarked in 1964 on
a major launch development program known as Black
Arrow. In 1971, the Black Arrow succeeded in orbiting
a single 66-kg satellite, called Prospero, from the
Australian test range at Woomera, following which the
program was canceled. Despite the L1 1.5 million
spent, the government determined that using U.S.
launchers would be significantly less expensive–un-
Iike the French, the British had no concern that the
United States would balk at launching commercially
competitive or military payloads. In 1969, the United
States orbited the first of two Skynet geosynchronous
military communications satellites.l G
lbWOr/~wi&  s~ce  Activities, op. cit., pp. 217-234.
Appendix H
INDUSTRIAL INNOVATIVE PROCESS
Innovation
If the United States is to remain a leader in the de-
velopment and use of space technology, it will be nec-
essary to enlist a greater share of private resources to
augment the contributions of the Federal Govern-
ment. In each of the four technologies dealt with in
this report, the opportunities for private investment
have increased dramatically in very recent times. In
its attempts to encourage industrial participation, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) has not only identified many potential com-
mercial applications for space technology, but has de-
veloped new institutional mechanisms for increasing
the flow of Government expertise and resources to
the private sector. With a few exceptions, however,
the private sector has remained unenthusiastic about
the prospects of investing in space.
The purpose of this appendix will be to take a brief
look at the process of innovation in order to establish
a framework within which to discuss the issue of com-
mercializing space technology. Because the subject
of industrial innovation is complex, and highly de-
pendent on subtle factors such as the willingness to
take risks and the acuity of technical and business
judgments, generalizations in this area can be decep-
tive. Nevertheless, it is useful to identify some of the
key factors that motivate the private sector to allocate
resources to the pursuit of product development and
improvement.
Innovation is generally defined by economists to be
the first commercial application of a new or improved
product or production process. The process by which
innovations are developed can be viewed as a se-
quence of three interdependent events. ’
Ž Generation of an idea, involving the synthesis of
a market need and the recognition of a technical
capability for meeting that need.
l Problern solving including the setting of specific
technical goals and the search for alternate methods
of meeting those goals.
l Irnplernentation or commercialization, consisting of
engineering design, tooling for production, plant
construction, production and marketing start-up,
and first commercial introduction.
Analyzing these three stages, it becomes apparent
that the management of technical innovation requires
much more than the maintenance of a productive
research and development (R&D) laboratory. It is a
‘James M. Utterback,  “Innovation in Industry and the Diffusion of Tech-
nology,” Science, vol. 183, Feb. 15, 1974, p. 621.
corporation-wide task that involves the skills and per-
sonalities of everyone from the scientists and engineers
in the lab to the top legal and financial management.
Because of this wide spectrum of interested parties,
the process of project selection is highly dependent
on the flow of information within the firm. The ob-
ject of scientists and engineers is generally new knowl-
edge, and they tend to focus on the problem of techni-
cal success.
Managers, on the other hand, are concerned with
marketing a profitable product and therefore focus on
development time, risk, and potential return on invest-
ment. This marked difference in interests and goals
may result in a communication gap that prevents man-
agement from getting the technical information that
it needs to assess projects accurately.2
This problem is particularly significant in the con-
text of NASA’s desire to involve the private sector in
the commercialization of space technology. The proc-
ess of project selection within a firm is already com-
plex. When the administrative problem of coordinat-
ing NASA’s management structure and technical ex-
pertise with that of the firm is added, such a project
may appear unattractive. NASA’S Joint Endeavor
Agreements (discussed in ch. 8) and related institu-
tional arrangements are designed, in part, to address
this problem.
The Decision to Innovate
Innovation is one means used by firms to stimulate
growth and to compete with other firms within an in-
dustry. Improvements in a product or process can lead
to a reduction in the costs of production or improve-
ments in performance or quality. In this manner, inno-
vation can increase a firm’s market share, profits, or
both. Innovation may also be directed to the develop-
ment of new products targeted for existing or poten-
tial markets.
Innovation is not the only way, and often not the
best way for individual firms to stimulate growth and
to compete. These goals can also be accomplished
by noninnovative methods designed to maximize
sales, such as advertising or new marketing strategies,
or to minimize cost, as by standardizing production
techniques. A firm is also not limited to internal
development, but can pursue growth and a competi-
tive edge through merger, acquisitions, and diversifi-
cation.3
‘Edwin Mansfield, The Economics of Technical Change, 1968, pp. 59-61.
‘Attilio  Bisio and Lawrence Gastwirt, Turning Research and Development
Into Profit, 1979, p. 37.
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Within the industrial sector a small number of specif-
ic industries make a disproportionate contribution to
the total annual amount of R&D expenditures. Table
H-1 demonstrates that five industrial categories–air-
craft and missiles, electrical equipment, machinery,
motor vehicles, and chemical products—accounted
for over 75 percent of total industrial spending in 1978.
The large interindustry differences in R&D expendi-
tures illustrate the fact that different firms and different
industries do not attach the same importance to R&D
investment.
The decision by a firm to allocate resources to the
pursuit of innovation can be viewed as a function of
two major factors. The first is the firm’s potential for
innovation as dictated by external considerations such
as the structure and maturity of the industry, the in-
dustry relationship with Government and the overall
state of the economy. The second factor is the firm’s
willingness to innovate as dictated by internal finan-
cial, technical and human resources and the particular
corporate strategy, or “personality,” of the firm.
Potential for Innovation
Federal Government programs, incentives, and reg-
ulations have a significant role to play in the creation
of an industry’s operating environment, Federal Gov-
ernment support of the electrical equipment and aero-
space industries is largely responsible for the fact that
these two industries combined constitute almost half
of the entire R&D expenditures in 1978 (table H-1).
By supplying the funds or the financial incentive to
conduct research, and by guaranteeing a market for
new product and process innovations, the Govern-
ment can encourage a level of R&D activity that would
not otherwise be maintained. (This subject is discussed
in greater detail later).
Of course, this is not to say that Government finan-
cial support is the main factor in stimulating industrial
innovation in all industries. Certain industries, notably
pharmaceuticals and chemicals, maintain very high
R&D to sales ratios and receive very little Government
support. 4 This is the result of the fact that competi-
tion in these industries is primarily based on new prod-
uct development and improved product performance.
Another factor that affects the level of R&D spend-
ing is the structure of a particular industry. Whether
or not it is profitable for a firm to invest in innovative
activities is to some degree dictated by the number
of potential rivals and the overall market profit poten-
tial. in an industry composed of many small sellers,
such as home construction or brick manufacturing,
the rate of innovation has been traditionally very low.
4D. Schwartzman,  Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry.
This results in part from the fact that no single firm
controls a significant enough portion of the market to
make a sustained research endeavor profitable. Since
market share directly affects revenue flow and the re-
turn that a firm may anticipate on a particular invest-
ment, firms with a small share of a particular market
cannot afford to make large investments in R&D. S
Innovative activity tends to be greater in new in-
dustries and industries characterized by rapid growth
and expanding markets.6 Initially, competition in these
industries is based on product quality and perform-
ance and a second-best product may have little value.
However, as such industries begin to mature, competi-
tion starts to become based on price and the produc-
tion process, and therefore the product becomes rela-
tively standardized. Innovations that are pursued after
this time tend to be incremental process innovations
that will lower the unit costs of production. Eventual-
ly, as large investments are made in plant and equip-
ment, manufacturers are less inclined to pursue radical
innovations in either the product or the manufactur-
ing process, as this could render their existing capital
base obsolete.7
An interesting example of this can be seen in the
U.S. satellite communications industry. Until 1973,
NASA played the leading role in the development of
advanced communications satellite technology. When
the NASA program was phased down, it was assumed
that the private sector would continue to finance and
develop the communications systems necessary to
meet future needs. Though the communications in-
dustry did continue to fund R&D programs, most of
the research was dedicated to improving the opera-
tional capabilities and the reliability of existing
systems. As a result, the U.S. satellite communications
industry may face strong competition from the Japa-
nese and the Europeans, both of whom have begun
to develop the high-frequency satellite systems that
may be necessary to meet the future demand for sat-
ellite communication services.
Industrial innovation is also affected by the overall
health of the economy. An economy characterized
by a high rate of inflation and generally volatile finan-
cial markets has an adverse effect on all types of in-
vestment but is particularly damaging to investment
in innovation. Under such conditions firms show a
preference for short-term, low-risk investments.
Radical innovations, which by their nature are risky
and often require long periods of time between con-
cept identification and eventual commercialization,
do not compete well for corporate resources.
SMansfield,  op. cit.
Wtterback, op. cit.
7Christopher  T. Hill and James  H. Utterback,  Techno/ogica/ Innovation for
a Dynamic Economy, 1979,  p. 53.
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The stimulus to innovate may also stem from criti-
cal shortages or a sharp rise in cost of the resources
necessary for production. For example, intensive
research on synthetic rubber was only undertaken
after certain cartel agreements caused the price of
natural rubber to increase dramatically.8 A more re-
cent example is the aerospace industry’s attempts to
design jet engines with greater fuel efficiency. This
decision was undertaken in response to rising fuel
costs and the threat of temporary fuel shortages. Ris-
ing labor costs have also contributed significantly to
innovations in robotics and industrial automation.g
Willingness to Innovate
At the broad level of R&D strategy, individual firms
must assess the relative advantages of innovation v.
imitation. Innovation is attractive if being first yields
a strong market position and if barriers to entry (e.g.,
patent protection, capital requirements, control over
distribution) can be erected which limit the ability of
other firms to copy or improve upon a product.10 On
the other hand, the risk assumed by the imitator is
much lower, and if the innovator is very successful
he may create a market large enough to accommodate
the imitator. The R&D strategy of a firm can have many
different orientations to the market:11
Ž First to market—based on strong R&D, technical
leadership, and risk taking.
. Follow the leader—based on strong development
resources and the ability to act quickly as the mar-
ket starts its growth phase.
. Applications engineering—based on product
modifications to fit the needs of particular cus-
tomers in mature markets.
For each new product or service being sought or
considered, the firm must also assess the effects of that
product or service on the firm’s present manufactur-
ing, distribution, and office facilities. New product
development can be sought to enhance an existing
area of competence such as a distribution system, a
production capability, or promotional skills. Such
development may also be primarily defensive in char-
acter, as when a firm pursues a product in order to
spread the risks of its involvement in a highly cyclical
industry.
The decision of a firm to allocate resources to inno-
vation is a subjective determination on the part of
management that takes into consideration the need
to innovate, the probability that a given project will
%. W. Stocking and M. W. Watkins, Cartels in Action, 1964, p. 73.
gjohn  D. Fisk, /ndustria/  Robs  in the  U. S.: /ssues and Perspectives, Con-
gressional Research Service, March 1981.
IOBisio,  op. cit., p. 37.
II Bisio,  op. cit., p. 38.
be a technical and commercial success, and the finan-
cial ability of a firm to undertake the project. Although
formal, quantitative project selection techniques can
be used to project such factors as rates of return and
pay-out periods, in the final analysis the decision to
innovate is a strategic choice that depends upon a cor-
porate manager’s business and technical acumen.
Some analysts have charged that U.S. corporate
managers have underestimated the need for innova-
tion. They contend that this has resulted in the decline
in innovation and productivity growth and deficits in
the balance of trade. A recent article charged that
By their preference for servicing existing markets
rather than creating new ones and by their devotion
to short-term returns and “management by numbers,”
many (American managers) have effectively forsworn
long-term technological superiority as a competitive
weapon.
Because of the existence of other factors such as in-
flation, tax laws, labor costs, Government regulation,
fear of capital shortages, or the price of imported oil
it is difficult to gauge the truth of this assessment. It
is important to note, however, that to the extent that
corporate managers do rely on quantitative project
selection techniques, there is some evidence that such
techniques tend to be biased against ambitious proj-
ects with potentially large payoffs.13 These techniques
often utilize formal market surveys to compare the es-
timated returns on investment for alternative projects.
Reliance on such surveys can be misleading in that
consumers are often unable to appreciate the value
of major innovations before they are commercial-
ized.14 A Though major innovations may have a much
greater profit potential than modest product improve-
ments, they are more difficult to justify using formal
market surveys.
This fact has important ramifications for potentially
commercializable space applications. Because such
projects involve both technical and market uncertain-
ties, industry has viewed them as unattractive invest-
ment. It is difficult to assess, at this point, whether in-
dustry’s cautious view of space is the result of myopic
management techniques or insight based on experi-
ence in dealing with complex investment decisions.
IZRobert H. Hayes and William J. Abernathy, “Managing OUr  Way to ECO-
nomic Decline,” Harvard Business Review, july-August  1980, p. 70.
IJEdwin  Mansfield, et al., The I?oduction and Application of New Industrial
Technology, 1977, p. 43.
14Hayes, op. cit.,  p. 71; Hayes and Abernathy point out that: “The ar6u-
ment that consumer analyses and formal market surveys should dominate
other considerations when allocating resources to product development is
untenable. It may be useful to remember that the initial market estimate for
computers in 1945 projected total worldwide sales of only 10 units. Similar-
ly, even the most carefully researched analysis of consumer preferences for
gas-guzzling cars in an era of gasoline abundance offers little useful guidance
to today’s automobile manufacture in making wise product investment deci-
sions. Customers may know what their needs are, but they often define those
needs in terms of existing products, processes, markets, and prices. ”
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The answers to such questions may be forthcoming
as Europe and Japan target specific space technologies
for commercial application.
In space applications, as well as other high-technol-
ogy industries, the Government has played, and con-
tinues to play, a major role in product identification
and development. It is important therefore to examine
the nature of this role and Some of the methods by
which it is accomplished.
Government Role in Innovation
The Government plays an extremely important role
in the innovative process, particularly in the area of
basic research. The impact of such financial support
has been particularly significant in the aerospace, elec-
tronics and computer industries, where expensive
basic research has been essential to product develop-
ment. Government can provide financial support of
R&D both directly and indirectly, through a variety
of mechanisms. Such support does, however, raise im-
portant questions as to the appropriate roles of the
public and private sectors in the development and
operation of new technology. One way to address this
problem is to identify the kind of benefit–public good
or private good—that a new technology will provide.
A public good is one that cannot profitably be di-
vided, priced, and sold to the individual members of
a collectivity (i.e., a city, State or country). Govern-
ments traditionally have existed to provide public
goods such as highways, sea and air navigation aids,
and national defense. A private good, by contrast, is
one that can be provided through a market transac-
tion to those who desire it and are willing to pay the
price set by the provider, Of course, it is often the case
that a particular product or service produces mixed
benefits, making it difficult for a private sector sup-
plier to justify the cost of providing the benefit. In this
situation, some argue that the Government should in-
tervene to correct this lack of market incentive by
using public funds to invest in technology intended
for eventual use in the private sector.
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally in the con-
text of Government funding, the definitions of public
good and private good are highly political in character.
It is important to recognize that when discussing tech-
nologies that may benefit large segments of society,
it is a matter of judgment and philosophy, not an issue
for analytical resolution, which should be provided
through Government programs and which through
private activity.
The most controversial area with respect to R&D
funding by the Government is that in which eventual
commercialization is a major objective in the develop-
ment program. Ordinarily, the private sector bears the
total responsibility for funding R&D intended to be in-
corporated into commercial systems. However, over
the past decade the Government has provided signifi-
cant support, not only for basic research but also for
applied research, technology and systems develop-
ment, and even demonstration projects in such areas
as space and energy technology.
A policy decision to support R&D in an area in-
tended for eventual commercialization is a decision
to augment or override market forces as a determi-
nant of R&D investment. In the United States, the sci-
entific and technological sectors that have advanced
most rapidly in the 20th century, including space, are
those that have received substantial assistance from
the Federal Government.15 This assistance has taken
the form, among others, of direct financial support for
R&D and of the creation of Government organizations
to manage the research programs carried out with
such  s u p p o r t .
The establishment of NASA, and this organization’s
early work on communications satellites, are examples
of substantial Government involvement in a commer-
cially viable technology. Another example can be
found in the development of electronic component
technology. The reason for early U.S. domination of
this industry is directly related to the R&D support pro-
vided by the Government. In the early 1950’s, the mil-
itary services, desiring to make their equipment more
portable and to increase its reliability in the field,
began to finance semiconductor R&Don a large scale.
Between 1955 and 1961, the Government spent ap-
proximately $66 million on semiconductor R&D and
production refinements.
Purchase Guarantees
In addition to direct financial support the Govern-
ment may encourage innovation and the commerciali-
zation of new technologies in a number of ways, such
as guarantees, technology transfers, and favorable tax
treatment. One example of the influence of market
guarantees can be seen in the integrated circuit indus-
try. Though the basic inventions in this industry re-
sulted from work done under Government contract,
the technical breakthrough that allowed mass produc-
tion was accomplished by Fairchild Industries without
any Federal support.16 The fact that there was a clear
Government demand for these products and proc-
esses was an important factor in the firm’s decision
to undertake this research in the first place. Future
15J. Schnee, “Government Programs and the Growth of High-Technology
Industries,” Research Policy, vol. 7 no. 2 (1978), p. 4.
lbOECD,  Gaps in Technology: Electronic Components, 1968,  p. 59.
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developments in remote sensing may provide another
example of the importance of a Government-guaran-
teed market. Several plans have been proposed that
envision the transfer of the Landsat system to a private
sector organization. All of these plans are contingent
on the Government’s agreement to purchase its re-
motely sensed data from such an organization,
thereby guaranteeing that such a venture would have
a stable financial base.
Technology Transfer
In addition to providing assured product demand,
it is also significant that the Government develops
technologies that have either a director indirect usage
in the private sector. An example of this can be seen
in the computer industry. Because of Government
sales in this industry companies were able to fund their
R&D programs at very high Ievels.17 This resulted in
a rate of technological progress that exceeded that
which could have occurred in a normal commercial
environment. In addition, military requirements with
respect to computer size, speed, and reliability far ex-
ceeded what would have been requested by the busi-
ness community. As a result, the technology that was
transfered to the private sector was far more sophisti-
cated than it would have been without Government
involvement. Finally, because of the military’s exten-
sive use of this new technology, the computer industry
was able to overcome the natural skepticism that
would have existed in the business community toward
an untried product. There are many examples of tech-
nology transfers in the aerospace industry that have
resulted or may result in important commercial prod-
ucts. The obvious examples that have been mentioned
above are advanced communication systems and re-
mote-sensing technology.
Government Regulation
Though the effects of Government regulation on in-
novation are not completely understood, many are of
the opinion that regulation is a factor in the recent
decline of innovation in the United States. A recent
report by the National Research Council tended, with
certain reservations, to agree with this opinion.18 It
stated that though the reasons for the decline in U.S.
innovation are varied and complex, there are a num-
ber of cases (such as new pesticides, certain chemical
compounds and railroad shipping services), where sol-
id documentation existed to prove that regulation con-
tributed to this decline. *
I Zschnw, op. cit., p. 10.
locational Research Council,  The Impact  of Regulation on Industrial Inn*
vation,  1979,  p. 9.
l The NRC report does point out, however, that in certain instances Govern-
ment regulation may act to stimulate innovation. For example, though it ap-
Government regulation can also delay the introduc-
tion of new and useful products and processes. An
example of this fact can be seen in the history of the
use of satellites for domestic communications. In 1963,
when NASA began launching its Syncom series of sat-
ellites utilizing the geosynchronous orbit, it became
apparent that the use of this orbit would have impor-
tant applications for domestic communications. Yet,
it was not until 1974 that commercial domestic satel-
lite service was available in the United States. This long
period between the technical realization and the com-
mercial application of the technology was marked by
scores of legal and organizational battles over systems
ownerships involving the Federal Communication
Commission (FCC), the Justice Department, the White
House and the numerous segments of private industry
who wished to use the technology. The result of nearly
a decade of struggling was that FCC, in 1972, an-
nounced its multientry decision which held that any
qualified entity, subject to certain conditions, could
own and operate a commercial satellite system. Mean-
while, Canada had been enjoying for years a domestic
satellite system built by a U.S. company and launched
by NASA.19
In the near future, Government regulation will have
a significant role to play in the development of private-
ly owned launch systems. At present, several different
agencies, each with uncertain authority, are issuing
regulations that have an effect on private launches.
No lead agency has been designated to address critical
issues such as aerial and maritime clearance, the de-
velopment of new commercial launch sites, the need
for a comprehensive indemnification scheme, and
methods by which to authorize and license payloads.
Because of the importance of these issues both domes-
tically and internationally, it is certain that some form
of regulation will be necessary. Whether or not such
regulation will encourage or hinder the flow of private
capital into this infant industry is yet to be seen.
Tax Incentives
The Government may also stimulate R&D expendi-
tures by allowing industries to use the tax system to
reduce the cost of such endeavors. Three of the main
incentives in the present tax system are depreciation
allowances, investment tax credits, and the deductibil-
ity of R&D outlays. Depreciation allows a firm to de-
duct as a business expense the cost of certain assets
over the period of their useful life. Investment tax
credits allow firms to take a certain percentage of new
pears that regulation has caused R&D capital funds to be used to meet regula-
tions, it has also had the effect of stimulating the development of new socially
desirable products such as pollution-control equipment and technology.
T9M. Kinsley,  Outer  Space and /nner Sanc tums,  1976,  p. 131.
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investment purchases as a credit against their tax liabil-
ity. Section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code permits
firms to deduct total R&D outlays in the year that the
expenditures are incurred.
Though the intricacies of the corporate tax system
are beyond the scope of this report, a simple exam-
ple is helpful to illustrate some of the ways that
changes in the tax structure can create the incentive
to innovate .20
Figure H-1 depicts an R&D project with a 20-year
development time and a 15-year market life. It
assumes a research expenditure of $1 million per year,
an investment of $50 million spread over 4 years to
build the manufacturing facility, and a venture suc-
cess rate of 100 percent. It also assumes that the tax
regulations allow a 100-percent deduction for R&D
——— .—. .—
~~john  s Benjarnln,  stdternerlt  on the Space Industrlallzatlon Act of  1979
(H. R, 2337), hearings before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Ap-
pllcatlons of the House Committee on Science and Technology, 96th Cong.
1st sess , 1979.
outlays, an investment tax credit of 10 percent, and
a depreciable life of plant and equipment of 14 years.
Taking these factors into consideration, if a firm wants
to earn a 15-percent return on investment, taking into
account the time value or money, it must anticipate
pre-tax earnings of over $90 million. If the tax regula-
tions in this example are altered to allow a 150-percent
deduction on R&D outlays, an investment tax credit
of 25 percent, and a 5-year depreciation on the plant
and equipment, the required pre-tax earnings to
achieve a 15-percent return on investment would be
cut in half. Figure 5 demonstrates the effect of these
changes.
Although models set forth in figures H-1 and H-2
are in many ways overly simplistic, they do point out
how the tax system can be used to help firms recover
the cost of their R&D efforts. By making R&D expend-
itures easier to recover, firms will have the incentive
to invest in more and longer research and develop-
ment projects.
Figure H-1.— Results of Project Model for 20-Year Development Time
(millions) Time (years) +
Figure H.2.—Effect of Tax Law Modifications on Project Model
SOURCE The Space Industrialization Act of 1979: hearings on H.R. 2337 before the Subcommittee on Space Science and
Applications, 96th Cong., Ist sess. 45 (statement of Dr. John S. Benjamin).
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AN ACT To provide tor reeeareh LDto problems ot ftlght within 
and outaide the earth's atmosphere, and tor other purposes 
Be it mtlC~d by the S61'I4te aM HlYU8e 0/ RepruMltta-
ewe. 0/ the United Statu 0/ America in Oongreu tU-
.emlJl6d, 
TITLE I-SHORT TITLE, DECLARATION OF 
POLICY, AND DEFINITIONS 
mOIlT T1TLII 
Sm. 101. This Act may be cited as the "National Aero-
nautics .and Space Act of 1958". 
DEOLABATION (D' POLICY AND PUllP08Il 
SEC. 102. (a) The Co~ hereby declares that it is 
the policy of the United States that activities in space 
should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of 
all mankind. 
(b) The Congress declares that the general welfare 
and security of the United States ~uire that ad~uate 
~tt~~mfu~:: c~t~ :~~=v= 
be the responsibility of, and shall be directed by, a 
civilian ~ncy exercising control over aeronautical and 
space activities sponsored by the United States, except 
that activities pecUliar to or primarily associated with the 
development of wellPOns systems, military operations, or 
the defense of the United States (including the research 
and development n~ to make eft'ective provision 
for the defense of the United States) shall be the re-
sponsibility of, and shall be directed by, the Department 
I)f Defense; and that determination as to which such 
agency has responsibility for and direction of any such 
activity shall be made by the President in conformity 
with section 201 ( e ) . 
(c) The aeronautical and space activities of the United 
States shall be conducted so -as to contribute materially 
to one or more of the following objectives : 
(1) The expansion of human know ledge 01 phe-
nomena in the atmosphere and space; 
42 U.s.c, ~Il 
500 501
TITLE II-COORDINATION OF AERONAUTI-
CAL AND SPACE ACTIVITIES
502 503
FUNCTIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION
Acquisition,
construction,
maintenance,
etc., of
property.
Cafeterias and
other facilities
for employees.
Gifts.
504 505
5 A ut nrrjzatlon  to r’1~ at rate  not  to e~ceed $100  per d i e m  f o r  ln -
“~ Authorl:v  tn lea~e hulldlass In the District of Columbla  was  r idded
to s e c .  2 0 2 ( h )  (3), T-? Stnt.  4 3 0 .  bv Pllbllc  L-IW  R6-20.  Mav  13. 1959 dividunls  mm.  unended  by Public Law 9.3-316,  June 22, 197A, section 6(88 Stat. 2A3).( ?S Stnt.  2 1). The erect  of 40 U. S.C. 24 has  been  modi f i ed  by  Publ i c
Lnw 90-S30 Octcber  4. 1969  (82 Stat. 944).
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(10) when determined by the Administrator to be 
n~, and 8Ub~eet to such security investigations 
as he maY' determme to be appropriate, to employ 
aliens without regard to statutory provisions. pro-
hibiting payment of compensation to aliens; 
(11) to provide by concession, without ~rd to 
section 321 of the Act of June 30, 1932 (47 Stat. 412; 
40 U.S.C. 303b), on such terms as the Administra-
tor may deem to be appropriate and to be necessary 
to protect the concessloner against loss of his in-
vestment in propertJJ~ut not anticipated profits) re-
sulting from the A . istration's discretIonary acts 
and decisions, for the construction, maintenance, and 
operation of all manner of facilities and equipment 
for visitors to the several installations of the Admin-
istration and, in connection therewith, to provide 
services incident to the dissemination of information 
concerning its activities to such visitors, without 
charge .01· with a reasonable charge therefor (with 
this authority being in addition to any other author-
ity which the Adriiinistration may have to provide 
facilities, equipment, and services for visitors to its 
installations). A concession agreement under this 
paragraph may be negotiated with any qualified 
proposer following due consideration of &ll pro-
posa.ls received after reasonable public notice of the 
mtention to contract. The concessioner shall be af-
forded a reasonable opportunity to make a profit 
commensurate with the capital invested and the 
obl~tions assumed, and the consideration paid by 
him for the concession shall be based on the probable 
value of such op~rtunity and not on maximizing 
revenue to the Umted States. Eo.~ concession-agree-
ment shall specify the manner in which the con-
cessioner's recordS are to be maintained, and shall 
provide for access to any such records by the Ad-
ministration and the COmptroller General of the 
United States for a period of five years after the 
close of the business year to which such records re-
late. A concessioner may be accorded a possessory 
interest, consisting of 8.l1 incidents of ownership 
except legal title (which shall vest in the United 
States), in any structure, fixture, or improvement he 
con...qf;ructs or locates upon land owned by the United 
States; and, with the approval of the Administra-
tion4 such ~rv interest may be ass~ed, trans-
ferred, encumbered, or relinquished by him, and, 
unless otherwise provided by contract, shall not be 
extinguished by the expiration or other termination 
of tAe concession and may not 'be taken for public 
W!Ie without just compensation; • 
(12) with the approval of the President, to enter 
into cooperative ~nts under which members 
of the Army, Nary, Air Force, and Marine Corps 
may be detailed bv the appropriate Secretary for 
services in the perlormance of functions under this 
Act to the same extent as that to which they might 
be lawfully assigned in the Department of Defense; 
(13) (A) to eonsider ascertain, adjust, deter-
mine, Settfe, and pay, on behalf of the United States, 
in full satisfaction thereof, any claim for $5,000 or 
less against the United States for bodily injury, 
death, or damage to or loss of real or personal 
prope~ result~ from the ~ond~ct of the ~dmin­
istratlon's functIons as specified m subsection ~a} 
of this section, where such claim is presented to the 
Administration in writing within two years after tho 
accident or incident out of which the claim arises; 
and 
(B) if the Administration considers that a claim 
in excess of $5,000 is meritorious and would other-
wise be covered by this paragraph, to report the 
facts and circumstances tliereof to the Congress for 
its consideration; T and 
[(14)] Repealed.' 
CIVILIAN-MILITARY LIAISON COMMITrEE· 
SIIe. 204. (a) There shall be a Civilian-Militarv T.ial-
lIOn Committee consisting of- ." ----
(1) a Chainnan. who shall hA thA h .. .rul th,,-_n'" 
mel who Shall be appoiJ"te~rby -the-presid~t~~-~il 
serve at the pleasure of the President.10 
·P'ubUc Law 93-74 • .July 23. 1973. seetlon 8 (87 ~tat. 114) added 
r~w~pe.i1·8~~u.:!r' u~~\:~i~~t ~~) 30:'~h:9~ra:e~~::f~~1~8a1~~ 
(11). 72 8tat. 431. Wblclf: formerly lluthortHd NASA. ··to employ retiree! 
_ml_oDed odleen of the arme4 forces of the United 3t1ltes and com. 
peuate them at the rate establlBhed tor the ~tiOIl!l oecupied by them 
within the AdmJDI.tration. lub;eet only to the llmltatlo •• In PII)" sd (orUlln 118C!. 212 of the Act ot .June 30. 1932. aa amended (15 U.~.C. ~911)." 
'ftr:eg::l~r.nf~r:.n .::.t a~~ t03~Yin~1&~. ~Je~i~~!~~'c~~!k 
e!IIte • • • the law~ COnl'E'rniDIIJ the eiYiJlaa etDnloyment nt retired mem-
lien at the DDUormf'd semeee. • • .,. Pertinent IIOrtlolLl or tile Dual 
Comlldl'llti8A A~t are llet forth ID AppeDdu B. ' 
tr;r':-o~·d~':a.o~:: .!e::.~~d!fe(:A~.:'~. ~it:~~~ UJuler the Fed· 
• Public Law 91-646 • .January 2. 1971. seetJon 220(.) (2) (M Stat. (803), repealed seettoo. 203(b) (14). 
• The Committee wal abolished by Reorganization PIlln No. 4 of 19615. 
elreetiYe .July 27. 19M (30 Federal &.g1.ter 9353. Jul)" 2S. 19815. j9 Stat. 131~), and-Its fuDction. were transferred to the PresldeDt. 
»PrnloUJI lancunge In sec. 204(a) (1) (72 Stat. 431) providing tor 
eompenaatloD of the Ch.t1rmaD at the l8te of )t20.000 per aDnum wa. 
r!pealed OD August 14. 1964. by the Federal Exeeutl.e Salary Act ot 1084 
,_pro, see. 305(13)(B) (78 Stat. 423). No subltUtute prOVision was made 
t) replace the laDguage repealed. 
• 
C2U. .. e.MT~ Jkt La , .~. 
• 
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I
I
I m30.
KeeoluUon of 
cllfrerencl'll by 
President. 
ChalrmaD • 
.. meeotae-
un or retired 
otlleer. 
201 (e). 
(d) ~otwithst~nding the provisions of any other law, 
any actIve or retIred oft!cer of the A~~, Navy, or Air 
Force may serve as ChaIrman of the LIaIson Committee 
without prejudice to his active or retired status as such 
officer: ~ny such a.ctive officer serving as Chairman of 
the LIaIson CommIttee shall receive, in addition to his 
pay and allowances, including special incentive pay:.:. 
an amount ~qual ~ the di!ference between such pay and 
allowances] mcluding specIal and incentive pays. and the 
compensatIOn fixed ~y subsection (a) (1) for such Chair-
man. Any such retIred officer serving as Chairman of 
tIle Liaison CO~illlittee shall receive the compei.sation 
fixed by subsection (a) (1) for such Chairman and his 
retired pay, subject to section 201 of the Dual Compen-
sation Act.n 
USee. 304(d). 72 Stat. 4'32. wu amended to read u above by the Dual 
CompcnRlltion Act. ~ec. 401(g). Aultust 19. 1964 (78 Stat. 490). That part 
ot "e('. ,t04 (d) which had referr_ed to the compensation "fixed by 8ub!lec. 
(It) (1) WIlS repellled by sec. 3001 (13) (B) ot the Federlll Execut\T'P Salary 
g: D~,~r~~~~~:ago~ Sl~:: ~~3~o~t !~O~:III~,g:tC:~e blo~e;tie~~l~!-ir ~! 
no provl!<lon fixing compenut1on In sec. 204(a) (1). 
I~TERN ATIUN AL ~uurJ!;ltA·nu.l.'j 
SEC. 205. The Administration~ under the foreign policy 42 U.S.C. 2415 
guidance of the President. may engage in a program of 
mternational cooperation in work done pursuant to this 
Act, and in the peaceful application of the results there-
)f, pursuant to agreements made by the President with 
. he advice and consent of the Senate. 
REPURTIS TU THE CU!'ItiKt.::." 
SEC. 206. (a) The President shall transmit to the 
~ongress in January of each year a report, which shall 
mdude (1) a comprehensive description of the pro-
grammed activities and the accomplishments of all agen-
cies of the "Cnited States in the field of aeronautics and 
space activities during the preceding calendar vear. and 
.(2) an evaluation of such actiyities nnd uccomplishments 
m terms of the attainment of. or the failure to attain, the 
objectives described in section 102(c) of this Act. 
(b) Any report made under this section shall contain 
such recommendations for additional leO'isJation as the .\dmi~istrator or the President may cOI~sider necessary 
O!' (leslrable for the attainment of the objectives described 
in section 102 (c) of this Act. 
(c\ ~ 0 in formation "hi('h r.:lS b>en ('1nssifie~ ior rea-
sons of national. secnri.ty shall be included in any report 
made under thIS sectIon, unless such information has 
~en. de~la~i!1ed. by, or pursuant to authorization given 
by. the PresIdent.a 
. SEC. 207. Notwithstanding- the provisions of this or anv 
other law, the Administration may not report to a dis-
posal agE-ncy as excess to the needs of the Administration 
an~ ]a:r:d having an estimated value in exces!! of $1)0.000 
".hI~h IS o\vned by the United. States and under the iuris-
dIc~lOn and ~ontrol of the Administration, unless (A) a 
~erIOd of thlrty days has passed after the receipt by the 
:-speaker and the Committee on Science and Astronautics· 
of the HOl~se of Representatives and the President nnd 
the CommIttee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences of 
!he Senate ?f. a report by the Administrator or his des-
19n.ee contammg a full and complete statement of the 
actIOn proJ.>osed to b~ taken and the facts and circum-
stances rehed upon m support of such action, or (B) 
12 Public La"" 92-68, August 6 1971 section 7 (8~ St t 177 J:;b~:~t1~~:.sectlon (a) ot section' 206 and renumbered th~' rema~nl~ 
he • ~01;j4Tb~ "Committee Reform Amendmenta ot 1974," enacted O.-to-
t\~ ot th • ~ anged. ttb:, name ot tbe Committee on Selence and Aatronau-
TechnoiOC:. ouae 0 epresentatives to tbe Committee on Science and 
Prellident'll 
annual report 
ot activities ot 
all agenCies. 
Approval by 
C'nngreselonal 
committees. 
• 
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Reports to
Congress.
Note uDder 
42 U.S.C. 2472. 
Termination. 
TranRfer I1f 
fectlola .. 
Procurement. 
National 
leCurlty; 
IUlpenllon of 
employee-. 
Unitary Wind 
Tun~l Plan 
Actot 1949. 
JClI'eeUYe date. 
each such committee before the expira.tion of such period 
has transmitted to the Administrator written notice to 
the e·ffect that such committee has no objection to the 
proposed actiOn.1S 
TITLE TIl-MISCELLANEOUS 
NATIONAL ADVISORY CO:aoaI'TEE FOR AERONAUTICS 
SEC. 301. (a) The National Ad:visory Committee for 
Aeronautics, on the effective date of this section. shall 
cease to exist. On such date all functions, powers, 
duties, and obligations, and all real and personal prop-
ertyl personnel (other than members of the Commjttl'e), 
fundS, and records of that organization, shall be trans-
ferred to the Administration. 
(0) Section 2302 of title 10 of the United St.ntes Code 
is amended by striking out "or the Executive Secretary 
of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics." 
and inserting in. lieu thereof "or the Administrator of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration."; and 
section 2303 of such tide iO is amended by striking out 
''The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics." 
and inserting in lieu thereof "The National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration." 
(c) The first section of the Act of August 26. 1950 
(5 U.S.C. 22-1),16 is amended by striking out "the Direc-
tor, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics" and 
inserting in lieu thereof ''the Administration of the N a-
tionAl Aeronautics and Space Administration", and by 
striking: out "Oi" National Adv-isory Committee for Aero-
nautics" and inserting in lieu thereof "or National Aero-
na.utics and Space Administration". 
(d) The Unita,ry Wind Tunnel Plan Act of 1949 (50 
U.S.C. 511-515) is amended (1) by striking out "The 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (herein-
after referred to as the 'Committel")" and inserting in 
lieu thereof "The Administrator of the National Al'ro-
na.utics and Space Administration (hereinafter referred 
to as the 'Admipistrator')"; (2) bv striking out "Com-
mittee" or "Committee's" wherever they appear and in-
serting in lieu thereof "Administrator" and "Adminis-
trator's", respectively; and (3) by striking out "its" 
whereve.r it appears and inserting In lieu thereof "his". 
( e) t5 This section shall take enect ninety days after 
11 Publle Law 98-74, ,.pm, section 7 (87 Stilt. 175), Idded s('ctlon 207. 
10 Th~ l:tlt nllZt ot tile third. provl,o of the al'l"t section of the Act o( 
A1tpft 24. 1950' (84 Stnt. "'71\) WU. repealed bY'see. 5 of Pnbllc Law 
89-380, Mareb 30. 1'968 (80 Stat. 95). Other portlo_ 0(. tM A('t of 
.~!t 26. 1936 (!!4 Stat. 476) were rpJ)f'olPd bY' ~PC. R(!!) 0' ?~h1!(" !,nw 
89-554 (80 Stat. 632) lind renlaced by 5 U.S.C. 3571. :i!i94. 7~12. 75011('\. 
7512IC). 7532). 5 U.S.C. :il'i94 W"I rene~led by lIec. 1(34) (B) ot Public 
LPw !m-Rlt. ~"tember 11. lA67 (111 !'Itllt. 201 \. 
11 EtreeUve c~le of bulllne" September 30, 1958, by virtue of proc-
lamation of September 25, 1958. (23 Federal Relrillter 7596, S~tem­
ber 30, 1938.) 
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the date of the eImCtment of this Act, or on any earlier 
date on which the Administrator shall determme, and rnu~~[atlon 
announce by proclamation published in the Federal Reg-
ister, that the AdministratIOn has been organized and IS 
prepared to discharge the duties and exerCIse the powers 
conferred upon it by this Act. 
TRANSFER OF BELA TED FUNCTIONS 
SEC. 302. (a) Subject.to the provisions of this section, 
the President. for a period of four years after the date of 
enactment of this Act, may transfer to the Administra-
tion any functions (including powers, duties. activities, 
facilities, and parts of functions) of any other depart-
ment or agency of the United States, or of any officer or 
organizational entity thereof, which relate primarily to 
the functions, powers, and duties of the Administration 
as prescribed by section 203 of this Act. In connection 
with any such transfer. the President may, under this 
section or other applicable authority, provide for ap-
propriate transfers of records, property, civilian person-
nl'lL a.nd funds. IS 
--('b)Wh;~~~~r any such transfer is made before Janu-
ary 1, 1959, the President shall transmit to the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives and the President pro 
tempore of the Senate a full and complete report con-
cerning the nature and effect of such transfer. 
(c) After December 31, 1958, no transfer shall be 
made under this section until (1) a full and complete re-
port concerning the nature and effect of such proposed 
!..,ransfer has .~f! .t,ran"sm.itted. b,. ~h~ ~resi?en~ to. the 
\;ongress, ana \~} tne nrst perIOa 01 SIXty caJenaal' aays 
of regular session of the Congress following the date of 
receipt of suc~ report by the Congress has expired with-
out the adoptIon by the Congress of a concurrent resolu-
tion sta.ting that the Congress does not favor such 
transfer. 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
SEC. 303. Informat.ion obtained or developed bv the 
Administrator in the performance of his functions under 
this Act sha)l be ma~e availab~e for public inspection, 
ex.cept (A) InfOrm~tlOn authorized or required by Fed-
eral statute to be WIthheld, and (B) information classi-
fied to protect the ~lational security: Provided, That 
le Transfers eursuant to ~('c. 302 have bl'l'n: Executive Ordpr 10783 
October 1. 19.>8, traosferrtnc from the ~partJnf'nt of D~en"e the 
Proj('('t VANGt'AnD and other projPcts of Advanced Research Projects 
Agency and of Departm('nt of the Air Force r('lating t() SPRce activities' 
Executive Order 10i93. December 3. 19.'i8. transferring from Dl-partment 
of the .\rmy the .T .. t Propul",lon Laborat"ry (n .. ar Pasadena. California) : 
Transfer PVln. delivered to Con:rress January H. 1 P60. et'l'ectlve ~f,trch 15. 
1960. transferring from tbe Depnrtmt'nt of D('tt'nse tbe Ilct:\"ltlel ot 
development And rl'l'learch of sps('(' ,·phlcl .. ~yst('m!l lind ~pel'j!lcalIy the 
?~;':~oiI'::~~!vgl~~rlI~b~~~)I~i8Ion of the Army Ballistic ~U8sl1e Agency 
42 U.S.C. 24:)3-
Tranfers to 
l"ASA. 
42 U.S.C. 24~4. 
Public Inspec· 
tlon: excep· 
tions. 
• 
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or explGratiOR work and the in'!8Dtion is related to 
the work he was employed or lIS!DPed to perform! or 
that it was within the scope of hIS ~mploym~t d~ 
whether o~ not it was made dunug workin2 hours, 
or with a contribution by the Government C?f the use 
of Gonrnment facilitiflB, equipment, matenals, allo-
cated ftmds, information proprietary to the Gov-
ernment, or services of Government employees dur-
ing working hours; or . . 
(2) the person who made the inventIon was not em-
~~~roro:x=':! :rr,~~~e :~~ t::~~t 
theless related to the cont~, or to the work or 
duties he was employed or assIgned to I?8rform, an? 
was made durln2 working hours. or WIth a contn-
bution from the ~-oV8rnmmlt of the sert I'8fe~~ to 
in clause (1),. . 
such invention shall be the exclUSlV& :property of the 
United States, and if such invention ~ patentable, a 
patent therefor shall be issued ~ .the Umted States upon 
application made by the Administrator. ~ess the Ad-
ministrator waives all or any' PlI:rt of the ~hts .of the 
United States to such invention In confornuty Wlth the 
provisions of subsection (f) of this section. 
(b) Each contract entered into by the Administrator 
with any party for t~~ performance. of any work shall 
contain e1l'ective proVlSlOns under which such party shall 
furnish promptly to the Administrat.or a written report 
containing full and complete techni~l information c<?n-
cerning any. invention, disco~ery, Improvement, or m-
novation which may be made m the performance of any 
such work. . 
(c) No patent may be issued to an., appl.Icant other 
than the Administrator for any inventlo~ ,,:hIch ap~~rs 
to the Commissioner of Patents to have SIgnI!i~'-!lt utIhty 
in the conduct of aeronautical an~ space act.IVltIes unl~ 
the applicant files with the CommlSSlOner, With the apph-
cation or within thirty days after ~uest therefor by the 
Commissioner. a written statement executed under oath 
setting forth the full facts concerning the circ~nces 
under which such invention was made and statIng the re-
lationship (if any) ot such invention to the ~~ormB:Dce 
of any work under anv contract of the AdmIrustratlOn. 
Covies of each such Statement and the application to 
whIch it relates shall be transmitted forthwith by the 
Commissioner to the Administrator. 
(d) Upon any applic~ti0!l as t~ whic!t ~.r such state-
ment has been transmitted to the AdmInistrator, the 
Commissioner may, if the invention is .p~ntable, ~le 
a patent to the appli~t unless the A~n~rator, wIthm 
ninety days after receIpt of such apphcation and state-
ment, requests that such patent be issued to him on behalf 
of the United States. If, within such time, t~ .Adminis-
trator files such a request with the Colllllll88loner, ~e 
Commissioner shall transmit notice thereof to ~~ appli-
cant, and shall issue such patent to the A  !loud f 
unless the applicant within thirty days after receIpt of Patet 0 
such notice requests a bearing before a Board?f. Patent IaterfereDe& 
Interferences on the question whether the AdmlNat.rator 
is entitled under this section to receift such patent. The 
Board may hear and determine, in acoordance with nlles 
__ ..:I -I"w-J'AdUl'eS established for intei'f.,,~nce eases, the 
auu ,p."""" . . shall be b-CJuestion 80 presented, and its determinatIon 811 
]ect to appeal by the applicant or by the A~inistratol" 
to the COurt of Customs and Patent Appeals m ~rd­
anee with procedures governing appealS from deelSlons 
of the Board of Patent Interferences in other proceed-
~.) Whenever any patent has been issued to any &l?P~i- ~==t 
cant in conformity with subsection (d), and the Adminis- ~li. ~':l 
trator thereafter has reason to believe that the statement 
filed by the applicant in connection therewith contained 
any false representation of any material fact., ~ Ad-
ministrator within five years after the date of lSBUance 
-of such patent may file with the Commissioner a request 
for the transfer to the Administrator of title to such 
patent on the records of the Commissioner. Notice of any 
'SUch request shall be transmitted by the Commissioner to 
the owner of record of such patent, and title to such 
patent shall be 80 transferred to the Administrator un-
less within thirty days after receipt of such notice such 
tlwner of record requests a hearing before a Board of 
Patent Interferences on the question whether any such 
false re'Dresentation was contamed in sgen ~Dt. 
Such 9uestion Shall be heard ~d dete~ed.' and deter-
minatIon thereof shall be subject to renew, m the man-
ner prescribed by subeection (d) for questions arising 
thereunder. No request made by the AdDiinistrator under 
this subsection for the transfer of title to any patent] 
and no prosecution for the violation of any criminal 
statute, shall be barred by any failure of the Adminis-
trator to make a request under subsection (d) for the 
issuance of such patent to him, or by any notice previ-
ously pven by the AdministratGr stating that he 1i&d no 
objectIon to the issuance of SlIm patent to the applicant 
therefor. 
(f) Under such regulations in conformity with this ~:r:of 
subsection as the Ad..miniAtrator RhaU prescribe, he may lDftIltiou. 
waive all or any part of the rights of the United States 
under this section with respect to any invention or class 
of inventions made or which may be made by any per-
son or class of persons in the performance of any work 
required by any contract of the Administration of the 
Administrator determines that the interests of the United 
• 
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Application.
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ProteetioD 
of tltl .. 
uefeD .. 
• "DI:7. 
t2 U.1:S.\:. 2408. 
States will be served thereby. Anv such waiver may be 
made upon such terms and Under 'such con<1:itions as the 
Administrator shan determine to be reqUIred for the 
protection of the· int~rests of the Unite~ Sta~s. Ellch 
such waiver made WIth respect to any InVentIOn shall 
be subject to the reservation by the Administrator of an 
irrevocable, nonexclusive, nontransferable, royalty-free 
license for the practice of such invention throughout the 
world by or on behalf of the United States or Ilny for-
;rib ~!eu~;dt §~~ia~ ~~~~~t~o~r a~~re;~~~; 
under this subsection shall be referred to an Inventions 
and Contributions Board which shall be established bv 
the Administrator within the Administration. Such 
Board shall accord to each interested porty an opportu-
nity for hearinl!:, and shall transmit to the Admimstrator 
its findings of fact with respect to such proposal and its 
recommendations for action to be taken with respect 
thereto. 
(g) The Administrator shall determine, and promul-
gute re~lations specifying the terms and conditions upon 
which licenses will be granted by the Administration for 
the prattice by any person (other than an agency of the umi States) of any invention for which the Adminis-
trato holds a patent on behalf of the United States. 
( The Administrator is a nthorizE'd to take a 11 
sui ble and necessary steps to protect any invention 
or discovery to which he has ti~le, .and to. requi:e that 
contractors or persor~ who fetaul tItle to InventIons or 
discoveries under this section protect the inventions or 
dis('overies to which the Administration has or may 
acquire a license of use. . 
(i) The Administration shall be considered a defense 
agency of the United States for the purpose of chapter 
17 of title 35 of the .United States Code. 
(j) As used in this section-
(1) the term "people" means any individual. 
partnership, corporation, association, institution, or 
Other entity. - . , , 
(2) the term "contract" means any actual or 
proposed contract, agreement, understanding, or 
other arrangement, and inc1udes any assignment, 
substitution of parties, or subbcontract executed or 
entered into thereunder; and 
(3) the term "made", when used in relation to 
any invention, means the conception or first actual 
reduction to practice of such invention. 
CONTRIBUTIONS AWARDS 
SEC. 306. (a) Subject to the provisions of this section, 
~he Administrator is authorized, upon his own initiative 
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or upon application of any person~ to make a monetary 
award, in such amount and upon such terms as he shall 
determine to be warranted, to any person (as defined by 
section 305) for any scientific or technical contribution to 
the Administration which is determined by the Adminis-
trator to have significant value in the conduct of aero-
nautical and space activities. Each application mude for 
any such award shall be referred to the Inventions and 
Contributions Board estab1ish~d under section 305 of 
this Act. Such B.oard shall ~rd to each such appli-
cant an opportumty for heanng upon such applicatlOn, 
and shall transmit to the Administrator its recommenda-
tion as to the terms of the award, if any, to be made to 
such applicant fo~. such contribution. In dett'rmining 
the tenns aud condItIOns of any award the Administrator 
shall take into IM:-eount-
(1) the value of the contribution to the United 
States; 
(2) the aggregate amount of any sums which have 
been expended by the applicant for the development 
of such contribution; 
(3) the amount of any compensation (other than 
salary received for services rendered a.5 an officer 
or employee of the Government) previous1y recei ved 
by the applicant for or on account of the use of 8uch 
contributIOn by the United States: and 
( 4:) such other factors as the Administrator shall 
det~rmjne to be material. 
(b) If more than one applicant under subsection (a) 
claims an interest ill the same contribution, the Admin-
istrator shall ascertain and determine the respective in-
terest of such applicants, and shall apportion any award 
to be made with respect to such contribution among such 
applicants in such proportions as he shall determine to 
be ~'1uitable. No award may be made under sllbsection (a) 
with respect to any contribution-
(1) unless the applicant surrenders, by such means 
as the Administrator shan determine to be effective, 
all claims which such applicant may have to receive 
any compensation (other than the award made under 
this section) for the use of such contribution or any 
element thereof at any time bv or on hE>ha1f of the 
United Statf's or by or on behllif of any foreign gov-
ernment pursuant to any treaty or agreement with 
the United States, within the United Siates or at any 
other place; 
(2) in any amount exceedi~ $100,000, unless the 
Administrator has transmitted to the appropriate 
committees of the Congress a full and complete 
report concerning the amount and terms of, and the 
basis for, such proposed award, and thirty calendar 
days of regular session of the Congress have expired 
after receipt of such report by such committees. 
Referral to 
lD"entlonl aDd 
CODtributlona 
~c;'!~J ~::-
ommendatloD. 
DetermiDatloD 
by Admlnls· 
trator. 
Surrender of 
:lalm~ to 
~mpensatloD. 
Umitatlon of 
lmount; report 
to Concrelll. 
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IT mr re@rement  of p r i o r  a u t h o r i z i n g  legialatioo,  a= A ~dk &
Publlc  Law 86-IS, June 15.1959 (73 Stat 75 42 U.S.C.  2480 ?.
= !3ubaee. (C) of ace. 307, added by  aec  6 of ~bllc tiW 88-113. SqMem-
ber 6.1968 (77 StaL  144).
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“TITLE IV—IJPPER ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH
%URF’OSE  A N D  FOLEY
“SIX. 401. (a) The purpose of this title is to authorize and direct
th;mA~#nistrstion  to develop and carry out a comprehensive pro-
5
research tihnology, and monitoring of the henomena of
at e upper atmosp~em so as to rovide for an understan  ing of and to
1!maintain the chemical and p ysical integrity of the Earth’s upper
atmos he=
1
“(b The Congress deelaree that it is the policy of the United States
to un ertake an Immediate and appropriate research, technolo  , and
Tmonitoring program that will provide for understanding the p ysics
and chemistry of the Eafi’s upper atmosphe~
.
%EP’INITIONS
“SEC 402. For the purpose of this title the t.enn ‘up r atmosphere’
rmeana that portion of the Earth’s sensible atmoep em above the
troposphere
“~RAX AUTHO~
“SEC 403. (a) In order to -my out the purposes of this title the
Administration in cooperation with other Fedemd agenciq shaU
initiate and carry out a pro- o! resemwh, technology, mcuntonng,
and other appro ride activities d!mct.ed  to undemtamd  the physica
/’and chemistry o the up r atmesphem.
r“(b) In carrying out eprovisions  ofthistitle the Adxnix&t~m. .
shall-
‘(l) arrange for artici ationby theech+lcand engines -
d 5.community, of be ‘%the ation’s induatrml or~~–~~~- an
instituting of higher education in planning and awg out
appropriate research, in developing necesaaxy technology and m
milting n
v
ob3ervation8 im&mea3urernent8;  ‘-
‘(2) promdq y way of gran~ cont~ scholarship or other
rarrangements, to the maximum extent practicable an consistent
with other lam  for the widest practicable and ap~ro@ate par-
ticipation of -tie scientific and engineering commuruty m the pm
~ aufioti by thia title; and
H
3 make all results of the program aut.horiaed  by this title
avai a le to the ap ropriata regulatory agencies and provide for
\the widest practica le dissemination of such results.
42 USC 2-
42 Usc 2482
42 USC ~
%NTERNAllONAL  IYX)IZRATION
%= 404. In car .m oti the provisions of this titlq the Adminis- 42 USC2~
tratio~, subject to Zfe irection of the President and after consulta-
tion with the secretary of State+ shall make every effort to enlist thel
su P@ ~d. Cqw.qatlon of ap ropriate acientista and engineera of;
Otl a?er countnea and Memation  organizations.n. I
SEU 9. This Act may be cited as the “National Aeronautics andl x titIG
Space Administration Authorization A% 1976”.
Approved June 19, 1975.
Abbreviations, Acronyms, and
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
AACB
AlAA
AID
APPLE
A-sat
ASTP
ATS
BLM
6SS
CCAD
CCD
CCIR
CC ITT
CCT
CEPT
CFE
CIFASA
CLT
CNES
COMSAT
COPUOS
CTA
CTS
DBS
dBw
DDR&E
DNS
DOC
DOD
DOE
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Aeronautics and Astronautics
Coordinating Board
American Institute of Aeronautics
and Astronautics
Agency for International
Development
Ariane Passenger Payload
Experiment
antisatellite
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project
Applications Technology Satellite
Bureau of Land Management (DOI)
broadcasting-satellite services
Crop Condition Assessment
Division
charge coupled device
International Radio Consultative
Committee of the International
Telecommunication Union
International Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative
Committee of the International
Telecommunication Union
computer-compatible tape
Magnetic tape containing digit
data in appropriate format.
DOI
DOMSAT
DSCS
EBU
ECS
EIRP
ELDO
ELV
EROS
ERS
ESA
ESRO
FAS
FCC
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Conference Europeene de Postes
et Telecommunications
continuous flow electrophoresis
French German Consortium
Campagnie Luxembourgeosie de
Telediffusion
Centre National D’Etudes
Spatiales, National Center for
Space Research–French
equivalent of NASA
Communications Satellite
Corporation
Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space (United Nations)
Centro Tecnico Aerospecial
(Brazil)
Communications Technology
Satellite
Direct Broadcast Satellite
a measure of power, decibels
referenced to 1 watt
Director of Defense Research
and Engineering
The Department of Defense
Navigation Satellite System
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
I
F L TSATCOM –
FM
FSS
GARP
GEO
GHz
GMS
GNP
GPS
H D D T
HDT-A
HF
HLLV
H z
IAF
ICBM
Ics
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Department of Interior
Domestic Communications
Satellites
Defense Satellite Communication
System
European Broadcasting Union
European Communication
Satellites (ESA)
effective isotropically radiated
power (measured in watts)
European Space Vehicle
Launcher Development
Organization
expendable launch vehicle
Earth Resources Observation
Systems
European Remote-Sensing
Satellite
European Space Agency
European Space Research
Organization
Foreign Agricultural Service
(of the DOA)
Federal Communications
Commission
Fleet Satellite Communication
System (Navy)
frequency modulation
fixed satellite service
Global Atmospheric Research
Program (of the World
Meteorological Organization)
geostationary orbit
gigahertz (91 billion cycles
per second)
Geostationary Meteorological
Satellite (Japan)
gross national product
global positioning satellite
(sometimes NAVSTAR/GPS-DOD)
high-density digital tape
high-density digital tapes of
either MSS or RBV data that
have been radiometrically but
not geometrically corrected.
high frequency
heavy-lift launch vehicle
hertz; a unit of frequency equal
to one cycle per second
International Astronautical
Federation
intercontinental ballistic missile
Interdepartmental Committee on
Space (Canada)
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IEEE
IFOV
IFRB
IGI
INMARSAT
INTELSAT
IRAC
IRS
ISAS
ISPM
ISRO
I T U
JEA
kHz
KSC
LACIE
Landsat
Landsat D
LASS
LCP
LEO
LOS
—
—
—
.
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers
instantaneous field of view
International Frequency
Registration Board
Industrial Guest Investigator
International Maritime Satellite
Organization
International Telecommunication
Satellite Organization, with 106
member-nations that own and
operate the satellites in the
Global Communication Satellite
System
Interdepartment Radio Advisory
Committee
Indian Remote-Sensing Satellite
Proposed by Indian Space
Research Organization
Institute for Space and
Aeronautical Sciences Japanese
(established in 1954 at the
University of Tokyo)
International Solar Polar Mission
Indian Space Research
Organization
International Telecommunication
Union
Joint Endeavor Agreement
kilohertz (1 ,000 cycles
per second)
Kennedy Space Center
Large Area Crop Inventory
Experiment
Land remote-sensing satellites
(formerly ERTS; Earth Resources
Technology Satellites) of the
series currently operated
by NASA
The next generation of NASA’s
land remote-sensing satellites
Follow-on spacecraft of this
series will be sequentially
designated Landsat D’,
Landsat D“, etc.
The Land Applications Satellite
System under consideration by
ESA for a 1987/88 launch
Large Communications Platform
low-Earth orbit (up to
approximately 500 km)
Land Observations Satellites
being considered by Japan for
1987 launch
MHz
MLA
MOS
MOU
MPS
MPTS
MSS
MW
NACA
NAS
NASA
NASDA
NATO
NESS
NOAA
NOSS
NSF
NTIA
OMB
OTA
OTRAG
OTS
PRC
PRC (Space)
P T T
RARC
RBV
R&D
Slc
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
megahertz (1 Ob cycles
per second)
multi-linear array—solid state
technology for remote-sensing
Maritime Observation Satellite
(Japan)
Memorandum of Understanding
materials processing space
microwave power transmission
system
multispectral scanner
megawatt (1 OG watts)
National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics
National Academy of Sciences
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
National Space Development
Agency (Japan)
North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
National Environmental Satellite
Service
National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration
National Oceanic Satellite
System
National Science Foundation
National Telecommunications
and Information Agency (DOC)
Office of Management
and Budget
Office of Technology Assessment
Orbital Transport and Raketen
Aktiengesellschaft (German
private firm)
Orbital Test Satellite (European)
People’s Republic of China
Policy Review Committee on
Space established by Presidential
directive in May 1978, to
provide a forum for discussion cf
proposed changes to national
space policy and for rapid
referral of issues to the President
for decision
Postal Telephone & Telegraph
Agencies
Regional Administrative Radio
Conference
return beam vidicon
research and development
Space Industrialization
Corporation
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SITE
SLAR
Solaris
SPS
SSTO
STEP
STS
TDRSS
TEA
T M
USDA
USGS
—
—
—
—
—
.
—
—
—
—
—
—
Satellite Instructional Television VHF —
Experiment (India) WARC –
side looking airborne radar
proposed French free-flying, W A R C - 7 7  –
automated, industrial processing
station
solar power satellite
single stage to orbit
space vehicle
Symphonic Telecommunications W A R C - 7 9  –
Experimental Project (India)
space transportation system
Tracking. and Data Relay
Satellite System
Technical Exchange Agreement WBTR –
thematic mapper WMO –
U.S. Department of Agricukure
U.S. Geological Survey (DOI)
very high frequency
World Administrative Radio
Conference (conducted by ITU)
A specialized World
Administrative Radio Conference
that met in Geneva in the winter
of 1977 to plan for the broad-
casting-satellite service in the
band 11.7 to 12.5 GHz
A General World Administrative
Radio Conference that met in
Geneva in the Fall of 1979 to
revise the international radio
regulations of ITU.
wide-band tape recorder
World Meteorological
Organization (U. N. Agency)
Glossary
A priori planning of radiofrequencies-procedure by
which frequencies and orbital locations are allotted
to individual countries according to a plan negoti-
ated by member nations and implemented by ITU.
Access fee–the charge paid by operators of ground
stations for the right to receive the data transmitted
from land remote-sensing satellites.
AgRISTARS–Agriculture and Resources Inventory
Surveys Through Aerospace Remote Sensing. Large,
cooperative, multiyear development program of the
Departments of Agriculture, Interior, Commerce,
NASA, and AID. Will develop, test, and evaluate
ways to use remotely sensed data to produce early
warnings of crop stress, crop assessments and fore-
casts, small-area land cover and water evaluation,
and renewable and nonrenewable resource inven-
tories.
Allocation (of frequency band) –entry in the table of
frequency allocations of a given frequency band for
the purpose of its use by one or more terrestrial or
space radiocommunication services or the radio as-
tronomy service under specified conditions. This
term shall also be applied to the frequency band
concerned.
Assigned frequency–the center of the frequency
band assigned to a station.
Assigned frequency band–the frequency band within
which the emission of a station is authorized; the
width of the band equals the necessary bandwidth
plus twice the absolute value of the frequency tol-
erance. Where space stations are concerned, the
assigned frequency band includes twice the max-
imum Doppler shift that may occur in relation to
any point of the Earth’s surface.
Band–in radio, frequencies that are within two defi-
nite limits and are allocated for a definite purpose
or service, e.g., the standard AM broadcast band.
Broadcasting-satellite service-a radio-communica-
tion service in which signals transmitted or retrans-
mitted by space stations are intended for direct re-
ception by the general public.
Broadcasting sewice-a radio-communication service
in which the transmissions are intended for direct
reception by the general public. This service may
include sound transmission, television transmis-
sions, or other types of transmission.
Containerless processing–a technique by which ma-
terials may be processed without a supporting con-
tainer; this may be accomplished by using the mi-
crogravity environment of space or by employing
such methods as ultrasonic levitation on Earth.
Data–in this document, “data” is used to specify the
sensor voltage readings that are transmitted in digital
format and received at the ground station. These
readings must be interpreted and converted to other
dimensions for most applications purposes.
Decibel–a unit for expressing the ratio of two
amounts of electric or acoustics signal power equal
to 10 times the common logarithm of this ratio, A
ratio of 10 is 10 dB, a ratio of 100 is 20 dB, a ratio
of 1,000 is 30 dB, etc.
Digital transmission—a technique that transmits the
signal in the form of one of a discrete number of
codes. The information content of the signal is con-
cerned with discrete states of the signal, such as
the presence or absence of a voltage, a contact in
the open or closed position, or a hole or no hole
in certain positions on a card.
Direct readout–the capability that allows ground sta-
tions to collect and interpret the data messages that
are transmitted from satellites.
EROS Data Center—a facility that collects, processes,
archives, and distributes data obtained from satel-
lite, aircraft, and other systems, operated by the
U.S. Geological Survey of the Department of in-
terior, at Sioux Falls, S. Dak.
Earth exploration-satellite service-a radio-commu-
nication service between Earth stations and one or
more space stations, which may include links be-
tween space stations, in which: 1 ) information re-
lating to the characteristics of the Earth and its
natural phenomena is obtained from active sen-
sors or passive sensors on Earth satellites; 2) similar
information is collected from airborne or Earth-
based platforms; 3) such information may be
distributed to Earth stations within the system con-
cerned; and 4) platform interrogation may be in-
cluded. This service may also include feeder links
necessary for its operation.
Emission–radiation produced, or the production of
radiation, by a radio transmitting station.
Fixed-satellite service-a radio-communication serv-
ice between Earth stations at specified fixed points
when one or more satellites are used; in some
cases this service includes satellite-to-satellite links,
which may also be effected in the intersatellite ser-
vice; the fixed-satellite service may also include
feeder links for other space radio-communication
services.
Fixed service-a radio-communication service be-
tween specified fixed points.
Frequency—the number of complete oscillations per
second of an electromagnetic wave, measured in
hertz (Hz). One hertz equals one cycle per second.
Frequency allocation table (national)–a table in the
FCC Rules and Regulations allocating bands of fre-
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quencies, in the usable portion of the radio spec-
trum, to radio-communication services.
Frequency of obsewation-the normal period, usually
measured in days, elapsing between two sequen-
tial times at which a point on the Earth falls within
the field of view of one of the spacecraft of the
system.
Geostationary satellite–a geosynchronous satellite
whose circular and direct orbit lies in the plane of
the Earth’s Equator and which thus remains fixed
relative to the Earth; by extension, a satellite whose
position remains approximately fixed relative to the
Earth.
Geostationary satellite orbit–the orbit in which a sat-
ellite must be placed to be a geostationary satellite.
Geosynchronous satellite–an Earth satellite whose
period of revolution is equal to the period of rota-
tion of the Earth about its axis.
GSFC–Goddard Space Flight Center (NASA)
Harmful interference-interference that endangers
the functioning of a radionavigation service or of
other safety services or seriously degrades, ob-
structs, or repeatedly interrupts a radio-communi-
cation service operating in accordance with these
regulations.
Illuminance–irradiance; rate of energy per solid angle
measured at a given point.
Infrared (l R)–that part of the spectrum from the red
end of visible light to the microwave region; that
is, from about 0.7 m to 1 mm.
Instantaneous field of view (l FOV)-the field of view
of a scanning instrument with the scan motor
stopped.
Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC)
—a body of 20 Federal agencies and departments
that assists NTIA in the development of the National
Table of Frequency Allocations, the assignment of
frequencies to stations operated by the Federal Gov-
ernment, and other spectrum management func-
tions.
Interference-the effect of unwanted energy due to
one or a combination of emissions, radiations, or
inductions upon reception in a radio-communica-
tion system, manifested by any performance degra-
tion, misinterpretation, or loss of information that
could be extracted in the absence of such unwanted
energy.
International Frequency Registration Board (lFRB)–a
permanent organ of ITU with five officials elected
by the plenipotentiary conference, examines noti-
fications of frequency assignments from member-
nations for conformity with the radio regulations.
International Telecommunication Union (lTU)–the
U. N.-related organization with responsibilities in the
field of international telecommunications including
spectrum management. Present membership is 155
nations.
ITU Convention–the governing instrument of ITU
that sets forth the structure and activities of the
Union; only the plenipotentiary conference of ITU
can amend or revise the Convention; it last met in
Malaga-Torremoiinos in 1973, and will meet again
in September 1982.
Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment (LACIE)–a
demonstration program (1974-1977) that used Land-
sat and weather data to provide estimates of wheat
production.
Kourou–Ariane’s South American Launch Site.
Maritime radio-navigation satellite service–a radio-
navigation satellite service in which Earth stations
are located onboard ships.
Micron–unit of length equal to one-millionth (1 O-b)
of a meter.
Microwave—a comparatively short electromagnetic
wave, especially one between 100 cm and 1 cm in
wavelength or, equivalently, between 0.3 and 30
GHz in frequency.
Multispectral scanner (MSS)–an instrument which
provides data in four bands of the visible and near-
infrared portions of the spectrum. The MSS scans
a swath 185 km wide and has an instantaneous field
of view (I FOV) of 80 meters.
Orbit–the path, relative to a specified frame of refer-
ence, described by the center of mass of a satellite
or other object in space subjected primarily to nat-
ural forces, mainly the force of gravity.
Outer Space Treaty–the abbreviated name for the
multilateral Treaty of Principles Governing the Ac-
tivities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bod-
ies, which established in 17 articles general prin-
ciples governing the activities in outer space of State
parties to the Treaty in support of the use of outer
space for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of
all peoples. The United States is a party to the Outer
Space Treaty, which entered into force October 10,
1967.
Permissible interference-interference at a higher
level than that defined as permissible interference,
and which has been agreed upon between two or
more administrations without prejudice to other ad-
ministrations.
Polarization–the electric (E) and magnetic (H) fields
that comprise a propagating electromagnetic wave
may be fixed in relation to Earth’s horizon, or they
may rotate. By convention, the vector of the E field
is related to Earth’s horizon: if the two are perpen-
dicular, the wave is said to be vertically polarized;
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if parallel, horizontally polarized. When the E and
H fields are continuously rotating with respect to
the horizon, the wave is said to be elliptically
polarized.
Power density—the quantity of electromagnetic
energy that flows through a given area per unit of
time. Formally, power density is specified in watts
per square meter (W/mz), but by tradition in bio-
logical effects studies it is usually expressed in
milliwats per square centimeter (mW/cmz).
Power flux density–a measure of the power radiated
by a transmitter, used as a constraint on certain serv-
ices to protect other services in a shared band.
Primary service-a class of allocation. Stations in a pri-
mary service may not cause harmful interference
to stations in the same, or another primary service,
and can claim protection from interference from sta-
tions in primary, permitted, and secondary services.
Printed in solid capitals in the ITU table of alloca-
tions.
Propagation–the transmission of electromagnetic
wave energy from one point to another.
Radar–a radio-determination system based on the
comparison of reference signals with radio signals
reflected, or retransmitted, from the position to be
determined.
Regions of ITU–for the allocation of frequencies, the
world has been divided into three regions by ITU.
Exact boundaries of the regions are given in the
radio regulations; a general description follows:
region 1–Europe, Africa, the U. S. S. R., Turkey, the
Territory of the Mongolian People’s Republic, and
areas to the north of the U. S. S. R.; region 2—North,
Central, and South Americas, the Caribbean, and
Greenland; and region 3–Asia, Oceania, Australia,
and New Zealand.
Return beam vidicon (RBV)-cameras which essen-
tially provide black and white TV images. Each RBV
image from Landsat 3 covers an area 90 km on a
side (180 km total swath) and has an equivalent
IFOV of 40 m.
S-Band–a frequency band over which MSS data are
transmitted to foreign ground station operators on
the reproduction or resale of Landsat standard data
products.
Satellite–a body that revolves around another body
of preponderant mass and that has a motion pri-
marily and permanently determined by the force
of attraction of that other body.
Satellite link–a radio link between a transmitting
Earth station and a receiving Earth station through
one satellite.
Satellite system–a space system using one or more
artificial Earth satellites.
Side lobe–refers to power radiated from an antenna
in a direction other than the desired direction of
transmission.
Space system-any group of cooperating Earth stations
and/or space stations employing space-radio com-
munication for specific purposes.
Spectral bands–portions of the electromagnetic spec-
trum of energy radiated or reflected by the Earth
to which spacecraft sensors are sensitive.
SPOT–Satellite Probatoire d’Observation de la Terre.
This system is scheduled for launch by France in
1984 and is to contain two 3-channel multispectral/
panchromatic multilineal visible spectrum array
sensors. lts objectives are to develop satellite renew-
able and nonrenewable resource observation tech-
niques and to develop a stereo and cartographic
data archive.
Standard data products-data in prescribed form that
are put through additional computer processes at
the satellite ground processing facility. Two classes
of standard data products are currently available—
film imagery, which is convenient for those ac-
customed to working with maps and photographs,
and computer-compatible tapes. The tape form is
suitable for input to standard computers and lends
itself to automated or specialized data handling and
analysis.
Stereo coverage–refers to the availability of data from
which the variation in the height of the surface
being viewed can be determined.
Telecommunications-any transmission, emission, or
reception of signals, wiring, images, and sounds or
intelligences of any nature by wire, radio, optical,
or other electromagnetic systems.
Thematic mapper (TM)–an instrument containing
seven spectral bands, including three in the infrared
region, with an IFOV of 30 m for all but the ther-
mal infrared band which has an IFOV of 120 m.
Timeliness—the length of time between the observa-
tion itself and the delivery of suitable processed data
to users or to the archive.
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS)–a
communications system to be used for the relay of
data direct from Landsat to a single U.S. ground sta-
tion at White Sands, N.M.
Transmission fee–a fee that could be paid by foreign
ground station operators for data transmitted and
received.
Value-added products-are products derived from
standard data as a result of manipulation by computers
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and/or interpreted in various ways to provide infor- Zone of exclusion–an area over the Indian subcon-
mation about the surface of the Earth. tinent and south-central U.S.S.R. where direct sat-
Wave guide–a device for transmitting and guiding ellite transmission to the TDRSS is physically impos-
radiofrequency waves. sible.
X-band—a frequency band over which a combination
signal of MSS and TM data from Landsat D will be
transmitted directly to foreign ground stations.
